Oates v. Target Corporation
Filing
71
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 44 and 45 Motions to Compel - Signed by Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. (LBar)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Saundra Oates,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Civil Action No.: 11-CV-14837
District Judge Gerald E. Rosen
Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub
Target Corporation
Defendant.
_____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO COMPEL [44] AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL [45]
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Saundra Oates’s Motion to Compel
Defendant’s Respones to Her Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents (docket no. 44) and Defendant Target Corporation’s Motion to Compel Plaintiff to
Provide Complete Responses to its Second Request for Production of Documents (docket no. 45).
Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff’s Motion (docket no. 46), Plaintiff filed a Supplemental
Statement in Support of her Motion (docket no. 64), and Defendant filed a Supplemental Response
(docket no. 68). Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant’s Motion (docket no. 51), and Defendant
filed a Reply (docket no. 52). The Parties filed a Joint Statement of Unresolved Issues (docket no.
55) and, at the Court’s request, an Updated Statement of Resolved and Unresolved Issues (docket
no. 70). These motions were referred to the undersigned for decision. (Docket no. 48.) The Court
dispenses with oral argument pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(e). The Motions are now ready for
ruling.
I.
Background
Plaintiff alleges in her five-count complaint that Defendant Target wrongfully terminated her
on December 15, 2009, in violation of Michigan Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Act; she also claims
that Defendant discriminated against her on the basis of her race in violation of Title VII and
Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act. (Docket no. 1).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel seeks an Order compelling answers and production related to
her Interrogatory Nos. 2 and 3, and her Requests for Production Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 pursuant to
her Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents.1 Defendant’s Motion
to Compel seeks an Order compelling production related to its Requests for Production of
Documents Nos. 3, 4, 10, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, and 24 pursuant to its Second Request for Production
of Documents.2
II.
Governing Law
The scope of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is traditionally quite
broad. Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., 135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998). Parties may obtain discovery
on any matter that is not privileged and is relevant to any party’s claim or defense if it is reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(1). “Relevant
evidence” is “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 401. But the scope of discovery is not unlimited. “District courts have
1
In the Parties Update Joint Statement, they indicate that the issues related to Plaintiff’s
Request for Production No. 1 have been resolved. (Docket no. 70 at 5.)
2
In the Parties Update Joint Statement, they indicate that the issues related to Defendant’s
Request for Production No. 3 have been resolved. (Docket no. 70 at 9.)
discretion to limit the scope of discovery where the information sought is overly broad or would
prove unduly burdensome to produce.” Surles ex rel. Johnson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 474 F.3d
288, 305 (6th Cir. 2007).
Rules 33 and 34 allow a party to serve interrogatories and requests for production of
documents on an opposing party. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33, 34. A party receiving these types of discovery
requests has thirty days to respond with answers or objections. Fed.R.Civ.P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A).
If the receiving party fails to respond to interrogatories or RFPs, Rule 37 provides the party who sent
the discovery the means to file a motion to compel. Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(3)(B)(iii) and (iv). If a court
grants a Rule 37 motion to compel, then the court must award reasonable expenses and attorney’s
fees to the successful party, unless the successful party did not confer in good faith before the
motion, the opposing party’s position was substantially justified, or other circumstances would make
an award unjust . Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(A)(5)(a).
III.
Analysis
A.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel
1.
Number of Interrogatories
Defendants allege that with subparts, Plaintiff’s interrogatories exceed the 25 interrogatories
allowed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(a)(1). (Docket no. 46 at 6-7.) The term “discrete subparts”
does not have a precise meaning, but “courts generally agree that ‘interrogatory subparts are to be
counted as one interrogatory . . . if they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily
related to the primary question.’” Trevino v. ACB American, Inc., 232 F.R.D. 612, 614 (N.D. Cal.
2006). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s interrogatories do not number more than 25, “including all
discrete subparts.” Upon examination, each interrogatory appears to address a discrete subject, and
to the extent that the interrogatory contains subparts, the subparts seek details related to the common
theme of the interrogatory.
2.
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 2
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 2 requested “the beginning salaries for all Target Team Leaders
employed between 2005 and 2010, within Target Store 777 . . . including . . . the pay scale
designated for the Target Executive Team Leader Positions.” (See docket no. 46-2 at 5.) Defendant
objected that the interrogatory was overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not relevant. (Id.)
