Lapkewych v. Michigan Attorney General's Office

Filing 10

ORDER Accepting 7 Report and Recommendation, Granting 3 defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Dismissing Case. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

RONALD P. LAPKEWYCH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-CV-10068
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH

v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN - BILL
SCHUETTE, in his official capacity
as Michigan Attorney General,
Defendant.
_____________________________/

ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (#7), GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (#3), AND DISMISSING CASE
Plaintiff is the owner of an automobile that is insured under Michigan law. In 2009,
plaintiff’s daughter was driving this automobile, with plaintiff’s consent, when it struck
another vehicle and physically injured the other driver. Although plaintiff was not driving
the vehicle when the collision occurred, the injured driver sued plaintiff in the Wayne
County Circuit Court under Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.401(1), which provides:
The owner of a motor vehicle is liable for an injury caused by the negligent
operation of the motor vehicle . . . [whenever] the motor vehicle is being
driven with his or her express or implied consent or knowledge. It is
presumed that the motor vehicle is being driven with the knowledge and
consent of the owner if it is being driven by . . . [an] immediate member of
the family.
On January 6, 2012, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed this lawsuit against the State of
Michigan and its Attorney General, Bill Schuette, challenging the constitutionality of both
this statute and Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.402(a) (establishing a presumption that in rearend collisions, the driver of the rear car is prima facie guilty of negligence). The case was
referred to Magistrate Judge Randon for all pre-trial matters. On February 6, 2012,
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defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Plaintiff filed a response to the motion and a hearing
was held.

On April 12, 2012, Magistrate Judge Randon issued a report and

recommendation. Magistrate Judge Randon recommended that defendant’s motion to
dismiss be granted because the Younger abstention doctrine applies and, alternatively,
because plaintiff failed to state a claim. On April 20, 2012, plaintiff filed objections to the
report and recommendation. For the reasons set forth below, the court overrules plaintiff’s
objections and adopts Magistrate Judge Randon’s report and recommendation as to the
application of the Younger abstention doctrine. Because abstention is proper, the court
need not address whether plaintiff failed to state a claim.
Standard of Review
“A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of a
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” Id.
Analysis
The Younger abstention doctrine provides that federal courts should abstain from
deciding matters when there is an ongoing state action in which “the moving party has an
adequate remedy at law.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971). The doctrine is
based on the notion of comity and is designed “to allow the State an opportunity to set its
own house in order when the federal issue is already before a state tribunal.” Ohio Bureau
of Employment Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1977) (internal citations omitted).
A federal court considers three factors in determining whether abstention is appropriate:
“(1) whether the underlying proceedings constitute an ongoing judicial proceeding, (2)
whether the proceedings implicate an important state interest, and (3) whether there is an
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adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise a constitutional challenge.” Fieger
v. Cox, 524 F.3d 770, 775 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff objects to each prong of the Younger
abstention test being met.
First, plaintiff contends that the Wayne County matter does not constitute an
ongoing judicial proceeding because the State of Michigan is not a party to that case. It
is true that “Younger abstention is generally an issue where the state is the plaintiff in the
state case and the defendant in the federal proceeding and the federal plaintiff is the
defendant in the state case.” Executive Arts Studio, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 179
F.Supp.2d 759, 759 (W.D. Mich. 2001). However, this commonality is not a requirement.
See Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Ky. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 1986 WL 16708, at *3 (6th Cir. March
24, 1986) (per curiam) (holding that “[f]ormal denominations of plaintiff and defendant
should not be applied mechanically” in the context of Younger abstention). The Supreme
Court has held that even when a state court proceeding is between private parties, the
state’s interest can be sufficient as to require Younger abstention. Penzoil v. Texaco, 481
U.S. 1, 17 (1987). Because that is the case here, plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
Second, plaintiff again uses the fact that the state is not a party to the underlying
state action to argue that no important state interest can be implicated. However, it has
been clearly established that a state can have an important interest in cases between
private parties. Id. at 13-14. Here, Magistrate Judge Randon found such an important
interest in Michigan’s ability to maintain its system of negligence law. (R&R 10, citing Berry
v. Seeley, 2:10-CV-162, 2010 WL 5184883 *6 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 15 2010)). Similarly,
courts have recognized an important interest in a state’s ability to administer its judicial
system. See Middlesex County Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432

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(1982). For both of these reasons, plaintiff’s argument that no state interest is implicated
fails and the objection is overruled.
Finally, plaintiff objects to his having the opportunity to raise a constitutional
challenge in state court. This objection is without merit. As Magistrate Judge Randon
found, it is not enough that plaintiff’s current attorney refuses to raise the challenges in
state court. (R&R 8.) The Supreme Court has established that the burden “rests on the
federal plaintiff to show that state procedural law barred presentation of [his] claims” and
that “when a litigant has not attempted to present his federal claims in related state-court
proceedings, a federal court should assume that state procedures will afford an adequate
remedy, in the absence of unambiguous authority to the contrary.” Penzoil, 481 U.S. at
14-15. In the absence of such authority, plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the court overrules plaintiff’s objections and adopts
Magistrate Judge Randon’s report and recommendation as to the application of the
Younger abstention doctrine. Because abstention is proper, the court need not address
whether plaintiff failed to state a claim. Plaintiff’s complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: July 31, 2012
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record and
on Ronald P. Lapkewych, 15725 Kingsley Street, Southgate,
MI 48195, on July 31, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Barbara Radke
Deputy Clerk

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