Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield, Charter Township of et al

Filing 218

OPINION AND ORDER granting 106 Motion for Summary Judgment; finding as moot 114 Motion to Limit Damages ; denying 121 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Without Prejudice. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MUSLIM COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION OF ANN ARBOR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-CV-10803

v.

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP,
Defendant.
________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and (3)
DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT DEFENDANT’S MOTION
TO LIMIT DAMAGES
I. INTRODUCTION
Defendant Pittsfield Charter Township (“the Township”), through its
Planning Commission and Board of Trustees, denied a rezoning application
submitted by Plaintiff Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, doing
business as Michigan Islamic Academy (“MIA”). According to MIA, the denial of
the rezoning application means that it cannot build a new Islamic school on
property within Pittsfield Township that it wishes to utilize for that purpose. MIA
claims that the Township’s decision to deny the rezoning application was based on
hostility toward Islam, and asserts claims under the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. and the
United States Constitution. MIA also brings pendent state law claims under the
Michigan Constitution.
The sole remaining Defendant is Pittsfield Charter Township. The claims
that remain are brought under: (1) RLUIPA’s substantial burden clause; (2)
RLUIPA’s antidiscrimination clause; (3) RLUIPA’s equal terms clause; (4) the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
and its Michigan Constitution counterpart; and (5) the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and its Michigan
Constitution counterpart.
On July 14, 2014, the Township moved for summary judgment and MIA
moved for partial summary judgment. The Township seeks summary judgment on
each of MIA’s five remaining claims; MIA seeks summary judgment on only its
claim under RLUIPA’s substantial burden clause. Additionally, the Township
filed a motion asking the Court to limit, as a matter of law, any damages to which
MIA may be entitled in this lawsuit. The Township asks the Court to resolve its
damages motion only if some of MIA’s remaining claims survive the Township’s
summary judgment motion.
All three motions are fully briefed. Pursuant to E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2), the
Court will decide the motions without oral argument. For the reasons that follow,
2

the Court will grant the Township’s motion for summary judgment subject to
certain caveats, deny MIA’s motion for partial summary judgment without
prejudice, and deny as moot without prejudice the Township’s motion to limit
damages.
II. BACKGROUND1
MIA is a school providing secular and Islamic religious education to
preschool through twelfth grade students. MIA’s current building is located in
Ann Arbor, Michigan, in a 10,000-square-foot facility that MIA feels is inadequate
to meet the school’s current needs.

Specifically, the space is too small to

accommodate growing enrollment numbers, and there is no room for basic
facilities such as a cafeteria, library, science lab, computer room, or an outdoor
play area. To alleviate these space concerns and better accommodate its students,
MIA began exploring expansion and relocation options.
MIA considered the possibility of expanding its current facility in 2009.
However, MIA decided not to pursue expansion at that time after learning that
expansion would be limited to a total building size of 13,496 square feet, which
was still not deemed large enough to fully alleviate the space concerns prompting
1

In lieu of detailing all pertinent background facts in this initial background
section, the Court sets forth a general outline of the pertinent events that occurred
leading up to this lawsuit and discusses additional facts later, as they become
relevant to the legal issues discussed. As the background facts contained in this
initial background section are undisputed, the Court dispenses with citations to the
record.
3

the need for expansion. MIA also considered buying and moving into the Ardis
Elementary School in Ypsilanti, Michigan, but that idea did not materialize.
MIA then considered building a new school. Tarek Nahlawi, an MIA board
member at the time, led MIA’s efforts to find a suitable tract of land on which to
construct a new school.

Nahlawi located a parcel of property in Pittsfield

Township (“the property”). The property, located at the intersection of Ellsworth
Road and Golfside Drive, is approximately 26.7 acres in size, undeveloped, and
zoned as a “planned unit development” (“PUD”) under Article 45 of the Pittsfield
Township Zoning Ordinance in effect at the time (“Township Zoning
Ordinance”).2
Specifically, the property is part of the “Silverleaf PUD,” which was
“approved in the early 1990s as a mixed housing project consisting of a singlefamily lot subdivision and single-family detached condominiums.” 6/8/11 Revised
PUD Area Plan Review (ECF No. 106-7 Page ID 1714).
2

In addition, the

In general, PUDs
permit flexibility in the regulation of land development, encourage
innovation in land use and variety in design, layout, and type of
structures constructed, achieve economy and efficiency in the use of
land, natural resources, energy, and the provision of public services
and utilities, encourage useful open space, and provide better housing,
employment, and shopping opportunities particularly suited to the
needs of the residents of this state.

Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3503(2); see also Township Zoning Ordinance § 45.01
(ECF No. 111-12 Page ID 3094).
4

Township’s general (master) development plan designates the property for
“suburban residential use,” which means that the property can “accommodate
ancillary uses such as . . . small-scale churches and small-scale schools.” Id. (Page
ID 1721). The term “small-scale school” is not defined in the Township Zoning
Ordinance.
Before purchasing the property, Issa Said met with Mandy Grewal, the
Township’s supervisor, to discuss the possibility of building a school and
community center on the property. Said is a board member of Hidaya Muslim
Community Association (“HMCA”), a domestic non-profit corporation whose
purpose is to facilitate greater ties between the Islamic community and the secular
community, thereby “opening up what Islam is really about through the
community, rather than through media.” Said Dep. at 8 (ECF No. 129 Page ID
5040). Said hoped to glean the Township’s preliminary thoughts on the possibility
of building a school and community center on PUD-zoned land within the
Township. Said left the meeting with the impression that Grewal was in favor of
the project and “invited the idea.” Id. at 19-23 (Page ID 5011-55).
On September 13, 2010, following his meeting with Grewal, Said bought the
property at a foreclosure sale for $260,000. Although Said bought the property in
his own name, he later sold it to North American Investment Properties, LLC
(“NAIP”) for $1.00 and, on December 21, 2012, NAIP sold the property for $1.00
5