Plaintiff asserts that based on a line of questioning during Plaintiff’s deposition, Plaintiff believes
that Defendant intends to argue that “Plaintiff deceptively received a higher salary than would have
otherwise been offered.” (Docket no. 44 at 4-5.) Plaintiff, therefore, argues that the information is
relevant to show that her pay was in line with that of other Team Leaders. (See id.) Defendant
asserts that the line of questioning during Plaintiff’s deposition “was directed at Plaintiff’s
truthfulness and honesty in completing her application” and that “[the] information goes to
Plaintiff’s credibility and qualification for employment, and otherwise constitutes after-acquired
evidence that is sufficient to limit and/or preclude Plaintiff’s damages entirely.” (Docket no. 46 at
8-9.)
Regarding Defendant’s objection that Plaintiff’s interrogatory is overly broad or unduly
burdensome, Plaintiff has subsequently limited her request to individuals employed at Store 777
between 2005 and 2006. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s request is not overly broad or unduly
burdensome. Regarding the relevance of this information, Plaintiff states that she would waive
discovery of this information if Defendant stipulates that it will not argue that she “deceptively
received a higher salary than would have otherwise been offered.” (Docket no. 44 at 5.)
The Court finds Plaintiff’s position reasonable. If Defendant intends to make such an
argument, then Plaintiff is entitled to the requested information as it is reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence related to such an argument. If Defendant does not intend
to make such an argument, then the information is not relevant. Therefore, the Court will order
Defendant to answer Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 2 no later than January 11, 2013, limited to Team
Leaders (identified by team member number only) at Store 777 from 2005 to 2006. In the
alternative, Defendant may stipulate in writing to Plaintiff that Defendant will not assert that
Plaintiff deceptively received a higher salary than would have otherwise been offered.
3.
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 3
Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 3 requests personnel records for all Executive Team Leaders
(ETLs) employed in the district managed by Jim Peterson from 2005 to 2010. (See docket no. 46-2
at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff requests the following information related to these individuals: (a)
name; (b) race; (c) date of hire; (d) date of promotion, if applicable; (e) position promoted to, if
applicable; (f) information regarding workers’ compensation claims; (g) information regarding
FMLA claims; (h) information regarding restrictions requested or imposed; (i) resumes and/or
applications; (j) performance evaluations/reviews; and (k) disciplinary history. (Id.) Plaintiff has
since limited her request to 2006 through 2009 and no longer requests information regarding FMLA
claims. (Docket no. 70 at 2.)
Plaintiff claims that this interrogatory is “intended to capture all the required information of
all ETLs to determine comparables.” (Docket no. 44 at 5.) The central issue in the parties dispute
over this interrogatory, however, appears to be the scope of Plaintiff’s request regarding the period
of time for which Plaintiff seeks information and the geographic scope of Plaintiff’s request. (See
docket no. 55 at 5-6; docket no. 46 at 9-13.) Defendant also argues that much of the information
Plaintiff requests has already been provided through Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories Nos. 3,
9, 10, 12, and 17. (Docket no. 70 at 3.)
Regarding the period of time for which Plaintiff requests the information, Defendant points
to the Court’s Opinion and Order issued in this matter on October 2, 2012, wherein the Court
granted in part Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel her first Interrogatory No. 3, finding that “Plaintiff’s
requested time frame of five years is unreasonable in that the parties have agreed to limit the scope
of Plaintiff’s other requests to events that occurred from January 1, 2009, through December 31,
2010.” (Docket no. 70 at 4 (citing docket no. 60 at 7).) Defendant, however, fails to recognize that
Plaintiff’s first Interrogatory No. 3 parts (a) through (d) requested information for a period of three
years and only subsection (e) requested five years of information; thus, the Court limited
Defendant’s response to subsection (e) as well. Moreover, in the same Opinion and Order, the Court
found that a five-year limitation from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2010, was reasonable
with regard to Plaintiff’s Request for Production of Documents No. 20. (Docket no. 60 at 8-9.) And
notably, Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 20 sought information similar to that which Plaintiff
seeks in the interrogatory at issue here. Therefore, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s Motion to the
extent that it now seeks information from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2009.
Regarding the geographic scope of Plaintiff’s request, Plaintiff seeks information from every
ETL who worked in District 135 during the time period referenced herein. (Docket no. 70 at 2.)
Defendant argues that this request is overbroad because Plaintiff is not similarly situated to all of
the employees to which her interrogatory applies. (Docket no. 46 at 10-11; docket no. 70 at 4.)
