Martinez v. Roggenbuck

Filing 8

OPINION AND ORDER Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Denying Certificate of Appealability and Denying Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (CPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RICHARD JAMES MARTINEZ, #249674,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 2:12-CV-11778
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

v.
JOAN ROGGENBUCK,
Respondent.
___________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND
DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I.

Introduction
Michigan prisoner Richard James Martinez (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, asserting that he is in custody in violation of his
constitutional rights. Petitioner pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver between 450 and
999 grams of cocaine, possession with intent to deliver five to 45 kilograms of marijuana, and
maintaining a drug house in the St. Clair County Circuit Court and was sentenced as a second
habitual offender to 15 to 45 years in prison on the cocaine conviction and concurrent terms of 10
months in jail on the marijuana and drug house convictions with credit for time served. In his
pleadings, Petitioner raises claims concerning the voluntariness of his plea and the effectiveness of
trial counsel.
For the reasons stated, the Court denies the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Court
also denies a Certificate of Appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.

II.

Facts and Procedural History
Petitioner’s convictions arise from his possession of cocaine and marijuana at his home in

St. Clair County, as well as his drug-selling activities, in 2008. A St. Clair County drug task force
instigated controlled buys of cocaine from Petitioner, conducted surveillance, and observed
Petitioner making multiple, brief stops at different locations in St. Clair County which they believed
were drug transactions. After receiving a tip that Petitioner was going to a mall to make a drug
transaction, deputies confronted him at the mall and arrested him. He was carrying about two
ounces of cocaine and over $1,300. After being advised of his constitutional rights, Petitioner
admitted that the cocaine was for sale and that he had conducted drug transactions that day. The
deputies took Petitioner to his home and obtained a search warrant. During the search, they found
592.6 grams of cocaine in the house, and 26.7 grams of cocaine and 6,593.5 grams of marijuana in
the garage.
Petitioner was subsequently charged with possession with intent to deliver between 450 and
999 grams of cocaine (with a drug enhancement), possession with intent to deliver five to 45
kilograms of marijuana, and maintaining a drug house, as well as being a second habitual offender.
He was bound over for trial. At the plea hearing on May 30, 2008, Petitioner agreed to plead guilty
to the drug charges and to being a second habitual offender in exchange for the dismissal of the drug
enhancement, an agreement not to charge his wife, and an agreement not to request an upward
sentencing departure. The parties and the court acknowledged that there was no sentencing
agreement. Petitioner was represented by counsel and said that he was satisfied with counsel. The
trial court informed Petitioner of the rights that he would give up by pleading guilty; Petitioner
indicated that he understood. Petitioner confirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will

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and that he had not been threatened or promised anything, other than what was stated on the record,
to induce him to plead guilty. When Petitioner hesitated in responding to the court, defense counsel
stated that Petitioner’s hesitation was due to the parties’ extensive discussions about the sentencing
guidelines. The court went on to discuss the sentencing issue in further detail, explaining that the
plea should only be based upon the on-the-record agreement and that the court was making no
promises as to sentencing other than to be fair and follow the law. Petitioner indicated that he
understood that there was no sentencing agreement. He confirmed his desire to plead guilty. He
then provided a factual basis for his plea. The trial court accepted the plea.
On August 25, 2008, the original date set for sentencing, Petitioner, through new counsel,
moved to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that a statement he made upon his arrest was an
illegally obtained confession and that prior counsel was ineffective. The trial court adjourned the
matter and scheduled a hearing to determine if Petitioner’s plea was knowing and voluntary given
the assistance of counsel he had at the time. On September 12, 2008, the trial court denied
Petitioner’s request to withdraw his plea on the briefs, finding that he had not made the requisite
showing to withdraw his plea. The trial court then proceeded to sentence Petitioner to 15 to 45 years
in prison on the cocaine conviction and to concurrent terms of 10 months in jail on the marijuana
and drug house convictions with credit for time served.
Following the filing of an improper claim of appeal and its dismissal, Petitioner filed a
Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal with the Michigan Court of Appeals asserting that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea because he can maintain his innocence at
trial, he misunderstood his plea advice, and trial counsel was ineffective. The Michigan Court of
Appeals denied leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. People v. Martinez, No.

