Potts et al v. Greenwell et al

Filing 50

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION re #46 Bill of Costs filed by Walbert Trucking, Inc. - Signed by Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub. (LBar)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RALEIGH POTTS, II,
and LAURA LEE POTTS
Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No.: 11-CV-15187

vs.

District Judge Bernard A. Friedman
Magistrate Judge Mona K. Majzoub

ROBERT J. GREENWELL,
R&B TRUCKING, and
WALBERT TRUCKING, INC.,
Defendants.
_____________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of an automobile accident between two tractor trailers. (See
docket no. 1 at 3.) Plaintiff Raleigh Potts, II, alleges that he suffered severe injuries when Defendant
Greenwell rear-ended him on November 26, 2008. (Id.) Plaintiff Laura Lee Potts joins in her
husband’s suit and alleges a Loss of Consortium resulting from the accident. (Id. at 6.) In a March
13, 2014 Opinion and Order, the undersigned granted Defendant Walbert Trucking’s Motion to
Compel [36], including Defendant’s request for reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 37(A)(5)(a). (Docket no. 44.) On April 10, 2014, Defendant’s counsel submitted a Bill
of Costs. (Docket no. 46.) The Court now issues this Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A).
I.

Recommendation

The undersigned recommends that Defendant Walbert Trucking be awarded reasonable costs
and attorneys fees in the amount of $600.00, payable by Plaintiff Raleigh Potts, II, to Defendant’s
counsel within 21 days.
II.

Report
A.

Procedural History

This matter was initially before the Court on Defendant Walbert Trucking, Inc.’s Motion to
Compel Discovery Responses from Plaintiff Raleigh Potts, II. (Docket no. 36.) On May 14, 1013,
Walbert Trucking served Plaintiff Raliegh Potts, II, with its “Interrogatories Directed to Plaintiff
Raleigh Potts, II.” (See docket no. 36-2.) Plaintiff failed to respond and failed to object, and on
June 18, 2013, Defendants’ counsel sent Plaintiffs’ counsel a letter indicating that he had not yet
received Plaintiff’s response to the interrogatories. (Docket no. 36-3.) The parties’ attorneys spoke
on October 1, 2013, but they did not reach a resolution. (Docket no. 36 at 2.) Defendant filed its
Motion, and despite having more than seven months of notice, Plaintiff filed no response. (See
docket no. 44 n.1.) The Court granted Defendant’s Motion in part with respect to its Interrogatories
to Plaintiff but denied its Motion with respect to any request for documents; Defendant had not
properly served such requests under Fed. R. Civ. P. 34. (Docket no. 44.) Pursuant to the Court’s
Order, Defendant’s counsel submitted a Bill of Costs seeking a total of $600.00 for three hours of
work. (Docket no. 46.) Plaintiff has filed no objection.
B.

Attorney Fees Standard

Rule 37(a)(5)(A) authorizes the Court to order the payment of “the reasonable expenses
incurred [by the moving party] in making the motion, including attorney’s fees.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(A). To calculate a reasonable attorney’s fees award, courts use the “lodestar method,”

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which requires the court to multiply a reasonable hourly rate by the reasonable number of hours
worked. Ellison v. Balinski, 625 F.3d 953, 960 (6th Cir. 2010). The Court “has broad discretion to
determine what constitutes a reasonable hourly rate for an attorney.” Hett, 2011 WL 740460, at *2
(quoting Wayne v. Vill. of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 533 (6th Cir. 1994). But “[a]ccording to the law
of this circuit, [the court] is required to adjust attorney fee rates to the local market rates for
attorneys.” Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F.Supp.2d 625, 647 (W.D.Mich. 1998) (citing Hadix v.
Johnson, 65 F.3d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1995)). In addition, the court considers the following factors
when calculating the reasonableness of attorney fees: (1) the professional standing and experience
of the attorney; (2) the skill, time and labor involved; (3) the amount in question and the results
achieved; (4) the difficulty of the case; (5) the expenses incurred; and (6) the nature and length of
the professional relationship with the client. Miller v. Alldata Corp., 14 Fed. Appx. 457, 468 (6th
Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court has also provided guidance:
The most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable
hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial
estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services. The party seeking an award of fees
should submit evidence supporting the hours worked and rates claimed. Where the
documentation is inadequate, the district court may reduce the award accordingly.
The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were
not “reasonably expended.” S.Rep. No. 94-1011, p. 6 (1976). Cases may be
overstaffed, and the skill and experience of lawyers vary widely. Counsel for the
prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours
that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a lawyer in private
practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission[.]
Hensley v. Eckerhard, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
C.

Analysis

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Defendant’s Counsel, Mark Roberts, seeks an hourly rate of $200.00 per hour. (Docket no.
46 at 2.) As noted, Plaintiff has not objected to Attorney Roberts’s request. Moreover, the
undersigned finds that Attorney Roberts’s hourly rate is reasonable and within local market rates.
With regard to the number of hours expended, Attorney Roberts asserts that he spent two hours
preparing the initial Motion to Compel and another hour reviewing the other filings related to the
Motion, including the Court’s Order. (Id. at 1-2.) Again, the undersigned finds this request
reasonable, particularly with no outstanding objections from Plaintiff.
D.

Conclusion

For the reasons indicated herein, the Court recommends awarding total costs and fees to
Defendant in the amount of $600.00
III.

Notice to Parties Regarding Objections
The parties to this action may object to and seek review of this Report and Recommendation,

but are required to act within fourteen (14) days of service of a copy hereof as provided for in 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2). Failure to file specific objections constitutes a
waiver of any further right of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Howard v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th
Cir. 1981). Filing of objections which raise some issues but fail to raise others with specificity, will
not preserve all the objections a party might have to this Report and Recommendation. Willis v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991); Smith v. Detroit Fed’n Of
Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(d)(2),
a copy of any objections is to be served upon this Magistrate Judge.

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Any objections must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” etc. Any objection must
recite precisely the provision of this Report and Recommendation to which it pertains. Not later
than fourteen days after service of an objection, the opposing party must file a concise response
proportionate to the objections in length and complexity. The response must specifically address
each issue raised in the objections, in the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,”
“Response to Objection #2,” etc.

Dated: May 29, 2014

s/ Mona K. Majzoub
MONA K. MAJZOUB
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of this Report and Recommendation was served upon Counsel
of Record on this date.

Dated: May 29, 2014

s/ Lisa C. Bartlett
Case Manager

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