Cabrera v. Donnellon et al

Filing 17

OPINION and ORDER Striking Plaintiff's 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Amended Pleadings and Dismissing Complaint. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (CCoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ARNALDO INFANTE-CABRERA,
Case No. 2:11-cv-14340
Petitioner,
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
v.
TIM DONNELLON, et al,
Respondent.
/

OPINION AND ORDER STRIKING PLAINTIFF'S
SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH AMENDED
PLEADINGS AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT (docket no. 7)
This is prisoner civil rights action. The Plaintiff, Arnaldo Infante-Cabrera, filed this
complaint pro se under 42 U.S.C. §1983. His original complaint alleges that he was denied
his right of access to the courts while incarcerated at St. Clair County Jail. ECF no. 1. Mr.
Infante-Cabrera filed his first amended complaint adding a claim that during a one week
stay in the jail's detention disciplinary unit, the defendants' daily removal of the mattress
from his cell during daylight hours constituted cruel and unusual punishment. ECF no. 7.
Mr. Infante-Cabrera has since been transferred to the Federal Correctional Institute in
Milan, Michigan ("FCI-Milan"). The Court has examined the claims and for the following
reasons, the Court will dismiss the complaint.
The Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amended Complaints
As a preliminary matter, the Court will first consider the second amended complaint
filed by Mr. Infante-Cabrera, ECF no. 15, and the third, fourth, and fifth amended
complaints filed by three additional prisoners not named in the original or first amended
complaint, Joseph Goireg, Malcon Harrison, and Damontai Weeks. ECF nos. 8, 10, 11.
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) states that a party may amend a pleading
once as a matter of course if a responsive pleading as not yet been filed. After this, a party
may amend a pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or leave of the court.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(2). Here, leave of this Court was not obtained before the filing of
the second, third, fourth, or fifth amended complaints. The Court will strike these amended
complaints.
Standard of Review
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires a court to screen a prisoner's civil action
before service in certain situations for frivolity, malice, or failure to state a claim.
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §1997e requires a court to dismiss a prisoner's complaint regarding
prison conditions if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim. Similarly,
28 U.S.C. §1915A also requires a court to dismiss a prisoner's complaint, this time if filed
against government entities or employees, if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, or fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well as “a
demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to
“give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 47 (1957) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this notice pleading standard does not
require “detailed” factual allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, it does require more than
the

bare

assertion

of

legal

conclusions

or

“an

unadorned,

the-

defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
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"'[L]labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action
will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court may dismiss an action for failure to state a claim if the allegations are not
"sufficient 'to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,' and to 'state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.'" Henley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir.
2009) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). In evaluating the
motion, the Court presumes the truth of all well-pled factual assertions. Bishop v. Lucent
Techs., 520 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreover, it must draw every reasonable
inference in favor of the non-moving party. Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422, 427 (6th Cir.
2007). But a complaint is insufficient if it merely "tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of
‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To state a federal civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he was deprived of
a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law.
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978). A pro se civil rights
complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct.
594 (1972).
Analysis of Claims
I. Access to the Courts
Mr. Infante-Cabrera first alleges that the defendants violated his right of access to the
courts. It is well settled that prisoners, including indigent prisoners, have a constitutional
right of access to the courts which the states have an affirmative duty to protect. See
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821-25 (1977). A prisoner’s right of access to the courts
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is limited to matters of direct criminal appeals, habeas corpus applications, and civil rights
claims challenging the conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355
(1996); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 391 (6th Cir. 1999). To state a violation of
this right, a prisoner must allege that a prison official's conduct caused him an actual injury,
such as frustration of a particular legal claim. Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405–06 (6th
Cir.1999). Examples of actual injury to "pending or contemplated litigation include having
a case dismissed, being unable to file a complaint, and missing a court-imposed deadline.”
Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir. 2005).
Mr. Infante-Cabrera cites three federal court cases to which he is a party which he
alleges were negatively impacted by the defendants actions. The first is a habeas corpus
petition challenging his placement in administrative segregation at FCI-Milan for assaulting
another inmate and challenging the failure to obtain a timely indictment. The docket sheet
reflects that, during the pendency of that proceeding, Mr. Infante-Cabrera was incarcerated
at FCI-Milan.1 See Infante-Cabrera v. Walton, No. 2:10-cv-13654 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
Therefore, he cannot show that his rights in that proceeding were prejudiced by any of the
defendants’ actions at St. Clair County Jail. Second, Mr. Infante-Cabrera filed an appeal
from the denial of the habeas petition. Here, Mr. Infante-Cabrera was incarcerated at the
St. Clair County Jail for at least part of the time the appeal was pending in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals. The appeal was denied because Mr. Infante-Cabrera’s release from
segregation and the filing of a timely indictment rendered the appeal moot. Mr. Infante-

