Berkshire v. Dahl et al

Filing 138

ORDER adopting in part 129 Report and Recommendation; granting in part and denying in part 110 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 112 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (MLan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RANDY BERKSHIRE,
Case No. 12-12038
Plaintiff,
v.

SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTHUR J. TARNOW

DEBRA DAHL, et al.,

MAGISTRATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. HLUCHANIUK

Defendants.
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ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND DECLINING TO ADOPT IN PART
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [129] AND GRANTING IN PART
AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS [110]
AND DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS [112]
On August 11, 2014, Magistrate Judge Hluchaniuk issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) [129] recommending that the Court grant Defendants Dahl,
Beauvais, Sermo, and LeDuc’s Motion for Summary Judgment [110]. Plaintiff timely
filed an Objection [132]. The R&R [129] also recommends that the Court deny
Defendant Pozios’s Motion for Summary Judgment [112]. Defendant Pozios timely
filed an Objection [131] and Plaintiff filed a Response [133].
For the reasons stated below, the Court HEREBY ADOPTS IN PART AND
DECLINES TO ADOPT IN PART the R&R [129]. Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [110] is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
Plaintiff’s Objection [132] is SUSTAINED IN PART AND OVERRULED IN

PART. Defendant Pozios’s Motion for Summary Judgment [112] is DENIED.
Defendant Pozios’s Objection [131] is OVERRULED.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
The Court adopts the explanation of facts as set out in the R&R [129]. They
read as follows:
Plaintiff originally filed his complaint on May 7, 2012. (Dkt. 1). Conceding that
he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before initiating this action, plaintiff
moved for dismissal without prejudice. (Dkt. 51). This Court dismissed the case
without prejudice. (Dkt. 54). Plaintiff then filed a motion to reinstate his case, as well
as a motion to vacate the order dismissing his case. (Dkt. 59, 61). The Court granted
plaintiff’s motion to reinstate his case and granted his motion to file an amended
complaint. (Dkt. 62). Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on August 15, 2013. (Dkt.
70). Defendants Dahl, Beauvais, and Sermo filed a motion to dismiss. (Dkt. 81).
Plaintiff responded by seeking to amend his complaint yet again. (Dkt. 84). This Court
granted plaintiff leave to amend and terminated as moot the pending dispositive
motion. (Dkt. 96).
Defendant LeDuc was subsequently served and filed an appearance. (Dkt. 98).
Plaintiff then filed his second amended complaint. (Dkt. 101). In his second amended
complaint, plaintiff claims that defendant Dahl discharged him from the Residential
Treatment Program (RTP), in alleged retaliation for complaints that plaintiff had made.
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(Dkt. 101, ¶¶ 2-3). Plaintiff was elected as a Housing Unit Representative (HUR) in
March 2012. (Dkt. 101, ¶ 2). On March 19, 2012, plaintiff submitted a three page
complaint to RUM Wilson and defendant Dahl addressing several concerns on behalf
of other prisoners in the RTP amounting to possible constitutional violations. Id. On
March 21, 2012, plaintiff alleges that Dahl changed his GAF score to 53, intentionally
downgraded all of his diagnoses by March 22, 2012, and was responsible for his
retaliatory discharge from RTP. Id. According to plaintiff, Dahl discharged him from
RTP without a mental health assessment, diagnostic evaluation and treatment or
disposition planning in according with applicable operating procedures. Plaintiff was
then transferred to a lower level of care where fewer privileges were offered and more