Specifically, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was directly supervised by her Store Team Leader,
Diane Duda, not District Manager, Jim Peterson; and Plaintiff’s conduct was not the same or similar
to the conduct of all of these other employees. (Id.) As the Court found in its October 2, 2012
Order, Plaintiff’s requests for information from throughout district 0135 are reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. (See docket no. 60 at 9, 13.) Even though Plaintiff
was directly supervised by Duda, Plaintiff may seek information related to possible comparables
who were supervised by the same district manager as well. Therefore, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent that it seeks information from throughout district 0135.
Nevertheless, discovery is not a license for a fishing expedition; the Rules do not permit
Plaintiff the broad discretion to request full employment history from every ETL in the district.
Plaintiff is only entitled to discovery related to those individual who have engaged in the same or
similar conduct. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352-53 (6th Cir.
1998); Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d 702, 217 (6th Cir. 2006). Thus, the Court will limit
Defendant’s response to those individuals who left the store unsecured, locked someone in the store,
or otherwise engaged in conduct similar to Plaintiff. (See section III.A.5, infra.)
Finally, regarding Defendant’s assertion that this information has already been provided
through its responses to Plaintiff’s First Set of Interrogatories, it appears that some of the
information has likely been provided, but not all of the information requested by Plaintiff in this
interrogatory. As Defendant notes, it need not respond to duplicative discovery requsts. But
Defendant knows what information it has provided. Therefore, the Court will order Defendant to
respond to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 3 no later than January 11, 2013, for employees throughout
district 0135 from January 1, 2006 through December 31, 2009; to the extent that Plaintiff’s current
Interrogatory No. 3 requests duplicative information, Defendant need not provide that information
again.
4.
Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 3
With regard to this request, Defendant indicates that “all responsive documents it has
identified to date have been produced” and that “it has diligently searched for any . . . records”
related to the incident specified in Plaintiff’s Motion. (Docket no. 70 at 5.) Even though Plaintiff
believes that such documents must exist, based on the deposition testimony of former ETL of Asset
Protection Andrew Bourassa (see docket no. 64.), Defendant can only produce the documents that
are actually in its possession, custody, or control. Therefore, subject to Defendant’s continuing duty
to supplement its responses should additional information be uncovered, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s Motion with regard to Request for Production No. 3.
5.
Plaintiff’s Request for Production Nos. 4, 5, and 6
A central issue in the parties’ dispute over these three requests is whether Plaintiff should
be entitled to all documents related to “Negligent Conduct,” as defined by Defendant’s Counseling
and Corrective Action Plan. (See docket no. 70 at 5-8.) Plaintiff argues that “all incidents or
documents as identified in the requests that relate to incidents of negligent conduct, whether or not
the offense is precisely the same as Plaintiff’s offense or not, should be produced, if the offense was
designated as Negligent Conduct.” (Docket no. 44 at 8.) Defendant draws the Court’s attention to
several examples of “Negligent Conduct” from its Counseling and Corrective Action Plan and
argues that such offenses are “very dissimilar to those engaged in by Plaintiff.” (Docket no. 70 at
6 n.1.) Therefore, Defendant asserts, it should not have to produce documents related to these
dissimilar offenses, presumably because individuals who have committed these acts are not
comparables for purposes of Plaintiff’s claims. (Id. at 6.)
Defendant states that it considers Plaintiff’s request to include “incidents where the LOD left
the store unsecured, locked someone in the store, or otherwise engag[ed] in conduct similar to
Plaintiff.” (Id. at 7; see also id. at 6; id at 8.) The Court finds Defendant’s limitation reasonable.
As noted, discovery is not a license for a fishing expedition. Even though Plaintiff’s actions were
classified as “Negligent Conduct” under the Counseling and Corrective Action Plan, it does not
follow, as Plaintiff seems to contend, that all conduct classified as Negligent Conduct under Plan
must be disciplined similarly. Thus, Plaintiff’s request for information related to “Negligent
Conduct” is overbroad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
With specific regard to Interrogatory No. 4, the parties appear to have narrowed their dispute
to one specific set of documents: Defendants have not provided Plaintiff with documents related to
“Negligent Conduct” other than leaving doors unsecured. (See docket no. 70 at 5-6.) Plaintiff has
already agreed to limit the scope of her request to documents related to Store 0777 from 2005
through 2010. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 5 similarly seeks documents related to “Negligent
Conduct” for employees employed at Store 0777, and Plaintiff has limited her request to documents
from 2005 through 2010. (Id. at 7.) Additionally, however, this Request for Production seeks
documents “relating to breaches in security.” (Id. at 6.) As Defendant notes, such language is too
broad and relates to an “undefined class of events wholly irrelevant to the present action (e.g. theft,
threats of violence, etc.).” (Id. at 7.) The Court agrees and finds that the relevant “breaches in
security” are encompassed in the aforementioned definition of “Negligent Conduct.”
