Mattson v. Hense
Filing
19
AMENDED OPINION and ORDER re 17 Order on Motion for Summary Judgment Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD MATTSON,
Plaintiff,
NO. 2:12-cv-11736
v.
HON. PATRICK J. DUGGAN
MAG. LAURIE J. MICHELSON
JAMES L. HENSE,
Defendant.
__________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Ronald Mattson (“Plaintiff”), a state prisoner in custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections at all times relevant to the instant action, filed this 42 U.S.C. §
1983 action against James Hense (“Defendant”) on April 14, 2012. When the acts
complained of occurred, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Cooper Street Correctional
Facility in Jackson, Michigan. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant, a registered nurse
providing medical services to Michigan Department of Corrections inmates, was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his constitutional right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment secured by the Eighth Amendment.
Plaintiff specifically claims that he was denied adequate care for a broken ankle.
Currently before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The Court has reviewed all of the filings and has
heard the positions of the parties at oral argument. For the reasons stated herein, the
1
Court grants Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses Plaintiff’s claim
with prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
While walking in the prisoners’ yard on May 20, 2011, Plaintiff twisted his ankle.
Compl. ¶ 1. The following day, Plaintiff submitted a health care kite to medical staff
requesting treatment. Id. ¶ 2. Defendant examined Plaintiff on May 26, 2011, noting that
Plaintiff’s “right ankle is slightly swollen, tender to touch, and bruised around [the]
outside lower part of [the] heel.” See Nurse Protocol, Compl., Ex. A. On the basis of this
physical examination, his observation that Plaintiff did not appear to be in distress, and
the fact that Plaintiff had been walking on his injured ankle for six days, Defendant
concluded that Plaintiff merely sprained his ankle and that no additional medical
treatment was necessary. See Hense Aff., Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, ¶¶ 6-7. After hearing
Defendant’s diagnosis that he had not broken any bones, Plaintiff inquired about the
possibility of x-rays or a second opinion from either a physician or physician’s assistant.
Compl. ¶¶ 4-6. Defendant allegedly rebuffed Plaintiff’s suggestions, asserting that either
course of action would be a waste of taxpayer money. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Defendant then
provided Plaintiff with Tylenol and indicated that the examination was complete. Id. ¶ 6.
Plaintiff continued to experience pain and sent another kite to medical staff on
June 14, 2011. Compl. ¶ 7. On June 16, 2011, a physician’s assistant examined Plaintiff
and allegedly told Plaintiff that Defendant should have either sent Plaintiff for x-rays or,
at minimum, allowed Plaintiff to see another medical professional for a second opinion.
Id. ¶ 8. X-rays of Plaintiff’s ankle were taken on June 20, 2011, revealing that Plaintiff
2
had, in fact, broken his ankle. Id. ¶ 9. Plaintiff explains that he experienced a great deal
of pain and had difficulty sleeping and walking prior to receiving proper treatment. Id. ¶
10. In addition, Plaintiff contends his ankle did not heal correctly and that he continues
to endure discomfort as a result. Id.
Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 19831 action on April 14, 2012, proceeding pro se.
Plaintiff subsequently acquired counsel. Plaintiff sues Defendant in his individual
capacity, alleging a violation of his Eight Amendment rights. Specifically, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant displayed deliberate indifference to a serious medical need when
he refused to have Plaintiff x-rayed or examined by another medical professional and
seeks $5,000,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages, as well
as payment of medical costs. Compl. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) on June 27, 2012. Plaintiff, through his
attorney, responded. Oral argument was held on November 1, 2012 and the Court is now
prepared to issue a ruling.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 instructs courts to “grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (2012). A court
1
Title 28 U.S.C. § 1983 provides:
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
priviliges, or immunities, secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
3
assessing the appropriateness of summary judgment asks “whether the evidence presents
a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that
one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Amway Distributors Benefits Ass'n v.
Northfield Ins. Co., 323 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512 (1986)).
The initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine dispute rests with the
movant, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986), who “must
support the assertion by: (A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record…; or (B)
showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the
fact[,]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). While this inquiry requires the Court to
construe factual disputes, and the inferences there from, in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S. Ct. at 2553;
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. at 2510.
If the moving party discharges their initial burden using the materials specified in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), the burden of defeating summary judgment shifts
to the non-movant who must point to specific material facts – beyond the pleadings or
mere allegation – which give rise to a genuine issue of law for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S.
at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2514. A mere scintilla of evidence supporting the non-movant’s
claim will not prevent summary judgment; rather, there must be evidence on which a jury
4
could reasonably find for the non-movant. Hirsch v. CSX Transp., Inc., 656 F.3d 359,
362 (6th Cir. 2011).
Moreover, if, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion,” the nonmovant “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element
essential to that party’s case[] and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial[,]” a court should enter summary judgment in favor of the moving party. Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. When this occurs, “there can be ‘no genuine issue as
to any material fact,’ since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of
the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. 477 U.S.
at 323, 106 S. Ct. at 2552. Thus, if the non-movant does not support the elements of a
claim or defense, the moving party is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate as a matter of law
because (1) Plaintiff cannot satisfy the standard of a constitutional violation for deliberate
indifference and, even if Plaintiff could, (2) the cause of action is barred by the doctrine
of qualified immunity. The Court begins with the Eighth Amendment issue because in
the absence of a constitutional violation giving rise to a § 1983 claim, the need to assert a
qualified immunity defense simply does not arise.
A.
Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Standard
The Eighth Amendment embodies “‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,
civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . .,’ against which [courts] must evaluate
penal measures.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290 (1976) (internal
5
citation omitted). These principles give rise to a governmental “obligation to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.” Id., 429 U.S. at 103, 97 S.
Ct. at 290; see also Baker v. City of Detroit, 217 F. App’x 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007)
(unpublished) (“The Supreme Court in Deshaney [v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S. Ct. 998, 1005 (1989)] recognized a line of cases
‘stand[ing] . . . for the proposition that when the State takes a person into its custody and
holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to
assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.’”). Prison inmates
“must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs; if the authorities fail to do
so, those needs will not be met.” Id. Even in non-life-threatening cases, “denial of
medical care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any
penological purpose.” Id.
To sustain a § 1983 claim arising from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and based on inadequate medical treatment,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs in diagnosing or treating him. See, e.g., Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County,
390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference claims consist of two
components, one objective and the other subjective. The objective component requires
that the condition itself be “sufficiently serious.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834,
114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994). The subjective component requires Plaintiff to show that
Defendant had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying [him] medical care.”
Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 895 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at 1977). While
6
deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence or a lack of ordinary
due care, the standard is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the
purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result. Farmer, 511 U.S. at
835, 114 S. Ct. at 1978. The Sixth Circuit requires that “a plaintiff [] establish that ‘the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,’ which is to
say ‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn
that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 837, 114 S. Ct. at 1979).
“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the
adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical
judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Westlake v.
Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit acknowledges that “[a]
claim of inadequate medical treatment[,]” as opposed to a claim of a complete denial of
medical treatment, “may state a constitutional claim” but cautions that such claims are
generally limited to situations where “the treatment rendered is ‘so woefully inadequate
as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Clark v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 98 F. App’x
413, 416 (unpublished) (citing Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860-61). This is because even if
treatment is furnished “carelessly or inefficaciously,” this does not mean the medical
provider “displayed a deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but merely a degree
of incompetence which does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Comstock
v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Williams v. Mehra, 186 F.3d
7
685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Thus, a complaint that [medical personnel have] been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not
become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” (quoting
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S. Ct. at 291)) .
B.
Application
Defendant’s care of Plaintiff falls within the line of cases where a prisoner has
received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy or efficacy of the
chosen treatment.2 In other words, this is a case where Plaintiff disagrees with the
medical provider’s course of treatment.