1

Mr. Infante-Cabrera was incarcerated at FCI-Milan during the original habeas action
from September 14, 2010, to December 1, 2010. It appears he was transferred to St. Clair
Shores County Jail, and then eventually, back to FCI-Milan.
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Cabrera fails to allege any plausible way in which the defendants’ actions negatively
affected his ability to pursue or argue this appeal. In fact, Mr. Infante-Cabrera filed a
twenty-five page response in the proceeding which included legal arguments and citation
of authority. Finally, Mr. Infante-Cabrera cites a federal criminal case presently pending
against him, United States v. Infante-Cabrera, No. 2:11-cr-20075 (E.D. Mich. 2011). Mr.
Infante-Cabrera is represented by appointed counsel in that proceeding and he again fails
to allege with any specificity any way in which defendants actions’ frustrated his ability to
mount a defense.
Mr. Infante-Cabrera has not identified any legal argument he could not raise, any
deadline missed, or any evidence he could not submit in any other court proceeding
because of defendants’ actions. The Court concludes Mr. Infante-Cabrera fails to allege
a claim that his constitutional right of access to the courts has been denied.
II. Eighth Amendment Claim
Mr. Infante-Cabrera next alleges that defendants violated his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment by not allowing him access to his mattress during daytime.
According to Mr. Infante-Cabrera, jail officials collect mattresses at 6:30 AM and return
them at 9:30 PM. Mr. Infante-Cabrera states this causes him a hardship because he
suffers from arthritis and is forced to sleep on the metal bed.
“[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically
barbarous, involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain, or are grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). While there is no “static test”
to determine whether the conditions of confinement violate the Eighth Amendment, prison
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officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate indifference to an
inmate’s health or deprive an inmate of basic human needs, food, medical care or
sanitation. Id. at 346–47. “‘Not every unpleasant experience a prisoner might endure while
incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment’.” Richmond v. Settles, 2011 WL 6005197, *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2011) (quoting
Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987)). An Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim has both a subjective and objective component. Id. The objective
component requires a plaintiff to show that the deprivations to which he has been subjected
deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at
347 (1981). The subjective component requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the prison
officials acted wantonly, with deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s serious needs. Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
The Court concludes that deprivation of a mattress during daylight hours does not
deprive a prisoner of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities. See Alex v.
Stalder, 225 F. Appx 313 (5th Cir. 2007) (taking of mattress during daytime hours does not
state an Eighth Amendment violation); Mestre v. Wagner, 2012 WL 300724, *4 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 31, 2012) (no Eighth Amendment violation where inmates provided with mattress for
nine hours each night); see also Jones v. Toombs, 77 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996)(two week
mattress restriction did not violate Eighth Amendment). Therefore, Mr. Infante-Cabrera has
not stated a claim under the Eighth Amendment for which relief can be granted.

ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that Mr. Infante-Cabrera's second amended
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complaint (docket no. 14), and third, fourth, and fifth amended complaints filed by Mr.
Goireg (docket no. 8), Mr. Harrison (docket no. 10), and Mr. Weeks (docket no. 11) are
STRICKEN, and Mr. Infante-Cabrera's complaint (docket no. 7) is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
SO ORDERED.

s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: August 31, 2012
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on August 31, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
Carol Cohron
Case Manager

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