Plaintiff’s Request for Production No. 6 seeks “any and all documents, emails, or other
communication between Diane Duda and either Jim Peterson, Gary McFarren and/or Sally Watters,
regarding facilitation of the corrective action process or imposition of discipline for negligent
conduct from 2005 to present.” (See id. at 7.) Here, Plaintiff has limited the scope of her request
to 2005 through 2010, but she has not limited her request to documents related to Store 0777. (Id.
at 8.) Defendant argues that, “[t]aken literally, this requests seeks communication exchanged
between these individuals regarding every corrective action decision for hundreds of employees over
seven years” and that such a request is overly broad. (Id.) The Court agrees and will again limit
Defendant’s production accordingly.
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will order Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s
Request for Production Nos. 4, 5, and 6 in full no later than January 11, 2013, limited to documents
related to Store 0777 for incidents where the employee left the store unsecured, locked someone in
the store, or otherwise engaged in conduct similar to Plaintiff from 2005 through 2010. Defendant
indicates that it has already produced documents subject to many of the limitations set forth above.
(See id. at 6, 7, 8.) Nevertheless, it appears that in some instances, where Plaintiff’s Interrogatory
requests information related to any employee, Defendant may only have provided documents related
to LODs. (See id. at 7, 8.) The Court’s order does not impose such a limitation, and Plaintiff will
be ordered to answer more fully. However, to the extent that Defendant has produced all responsive
information, the Court will order Defendant to serve Plaintiff with a response stating the same no
later than January 11, 2013.
B.
Defendant’s Motion to Compel
1.
Defendant’s Request for Production No. 4
Defendant’s Request for Production No. 4 seeks records related to financial accounts for
which Plaintiff had “access” from January 1, 2009, through present. (See docket no. 54-2 at 4.)
Defendant argues that this information is relevant because “it evidences [Plaintiff’s] assets at the
time of her termination in December 2009 through present, and any purported reduction of those
assets.” (Docket no. 70 at 9.) To that extent, the Court agrees; the information requested is, at least,
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Plaintiff, however, objects to discovery of the documents primarily because “Defendant
seeks confidential information of a person who is not a party to this litigation.” (Id.) Much of the
account information that Defendant seeks appears to belong, at least in part, to Netha Fickling,
Plaintiff’s domestic partner. (Docket no. 51 at 4.) Fickling and Plaintiff have been together for
approximately 20 years, and they have co-owned or shared title to real property and several accounts
during that time. (See docket no. 45 at 9.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant seeks information that
belongs to someone that is not a party to this litigation and that Defendant has not identified a
substantial need for the information. (Docket no. 51 at 4.) The Court agrees that if Fickling is the
sole owner of an account in question, Plaintiff is not required to disclose any related documents; the
proper vehicle for such a request is a third-party subpoena under Fed.R.Civ.P. 45.
With regard to accounts that Plaintiff and Fickling owned jointly, Plaintiff asserts that her
tax returns (which she has already produced) provide Defendant with all necessary information
relative to her income flow. (Id. at 5-6.) Defendant contends that Plaintiff admitted that she did not
report all of her income on her taxes; instead, some rental income was reported on Fickling’s taxes.
(Docket no. 52 at 3.) Therefore, Defendant argues, the rest of her financial documents are necessary
to determine Plaintiff’s proper damages. (Id. at 3-4.) The Court agrees with Defendant. Therefore,
to the extent that Plaintiff is a joint owner, co-owner, or otherwise is in possession, custody, or
control of the documents requested by Defendant, the Court will order Plaintiff to produce such
documents no later than January 11, 2013; Plaintiff is, however, entitled to redact any portions of
the financial documents that pertain solely to Fickling.
2.
Defendant’s Request for Production No. 173
Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents No. 17 seeks the following:
Any and all applications, resumes or related cover letters prepared, distributed or
3
The parties have not addressed in their Updated Joint Statement whether their issues
regarding Defendant’s Request for Production No. 17 have been resolved. Therefore, the Court
will assume that the parties have not resolved these issues.
otherwise used by the Plaintiff, including any sent via email, internet, and/otherwise
made online relative to any jobs or purported efforts to find employment between
December 15, 2009 and December 5, 2011.