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289235 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2009) (unpublished). Petitioner filed an Application for Leave to
Appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court; it was denied in a standard order. People v. Martinez,
773 N.W.2d 899 (Mich. 2009).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment with the state trial court raising
several claims, including a claim that he was coerced into pleading guilty to protect his family. The
trial court denied the motion, finding that it could not grant relief on claims that were decided
against Petitioner on direct appeal under Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D)(2) and that he had not
shown cause and prejudice as required to raise any new issues under Michigan Court Rule
6.508(D)(3). People v. Martinez, No. 08-000726-FH (St. Clair Co. Cir. Ct. Oct. 26, 2010)
(unpublished). Petitioner filed a Delayed Application for Leave to Appeal with the Michigan Court
of Appeals, which was denied “for failure to meet the burden of establishing entitlement to relief
under MCR 6.508(D).” People v. Martinez, No. 301876 (Mich. Ct. App. April 19, 2011)
(unpublished). Petitioner filed an Application for Leave to Appeal with the Michigan Supreme
Court; it was denied as well. People v. Martinez, 806 N.W.2d 315 (Mich. 2011).
Petitioner, through counsel, filed his federal Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus raising
the following claims:
I.

The trial court judge’s refusal to allow Petitioner to withdraw his guilty plea,
and the guilty plea itself, resulted in an unreasonable application of federal
law.
A.

Petitioner’s plea was the result of coercion where Petitioner pled
guilty because he believed his wife would be prosecuted if he
refused.

B.

Petitioner’s plea was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent as a
result of the ineffective assistance of counsel.

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III.

Standard of Review
Federal law imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of
the claim –
(1)

resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2)

resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceedings.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that
are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at
a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per
curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)); see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S.
685, 694 (2002).
“[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to
‘grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); see also Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
However, “[i]n order for a federal court to find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court]
precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or
erroneous. The state court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539
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U.S. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. “AEDPA thus imposes a
‘highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 333, n. 7; Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The United States Supreme Court recently held that “a state court’s determination that a
claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on
the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786
(2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court emphasized
“that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was
unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a
habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the
state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree
that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme
Court. Id. Thus, in order to obtain federal habeas relief, a state prisoner must show that the state
court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Id.
Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of whether the
state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme
Court at the time the state court renders its decision. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles
v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court “has held on numerous
occasions that it is not ‘an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’ for a state
court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court”)

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(quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam)); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). Section 2254(d) “does not require a state court to give reasons before its
decision can be deemed to have been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785.
Furthermore, it “does not require citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it does not even require
awareness of [Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court
decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002); see also Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 16.
While the requirements of “clearly established law” are to be determined solely by Supreme Court
precedent, the decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the
state court’s resolution of an issue. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones, 203 F. Supp. 354, 359
(E.D. Mich. 2002).
Lastly, a state court’s factual determinations are entitled to a presumption of correctness on
federal habeas review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A petitioner may rebut this presumption with clear
and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998). Moreover,
habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen v. Pinholster, _ U.S.
_, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal for “lack of merit
in the grounds presented” and the Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal in a standard
order. On state collateral review, the trial court denied relief pursuant to Michigan Court Rule
6.508(D)(2) and (3) and the appellate courts both denied leave to appeal pursuant to Michigan Court
Rule 6.508(D).
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the state courts’ denials of relief are

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neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of federal law or the
facts.1
IV.

Analysis
A.

Procedural Default

Respondent contends that some of Petitioner’s claims are barred by procedural default
because he first raised them in his motion for relief from judgment and the state courts denied relief
pursuant to Michigan Court Rule 6.508(D). It is well-settled, however, that federal courts on habeas
review “are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner
on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v. Singletary,
520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). The United States Supreme Court has explained the rationale behind
such a policy: “Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example,
if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved
complicated issues of state law.” Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. The procedural default issue appears
to be complex here, and the substantive issues are easier to resolve. Accordingly, the Court
proceeds to the merits of Petitioner’s claims.
B.