For purposes of his Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant is willing to
assume that Plaintiff’s ankle injury was a serious medical condition, thereby rendering
the objective component of the deliberate indifference test a non-issue. See Def.’s Br. at
3. Nonetheless, Defendant contends that no Eighth Amendment violation occurred.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not put forth any evidence beyond mere allegation to
establish that Defendant knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Plaintiff’s safety
2
At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel characterized Defendant’s actions as “a decision to
do nothing.” In essence, Plaintiff’s counsel argued that a decision not to order necessary
testing or additional treatment is not a medical judgment if motivated by a desire to save
taxpayer money. However, given the chronology of events described elsewhere in this
Opinion and Order, the Court does not believe this argument applies in the instant action
because Defendant declined to order an x-ray after he, in the exercise of medical
judgment, diagnosed Plaintiff’s ankle as sprained. As Defendant’s counsel stated at oral
argument, this decision appears “rationally connected” to Defendant’s observations at the
physical examination.
8
and, therefore, cannot establish the subjective component necessary to stating a viable
cause of action. Clark-Murphy, 439 F.3d at 286. The Court agrees.
The evidence material to the subjective component of the deliberate indifference
standard, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, does not support a
finding that Defendant acted with wantonness toward Plaintiff or that he intentionally
withheld medical care he knew would be necessary. Defendant’s Affidavit explains that
he believed, based on his examination, Plaintiff “suffered a minor sprain to his ankle and
no additional medical treatment was necessary.” Hense Aff., Def.’s Mot., Ex. A, ¶ 7.
While Plaintiff’s need for an x-ray and treatment for a broken ankle seems evident in
hindsight, the Court cannot conclude that Defendant’s decision not to order an x-ray or
send Plaintiff for a second opinion constituted deliberate indifference given that Plaintiff
had been walking on his injured ankle for six days and that the symptoms revealed during
the physical examination did not appear particularly pernicious. See Nurse Protocol,
Compl., Ex. A (noting “right ankle is slightly swollen, tender to touch, and bruised
around outside lower part of heel” and that “inmate appears in no distress”).
Of particular relevance to the instant case, which involves the failure to order an xray of Plaintiff's ankle to enable an earlier diagnosis, “is the language from Estelle that
‘[a] medical decision not to order an x-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and
unusual punishment,’ and ‘at most . . . it is medical malpractice.’”3 Durham v. Nu’Man,
3
The allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint appear to bolster a finding of malpractice.
Plaintiff asserts that during his second examination on July 16, the physician’s assistant
told Plaintiff that Defendant’s failure to schedule an x-ray “was medical error.” Compl. ¶
8.
9
97 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107, 97 S. Ct. at 293)).
The Court hesitates to turn Defendant’s potential malpractice into a constitutional tort.
As indicated above, even if Defendant’s treatment of Plaintiff was negligent, careless, or
ineffective, this does not establish unconstitutional indifference to his medical needs.
Despite Plaintiff’s suggestion to the contrary, Plaintiff’s unsupported allegations
that Defendant declined to order x-rays or schedule another examination because of the
cost to taxpayers do not alter the fact that Defendant declined to do these things after
determining, albeit erroneously, that Plaintiff did not break an ankle. Compl. ¶¶ 4-6.
Defendant’s actions “cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain’ or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.’” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-06,
97 S. Ct. at 292. Thus, despite Plaintiff’s belief that a factual dispute regarding whether
Defendant made comments about the cost of additional examinations exists, the dispute
does not relate to a fact that may affect the outcome of the suit. In other words, whether
or not Defendant uttered such words is not a dispute about a material fact.
The Court is satisfied that Defendant discharged his initial Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(a) burden showing his entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff
has not offered any evidence beyond the pleadings or mere allegation that creates a
genuine issue of material fact for trial. Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to establish an
essential element of his deliberate indifference claim. Because the record evidence does
not support a finding that Plaintiff suffered a deprivation of a constitutional right, “there
is no claim under § 1983, and Defendant[ has] no need for a qualified immunity defense.”
Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.2d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 1999).
10
IV.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that Defendant is entitled to
summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
and Plaintiff’s claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Dated: November 2, 2012
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Sabrina Shaheen Cronin, Esq.
A. Peter Govorchin, A.A.G.,
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?