to HMCA. HMCA presently owns the property. MIA does not own, and has
never owned, the property, although Said testified that MIA has “permission to
utilize [the] property” to build a new school. Id. at 62-63 (Page ID 5094-95).
After Said bought the property, MIA began the process of securing the
approval of the Township’s zoning authorities to build its school. As mentioned,
the property was zoned as a PUD. In the view of Paul Montagno, the Township’s
senior planner, MIA “would have to . . . go through the rezoning process” because
the property was zoned as a PUD district and PUDs “[do] not specifically allow for
a school.” Montagno Dep. at 10 (ECF No. 189 Page ID 8332). The Township’s
Zoning Ordinance sets forth the procedures for amending a PUD, differentiating
between “major” changes and “minor” changes. See Township Zoning Ordinance
§ 52.12 (ECF No. 111-12 Page ID 3121). Requests for a major change, which is
defined in pertinent part as a change to the “concept” or “character” of the
development, id. § 52.12(C) (Page ID 3121), are initially reviewed by the
Township’s Planning Commission and subsequently approved or rejected by the
Township Board of Trustees. Id. §§ 52.07(A)(5)-(6), 52.12(A) (Page ID 3115-16,
3121).3 Requests for a minor change, by contrast, are decided by the Planning

3

The Planning Commission is comprised of seven members, each of whom is
appointed to a term of three years. “The Planning Commission is responsible for
developing the township master plan and the township zoning ordinance that
protects and enhances the public health, welfare, and safety.” Planning
6

Commission alone. Id. § 52.12(A) (Page ID 3121). MIA’s proposed change to the
PUD was deemed a major change.
Major changes to a PUD must satisfy the eleven standards listed in §
52.07(C) of the Township Zoning Ordinance.

Under the Township Zoning

Ordinance, the Planning Commission must undertake a study of the rezoning
petition, hold a public hearing, consider evidence with regard to each of the eleven
standards, and determine whether each standard is satisfied. See id. § 52.07(A),
(C) (Page ID 3115-16, 3118-19). After doing so, the Planning Commission must
submit a report to the Township Board of Trustees containing “the Planning
Commission’s analysis of the petition, findings regarding standards, suggested
conditions of approval, if applicable, and its recommendation.” Id. § 52.07(A)(5)
(Page ID 3116). The Township Board of Trustees must then “review the petition
and the reports . . . and shall approve or deny the petition.” Id. § 52.07(A)(6) (Page
ID 3116).

Commission,
PITTSFIELD
CHARTER
TWP.
MICH.,
mi.gov/index.aspx?NID=124 (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).

http://pittsfield-

The Township Board of Trustees is “an elected seven member board that governs
Pittsfield Charter Township.” “The board is comprised of the three full-time
administrative legislators: supervisor, clerk, and treasurer, along with four parttime legislative trustees who are each elected to serve a four year term, which
coincides with the presidential election cycle.” Board of Trustees, PITTSFIELD
CHARTER TWP. MICH., http://pittsfield-mi.gov/index.aspx?NID=118 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2015).
7

In accordance with Montagno’s view that MIA “would have to . . . go
through the rezoning process” in order to build a school on the property, MIA
submitted a petition for a zoning amendment on December 6, 2010, together with
an area plan prepared by its site planner, David Kubiske of David Arthur
Consultants, Inc. However, MIA does not believe that it was required to seek an
amendment to the PUD in order to build its school. As mentioned, in addition to
being zoned a PUD, which does not explicitly allow schools, the Township’s
general (master) development plan designates the property for “suburban
residential use,” which can accommodate “small-scale schools.” MIA believes
that its proposed school qualifies as a “small-scale school,” and that it was
therefore unnecessary to pursue an amendment to the PUD. However, MIA did
not, at the time, oppose the Township’s position that MIA was required to pursue
an amendment to the PUD. Rather, MIA followed the Township’s instructions and
submitted an amendment petition.
On January 5, 2011, a community planning firm employed by the Township,
Carlisle/Wortman Associates, Inc. (“CWA”), prepared a “planned unit
development amendment area plan review” in connection with MIA’s petition for
zoning amendment. CWA’s area plan notes that “[a] number of informational
items are deficient” and that “the site location and layout raise concerns,” and lists

8

seven items that should be addressed. 1/5/11 Area Plan (ECF No. 109-12 Page ID
2002).
The Planning Commission held meetings on MIA’s petition on January 13,
2011 and February 17, 2011. At the meetings, the Commission heard numerous
comments from members of the public, both for and against MIA’s petition. The
Commission also heard from Montagno and Kubiske, both of whom discussed
various aspects of the project. A reoccurring issue raised by members of the
public, the Planning Commission, and the site planners was the possibility that a
school at the contemplated location would exacerbate already significant traffic
and congestion problems in the area. At the end of the February 17 hearing, the
Planning Commission decided to defer action on MIA’s petition until after the
submission of further information by MIA, including a traffic impact study.
MIA’s site planner submitted a traffic impact study dated March 14, 2011,
along with a revised area plan. By letter dated March 29, 2011, the Planning
Commission informed MIA that it would seek comment from the Washtenaw
County Road Commission (“WCRC”) on the study. On April 1, 2011, Gary
Straight, WCRC’s permits and subdivision engineer, informed MIA that the study
“is not approved at this time,” raising several deficiencies with the study and
inviting MIA to submit a revised study addressing the deficiencies. 4/1/11 Letter

9

(ECF No. 110-3 Page ID 2301). MIA submitted a revised study dated April 11,
2011, which was subsequently approved by WCRC on April 18, 2011.
On April 13, 2011, CWA submitted a revised area plan. The revised plan
notes deficiencies with MIA’s proposed area plan, and lists ten items that should
be addressed. On June 8, 2011, CWA submitted another revision to its area plan,
this time noting that “the proposed project has been significantly improved” and
listing five “comments [that] can be addressed at the next stage of site plan
review.” 6/8/11 Area Plan (ECF No. 106-7 Page ID 1723).
The Planning Commission discussed MIA’s petition at its meeting on June
16, 2011. MIA’s site planner, David Kubiske, highlighted that WCRC approved
MIA’s revised traffic impact study and that traffic concerns were no longer an
issue. In addition, dozens of members of the public spoke for and against MIA’s
petition.