Merits of Claims
1.

Plea Withdrawal Claim

Petitioner says that he is entitled to habeas relief because the state trial court erred by
refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. Petitioner, however, is not
entitled to habeas relief on any such claim. Such a claim is not cognizable on habeas review because
it is a state law claim. A criminal defendant has no federal constitutional right, or absolute right

1

The Court notes that it would reach the same result under a de novo standard of review.

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under state law, to withdraw a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea. Chene v. Abramajtys, 76
F.3d 378 , 1996 WL 34902, *2 (6th Cir. 1996) (table). Consequently, “the decision to permit a
defendant to withdraw a plea invokes the trial court’s discretion. A trial court’s abuse of discretion
generally is not a basis for habeas corpus relief.” Adams v. Burt, 471 F. Supp. 2d 835, 843 (E.D.
Mich. 2007) (internal citations omitted); see also Hoffman v. Jones, 159 F. Supp. 2d 648, 655 (E.D.
Mich. 2001). Federal habeas courts have no authority to correct perceived errors of state law.
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67–68 (1991); Serra v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 4 F.3d 1348, 1354
(6th Cir. 1993). Habeas relief is not warranted on any such claim.
2.

Coerced Plea Claim

Petitioner says that he is entitled to habeas relief because his guilty plea was coerced.
Specifically, he claims that his plea was improperly induced by a promise not to prosecute his wife.
Petitioner states that on the day of the plea, the prosecutor informed trial counsel that if Petitioner
did not accept the plea, Petitioner’s wife would be arrested and his step-daughter would be put into
foster care.
When a habeas petitioner is convicted as a result of a plea, habeas review is limited to
whether the plea was made voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly. United States v. Broce, 488
U.S. 563 (1989); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). A plea is voluntary if it is not induced
by threats or misrepresentations and the defendant is made aware of the direct consequences of the
plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). The voluntariness of a plea “can be
determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Id. at 749. The
plea is intelligent and knowing where there is nothing to indicate that the defendant is incompetent
or otherwise not in control of his or her mental faculties, is aware of the nature of the charges, and

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is advised by competent counsel. Id. at 756. The plea must be made “with sufficient awareness of
the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748.
The mere fact that Petitioner’s plea was based, in part, on a promise that his wife would not
be prosecuted does not make it without more coercive. A plea in exchange for a promise by the
government not to prosecute a third party is valid so long as the plea is otherwise voluntary and there
is no illegitimate government action. See United States v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1983)
(finding no justification for withdrawal of a guilty plea where the ability of a defendant's wife to
plead was conditioned upon the defendant’s own plea); accord United States v. Shapiro, 29 F. App’x
33, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1990)); United
States v. Keeter, 130 F.3d 297, 300 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Prosecutors may offer strong inducements,
such as reduced charges or immunity for family members, to elicit confessions or guilty pleas.”);
Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1455 (9th Cir. 1995) (government’s promise not to
prosecute the defendant’s wife did not render the defendant’s guilty plea invalid where he denied
that he had been threatened or coerced); Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir. 1986)
(agreement not to prosecute defendant’s wife and mother-in-law); see also Doe v. United States, 88
F.3d 628 (table), 1996 WL 250444, *5 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has not ruled
on the issue, Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 n. 8 (1978), and ruling that such deals are
permissible if the government has probable cause to prosecute the third party). Petitioner does not
offer any facts to show, nor does the record indicate, that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or lacked
probable cause to charge Petitioner’s wife.
Moreover, the state court record reveals that Petitioner’s guilty plea was knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary. Petitioner was 30 years old, married with a step-daughter, and taking college classes

