Jackson v. Smith
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING Plaintiff's Objections, ADOPTING 12 Supplemental Report and Recommendation, DENYING the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and DENYING the Certificate of Appealability, Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ERNEST GREY JACKSON,
Petitioner,
Case No. 11-14705
v.
WILLIE SMITH,
Respondent.
/
OPINION AND ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS, ADOPTING THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION,
AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
On August 2, 2013, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives issued a Supplemental
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) in the above-captioned matter, recommending
that the court deny Plaintiff Ernest Jackson’s (“Jackson”) petition for the writ of habeas
corpus and that the court deny Jackson a certificate of appealability. On August 16,
2013, Jackson filed objections to the supplemental R&R. For the reasons discussed
below, the court will overrule Jackson’s objections and adopt the supplemental R&R in
full. The court will also deny Jackson a certificate of appealability.
I. STANDARD
The filing of timely objections requires the court to “make a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified findings or recommendations
to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). See United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667 (1980); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). This de novo
review, in turn, requires this court to re-examine all the relevant evidence previously
reviewed by the magistrate to determine whether the recommendation should be
accepted, rejected, or modified in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court
may “receive further evidence” if desired. Id.
A party who files timely objections to a magistrate’s report in order to preserve
the right to appeal must be mindful of the purpose of such objections: to provide the
district court “with the opportunity to consider the specific contentions of the parties and
to correct any errors immediately.” Walters, 638 F.2d at 949–50. The Supreme Court
upheld this rule in Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985), a habeas corpus case. The
Supreme Court noted that “[t]he filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the
district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart
of the parties’ dispute.” Id. at 147 (footnote omitted).
Further, “[o]nly those specific objections to the magistrate’s report made to the
district court will be preserved for appellate review; making some objections but failing
to raise others will not preserve all the objections a party may have.” Smith v. Detroit
Fed’n of Teachers, Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987).
II. DISCUSSION
In his Supplemental R&R, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Jackson filed his
petition outside of the one-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and that a
certificate of appealability should be denied. Each of Jackson’s objections is addressed
in turn.
A. Objections # 1 and # 2
In Jackson’s first two objections, he argues that the Magistrate Judge’s analysis
was objectively unreasonable and clearly erroneous. Specifically, Jackson takes issue
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with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the Michigan Supreme Court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Jackson’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of his motion to
withdraw his plea. Jackson argues that despite the Michigan Court of Appeals’s
dismissal of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the Michigan Supreme Court “accepted
the case, reviewed the merits, and upheld the trial court ruling.” Jackson further asserts
that the Michigan Supreme Court did not deny the matter on jurisdictional grounds, and
“recognized . . . the legitimacy of the filing of the motion and application for leave and
jurisdiction[.]” (Pg. ID# 883–84.)
The Michigan Supreme Court’s opinion contains no such language, instead
stating: “On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the December 14,
2006 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not
persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.” People v.
Jackson, 737 N.W.2d 774, 774 (Mich. 2007). Jackson equates the court’s statement
that it considered his application for leave to appeal with the consideration of the merits
of his case. However, the court issued no ruling on whether it had jurisdiction to
consider Jackson’s appeal and refused to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly,
the Magistrate Judge was correct in concluding that “unexplained state court denials of
a petitioner’s claim are presumed to rest on the same procedural default ground as the
last ‘reasoned’ decision.” (Pg. ID# 873) (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797,
805–06 (1991)). The last decision in Jackson’s case was issued by the Michigan Court
of Appeals, which concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal. People v.
Jackson, No. 274819 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2006). As the Magistrate Judge
concluded, determinations of state law regarding jurisdiction and the timeliness of an
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application for leave to appeal are binding on the court under § 2244(d). Vroman v.
Brigano, 346 F.3d 598, 603 (6th Cir. 2003). Jackson’s first and second objections are
overruled.
B. Objection # 3
Jackson argues that the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that a motion for relief
from judgment is the exclusive means of collateral review of a conviction under
Michigan law is clearly erroneous. Michigan law allows for an application for leave to
appeal from a motion for relief from judgment. Relying on this principle, Jackson argues
that his application for leave to appeal after the trial court rejected his request to
withdraw his guilty plea functioned as an application for post-conviction relief within the
meaning of § 2244(d)(2).
This argument does not engage meaningfully with the Magistrate Judge’s
analysis. The Magistrate Judge’s recommendation rests on the conclusion that the only
means a prisoner has under Michigan law for challenging his conviction (aside from
direct appeal) is through a motion for relief from judgment. Daniel v. Davis, No. 2:07-cv119, 2008 WL 408470, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2008). “Because a motion to
withdraw a plea is generally part of the direct appeal process,” it is not properly
characterized as a application for post-conviction collateral review. (Pg. ID# 875.)
Simply put, Jackson’s failed attempt to withdraw his guilty plea was part of his direct
appeal, and therefore does not fall within the meaning of “post-conviction or other
collateral review” under § 2244(d)(2). Jackson’s third objection is overruled.
C. Objection # 4
Lastly, Jackson objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation that a
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certificate of appealability be denied. Because reasonable jurists could not debate the
correctness of the court’s procedural ruling, the court overrules Jackson’s fourth
objection.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS ORDERED that Jackson’s objections [Dkt.
# 14] are OVERRULED, and the Magistrate Judge’s Supplemental Report and
Recommendation [Dkt. # 12] is ADOPTED IN FULL AND INCORPORATED BY
REFERENCE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the court DECLINES to issue a certificate of
appealability.
Finally, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
A separate judgment will issue.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 24, 2013
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record
on this date, October 24, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(313) 234-5522
S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C2 ORDERS\11-14705.JACKSONvSMITH.OrderAdoptingRR.jac.wpd
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