restrictions imposed. (Dkt. 101, ¶ 3).
Plaintiff asserts that defendant Beauvais issued a misconduct ticket after plaintiff
expressed homicidal ideation. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff next claims that on April 3, 2012,
defendant Sermo conducted a face-to-face interview that lasted only five minutes.
Appropriate treatment was discussed. Id. at ¶ 11. The next day, plaintiff had a hearing
on the ticket written by defendant Beauvais. Plaintiff claims that defendant Sermo
completed a Misconduct Sanction Screening form, which enabled the hearing officer
to impose the maximum sanction. Plaintiff was found guilty. Id. at ¶ 12.
Next, while he was in top-of-bed restraints, plaintiff claims that defendant
LeDuc came to check on him, but refused to offer a break or water. (Dkt. 101, ¶ 16).
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Plaintiff states that Defendants Sermo and Beauvais entered his cell at some point and
told plaintiff that he was being transferred to the Crisis Stabilization Program (CSP).
Id. at ¶ 23. Plaintiff asserts that defendants Beauvais and Sermo (as well as defendant
Pozios) were subjectively aware that he was at risk of suicide prior to April 9, 2012,
but failed to take appropriate measures, resulting in plaintiff’s attempted suicide. Id.
at ¶ 26. In his “Statement of Claim,” plaintiff alleges that defendant Dahl’s actions
constituted First Amendment retaliation; that defendant Sermo’s and Beauvais’s
actions constituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and
that defendant LeDuc violated plaintiff’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id.
at ¶¶ 28-30.
Debra Dahl was the Unit Chief of the Residential Treatment Program at the
Macomb Correctional Facility. (Dkt. 110, Ex. 1, Affidavit of Debra Dahl, ¶ 1).
According to Dahl, plaintiff was not discharged from RTP because he made
complaints. Rather, plaintiff was discharged because he was no longer in need of RTP
services and was determined to be able to function in Level IV General Population. Id.
at ¶ 5. The decision was made after plaintiff’s progress was discussed at a case
management meeting. Id. at ¶ 4.
Donna Beauvais is currently the Unit Chief of the RTP at Macomb, but during
the time of plaintiff’s claims she was the Unit Chief of the Outpatient Mental Health
Program at Macomb. (Dkt. 110, Ex. 2, Affidavit of Donna Beauvais, ¶ 1). On March
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26, 2012, defendant Beauvais was approached by a teacher who expressed concern that
plaintiff appeared agitated. Id. at ¶ 3. She met with plaintiff, who stated that he did not
know that he was going to be discharged from RTP and that he could not lock in
general population. Id. at ¶ 4. Plaintiff indicated that he could not get along with his
bunk mate. Id. at ¶ 5. After defendant Beauvais encouraged plaintiff to return to his
housing unit, plaintiff stated that if a certain officer bothered him, then he was going
to “slice his throat.” Id. at ¶ 6. Defendant Beauvais contacted the control center about
the threat and then wrote a misconduct ticket. Id. at ¶ 7. Defendant Beauvais then
assigned defendant Christopher Sermo as plaintiff’s case manager to manage plaintiff’s
psychological treatment. Id. at ¶ 9.
Christopher Sermo is a psychologist at Macomb. (Dkt. 110, Ex. 3, Affidavit of
Christopher Sermo, ¶ 1). After plaintiff was put in segregation based on the ticket
written by defendant Beauvais, he was put on defendant Sermo’s caseload. Id. at ¶ 3.
Defendant Sermo reviewed plaintiff’s medical record and informed the psychiatrist that
plaintiff’s medication order was about to expire. Id. at ¶ 4. Defendant Sermo, along
with Dr. Pozios (the psychiatrist), attempted to interview plaintiff on March 30, 2012,
but plaintiff refused to speak with them. Id. at ¶ 6. A few days later, defendant Sermo
learned that plaintiff had been placed in an observation cell after stating that he was on
a hunger strike. Plaintiff refused to speak with defendant Sermo.

