Sprague v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 17

OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 11 Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 14 Report and Recommendation on 14 Report and Recommendation, 8 Motion for Summary Judgment, 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BERNIE JOHN SPRAGUE,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-13492
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff applied for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income (“benefits”) in May 2008, alleging that he became
disabled due to mental and shoulder impairments on June 30, 2006. The Social Security
Administration denied Plaintiff’s request for benefits initially. Upon Plaintiff’s request,
Administrative Law Judge Andrew G. Sloss (“ALJ”) conducted a de novo hearing on
March 15, 2010. The ALJ issued a decision on June 17, 2010, finding Plaintiff not
disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and therefore not entitled to
benefits. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the Social Security
Commissioner (“Commissioner”) when the Social Security Appeals Council denied
review. Plaintiff thereafter initiated the pending action.
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. This matter has been
referred to a magistrate judge and was assigned to Magistrate Judge David R. Grand on
December 2, 2011. On August 7, 2012, Magistrate Judge Grand filed his Report and

Recommendation (R&R) recommending that this Court grant Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment, deny Defendant’s motion, and remand the matter pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration. Magistrate Judge Grand
determines that the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment,
finding incorrectly that Plaintiff’s problems had persisted for only the past six months. At
the conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge Grand advises the parties that they may
object to and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of service upon them.
Defendant filed objections to the R&R on August 21, 2012.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g):
Any individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner
of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a
party . . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil
action . . . The court shall have the power to enter . . . a
judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of
the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without
remanding the cause for a rehearing. The findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported
by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Boyes v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 511-12
(6th Cir. 1994). “Substantial evidence is defined as ‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Abbott v. Sullivan,
905 F.2d 918, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401,
91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971)). The Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal
because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion.
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Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Baker v. Kechler, 730 F.2d
1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court must affirm. Studaway v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
815 F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
The court reviews de novo the parts of an R&R to which a party objects. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
However, the Court “is not required to articulate all the reasons it rejects a party’s
objections.” Id.
Analysis
An ALJ considering a disability claim is required to follow a five-step process to
evaluate the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ determines that the claimant
is disabled or not disabled at a step, the ALJ makes his or her decision and does not
proceed further. Id. However, if the ALJ does not find that the claimant is disabled or
not disabled at a step, the ALJ must proceed to the next step. Id. “The burden of proof is
on the claimant through the first four steps . . . If the analysis reaches the fifth step
without a finding that the claimant is not disabled, the burden transfers to the
[defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir.
1994); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5
(1987).
The ALJ’s five-step sequential process is as follows:
1.

At the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is currently
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engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).1
2.

At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a severe
medically determinable physical or mental impairment that meets the
duration requirement of the regulations and which significantly limits the
claimant’s ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c).2

3.

At the third step, the ALJ again considers the medical severity of the
claimant’s impairment to determine whether the impairment meets or equals
an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairment meets any
Listing, he or she is determined to be disabled regardless of other factors.3
Id.

4.

At the fourth step, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional
capacity and past relevant work to determine whether the claimant can
perform his or her past relevant work.4 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

5.

At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and past work experience to see if he can do other
work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a)(4)(v). If there is no such work that the

1

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
June 30, 2006. (A.R. at 17.)
2

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairment: bipolar disorder.
(A.R. at 17.) With respect to Plaintiff’s alleged disability due to shoulder injury, the ALJ found
that the medical evidence indicates problems for only the preceding six months. (A.R. at 19.)
The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged shoulder impairment did not meet the
durational requirement to constitute a severe impairment within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. (Id.)
3

The ALJ analyzed whether Plaintiff’s impairment met any of the listed impairments and
determined that it did not. (A.R. at 19.)
4

The ALJ found that Plaintiff would have the residual functional capacity to perform a
full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: The
claimant is able to perform unskilled work involving 1 and 2 step instructions with limited need
for sustained concentration. (A.R. at 20.)
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claimant can perform, the ALJ must find that he or she is disabled.5 Id.
Defendant raises one objection addressing the magistrate judge’s conclusion with
respect to Plaintiff’s alleged shoulder impairment. Magistrate Judge Grand concludes
that the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment was not severe because
it did not meet the Social Security Act’s durational requirement and in failing to consider
its limitations on Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity. Defendant argues that there is
no significance to the ALJ’s failure to include Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment in
evaluating whether he has a severe impairment at step two of the sequential evaluation
process, as the ALJ found that Plaintiff did have a severe impairment requiring analysis at
the next step. Defendant argues that the ALJ then considered the medical evidence to
conclude that Plaintiff’s shoulder problems did not result in more than minimal
limitations on Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities. Defendant contends
that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusions.
The ALJ found from the record that Plaintiff only had problems with his shoulder
for the preceding six months. He wrote that while Plaintiff “testified to shoulder pain off
and on since 1988 . . . evidence indicates only recent shoulder pain.” (A.R. at 21.) This
finding is inconsistent with the record, as summarized by Magistrate Judge Grand in his
R&R. (See A.R. at 23-24.) In other words, the ALJ’s conclusion is not supported by
5

The ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, educational background, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there are a significant number of jobs in the
national economy that Plaintiff can perform based on his exertional and non-exertional
limitations. (A.R. at 22-23.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff is not under a
“disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. (Id. at 23.)
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substantial evidence. The ALJ’s opinion suggests that he did not adequately review the
medical records indicating Plaintiff’s past complaints of shoulder pain and restrictions on
his physical activities due to such pain. The ALJ’s decision therefore does not reflect that
he considered all of the medical evidence to properly consider whether specific
limitations result from Plaintiff’s shoulder impairment.
The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Grand that the matter should be remanded
for consideration of the apparently overlooked treatment records concerning Plaintiff’s
alleged shoulder impairment to assess whether it imposes any limitations on his ability to
do physical work activities on a sustained basis.
Summary
Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff only
experienced shoulder pain in the six months preceding the administrative hearing.
Medical evidence in the record reflects that Plaintiff has experienced shoulder problems
since 2007 or 2008. It appears that the ALJ overlooked those records, and thus did not
take them into consideration when evaluating whether Plaintiff has a shoulder impairment
that requires limitations on his residual functional capacity. The Court therefore adopts
Magistrate Judge Grand’s R&R dated August 7, 2012.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this matter is REMANDED pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings consistent with the R&R.

Dated:September 14, 2012

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
David M. Stewart, Esq.
AUSA Lynn M. Dodge
Magistrate Judge David R. Grand

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