(Docket no. 45-2 at 8.) Defendant’s Request for Production No. 10, included in its First Request
for Production of Documents, sought the following:
Any resumes or related cover letters prepared, distributed or otherwise used by the
Plaintiff, including email, internet and/or on-line applications for job postings,
between December 15, 2009 and through the date of trial in this action.
(Docket no. 15-4 at 7.)
Plaintiff asserts that new Request for Production No. 17 is duplicative of Defendant’s First
Request for Production No. 10. (Docket no. 51 at 6.) Additionally, Plaintiff acknowledges that she
has a continuing duty to supplement her response to Request for Production No. 10. (Id.) Defendant
argues that the new request “is narrowly tailored and specifically seeks and all documents
evidencing Plaintiff’s job search efforts during the nearly two years following her termination from
Target.” (Docket no. 45 at 10.) Defendant further contends that the request “is specifically geared
toward documents such as the letter Plaintiff claimed in her deposition to have received from the
UIA during that time period notifying her that she was not selected for a position.” (Id.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Defendant’s second request may be more narrowly tailored
than its first request, but the documents requested in Second Request for Production No. 17 are, by
their nature, encompassed in First Request for Production No. 10. Moreover, while Defendant may
have intended this request to encompass the letter that Plaintiff received from the UIA, Defendant’s
request seeks “applications, resumes, or cover letters prepared, distributed, or otherwise used by
plaintiff.” (Docket no. 45-2 at 8 (emphasis added).) Even given a broad interpretation, Defendant’s
request does not encompass document received by Plaintiff declining an offer of employment.
Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion with respect to Request for Production No. 17.
3.
Defendant’s Request for Production Nos. 10, 22, and 23
In these three Requests for Production, Defendant requests emails sent or received from
Plaintiff at two email addresses. (See docket no. 45-2 at 6, 10, and 11.) One of these email accounts
has been deleted in its entirety, and Plaintiff has deleted several emails from the other account.
(Docket no. 70 at 9-10.) Plaintiff indicates that she has produced any documents that are in her
possession, custody, or control and has answered Defendant’s subsequent interrogatories related to
the deleted account and emails. (Docket no. 51 at 7; Docket no. 70 at 10.) Defendant requests that
the Court compel Plaintiff to provide detailed information regarding the deletion of these accounts
and emails.4 (Docket no. 45 at 13.) Plaintiff argues that she is not required to provide any
information related to the documents that she produces when responding to a Request for Production
of Documents. (Docket no. 51 at 7.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts (and Defendant does not appear to dispute)
that she has produced all documents in her possession, custody, or control. Thus, to the extent that
Plaintiff has been served with a Request for Production of Documents, Plaintiff has responded fully.
To the extent that Defendant is alleging that Plaintiff has not fully or properly responded to its
subsequent interrogatories, such a motion is not before the Court. Therefore, the Court will deny
Defendant’s Motion with regard to Request for Production Nos. 10, 22, and 23.
4.
Defendant’s Request for Production Nos. 19 and 20
Defendant’s Request for Production Nos. 19 and 20 seek documents related to a loan
modification and a short sale of Plaintiff’s home. (Docket no. 70 at 10.) Plaintiff co-owned property
4
Additionally, Defendant requests that the Court draw an adverse inference against
Plaintiff with regard to the missing emails. (Docket no. 45 at 13.) Defendant’s request is not
proper as part of its Motion to Compel as the Parties have not fully briefed this issue. Thus, the
Court will not order such an inference at this time.
with Fickling. (Id.) Defendant points to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony and claims that this
documentation will “provide probative evidence of both Plaintiff’s financial condition following her
termination from Target and her forthrightness in correspondence with her lender.” (Id.) Defendant
states that Plaintiff acknowledged that “she and Ms. Fickling received monies from rent-paying
tenants on at least one . . . property” and that she “took out multiple home equity loans out (sic) on
the property all totaling over $150,000, before selling the home for $30,000.” (Docket no. 45 at 11
(citations omitted).) Plaintiff argues that (1) whether the documents show that Plaintiff lacked
honesty in dealing with her lender is irrelevant, (2) her tax returns are a sufficient reflection of her
income, (3) she should not be required to disclose documents that include confidential information
of a third party, and (4) in her search for documents responsive to this request, she only uncovered
“a Seller and Purchase Statement dated 2/29/2012, which she will produce.” (Docket no. 51 at 6;
Docket no. 70 at 10.)