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Plaintiff continued to be monitored by staff as a precaution, even though he had
not expressed being suicidal. Id. at ¶ 7. After it was reported that plaintiff ate, the
management plan was adjusted and plaintiff finally agreed to speak with defendant
Sermo. Id. at ¶ 8. Plaintiff’s psychotropic medications were renewed. Id. at ¶ 9. A few
days later when defendant Sermo went to evaluate plaintiff, an officer reported that
plaintiff had been found with a noose in his cell and was banging his head against the
wall. Plaintiff was moved to an observation cell and placed in soft restraints. Id. at ¶
10. Defendant Sermo asked about what had happened. Plaintiff indicated that he had
not been taking his medications. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff was placed in the Crisis
Stabilization Program for further evaluation. Id. at ¶ 12. Plaintiff was later transferred
to the Outpatient Program, where he was seen by other staff. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff was
then cooperative and compliant with his medications. Id. at ¶ 14. Defendant Sermo had
no further contact after being notified of this lawsuit. Id. at ¶ 15.
Robert LeDuc is currently a Captain, but was a Lieutenant at the time of the
allegations. (Dkt. 110, Ex. 4, Affidavit of Robert LeDuc, ¶ 1). Defendant LeDuc and
Nurse Quiles checked plaintiff’s restraints on April 9, 2012. Plaintiff was offered a
restroom break and water, but he refused. Id. at ¶ 3. During Defendant LeDuc’s shift,
plaintiff was checked four times. Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff was removed from top-of-bed
restraints the morning of April 10, 2012, at which time he was given the opportunity
to use a shower and restroom, and to drink water. Id. at ¶ 6.
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Defendant Dr. Pozios was scheduled to meet with plaintiff on March 30 for a
psychiatric evaluation and medication renewal. (Dkt. 112, Ex. F). However, plaintiff
refused to come out of his cell. Id. When Dr. Pozios and the case manager attempted
to assess plaintiff at his cell, he refused to respond to questions. Id. Dr. Pozios’s note
from that encounter states as follows:
Mr. Berkshire’s case manager and I attempted to meet with Mr.
Berkshire but he refused. I was informed that Mr. Berkshire’s
medication orders are due to end today, but that he has been
refusing his psychotropic medications. Because I could not
evaluate Mr. Berkshire and review his medications, I elected not
to renew his medications. I will attempt to meet with Mr.
Berkshire again in the next couple of weeks.
(Dkt. 112, Ex. H). On March 31, the nursing staff wrote that plaintiff had stayed in bed
since his hospital admission. (Dkt. 112, Ex. I). He claimed he could not remember
when he last had something to eat or drink. Id. However, the nurse’s physical
evaluation revealed no signs of dehydration. Id. Plaintiff appeared alert and oriented
and denied that he needed any help. Id.
Due to his refusal to eat, plaintiff was transferred to an observation cell and
asked to notify health care if he had any concerns or issues. (Dkt. 112, Ex. J). He
continued to refuse food, fluids and medications on April 1, 2012. (Dkt. 112, Ex. K).
He signed a form acknowledging that he was refusing to eat, and that he was not taking
his medications because he “doesn’t need meds.” (Dkt. 112, Ex. K, p. 2). He remained