Many speaking against the petition continued to cite traffic and

congestion concerns. One member of the public stated that he “would just wish
that everyone in this room could have pledged allegiance to the flag of the United
States of America.” 6/16/11 Meeting Minutes (ECF No. 112-23 Page ID 3722).
One of the Planning Commissioners testified in her deposition that people in the
audience applauded after this statement was made, a reaction that “floored” and
“shocked” her, made her feel “ashamed to live in Pittsfield Township,” and caused
her to believe that “bias” may have motivated some of the public comments
10

opposing MIA’s petition. Harris Dep. at 70-71 (ECF No. 157 Page ID 6728-29).
Later in the meeting, the chairperson of the Planning Commission stated that
“[neither] Islam nor the character of the Michigan Islamic Academy is on trial
here” and urged members of the public to “speak more specifically to the issue”
and to “address their comments to the issue of the impact of the rezoning.”
6/16/11 Meeting Minutes (Page ID 3725).
Also at this meeting, the Commissioners debated the merits of MIA’s
petition, discussing (with input Montagno and Nahlawi) the eleven standards listed
in the Township Zoning Ordinance that must be satisfied before a major
amendment to a PUD can be approved. By a 3-2 vote, the Planning Commissions
passed a motion to “postpone action” on MIA’s petition and “direct staff to draft a
resolution recommending denial” of MIA’s petition. Id. (Page ID 3754-55).
The Planning Commission’s final meeting on MIA’s petition took place on
August 4, 2011. At this meeting, like the prior meetings, numerous members of
the public spoke both in favor of, and in opposition to, the petition. In addition,
Montagno and Nahlawi were present to answer the questions of the Planning
Commissioners, Kubiske addressed various site planning concerns, and MIA’s
attorney, Lena Masri, addressed the legal considerations that MIA deemed
pertinent to the decisionmaking process of the Planning Commission, along with

11

MIA’s position on the eleven standards that must be satisfied to amend a PUD.
8/4/11 Meeting Minutes (ECF No. 110-15 Page ID 2619).
Following Masri’s presentation, the Planning Commissioners discussed the
merits of the petition and the eleven requirements for a PUD amendment. The
Commissioners discussed, and voted on, each of the eleven requirements one-byone. One of the eleven standards requires that “[t]he proposed development shall
conform to the adopted general development plan.” Township Zoning Ordinance §
52.07(C)(1) (Page ID 3118). As part of the analysis on this requirement, the
Planning Commission discussed whether MIA’s proposed school qualified as a
“small-scale school,” ultimately concluding by a 3-2 vote that it does not. The
Planning Commission reasoned that MIA’s school would not be a “neighborhood
school,” but rather one with “a regional draw” where students would be “primarily
bussed or driven in from different areas.” 8/4/11 Meeting Minutes (Page ID 2652).
The meeting minutes reflect that one of the Planning Commissioners agreed with
this finding, one disagreed with it, and one questioned whether “small-scale”
should be defined based the residence of the students and stated that she “would
like to see a definition of small scale.” Id.

12

By a final vote of 3-2, the Planning Commission recommended to the
Township Board of Trustees that MIA’s petition be denied.4 The Township Board
of Trustees, at a meeting on October 26, 2011, voted 7-0 to adopt the Planning
Commission’s recommendation to deny MIA’s rezoning petition.
Deborah Williams was one of the three Planning Commissioners who voted
to recommend denial of MIA’s petition. Williams lived in the neighborhood in
which MIA proposed to build its school and was vehemently opposed to MIA’s
petition, so much so that she took it upon herself to both inform community
members about MIA’s petition and actively encourage them to oppose it. Williams
admitted in her deposition that she went from house to house in February 2011,
“knock[ing] on doors,” distributing to residents living near the site of MIA’s
proposed school a letter opposing MIA’s petition. Williams Dep. at 34-35 (ECF
No. 154 Page ID 6440-41).5 About four months later, Williams emailed area

4

Although there are seven members of the Planning Commission, only five voted
because two were absent at the August 4 meeting.
5

The letter reads:
PROPOSED SCHOOL AT THE CORNER OF ELLSWORTH AND
GOLFSIDE
I am writing to inform you that a group is trying to put a 200-400
child school on Ellsworth, across from Oak Dr., kitty corner from the
400 member school of Fortis Academy at the light at the intersection
of Ellsworth and Golfview. At the Planning Commission meeting 3
weeks ago, when this was on the agenda, 25 neighbors showed up in
13

residents expressing the same sentiments and again encouraging the public to
oppose MIA’s petition.6

Williams went a step further, as well; she coached

opposition, so the Planning Commission voted no. However, this
group, the Michigan Islamic Academy is determined to get their
school in that location. They showed up en masse at last night’s
meeting, pretty much the whole school, to encourage the Planning
Commission to reverse course, and allow them to do a traffic study
and change anything wanted [sic] so that this land could be rezoned
for their school.
The Planning Commission changed and voted to let them do a Traffic
study and work with the Planning Dept. for a plan pleasing to all. If
we don’t oppose this, we will have this school put here as this group
will keep pushing for it. I am not opposed to an Islamic school, per
se, just any school at this very busy corner.
I am looking for neighbors who oppose having another school at this
corner, to email/write a note to the Planning Commission at:
[e-mail].
Urge the Planning Commission to listen to the homeowners here and
keep this property residential, rather than re-zone it to allow a school.
Thanks, Debbie Williams
[e-mail]
First Undated Letter of Williams (ECF No. 191 Page ID 8464).
6

In the second letter, Williams stated that “4 MIA folks attended and spoke” in
favor of the petition at the Planning Commission’s June 16, 2011 meeting, but that
“[t]hankfully, my husband, Jeff Williams, also attended and spoke” in opposition
to the petition. Williams also noted that “[b]ecause the previous vote was so close
(3 to deny, and 2 to allow), it is very important to let neighbors and friends know to
attend this meeting, if they are opposed to having a school on this property.”
Williams concluded by encouraging those opposed to the petition to make their
opposition known: “If you know anyone who is opposed to the school . . . please
encourage them to write an email (or another email) to the Planning Commission
14

community members on how to effectively oppose the petition by sharing specific
talking points and arguments opposing the petition, attempted to create public
hostility towards MIA’s project, and urged others to adopt her views regarding the
merits of MIA’s petition.7
MIA brought this lawsuit on February 22, 2012. As stated, the statutory
claims that remain are brought under RLUIPA’s substantial burden, equal terms,
and nondiscrimination provisions, and the constitutional claims that remain are
brought under the Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses.
MIA alleges that the Township denied it the zoning authorization necessary
to build its school out of hostility for Islam and, in doing so, substantially burdened
the religious exercise of MIA and its students.

