BEARDSLEY v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 20

ORDER Adopting 18 Report and Recommendation,Granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment filed by ROBERT BEARDSLEY, 16 Denying Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Social Security, Commissioner of, and Remanding the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by District Judge Stephen J. Murphy, III. (CCoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT BEARDSLEY,
Case No. 12-cv-11167
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (docket no. 18),
GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR REMAND (docket no. 11), DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (docket no. 16),
AND REMANDING THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSIONER
Plaintiff Robert Beardsley filed his complaint seeking review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), which denied his application for a
period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income. The
matter was referred to a United States magistrate judge for the issuance of a report and
recommendation. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand and the Commissioner filed a motion
for summary judgment. The magistrate judge recommends denying the Commissioner's
motion, granting Plaintiff's motion, and remanding the action to the Commissioner for
further proceedings under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Commissioner filed
objections to this recommendation. For the reasons that follow, the Court will overrule the
Commissioner's objection, adopt the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, and
remand the case for further proceedings.

BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his application for Social Security disability benefits on June 10, 2008,
alleging he had been disabled beginning May 15, 2007, as the result of impairments
including "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), type 1 bipolar disorder,
personality disorder not otherwise specified with antisocial traits, and polysubstance abuse
disorder, currently in remission." ALJ Decision Tr. 11 & 13, ECF No. 7-2. His claim was
initially denied on August 19, 2008. Id. at 11. Thereafter, an administrative law judge
("ALJ") held a hearing on the matter and denied his claims in a written decision on
December 30, 2010. Id. at 20. The Appeals Counsel denied his request for review on
March 6, 2012, making the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. Id.
at 1-5. Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of this decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)
and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Compl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 1.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Civil Rule 72(b) governs the Court's review of the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The Rule requires a district judge who refers a
dispositive motion to conduct a de novo review of the parties' “specific written objections
to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Id.
Here the referred motions pertain to a final administrative decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security. The Court reviews the Commissioner's final
administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This review is not de novo, but
instead, the "Court must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a determination that
the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of
fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
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402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387,
390 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is "more than
a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Rogers v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted). The substantial
evidence standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v. Bowen,
800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir.1986) (en banc) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus,
when there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision, the Court "will
defer to that finding 'even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have
supported an opposite conclusion.'" Longworth, 402 F.3d at 595 (quoting Warner, 375 F.3d
at 390).
DISCUSSION
In rendering her decision, the ALJ employed the five-step sequential evaluation
process established by the Social Security Administration for determining whether an
individual is disabled. ALJ Decision at Tr. 12. The ALJ found at step three that Plaintiff does
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one
of the impairments listed in the regulations. Id. at 14. The ALJ then found that the Plaintiff
has the residual functional capacity to perform medium work with some restrictions. Id. at
17. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff's treating psychiatrist's opinion
as follows:
the claimant's treating physician, Ann M. Tadeo, M.D., opined that the
claimant would be unable to return to work on a permanent basis (Exhibits
13B and 9F). I find the severity of Dr. Tadeo's opinion unsupported by the
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whole of the record. I note that she lacks the treatment records to
substantiate such an opinion. In fact, although her records diagnosed the
claimant with a bipolar and personality disorder, the records appear to be
internally inconsistent; for example, while concluding the claimant was
mentally impaired, she noted he denied any depressive episodes and that he
was pleasant and cooperative. Based upon the foregoing, I afford the opinion
of Dr. Tadeo little weight when assessing the claimant's residual functional
capacity.
Id. at 19. She then addressed the opinion of the State agency psychological consultant
noting that this opinion "found the claimant's understanding and memory, capacity for
sustained concentration and persistence, and social interactions moderately limited" and
found that the Plaintiff "retained the mental capacity to perform work comprised of step one
and step two tasks on a sustained basis." Id. The ALJ gave this opinion "great weight
because it remains consistent with the whole of the objective medical evidence." Id. She
then determined in light of his residual functional capacity, Plaintiff could perform his past
relevant work as a machine operator and was, therefore, not disabled within the meaning
of the Social Security Act. Id. at 20.
Plaintiff argues that his case should be remanded because the ALJ erred by failing to
properly evaluate the opinion evidence of his treating psychiatrist, Dr. Tadeo, when she
rejected Dr. Tadeo's position and adopted the opinion of a non-examining state disability
consultant. Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 3, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff submits that because the ALJ failed
to comply with the Social Security regulations for evaluating treating source medical
opinions, her decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 8. After reviewing the
record and motions of both parties, the magistrate judge agreed with the Plaintiff's position.
Report 12, ECF No. 18. The magistrate judge found that although the ALJ was entitled to
afford greater weight to the State agency psychological consultant's opinion, "she provided

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no basis for her decision other than to say that it 'remains consistent with the whole of the
objective medical evidence,'" and "[s]uch a general statement is insufficient to support the
ALJ's decision as it is not sufficiently specific to explain the reasoning behind the decision."
Id. Defendant objects to this finding and argues that the "the ALJ provided more than
adequate reasoning for assigning this treating physician's opinion limited weight." Def. Obj.
2, ECF No. 19.
"An ALJ must give the opinion of a treating source controlling weight if he finds the
opinion 'well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques' and 'not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.'"
Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 20 C.F.R. §
404.1527(d)(2)). Here the ALJ found that Dr. Tadeo's opinion was "unsupported by the
whole of the record" and "lack[ed] the treatment records to substantiate" the opinion. ALJ
Decision at Tr. 19. Thus, the ALJ was not required to give Dr. Tadeo's opinion controlling
weight. But when "the opinion of a treating source is not accorded controlling weight, an
ALJ must apply certain factors—namely, the length of the treatment relationship and the
frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, supportability
of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and the specialization
of the treating source—in determining what weight to give the opinion." Wilson, 378 F.3d
at 544. Additionally, "a decision denying benefits 'must contain specific reasons for the
weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by the evidence in the
case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers
the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons
for that weight.'" Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul.96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (1996)). The
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ALJ's decision fails to provide clear reasoning for the weight assigned Dr. Tadeo's opinion,
and does not discuss what impact the above listed factors had on the assessment other
than minimally addressing the consistency of the opinion with the whole record. ALJ
Decision at Tr. 19. "[F]ailure to follow the procedural requirement of identifying the reasons
for discounting the opinions [of a treating physician] and for explaining precisely how those
reasons affected the weight accorded the opinions denotes a lack of substantial evidence,
even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based upon the record." Rogers, 486
F.3d at 243. And "[a] court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural protection
simply because, as the Comissioner urges, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the
ALJ to discount the treating source's opinion and, thus, a different outcome on remand is
unlikely." Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546. Although the Court agrees with the magistrate judge's
assessment that remand in this case "may ultimately be an exercise in formality," it is
necessary for meaningful appellate review. Report at 12. Accordingly, the Court will
remand this matter for the ALJ to address the reasons for the weight assigned to the
opinions of Dr. Tadeo and the state agency reviewing physician.
ORDER
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that the Commissioner's objection (docket no.
19) is OVERRULED and the magistrate judge's report and recommendation (docket no.
18) is ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for remand (docket no. 11) is
GRANTED, the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment (docket no. 16) is DENIED

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and this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with
this Order and the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge.
SO ORDERED.
s/Stephen J. Murphy, III
STEPHEN J. MURPHY, III
United States District Judge
Dated: March 18, 2013
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties and/or
counsel of record on March 18, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
Carol Cohron
Case Manager

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