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under close watch on April 2, 2012, and continued to refuse to speak to his case
manager and the psychiatrist. (Dkt. 112, Ex. L). He continued to refuse his
medications. (Dkt. 112, Ex. M). Finally, on the evening of April 3, 2012, plaintiff
ended his self-imposed hunger strike. (Dkt. 112, Ex. N). However, he continued to
refuse medications. (Dkt. 112, Ex. O).
On April 5, plaintiff told his nurse that his medications were not being renewed
until he had a psychiatric evaluation. (Dkt. 112, Ex. P). He reported that he was upset
because he had been informed that “his psych problems are no longer valid to support
meds plus noncompliant with meds.” (Dkt. 112, Ex. Q). He was scheduled to be seen
by the psychiatrist on April 6. Id. However, due to his continued noncompliance with
health care personnel, Dr. Pozios was not able to evaluate him. (Dkt. 112, Ex. R). His
medications were renewed for a month without refills, and he was scheduled for a
medication review on April 9. Id. Plaintiff agreed he would take his medications and
“take one day at a time.” (Dkt. 112, Ex. S). Despite his promise, plaintiff continued to
refuse to take his medications.
On April 9, he was evaluated by Dr. Pozios as previously scheduled. Earlier in
the day, he had been found with a makeshift noose, although it was not clear that he
had actually had the noose around his neck. (Dkt. 112, Ex. T). Due to his threats of
self-harm, plaintiff was transferred to an observation cell and placed in soft restraints.
Id. During the course of Dr. Pozios’s April 9 evaluation, plaintiff stated that he had
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been refusing his medications since March 26. Id. When Dr. Pozios attempted to
question him further, he was uncooperative and refused an offer to discuss alternative
medications. Id.
The only factual allegation in the complaint against Dr. Pozios is a purported
failure to renew his medications on March 30, 2012. The pertinent portion of the
Complaint states as follows:
On March 30, 2012 it was noted in the Health Care logbook and
Defendant Pozios was informed that Plaintiffs psychotropic
medications had expired. Defendant Pozios had deliberately
refused to renew the order for those medications. The
psychotropic medications prescribed to Plaintiff, are used to help
him rehabilitate his severe mental disorders, including suicidal
attempts.
(Dkt. 1, ¶ 7, Pg ID 1191). Plaintiff claims that as a result of the “deprivation” of
medications, his mental health deteriorated, and he attempted suicide.
R&R [129] at 2–9.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court reviews objections to an R&R on a dispositive motion de novo. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole
or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
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to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the
burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be
accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an
essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The
Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
ANALYSIS
I. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [110]
Plaintiff’s Objection [132] presents three arguments. First, Plaintiff objects that
the R&R erred in concluding that temporal proximity is the only evidence that
Defendant Dahl retaliated against him. Dahl only disputes the causation element of
Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim. Under the causation element of a
prisoner's prima facie case on a First Amendment retaliation claim, the subjective
motivation of the decisionmaker is at issue. Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1038
(6th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff must show that (1) that the adverse action was proximately
caused by an individual defendant's acts, but also (2) that the individual taking those
acts was “motivated in substantial part by a desire to punish an individual for exercise
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of a constitutional right.” King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal
citation omitted). “[T]emporal proximity between the protected conduct and the
adverse action, standing alone, may be significant enough to create an inference of
retaliatory motive.” Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2004). “In
analyzing the facts in temporal proximity cases, [the Court looks] at the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether an inference of retaliatory motive could be
drawn.” Vereecke v. Huron Valley School Dist., 609 F.3d 392, 401 (6th Cir. 2010).
In March 2012, Plaintiff was elected as a Housing Unit Representative. On March 19,
2012, Plaintiff submitted a three-page complaint to Resident Unit Manager Wilson and
Defendant Dahl—conduct that Defendant Dahl does not dispute was protected. A
mere two days later, Dahl changed Plaintiff’s Global Assessment Functioning to
53—slightly above the score of 51 needed for Plaintiff to have remained in the
Residential Treatment Program—and only three days later downgraded his diagnoses
for post-traumatic stress disorder and major depression, leaving only his intermittent
explosive disorder diagnosis intact. Neither party has submitted evidence about
Plaintiff’s length of treatment or progress in the Residential Treatment Program, so it
is impossible to conduct a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis on those bases.
Within two and three days of Plaintiff’s protected conduct, Dahl adjusted Plaintiff’s
GAF score to just high enough to remove Plaintiff from the Residential Treatment
Program and indicated that two major mental disorders that had been intractable for
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nearly Plaintiff’s entire life had resolved. Given the temporal proximity of Plaintiff’s
protected conduct to Dahl’s adverse action and the totality of the other circumstances,
the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has stated a prima facie case for retaliation.
Plaintiff’s Objection [132] is sustained as to Defendant Dahl.
Second, Plaintiff objects that he established that he had a serious medical need
and that he established a question of fact as to whether Defendants Beauvais and
Sermo were subjectively deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. A
medical need is sufficiently serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician that has
mandated treatment or it is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
the need for medical treatment. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th
Cir. 2004). During the relevant time period, Plaintiff was in the throes of a weeks-long
period of mental instability and neurological distress. He was cited for homicidal
ideation1, he was placed in top-of-bed restraints, he often refused food and water, he
was transferred to the Crisis Stabilization Unit, he suffered convulsive seizures, and
eventually he attempted suicide on April 9, 2012. During the relevant time period had
diagnoses of post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, and intermittent
explosive disorder, and a facility doctor had been prescribing Plaintiff psychiatric