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at the time of his plea. No evidence suggests that he suffered from physical or mental problems
which would have impaired his ability to understand the criminal proceedings or the nature of his
plea. Petitioner was represented by counsel and conferred with counsel during the plea process. The
trial court advised Petitioner of his trial rights and the fact that he would be giving up those rights
by pleading guilty. The court discussed the charges and the terms of the plea and its consequences,
including the maximum sentence for the offenses and the fact that there was no sentencing
agreement. Petitioner indicated he understood the terms of the plea, that he was pleading guilty of
his own free will, and that he had not been coerced, threatened, or promised anything, other than
what was stated on the record, to induce his plea. Petitioner provided a factual basis for his plea and
admitted his guilt of the offenses. Petitioner has not shown that his plea was involuntary. The fact
that he was subsequently dissatisfied with his plea or may have hoped for more lenient treatment
does not render his plea unknowing or involuntary. Brady, 397 U.S. at 757. Petitioner’s plea was
not coerced. Habeas relief is not warranted.
3.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims

Petitioner relatedly claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because defense counsel was
ineffective for failing to file potentially dispositive motions before trial, for failing to inform him
of all the risks and advising him to plead guilty, and for misadvising him about his sentence.
The United States Supreme Court set forth a two-part test to evaluate the claim of a habeas
petitioner who challenges a plea on the ground that he or she was denied the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must establish that “counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58 (1985)
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). To demonstrate that counsel’s

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performance fell below this standard, a petitioner must overcome the “strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689.
Second, if the petitioner satisfies the first prong, the petitioner must then demonstrate that
counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, i.e., “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, [he/she] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”
Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The Supreme Court has explained that “[i]n many guilty plea cases, the
‘prejudice’ inquiry will closely resemble the inquiry engaged in by courts reviewing
ineffective-assistance challenges to convictions obtained through a trial.” Id. The Supreme Court
also emphasized that “these predictions of the outcome at a possible trial, where necessary, should
be made objectively, without regard for the ‘idiosyncracies of the particular decisionmaker.’” Id.
at 59-60 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695).
The Supreme Court confirmed that a federal court’s consideration of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims arising from state criminal proceedings is quite limited on habeas review due to
the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts reviewing their performance. “The
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply
in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 788 (internal and end citations omitted).
“When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The
question is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential
standard.” Id. at 788. Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized the extraordinary deference
afforded trial counsel in the area of plea bargaining. See Premo v. Moore, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 733,
741 (2011) (stating that “strict adherence to the Strickland standard [is] all the more essential when

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reviewing the choices an attorney made at the plea bargain stage”); see also Bray v. Andrews, 640
F.3d 731, 738 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Premo).
Petitioner says that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case and file
motions. To the extent that Petitioner claims that counsel failed to take certain actions during the
pre-plea period, he is not entitled to habeas relief. It is well-settled that claims about the deprivation
of constitutional rights that occur before the entry of a guilty or no contest plea are foreclosed by the
plea. United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267
(1973). The Supreme Court has explained:
[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has preceded it in the
criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that
occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and
intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from
counsel was not within [constitutional standards].
Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267. Simply stated, a defendant who pleads guilty or no contest generally
waives any non-jurisdictional claims that arose before the plea. In such a case, a reviewing court’s
inquiry is limited to whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Broce, 488 U.S. at
569. Accordingly, Petitioner’s claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case,
file motions, or take other action during the pre-trial period is foreclosed by his plea and does not
warrant habeas relief.
Petitioner also claims that defense counsel was ineffective for advising him to plead guilty
rather than discussing his options and preparing a defense. It is true that defense counsel has a duty
to conduct a reasonable investigation into the facts of a defendant’s case, or to make a reasonable
determination that such investigation is unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91; Lundgren v.