The Court agrees with Defendant that the information requested is relevant with regard to
Plaintiff’s credibility and her damages. As the Court noted in Section III.B.1, supra, Plaintiff
acknowledged that she had rental income that was not included in her tax returns. (Docket no. 51
at 5-6.) Moreover, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony provides reason to believe that these documents
may cast doubt on her credibility. Thus, Defendant’s request is reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence, and such information is not duplicative of Plaintiff’s tax returns.
Additionally, as the Court implied in Section III.B.1, any documents related to property jointly
owned by Plaintiff and Fickling are discoverable under Rule 34. Therefore, the Court will order
Plaintiff to respond to Defendant’s Request for Production Nos. 19 and 20 in full no later than
January 11, 2013; Plaintiff is, however, entitled to redact any portions of the documents that contain
Fickling’s own confidential information.
5.
Defendant’s Request for Production No. 24
Defendant’s Request for Production No. 24 seeks three years of Plaintiff’s telephone records
to verify that Plaintiff spoke with other Target employees following her termination. (Docket no.
45 at 13-14.) Plaintiff argues that the request is overbroad and irrelevant. (Docket no. 51 at 7;
docket no. 70 at 12.) Defendant asserts that it is entitled to the records to verify that the
conversations took place and offers to allow Plaintiff to redact all other call records. (Docket no.
70 at 11-12.) Plaintiff responds that Defendant does not need three years of phone records to verify
three calls, that all of the people she spoke with have verified, through deposition testimony or
affidavits, that the conversations took place, and that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant would know
if these individuals called from a particular phone number. (Id. at 12.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Defendant has not articulated any reason to believe that
these calls may not have taken place, and all of the individuals with which Plaintiff claims to have
spoken appear to have verified that such a conversation occurred. Defendant’s request is a fishing
expedition and is not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Therefore, the Court will deny Defendant’s Motion with regard to Request for Production No. 24.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
a.
Defendant is ordered to answer Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 2 no later than January
11, 2013, but such response is limited to Team Leaders (identified by team member
number only) at Store 777 from 2005 to 2006. In the alternative, Defendant may
stipulate in writing to Plaintiff that Defendant will not assert that Plaintiff
deceptively received a higher salary than would have otherwise been offered;
b.
Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 3 no later than January 11,
2013, for employees throughout district 0135 from January 1, 2006 through
December 31, 2009; to the extent that Plaintiff’s current Interrogatory No. 3 requests
duplicative information, Defendant need not provide that information again;
c.
Defendant is ordered to respond to Plaintiff’s Request for Production Nos. 4, 5, and
6 in full no later than January 11, 2013, but such response is limited to documents
related to Store 0777 for incidents where the employee left the store unsecured,
locked someone in the store, or otherwise engaged in conduct similar to Plaintiff
from 2005 through 2010;
d.
To the extent that Defendant has produced all responsive information to Plaintiff’s
Request for Production Nos. 4, 5, or 6, the Defendant is ordered to serve Plaintiff
with a response stating the same no later than January 11, 2013;
e.
Plaintiff’s Motion with regard to Request for Production No. 3 is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Compel is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART as follows:
a.
In response to Defendant’s Request for Production No. 4, Plaintiff is ordered to
produce no later than January 11, 2013, any documents responsive to Defendant’s
requests related to property where Plaintiff is a joint owner, co-owner, or otherwise
is in possession, custody, or control of such documents; Plaintiff is, however, entitled
to redact any portions of the financial documents that pertain solely to Fickling.
b.
Plaintiff is ordered to respond to Defendant’s Request for Production Nos. 19 and 20
in full no later than January 11, 2013; Plaintiff is, however, entitled to redact any
portions of the documents that contain Fickling’s confidential information;
c.
Defendant’s Motion with respect to Request for Production Nos. 17, 20, 22, 23 and 24 is
DENIED.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), the parties have a period of fourteen days
from the date of this Order within which to file any written appeal to the District Judge as may be
permissible under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Dated: December 17, 2012
s/ Mona K. Majzoub
MONA K. MAJZOUB
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this Order was served upon Counsel of Record on this date.
Dated: December 17, 2012
s/ Lisa C. Bartlett
Case Manager
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