Meadows v. Carpenters' Pension Trust Fund - Detroit and Vicinity et al

Filing 22

OPINION AND ORDER granting 13 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ESTATE OF BILLIE JOE MEADOWS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 11-15686
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

CARPENTERS’ PENSION TRUST FUND DETROIT AND VICINITY, and
JOAN MEADOWS,
Defendants.
____________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CARPENTER’S PENSION
TRUST FUND - DETROIT AND VICINITY’S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on December 29, 2011, seeking an injunction barring the
Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund – Detroit and Vicinity (“Fund”) from paying certain
benefits to Defendant Joan Meadows (“Ms. Meadows”) and a declaratory judgment that
Plaintiff is entitled to those benefits. Presently before the Court is the Fund’s motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, filed pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6),
respectively, on January 20, 2012.
Plaintiff filed a response to the Fund’s motion to dismiss on February 8, 2012.
The Fund filed a reply brief on February 22, 2012. The Court concludes that oral
argument will not aid in its adjudication of the matter and therefore is dispensing with
oral argument pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f). For the reasons

that follow, the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action
and thus Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed without prejudice. Absent jurisdiction,
this Court has no authority to address the Fund’s alternative argument that Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
I.

Standards Applicable to Rule 12(b)(1) Motions
Motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)

fall into two categories: facial attacks and factual attacks. United States v. Ritchie, 15
F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit described these two categories of
motions:
A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of the
pleading itself. On such motion, the court must take the
material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party . . . A factual
attack, on the other hand, is not a challenge to the sufficiency
of the pleading’s allegations, but a challenge to the factual
existence of subject matter jurisdiction. On such a motion, no
presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations . . .
and the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as
to the existence of its power to hear the case.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original). It is the plaintiff’s burden to
demonstrate that the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter. RMI Titanium Co. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F3.d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
The Fund is raising a facial attack to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
(See Fund’s Br. in Support of Mot. at 4.)

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II.

Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is the Estate of Billie Joe Meadows. Billie Joe Meadows (“Mr.

Meadows”), now deceased, was employed as a millwright and was a member of a union.
(Compl. ¶ 8.) As such, he was eligible to receive certain retirement and pension benefits
administered by the Fund. (Id. ¶ 9.) Mr. Meadows married Ms. Meadows on October 21,
1993. (Id. ¶ 10.) Mr. Meadows had one child from a previous marriage named Deborah
Meadows. (Id. ¶ 11.)
In 1995, Mr. Meadows retired and elected a 50% joint and survivor benefit, with
Ms. Meadows as beneficiary. (Id. ¶ 12; Fund’s Mot. Ex. 1.) On October 24, 2008, Mr.
Meadows and Ms. Meadows were divorced pursuant to a Judgment of Divorce entered by
the Circuit Court for Wayne County, Michigan. (Id. ¶ 2, Ex. 2.) Paragraph thirty-four of
the Judgment of Divorce reads in relevant part: “The parties shall retain their own in any
pension benefits, IRAs, and profit sharing plans, deferred compensation plans, including
any other 401K, defined benefit plans, or other retirement funds, or stock as their sole and
separate property free from any right, title or interest of the other party.” (Id. Ex. 2 ¶ 34.)
On November 15, 2006, Mr. Meadows executed his Last Will and Testament in
which he named his daughter, Deborah Meadows, as the personal representative of his
estate. (Compl. ¶ 2; Ex. 1.) Mr. Meadow also declared that he was leaving his entire
estate to his daughter. (Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Meadows died on October 29, 2011. (Compl.
¶ 16.)
On December 29, 2011, Plaintiff initiated this action to contest Ms. Meadows’
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right to retain survivor benefits from the Fund. In the Complaint, Plaintiff invokes federal
subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, alleging that “[t]his action
concerns pension rights and issues arising under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”) . . ..” (Id. ¶ 5.) Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Meadows waived all of
her rights and interest in pension benefits from the Fund in the Judgment of Divorce. (Id.
¶ 32.) Nevertheless, Plaintiff acknowledges that, pursuant to ERISA, the Fund “is
required to pay the survivor benefits in accordance with the plan documents which it
possesses”– i.e., to Ms. Meadows. (Id. ¶ 24.) Alleging that there is a “serious danger that
she [Ms. Meadows] will use, dissipate, destroy or hide these monies preventing any future
recovery” (id. ¶ 27), Plaintiff asks the Court to order the payment of the benefits into a
constructive trust and to declare that Ms. Meadows waived her rights to the benefits and
that they must be released to Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 34.)
On the date the Complaint was filed, Plaintiff also filed an ex parte motion for a
temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to enjoin the Fund from paying Ms. Meadows the
survivor benefits or otherwise dissipating or disposing of those benefits. This Court
granted the motion and entered a TRO on December 30, 2011, in which it also ordered
Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. (Doc. 6.)
On January 30, 2012, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation at an earlier hearing attended by
Ms. Meadows and attorneys for Plaintiff and the Fund, the TRO was extended “until
further Order of this Court.” (Doc. 19.)
The Fund and Ms. Meadows filed responses to the show cause order on January 16
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and 25, 2012, respectively. As indicated above, the Fund also filed the pending motion to
dismiss.
III.