MIA further alleges that the

Township treated other entities, both religious and nonreligious, more favorably
(and the Township Board of Trustees as well).”
Williams (ECF No. 192 Page ID 8465).
7

Second Undated Letter of

The record contains numerous emails written by Williams sent to various
members of the community. Williams Emails (ECF No. 203 Page ID 9848-64). In
one email, Williams told a community member that MIA “ambushed” a Planning
Commission meeting. In another, Williams told community members that MIA’s
school would “change the character of our neighborhoods even though a small
scale school is ‘technically’ allowed in a residential district” and that “[w]e do not
want the rezoning due to the noise levels of 360 extra students (small scale?) on
top of the 750 already at Fortis Academy, the increased traffic burden, and the fact
that more people will be cutting through the neighborhoods.” Id. (Page ID 9851).
And in another, Williams told community members that it “would be wise for
some opposition to show up” at one of the Planning Commission meetings to
prevent the Planning Commissioners from being “swayed into changing their
vote.” Id. (Page ID 9852).
15

than it treated MIA, thereby creating a preference for nonreligious entities and nonIslamic religious entities, by subjecting MIA’s zoning request to more scrutiny and
more hurdles than the zoning requests of nonreligious and non-Islamic religious
entities. On July 14, 2014, the Township filed its motion for summary judgment
and MIA filed a motion for partial summary judgment.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to “grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A court assessing the appropriateness of summary judgment asks “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Amway
Distribs. Benefits Ass’n v. Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505,
2512 (1986)).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. RLUIPA Claims
As stated, the three statutory claims that remain are brought under
RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (prohibiting
governments from imposing “a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
16

substantial burden on . . . religious exercise”), equal terms provision, id. §
2000cc(b)(1) (prohibiting governments from imposing “a land use regulation in a
manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with
a nonreligious assembly or institution”), and nondiscrimination provision, id. §
2000cc(b)(2) (prohibiting governments from imposing “a land use regulation that
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or
religious denomination”).
Under the language of the statute, the government’s imposition of a “land
use regulation” is a necessary component of all three asserted RLUIPA claims. A
“land use regulation” is statutorily defined as
a zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that
limits or restricts a claimant’s use or development of land . . . if the
claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other
property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option to
acquire such an interest.
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5).

Therefore, as the Seventh Circuit has recognized,

RLUIPA land-use claimants must have some “legally recognized property interest”
in the land at issue. Taylor v. City of Gary, 233 F. App’x 561, 562 (7th Cir. 2007).
In Taylor, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a claim under
RLUIPA’s substantial burden provision, holding that a city’s decision to demolish
part of a church situated on property it owed, instead of giving it to the RLUIPA
plaintiff, a minister, was not a “land use regulation,” as the minister lacked “any
17

legally recognized property interest in [the church].” Id. at 562. Other courts have
similarly dismissed RLUIPA claims in situations where the plaintiff lacked a
legally cognizable interest in the subject property. See, e.g., Congregation Etz
Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. 10-1587, 2012 WL 11826032, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 17, 2012) (synagogue’s congregants lacked ability to bring RLUIPA land use
claim where subject land was owned by synagogue and not congregants);
Covenant Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, No. 06-CV-1994, 2008 WL
8866408, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 2008) (church’s pastor dismissed as plaintiff
from RLUIPA land use case where subject land was owned by church and not
pastor).
The Township argues that MIA has no legally cognizable interest in the
property and it is therefore entitled to summary judgment on all three remaining
RLUIPA claims.8 Although MIA now admits that it does not own the property and

8

The Township contends that, because MIA does not have a cognizable property
interest, it lacks Article III standing to bring its RLUIPA claims. However, as the
Second Circuit recently clarified, the issue is not one of Article III standing; it is
one of “statutory standing,” namely, “whether a statute grants a plaintiff a cause of
action.” Chabad Lubavitch of Litchfield Cnty., Inc. v. Litchfield Historic Dist.
Comm’n, 768 F.3d 183, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2014). MIA has Article III standing to
bring its RLUIPA claims, as it has alleged that it cannot build its school due to the
zoning actions of the Township – harm that this Court can redress.
18

has never owned the property, it argues that it has an interest in the property that is
sufficient under RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation.”9
The evidence submitted by the parties reveals that the property was bought
and sold three times between 2010 and 2014. On September 13, 2010, Issa Said
bought the property from the Federal Deposit Insurance Company at a foreclosure
sale for $260,000. Pittsfield Charter Township General Property Information (ECF
No. 112-24 Page ID 3781). On June 6, 2011, Issa Said and his wife sold the
property for $1.00 to NAIP. 6/11/11 Warranty Deed (ECF No. 106-10 Page ID
1740). Finally, on December 21, 2012, NAIP sold the property for $1.00 to
HMCA. 12/21/12 Warranty Deed (ECF No. 106-10 Page ID 1742). HMCA
presently owns the property.
Although MIA does not own the property, this does not end the inquiry, as
RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(5), makes
clear that nearly any type of property interest will suffice so long as the interest is
legally cognizable.

