International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America et al v. Honeywell International Inc.

Filing 25

ORDER granting in part 19 plaintiffs' motion for more definite statement and directing defendant to file an amended counterclaim. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE AND
AGRICULTURE IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA (UAW); and THOMAS BODE,
BRUCE EATON, WILLIAM BURNS, PETER
ANTONELLIS, and LARRY PRESTON, for
themselves and others similar-situated,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No. 11-14036
Honorable Denise Page Hood

HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL INC,
Defendant.
/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE
STATEMENT AND DIRECTING DEFENDANT TO FILE AN AMENDED
COUNTERCLAIM
I.

INTRODUCTION
This action involves the enforcement of retirement healthcare benefits negotiated during

collective bargaining. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion for a More Definite Statement
[Docket No. 19, filed February 4, 2012]. Defendant responded on February 17, 2012 [Docket
No. 22]. Plaintiffs replied on February 24, 2012 [Docket No. 23]. The Court heard oral
arguments on March 5, 2012. After consideration of the arguments and briefs, the Court
GRANTS IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion for more definite statement.

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II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Plaintiffs filed the present action September 15, 2011 making the following allegations:

(Count I) Anticipatory Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreements (“CBAs”); and (Count II)
Violation of ERISA. Defendant has counterclaimed for the following: (Count I) common law
fraudulent mispresentation; (Count II) common law negligent misrepresentation; and (Count III)
common law breach of an implied warranty of authority.
The individually named Plaintiffs are retired hourly employees that worked for a
Defendant Honeywell predecessor. Plaintiff, International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agriculture Implement Workers of America (“UAW”) represented over 4,700 Defendant
retired manufacturing employees in collective bargaining. Defendant is incorporated in Delaware
with its principal place of business in New Jersey.
Defendant and UAW have been parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements for
over 50 years. The agreements are renegotiated every three or four years in Michigan. During the
2003, 2007, and 2011 negotiations the parties have disagreed on Defendant’s obligation to
provide healthcare benefits to retirees. In 2007, they agreed that new language regarding retiree
contributions would take effect on January 1, 2012 but not whether it would apply to those who
retired prior to 2003.
On July 15, 2011, Defendant filed an action against four retired manufacturing
employees, a putative class of similarly situated retirees, eligible dependents and surviving
spouses, and the UAW in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking
a declaration that it may cap its contributions to all retirees. On September 15, 2011, UAW filed
the present action in the Eastern District of Michigan alleging that Defendant’s actions
constituted anticipatory breach of the CBAs. The parties stipulated to adjourning all pending
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The statement of facts are adopted and summarized briefly from the New Jersey letter opinion.
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motions and hearings and to submit a status report on December 15, 2011 pending the New
Jersey action [Docket No. 13]. Defendant notified retirees on September 19, 2011 of its intention
to limit healthcare contributions starting January 1, 2012.
District Court Judge William J. Martini, in a letter opinion, dismissed the New Jersey
action finding that Michigan was the proper forum for the parties dispute because: (1) the UAW
and retirees are the natural plaintiffs in this action; (2) Michigan has a greater nexus to the parties
and dispute because the CBAs were negotiated in Michigan, the UAW is headquartered in
Michigan, and the chief negotiator is located in Michigan; and (3) allowing UAW and the
retirees to define the class and elect the forum comports with the policies underlying ERISA and
the Labor Management Relations Act. The court also found that its departure from the first-filed
rule was appropriate because it appeared that Defendant had engaged in forum shopping. It was
attempting to avoid less favorable Sixth Circuit case law and filed the action without first
notifying the retirees of the benefit caps.
III.

LAW & ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “If a pleading fails to
specify the allegations in a manner that provides sufficient notice, a defendant can move for a
more definite statement under Rule 12(e) before responding.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534
U.S. 506, 514 (2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) allows a party to move for a more
definite statement before filing a responsive pleading when the pleading “is so vague or
ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Federal courts generally

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disfavor such motions and in light of “the notice pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2) and the
opportunity for extensive pretrial discovery, courts rarely grant such motions.” E.E.O.C. v. FPM
Group, Ltd., 657 F.Supp.2d 957, 966 (E.D. Tenn. 2009). A court should not grant a motion for
more definite statement unless the complaint is “so excessively vague and ambiguous as to be
unintelligible and as to prejudice the defendant seriously in attempting to answer it.” Id. (quoting
Kok v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 154 F.Supp.2d 777, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
Plaintiffs argue that Defendant’s counterclaim does not identify the source of common
law that it will rely on, be it federal or state law. Plaintiffs claim they wish to file a Rule 12
motion but are frustrated by the vagueness of Defendant’s counterclaim. Defendant argues that it
is not required to identify the law that it will rely on because choice-of-law questions will likely
be litigated at a later stage. Defendant indicated in an email to Plaintiffs’ counsel and in its
response that either Michigan or New Jersey law would apply. In response, Plaintiffs contend
that Rule 9(b) requires greater pleading specificity. Plaintiffs argue, in the alternative, that
Defendant should be required to amend its counterclaim to include allegations under both
Michigan and New Jersey law.
As to fraud, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “a party must state with
particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff’s
complaint must identify the allegedly fraudulent statements, the speaker, when and where the
statements were made, and why the statements were fraudulent. Frank v. Dana Corp., 547 F.3d
564, 570 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gupta v. Terra Nitrogen Corp., 10 F.Supp.2d 879, 883
(N.D.Ohio 1998)). The Court must first “determine the kind of fraud charged and then to
determine if, from the complaint, the defendant has adequate information to frame a responsive
answer.” Brewer v. Monsanto Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-1273 (M.D. Tenn. 1986). “The

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plaintiff is not required to plead facts proving each element; the plaintiff is required to plead the
particular circumstances which, in the plaintiff's cause of action, will give the defendant adequate
notice.” Id. (applying Tennessee law to determine that the complaint was sufficient to place the
defendants on notice of fraudulent misrepresentation under Tennessee law); see also Minger
v.Green, 239 F.3d 793, 800 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Kentucky law in determining that plaintiff
had stated a claim for intentional misrepresentation). “At a minimum, [a plaintiff] must allege the
time, place and contents of the misrepresentations upon which [he or she] relied.” Id.
In its counterclaim, Defendant has alleged fraud with the requisite particularity. It has
indicated the time, place, and content of allegations that it deems are the basis for fraud and
negligent misrepresentation. This is all that Rule 9(b) and the Sixth Circuit require. Plaintiffs
have not identified any support nor has the Court found any that requires Defendant to lock itself
into what state law will govern its allegations when choice-of-law questions may be addressed at
a later stage in litigation. Defendant has sufficiently put Plaintiffs on notice of what facts
establish the basis of its allegations of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. However,
Defendant has indicated in its response and in an email addressed to Plaintiffs’ counsel that it
intends to rely on either Michigan or New Jersey law. The Court directs Defendant to amend its
Complaint to indicate its intention to rely on either New Jersey or Michigan law so that Plaintiff
may adequately respond.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for a More Definite Statement [Docket No. 19,

filed February 4, 2012] is GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant is required to amend its counterclaim to

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indicate its reliance on either Michigan or New Jersey law, such amendment must be filed by
March 13, 2012.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: March 9, 2012
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
March 9, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager

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