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Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 771 (6th Cir. 2006); O’Hara v. Wiggington, 24 F.3d 823, 828 (6th Cir. 1994)
(failure to investigate, especially as to key evidence, must be supported by a reasoned determination
that investigation is unwarranted). Petitioner, however, has not established that counsel failed to
investigate his case or was deficient for advising him to accept a plea. Counsel’s strategy in
pursuing a plea and foregoing other avenues of defense was reasonable given the nature of the case,
Petitioner’s prior record, the significant evidence of guilt presented at the pre-trial hearings, and the
apparent lack of a solid defense.
Although Petitioner believes that he could have defended against the charges, he offers no
evidence, other than his own assertions, to support his claims. It is well-settled that conclusory
allegations are insufficient to warrant habeas relief. Cross v. Stovall, 238 F. App’x 32, 39-40 (6th
Cir. 2007); see also Workman v. Bell, 178 F.3d 759, 771 (6th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel do not justify habeas relief); see also Washington v. Renico, 455
F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir. 2006) (bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide a basis for
evidentiary hearing on habeas review). Habeas relief is not warranted.
Petitioner also alleges that his guilty plea was involuntary because defense counsel failed to
inform him of all the risks and misadvised him about his possible sentence. In particular, Petitioner
claims that counsel led him to believe that they had negotiated a sentencing agreement where his
sentence would be 11-23 years and he would serve less than that with good time credits. He states
that he did not understand that the prosecutor could argue for higher guideline scoring. Petitioner
presents his own affidavit (dated November 15, 2010) in support of his assertions, but does not offer
an affidavit from defense counsel or other supporting documentation for this claim.

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Nonetheless, even if Petitioner was misinformed by counsel, he is not entitled to habeas
relief. A trial court’s proper plea colloquy cures any misunderstandings that a defendant may have
about the consequences of a plea. Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560, 565 (6th Cir. 1999); see also
Boyd v. Yukins, 99 F. App’x 699, 703 (6th Cir. 2004). The record demonstrates that the trial court
conducted a proper colloquy. The court reviewed the terms of the agreement and the consequences
of the plea, including the maximum sentences for the offenses and the fact that there was no
sentencing agreement. In fact, when Petitioner hesitated when asked whether any other promises
had been made to him, the trial court clarified that the plea should only be based upon the agreement
stated on the record and that there was no sentencing agreement. Petitioner acknowledged that he
understood such matters. Petitioner has not shown that his plea was unknowing.
Furthermore, any claim that defense counsel pressured him into pleading guilty conflicts with
his sworn testimony at the plea hearing that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. There is
no evidence that counsel strong-armed Petitioner or misled him to get him to accept the plea. As
aptly stated by the Sixth Circuit when faced with a challenge to a plea bargain based upon alleged
off-the-record statements:
If we were to rely on [the petitioner’s] alleged subjective impression rather than the
record, we would be rendering the plea colloquy process meaningless, for any
convict who alleges that he believed the plea bargain was different from that outlined
in the record could withdraw his plea, despite his own statements during the plea
colloquy . . . indicating the opposite. This we will not do, for the plea colloquy
process exists in part to prevent petitioners . . . from making the precise claim that
is today before us. "[W]here the court has scrupulously followed the required
procedure, the defendant is bound by his statements in response to that court's
inquiry."
Ramos, 170 F.3d at 566 (quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). Given
the nature of the case and the significant evidence of guilt, counsel’s plea advice was reasonable.

15

Moreover, Petitioner has not shown that but for counsel’s sentencing advice or other alleged
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. His own affidavit
indicates that he rejected the prosecutor’s offer when he believed that there was a sentencing
agreement of 11-23 years (with less time served due to good time credit) and chose to proceed with
pre-trial motions, but subsequently accepted a plea bargain in order to protect his family. In short,
Petitioner fails to establish that counsel erred or that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct so as
to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective under the Strickland/Hill standard. Habeas relief is not
warranted.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas

relief his claims. Accordingly, the Court DENIES WITH PREJUDICE the Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal this decision, a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b). A COA may issue “only if the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2). When a court denies relief on the merits, the substantial showing threshold is met if the
petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists would find the court’s assessment of the claims
debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this
standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003).
Having conducted the requisite review, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not made a

16

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right as to his claims. The Court therefore
DENIES a Certificate of Appealability.
Lastly, the Court concludes that Petitioner should not be granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal as an appeal from this decision cannot be taken in good faith. Fed. R. App. P.
24(a). Accordingly, the Court DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: June 16, 2014
The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of record
by electronic means or U.S. Mail on June 16,
2014.
S/Carol A. Pinegar
Deputy Clerk

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