See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g) (mandating that the

provisions of RLUIPA “be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious
exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the
9

In its second amended complaint, MIA states that it “purchased the subject
property at a foreclosure auction on September 13, 2010, in the amount of
$260,000.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47 (ECF No. 61 Page ID 816). However, in its
summary judgment papers, MIA does not take the position that it now owns, or has
ever owned, the property.
19

Constitution”); Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 860 (2015) (characterizing RLUIPA
as an “expansive protection for religious liberty”). MIA contends that it has a
sufficient interest in the property because it has “permission [from the owner] to
utilize the property” to build a school. MIA Resp. Br. at 90 (ECF No. 185 Page ID
8038). The Court agrees that permission to utilize property certainly could suffice
as a property interest, but only if the permission is conferred in a way that is
recognized by the law. See Taylor, 233 F. App’x at 562 (requiring RLUIPA land
use claimant to have a “legally recognized property interest” in the land at issue).
Because the property at issue is located in Michigan, Michigan law will determine
whether MIA’s interest in the property is “legally recognized.”
Under Michigan law, “[a] conveyance of an interest in land must be in
writing and comport with the statute of frauds.” Marina Bay Condos., Inc. v.
Schlegel, 167 Mich. App. 602, 606, 423 N.W.2d 284, 287 (1988). The statute of
frauds requires that a conveyance in an interest of land, other than a lease not
exceeding one year, be in writing and signed by the grantor. Mich. Comp. Laws §
566.106. The record in this case contains no writing conveying any interest in the
property to MIA.
MIA contends that it has a right to receive at least five acres of the property
as a donation from NAIP and/or HMCA. MIA relies on the March 3, 2014
deposition of Issa Said, who testified that MIA would receive at least five acres of
20

the property as a donation from the property owner, whether it be himself, NAIP,
or HMCA, if MIA is permitted to build its school. Said Dep. at 61-63 (ECF No.
129 Page ID 5093-95). However, Said’s testimony cannot confer on MIA an
interest in the property. See Kitchen v. Kitchen, 465 Mich. 654, 660, 641 N.W.2d
245, 250 (2002) (“[The statute of frauds precludes an oral promise from forming
the basis of a claim to an interest in real property.”).
MIA also relies on a memorandum entitled “North American Investment
Properties, LLC Confidential Private Placement Memorandum.” See Confidential
Private Placement Memorandum (ECF No. 138). This memorandum was prepared
by NAIP for the use of potential investors of the property. The memorandum
provides that NAIP is offering ten investment units of the property for sale, with
each representing a 8.33% membership in NAIP, at a cost of $25,000 per unit. The
pertinent section of the memorandum is found on page four. Perplexingly, the
document contains two pages marked “Page 4,” both containing mostly the same
content, except that the specific provision that is relevant for the present purposes
is entirely omitted on the second “Page 4.”

The first “Page 4” contains the

following content:
After acquiring the real estate, [NAIP] will donate a portion of the
property to the Hidya Islamic Community Center. In addition, five
acres of the property will be donated to the Michigan Islamic
Academy, either by [NAIP] directly or by the Hidya Islamic
Community Center.
21

Id. (Page ID 5420) (emphasis added). The italicized sentence is omitted from the
second “Page 4,” and MIA does not explain the omission. Id. (Page ID 5421).
Even assuming that the first “Page 4” is the operative “Page 4” of the
memorandum, the italicized sentence does not confer on MIA an interest in the
property. The italicized sentence merely informs potential investors that five acres
of property will be donated to MIA; it does not purport to actually convey the
interest.

Moreover, even if the italicized language could be construed as

conveying an interest in the property to MIA, the memorandum is not signed by
the then-owner of the property (Said) or even by one of its future owners (NAIP or
HMCA); it fact, the memorandum is not signed by anyone at all.

The

memorandum does not convey an interest in the property to MIA.
MIA also relies on the Pittsfield Township “Petition for Zoning
Amendment” that it filed on December 6, 2010, requesting that the Township
rezone the property. See Petition for Zoning Amendment (ECF No. 136). The
petition contains an “applicant affidavit,” requiring the signature of the party
requesting rezoning, and a separate “owner affidavit,” requiring the signature of
the owner of the property. Tarek Nahlawi signed the “applicant affidavit” on
behalf of MIA, and Issa Said signed the “owner affidavit” on behalf of NAIP.10
MIA argues that the petition suggests that “the deed holders, at all times,
10

Contrary to Said’s representation, NAIP did not own the property at the time;
rather, Said owned it.
22

authorized [MIA] to proceed with the application, and . . . with the development of
the property.” MIA Resp. Br. at 92 (ECF No. 185 Page ID 8040). However, the
issue is not whether the property owner recognized MIA’s right to utilize the
property. Rather, the issue is whether the property owner conveyed some legally
cognizable interest in the property to MIA. The Petition for Zoning Amendment
does not convey to MIA any interest in the property.
In sum, MIA has not offered any evidence showing that it has, or ever had, a
legally cognizable interest in the property. In the briefing on this issue, MIA
conflates two issues, one of which is relevant and the other irrelevant. The first
issue, the irrelevant one, is whether MIA had permission in a colloquial sense to
utilize the property. It clearly did. The evidence offered by MIA and discussed
above shows that the owners of the property gave MIA permission to proceed with
its building project on their land. The second issue, the relevant one, is whether
the law of the State of Michigan recognizes as a property interest the permission
that MIA has been granted to use the property. This second issue is the relevant
one, and not the first, because the RLUIPA claims asserted by MIA require a
showing that the Township imposed a “land use regulation,” and a “land use
regulation” is a legal term requiring MIA to show that it has some interest in the
property that is recognized by the State of Michigan. MIA has offered no evidence
indicating that it has a legally cognizable interest in the property, even if it does
23

have the explicit informal permission of the land owner to proceed with its plan to
build a school. Notably, Tarek Nahlawi confirmed that, as of February 19, 2014,
the date of his deposition, no part of the property had actually been donated to
MIA. Nahlawi Dep. at 36 (ECF No. 128 Page ID 4982).
Although the parties do not raise the issue, the Court notes that the
permission granted to MIA to utilize the property here may constitute a license.
“A license grants permission to be on the land of the licensor without granting any
permanent interest in the realty.” Forge v. Smith, 458 Mich. 198, 210, 580 N.W.2d
876, 883 (1998). However, the Michigan Supreme Court has held that “[licenses]
are not considered interests in land.” Id. Moreover, a license has been held to
constitute an insufficient property interest under RLUIPA’s definition of “land use
regulation.” See E. End Eruv Ass’n, Inc. v. Vill. of Westhampton Beach, 828 F.
Supp. 2d 526, 540-41 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (concluding that plaintiffs, who were
granted a revocable license to use the subject land, held an insufficient property
interest under RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation”).
The Court also notes that this case is distinguishable from DiLaura v. Ann
Arbor Charter Township, 30 F. App’x 501 (6th Cir. 2002).

