Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield, Charter Township of et al

Filing 229

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 219 Motion for Reconsideration re 218 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment, Order on Motion - Free, Order on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MUSLIM COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION OF ANN ARBOR,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-CV-10803

v.

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

PITTSFIELD CHARTER TOWNSHIP,
Defendant.
________________________________/
ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
This matter is presently before the Court on the motion for reconsideration
of Defendant Pittsfield Charter Township (“the Township”), filed on April 3, 2015.
Plaintiff Muslim Community Association of Ann Arbor, doing business as
Michigan Islamic Academy (“MIA”), filed a response on May 4, 2015. The
Townships seeks reconsideration of the Court’s March 20, 2015 decision granting
summary judgment in its favor, with caveats, on both MIA’s RLUIPA claims and
its constitutional claims.

See Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield

Charter Twp., No. 12-CV-10803, 2015 WL 1286813 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2015).
The Court granted summary judgment to the Township on the RLUIPA claims
because MIA lacked an interest in the property at issue in this litigation that is

sufficient under RLUIPA’s definition of “land use regulation,” see 42 U.S.C. §
2000cc-5(5), and because MIA failed to ripen its claims by obtaining a final
determination of the Zoning Administrator/Zoning Board of Appeals as to whether
the proposed school can be built on the property as it is presently zoned. The
Court granted summary judgment to the Township on MIA’s constitutional claims
based on the ripeness rationale applicable to the RLUIPA claims.
In awarding summary judgment to the Township, the Court included three
caveats, two of which the Township challenges in its motion for reconsideration.
First, the Court held that MIA may reassert its RLUIPA claims should it acquire a
sufficient interest in the property, or, alternatively, the claims may be asserted by
another person or entity with a sufficient interest in the property. The Court
included this caveat because it would be unduly harsh to forever deprive the
persons or entities with a sufficient interest in the property of the opportunity to
vindicate their rights under RLUIPA.
Second, the Court held that the statute of limitations governing any potential
assertion or reassertion of the RLUIPA and constitutional claims would be deemed
tolled during the pendency of the present action, which lasted over three years.
The Court included this caveat because the statutes of limitation governing the
claims in this case are four years (for the RLUIPA claims) and three years (for the
constitutional claims), see Carroll v. Wilkerson, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986);
2

Dayson v. Cass Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 12-CV-1307, 2013 WL 1500672, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Apr. 10, 2013); thus, because this action had been pending for more
than three years, the Court was concerned that the statutes of limitation could
preclude the assertion or reassertion of the claims brought in this case, a result the
Court deems unjust under the present circumstances.
The Court continues to believe that MIA should be allowed to reassert its
RLUIPA claims should it acquire a sufficient interest in the property.

The

Township has not demonstrated that the Court’s decision allowing MIA to reassert
its claims amounts to “a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have
been misled.” E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(h)(3). However, the Court lacks authority to,
and therefore does not, dictate the circumstances under which a person or entity
other than MIA may assert the claims brought by MIA in this case. Such persons
or entities may assert such claims in accordance with the law governing those
claims.
With regard to the second caveat, in lieu of tolling the limitation periods, the
Court will allow MIA to reassert the claims brought in this case, if at all, within 90
days of the date on which the Zoning Administrator/Zoning Board of Appeals
issues a final decision determining whether the proposed school can be built on the
property as it is presently zoned.

3

Finally, the Township argues that the Court failed to recognize in its prior
decision that MIA lacked Article III standing to bring its constitutional claims
because it lacked an ownership interest in the property.1 However, the Township
cites no authority demonstrating that an ownership interest is necessary to confer
Article III standing. The Court previously determined that MIA had “permission
. . . to utilize the property” likely constituting a license. 2015 WL 1286813, at *9.
MIA alleged that the Township unconstitutionally prevented its lawful use of the
property. This constitutes a redressable injury-in-fact for purposes of Article III
standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130
(1992).
For these reasons, the Court adheres to its prior decision except as described
above.
SO ORDERED.
Date: June 1, 2015
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Gadeir I. Abbas, Esq.
Lena F. Masri, Esq.
Thomas R. Meagher, Esq.
David Yerushalmi, Esq.
Robert J. Muise, Esq.

1

In its prior decision, the Court concluded that MIA had Article III standing to
bring its RLUIPA claims, see 2015 WL 1286813, at *7 n.8, but did not explicitly
address whether MIA had Article III standing to bring its constitutional claims.
4