Analysis
The Fund’s argument in its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), in its

essence, is that this is not an action brought pursuant to ERISA because Plaintiff lacks
standing under ERISA. The Fund therefore contends that Plaintiff’s claim for a
constructive trust is not properly brought in federal court; and in fact, the Court lacks a
basis to assert federal subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
As Plaintiff acknowledges in its response brief, “ERISA’s civil enforcement
provisions, set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a), provide the exclusive remedy for participants
or beneficiaries to enforce their rights under an ERISA plan.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3.) In
fact, § 1132 grants the right to sue under ERISA to the following “persons,” only:
participants, beneficiaries, fiduciaries, and the Secretary of Labor. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a). Plaintiff further acknowledges in its response brief that it is not a participant
or beneficiary with respect to the plan, and it clearly is not a fiduciary or the Secretary of
Labor either. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3.) Thus Plaintiff lacks standing to bring this civil action
under ERISA.
Plaintiff actually appears to acknowledge in its response brief, contrary to the
assertions in its Complaint, that this is not an action concerning issues arising under
ERISA. For Plaintiff “agrees” in its response to the Fund’s motion that the Fund, in
accordance with ERISA, “must pay the benefits to Joan Meadows as the last named
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beneficiary and according to the plan documents.” (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 3.) As such, there
is no dispute in this case as to which party, under ERISA, is entitled to the benefits at
issue. In short, this is not an ERISA action. Rather, it is a claim to determine whether
Ms. Meadows waived her right to the pension benefits in the Judgment of Divorce; and if
so, whether those benefits should be placed in a constructive trust once they are paid to
Ms. Meadows and then transferred to Plaintiff. Contrary to Plaintiff’s misunderstanding,
the Fund is not contending that ERISA preempts Plaintiff’s claim for a constructive trust.
However it does not necessarily follow, as Plaintiff asserts in its response brief, that “this
[federal] Court has jurisdiction to decide . . . [Plaintiff’s] constructive trust claim.” (Id.)
“‘Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial
decree.’” Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Life Ins. Co., 632 F.3d 250, 255 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994)). Pursuant to this authority, federal courts have the power to adjudicate claims
“arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or where there is
complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. While
federal courts are authorized to exercise jurisdiction under other circumstances, see U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-1369, none of those circumstances appear to apply
in this case. As set forth earlier, it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate that this Court has
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
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Plaintiff invokes § 1332 and cites to ERISA. As discussed above, however, this
action does not arise under ERISA. As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth a
basis for this Court to exercise federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant Carpenters’ Pension Trust Fund - Detroit and
Vicinity’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction is GRANTED and
Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Date: March 5, 2012

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies to:
Thomas L. Stroble, Esq.
Mitchell H. Boardman, Esq.
Edward J. Pasternak, Esq.
Joan Meadows
c/o Joseh C. McCulley
4215 West Main Street
Kalamazoo, MI 49006

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