The RLUIPA

claimants there wanted to use a house as a religious retreat, hosting several guests
per week for the purposes of prayer and fellowship. An issue was whether one of
the claimants held a sufficient interest in the property under RLUIPA’s definition
24

of “land use regulation.” Although the claimant did not own the property, the
owner of the property agreed to donate the land to the claimant if the property
could be used for religious purposes. Importantly, the donation agreement between
the owner and the claimant was memorialized in a writing that was signed by the
owner. Id. at 503. Under these circumstances, the Sixth Circuit held that the
claimant’s interest in the property, although contingent, was sufficient under
RLUIPA. Id. at 507. DiLaura is factually distinguishable from the present case
because, while the claimant in DiLaura held an interest in the land that was
cognizable under the law, the same is not true here.
For these reasons, the Court must grant summary judgment in favor of the
Township with regard to MIA’s three remaining RLUIPA claims. Therefore,
MIA’s motion for partial summary judgment seeking summary judgment on one of
those claims will be denied. However, judgment will be entered in favor to the
Township on the RLUIPA claims without prejudice to either (1) MIA’s ability to
reassert the claims should it acquire a legally cognizable interest in the property, or
(2) the ability of another person or entity with a legally cognizable interest in the
property to assert the claims. The statute of limitations governing any potential
assertion or reassertion of the RLUIPA claims will be deemed tolled during the
pendency of the present action from February 22, 2012 until today, and preclusion

25

principles shall not present an impediment to the ability of MIA or another
person/entity from asserting or reasserting the RLUIPA claims.
B. RLUIPA and Constitutional Claims
The Township argues that MIA’s constitutional claims, along with its
RLUIPA claims, are unripe because the Township’s zoning authorizes have not
reached a final decision regarding the application of the zoning regulations to the
property.11 The Township asserts three theories in support of its argument. First, it
claims that its decision is not final because MIA was required to seek a variance
from the Zoning Board of Appeals after the Township Board of Trustees denied
MIA’s rezoning petition.12 Second, the Township argues that it did not reach a
final decision on MIA’s rezoning request because MIA failed to appeal to the
Zoning Board of Appeals the decision of the Township Board of Trustees denying
11

MIA’s constitutional claims are brought under the Establishment and Equal
Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution, and their analogs under the
Michigan Constitution. Michigan courts interpreting Michigan’s version of the
Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses apply the same legal standards as
federal courts interpreting those Clauses under the federal Constitution. See
Shepherd Montessori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 486 Mich. 311, 318,
783 N.W.2d 695, 697 (2010); Am. Atheists, Inc. v. City of Detroit Downtown Dev.
Auth., 567 F.3d 278, 301 (6th Cir. 2009).
12

The Zoning Board of Appeals is the body tasked with adjudicating variance
requests. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3604; Township Zoning Ordinance §
60.04 (ECF No. 111-12 Page ID 3216). It also hears appeals from decisions of the
Zoning Administrator. Township Zoning Ordinance §§ 60.07, 60.08 (ECF No.
111-12 Page ID 3220-21). The role of the Zoning Administrator is discussed in
more detail below.
26

MIA’s petition for a zoning amendment. Finally, the Township argues that MIA
was required to seek a decision from the Zoning Administrator on whether MIA
was required to submit a petition to amend the PUD and whether MIA’s proposed
school constitutes a “small-scale school” that would be permitted on the property
as it is presently zoned.
“Ripeness is a justiciability doctrine designed ‘to prevent the courts, through
avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the agencies from
judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.’” Nat’l Park Hospitality
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807, 123 S. Ct. 2026, 2030 (2003)
(quoting Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1515 (1967),
abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980
(1977)). “Haste makes waste, and the premature adjudication of legal questions
compels courts to resolve matters, even constitutional matters, that may with time
be satisfactorily resolved at the local level, and that may turn out differently in
different settings.” Miles Christi Religious Order v. Twp. of Northville, 629 F.3d
533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“To decide whether a dispute has ripened into an action amenable to and
appropriate for judicial resolution, we ask two questions: (1) is the dispute ‘fit’ for
27

a court decision in the sense that it arises in ‘a concrete factual context’ and
involves ‘a dispute that is likely to come to pass’? and (2) what are the risks to the
claimant if the federal courts stay their hand?” Id. (quoting Warshak v. United
States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir. 2008)). In the context of a land-use case such
as this one, the first question boils down to whether “the relevant administrative
agency resolve[d] the appropriate application of the zoning ordinance to the
property in dispute” or, phrased differently, whether “‘the government entity
charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding
the application of the regulations to the property at issue,’” id. at 537-38 (quoting
Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172, 186, 105 S. Ct. 3108, 3116 (1985)), and the second question focuses on
whether the land-use plaintiff has “shown that it will suffer any hardship by
delaying a federal court decision until the zoning [authorities] act[].” Id. at 538.
This ripeness inquiry applies not only to RLUIPA claims, but also to constitutional
challenges to land-use requirements. See id. at 537; Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox
Twp., 544 F.3d 609, 618 (6th Cir. 2008).
The Township first asserts that MIA’s claims are unripe because MIA was
required to seek a variance from the Zoning Board of Appeals after the Township
Board of Trustees, adopting the recommendation of the Planning Commission,
denied MIA’s rezoning petition. See Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d
28

584, 587 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[A] zoning determination cannot be deemed final until
the plaintiffs have applied for, and been denied, a variance.”). However, the
Township does not clarify what type of variance it thinks MIA should have sought
and why. Although two kinds of variances – “use” and “nonuse” – are recognized
under Michigan law, see generally Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3604, the Township
Zoning Ordinance authorizes only nonuse variances:
The Board of Appeals shall have the power and duty to authorize . . .
such nonuse variances from the provisions of this ordinance. . . .
Under no circumstances shall the Board of Appeals grant a variance to
allow a use not permissible under the terms of this ordinance in the
district involved.
Township Zoning Ordinance § 60.04 (Page ID 3216, 3218). See also id. § 2.02
(Page ID 2978) (defining “variance” as “a relaxation of the terms of the zoning
ordinance where such variance will not be contrary to the public interest and where
. . . a literal enforcement of the ordinance would result in unnecessary and undue
hardship,” but cautioning that “a variance is authorized only for height, area and
size of yards and open spaces and parking space; establishment or expansion of a
use otherwise prohibited shall not be allowed by variance.”).13 The Township does
not explain how a nonuse variance, the only type of variance available under the

13

Under Michigan law, local government units such as the Township are not
required to entertain requests for use variances: “The authority to grant use
variances . . . is permissive, and this section does not require a local unit of
government to adopt ordinance provisions to allow for the granting of use
variances.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3604(11).
29

Township Zoning Ordinance, could help MIA and provide it with relief from the
decision of the Township Board of Trustees to deny MIA’s rezoning petition.
Accordingly, MIA was not required to seek a variance to ripen its claims. See
Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A
property owner . . . will be excused from obtaining a final decision if . . . seeking a
variance would be futile. That is, a property owner need not pursue [a variance]
when a zoning agency lacks discretion to grant variances.”). Here, the Zoning
Board of Appeals lacked authority to grant MIA the kind of variance it needed to
obtain what it desired. MIA did not have to needlessly seek the unobtainable.
Second, the Township argues that it did not reach a final decision on MIA’s
rezoning request, and therefore the claims asserted in this lawsuit are not ripe,
because MIA failed to appeal to the Zoning Board of Appeals the decision of the
Township Board of Trustees denying MIA’s petition for a zoning amendment. As
MIA correctly points out, however, the Zoning Board of Appeals lacks authority to
review the decision of the Township Board of Trustees denying a petition for
zoning amendment. Petitions seeking an amendment to a PUD are governed by §§
52.12 and 52.07 of the Township Zoning Ordinance, which together provide that
major amendments are decided by the Township Board of Trustees following a
study by the Planning Commission. Michigan’s Zoning Enabling Act provides
that “an appeal [of a PUD decision] may be taken to the zoning board of appeals
30

only if provided for in the zoning ordinance,” Mich. Comp. Laws § 125.3603(1),
and the Township Zoning Ordinance does not authorize such an appeal. Because
finality does not require MIA to pursue relief that is not available to it under the
pertinent zoning regulations, MIA’s failure to appeal the decision of the Township
Board of Trustees denying MIA’s rezoning petition does not render the claims
brought in this lawsuit unripe.
Finally, the Township argues that, to ripen its claims, MIA was required to
seek a decision from the Zoning Administrator on whether MIA was required to
file a petition to amend the PUD and whether MIA’s proposed school constitutes a
“small-scale school” that would be permitted on the property as presently zoned.
As discussed, MIA’s position is that its proposed school constitutes a “small-scale
school” and that, because the property is already zoned to permit such a school, it
should not have been required to file a petition to amend the PUD.
Under the Township Zoning Ordinance, “all questions of interpretation and
enforcement [of the ordinance] shall first be presented to the Zoning
Administrator, and . . . shall be presented to the Board of Zoning Appeals . . . on
appeal from the decisions of the Zoning Administrator.”

Township Zoning

Ordinance § 60.08 (Page ID 3220). Whether MIA was required to pursue an
amendment to the PUD is an issue that was never resolved by the Township’s
zoning authorities; it appears to be an issue of “interpretation and enforcement”
31

falling within the authority of the Zoning Administrator, subject to review by the
Zoning Board of Appeals. Moreover, if it is determined that MIA was not required
to pursue an amendment to the PUD, the issue then arises whether MIA’s proposed
school qualifies as a “small-scale school,” which is an issue of interpretation that
the Zoning Administrator has exclusive authority to resolve, subject to review by
the Zoning Board of Appeals. See Township Zoning Ordinance § 60.08 (Page ID
3220-21) (“It is the intent of this ordinance that all questions of interpretation . . .
shall first be presented to the Zoning Administrator, and that such questions shall
be presented to the Board of Appeals . . . on appeal. . . . It is further the intent of
this ordinance that the duties of the Township Board . . . shall not include hearing
and deciding questions of interpretation . . . that may arise.”).
The question is: Under the ripeness doctrine, was MIA required to seek a
decision from the Zoning Administrator regarding the issues discussed in the
preceding paragraph prior to bringing this lawsuit? The Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Miles Christi is instructive.
The RLUIPA land-use claimant in Miles Christi was a religious order
conducting services and Bible study sessions in a house that it owned in a
residential neighborhood. 629 F.3d at 535. After neighbors complained to the
township about parking congestion at the house, the township investigated and
informed the order that it would need to seek a variance to allow for additional
32

parking and submit a site plan detailing the intended expansion, as it was
determined that the home was being used in a more intensive way than residential
zoning permits. Id. at 535-36. When the order failed to submit a site plan, as
instructed, it was issued a ticket for violating the township’s zoning ordinance,
prompting it to file a lawsuit in federal court alleging violations of RLUIPA and
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.

Id. at 536.

The district court

dismissed the case as unripe, concluding that the township had not reached a final
decision on whether the zoning ordinance required the order to submit a site plan
under the circumstances, because the order failed to appeal the township’s demand
for a site plan to the township’s zoning board of appeals, as permitted under the
township’s zoning ordinance. Id. at 537.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ripeness determination. In
doing so, the court reiterated that a ripeness determination in the context of a landuse case requires consideration of two questions: (1) has “the relevant
administrative agency resolve[d] the appropriate application of the zoning
ordinance to the property in dispute,” and (2) will the claimant “suffer any
hardship by delaying a federal court decision until the zoning board acts”? Id. at
537-38. Regarding the first question, the court determined that the township’s
zoning ordinance authorized an appeal to the township’s zoning board of appeals
of both the township’s determination that the house was being put to more
33

intensive use than permitted for residential zoning and its demand that the order
submit a site plan. Id. at 538. The court held that “[f]inality requires the input of
the zoning board on these unresolved questions.”

Id.

Regarding the second

question, the court held that an appeal to the zoning board of appeals could only
further the order’s goals, and could not hurt the order, because the appeals board
“may give the order the very relief it seeks: the chance to live and serve the
Northville community without further inquiries.” Id.
Miles Christi counsels in favor of holding that the claims that remain in this
lawsuit are unripe.

Regarding the first consideration of the Miles Christi

framework, whether MIA received a final decision about the application of the
Township Zoning Ordinance to the property, the Township’s position is final as to
one potential avenue to achieving the result desired by MIA but not final as to
another potential avenue – the one that MIA believes is the only appropriate
avenue. That is, the Township’s decision denying MIA’s petition to amend the
PUD is final, as that decision is not reviewable following denial by the Township
Board of Trustees.

However, MIA’s position is that the Township Zoning

Ordinance did not require it to seek an amendment of the PUD in the first place
because a “small-scale school” is permitted on the property as it is currently zoned,
and MIA’s proposed school qualifies as a “small-scale school.” The Township’s
decision on this issue – whether the current zoning of the property even needed to
34

be changed in order to accommodate the contemplated school – is unknown. This
is because MIA never attempted to put that interpretative issue before the
appropriate zoning body, which is the Zoning Administrator, whose decision
would be subject to review by the Zoning Board of Appeals.14
The second consideration of the Miles Christi framework is whether MIA
will suffer a hardship by delaying a decision in this case until the Zoning
Administrator and/or Zoning Board of Appeals reaches a final decision on whether
MIA’s contemplated school is an appropriate use of the property as it is currently
zoned. MIA mentions no hardship and the Court can discern none. Like the
religious order in Miles Christi, MIA may yet obtain the relief it seeks from the

14

As discussed, as part of the analysis of one of the eleven requirements for a PUD
amendment (i.e., whether MIA’s proposed school conformed to the general
development plan, which allows “small-scale schools”), the Planning Commission
and Township Board of Trustees concluded that MIA’s proposed school did not
qualify as a “small-scale school.” However, the Planning Commission and
Township Board of Trustees did not seek input from the Zoning Administrator
with regard to the interpretation of that term, even though the Township Zoning
Ordinance places “questions of interpretation” within the exclusive authority of the
Zoning Administrator. Instead, the Planning Commission applied its own
definition of the term – one with which some of the Commissioners agreed while
others disagreed, and one that conflicted with the definition proposed by MIA –
even as one of the Commissioners commented that she “would like to see a
definition of small scale.” 8/4/11 Meeting Minutes (ECF No. 110-15 Page ID
2652). Regardless of whether the Planning Commission had authority to interpret
the term as part of its analysis of an issue properly before it (i.e., whether MIA’s
proposed school conformed to the general development plan), its definition would
not be binding on the governmental unit with exclusive authority under the
Township Zoning Ordinance to resolve “questions of interpretation.”
35

Township – the ability to build its school on the property – by pursuing its theory
that the property is already appropriately zoned for the contemplated use. Pursuing
this avenue to MIA’s goal could only help MIA; if MIA is successful before the
Zoning Administrator/Zoning Board of Appeals, it will have obtained the result it
seeks – the ability to build its school. If it is unsuccessful, MIA may return
promptly to this Court and the litigation will resume where it left off.
MIA argues that forcing it to pursue additional relief before the Township’s
zoning authorities would be futile because the result would be the same. See
Murphy, 402 F.3d at 349 (“A property owner . . . will be excused from obtaining a
final decision if . . . . [the] zoning agency . . . has dug in its heels and made clear
that all such applications will be denied.”). However, MIA does not articulate why
it believes this to be the case other than to argue that the decision of the Planning
Commission and Township Board of Trustees to deny MIA’s petition was “facially
unreasonable” and there is no reason to believe the Township would treat it fairly
should it be required to pursue additional relief. MIA Br. at 99 (ECF No. 185 Page
ID 8047). The Court acknowledges MIA’s argument.15 However, the Court notes

15

The Court specifically notes the troubling behavior of Planning Commissioner
Deborah Williams, whose tiebreaking vote to recommend denial of MIA’s petition
mattered. The Court also notes the collective reaction of members of the public,
some of whom spoke at the various hearings on MIA’s petition and may have
influenced the recommendation of the Planning Commission, to an off-color
comment made during the Planning Commission’s June 16, 2011 meeting.
36

that the Zoning Administrator and the members of the Zoning Board of Appeals,
on the one hand, are not the same as the members of the Planning Commission and
the members of the Township Board of Trustees, on the other hand.16 Therefore,
even if unlawful animus toward Islam played a role in the decisionmaking process
of the Planning Commission and Township Board of Trustees, there is no reason to
believe the same would be true of the decisionmaking process of the Zoning
Administrator and the Zoning Board of Appeals.
For these reasons, the Court concludes that MIA’s claims under the
Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, along with its RLUIPA claims, are
presently unripe. To ripen the claims, MIA must obtain a final determination of
the Zoning Administrator/Zoning Board of Appeals as to whether the proposed
school can be built on the property as it is presently zoned.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Township’s motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED subject to the following caveats. First, MIA’s RLUIPA claims may

Certainly, a reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that the denial of
MIA’s rezoning petition stemmed, at least to some extent, from unlawful animus.
16

There appears to be one exception: George Ralph is presently on both the
Planning Commission and the Zoning Board of Appeals. However, Ralph was one
of the two Planning Commissioners who did not attend the meeting during which
the Planning Commission recommended denial of MIA’s petition, and his views
on the petition are therefore unknown. 8/4/11 Meeting Minutes (ECF No. 110-15
Page ID 2661-62).
37

be reasserted by MIA should it acquire a legally cognizable interest in the property,
or asserted by another person or entity with a legally cognizable interest in the
property. Second, MIA’s RLUIPA and constitutional claims may be reasserted
after MIA obtains a final decision from the Zoning Administrator/Zoning Board of
Appeals with regard to whether MIA may build its school on the property as it is
presently zoned. The statute of limitations governing any potential assertion or
reassertion of MIA’s claims will be deemed tolled during the pendency of the
present action. MIA need not file a new lawsuit should it wish to reassert the
claims brought in this lawsuit; it may simply file on the present docket a motion to
reopen the case. Should some or all of the claims be brought by a person or entity
other than MIA, an amended complaint naming the new plaintiff(s) should be filed
together with the motion to reopen.
MIA’s motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE. The Township’s motion to limit damages is DENIED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE AS MOOT.
Date: March 20, 2015
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Gadeir I. Abbas, Esq.
Lena F. Masri, Esq.
Thomas R. Meagher, Esq.
David Yerushalmi, Esq.
Robert J. Muise, Esq.
38