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The facility used Plaintiff’s homicidal ideation as the basis for penalizing him and
placing him in segregation. Yet, the facility’s medical records, which form the basis of
Plaintiff’s access to mental health care, state repeatedly that Plaintiff does not express homicidal
ideation.
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medication since December 2011. The facility’s own records indicate that Plaintiff
“has a significant [history] of psychiatric intervention . . . and has an extensive history
of harm to self and others.” The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has met the
requirements of the objective prong.
The subjective prong of the test for deliberate indifference requires an inmate
to show that prison officials had “a sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying
medical care.” Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000).

Deliberate

indifference “entails something more than mere negligence, but is satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994). Brent
Lang, along with several other prisoners, submitted declarations to the Court. In part,
Lang’s declaration states that Pozios told him that Beauvais and Sermo knew that
Plaintiff was suffering from a major mental disorder and had engaged in suicidal
behaviors during the relevant time period. Lang’s declaration also states the three of
them—Beauvais, Sermo, and Pozios—delayed transferring Plaintiff to the Crisis
Stabilization Unit because they hoped that Plaintiff would die. From the evidence, a
reasonable jury could infer that Beauvais and Sermo had the requisite culpability to
satisfy the subjective prong of the test for deliberate indifference. Plaintiff’s Objection
[132] is sustained as to Defendants Beauvais and Sermo.

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Plaintiff’s third objection goes to only his claim for deliberate indifference
against Defendant LeDuc.2 Plaintiff alleges that LeDuc denied him an opportunity to
use the restroom after one hour in top-of-bed restraints. The R&R [129] recommends
that the Court conclude that LeDuc is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity because what he did is not clearly unlawful. Plaintiff objects that
he should be given the opportunity to conduct discovery about whether LeDuc had a
ministerial duty to offer more frequent bathroom breaks to Plaintiff. Even if LeDuc
did have a policy-based obligation to offer Plaintiff more frequent breaks, breach of
that duty would not rise to the level of clearly unlawful. Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d
606, 621 (6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff’s Objection [132] is overruled as to LeDuc.
II. Defendant Pozios’s Motion for Summary Judgment [112]
The R&R [129] recommends denying Defendant Pozios’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [112]. Pozios filed an Objection [131], which presents three arguments.
First, Defendant objects that the R&R erred in concluding that Plaintiff established a
serious medical need on March 30, 2012, which is the only date at issue relative to
Defendant Pozios. Although Plaintiff’s serious medical need was determined supra,
the Court will analyze the status of Plaintiff’s serious medical need as of March 30,
2012. A medical need is sufficiently serious if it has been diagnosed by a physician

2

Plaintiff concedes summary judgment to Defendant LeDuc on his Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
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that has mandated treatment or it is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the need for medical treatment. Blackmore, 390 F.3d at 897. As of March
30, 2012, a doctor at the facility had been prescribing Plaintiff psychiatric medication
since December 2011, he had been refusing food, water, and prescribed medication for
four days, he had recently suffered convulsive seizures, and had recent diagnoses of
post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, and intermittent explosive disorder.
Pozios had access to all of this information on March 30, 2012. As stated in the R&R
[129], Plaintiff satisfied the objective prong of the test for deliberate indifference under
the Eighth Amendment because he suffered from a sufficiently serious medical
condition on March 30, 2012 that had been diagnosed by a physician and mandated
treatment.
Defendant Pozios’s second objection is that the R&R [129] erred in finding that
the declaration submitted by Brent Lang was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact on the subjective prong of the test for deliberate indifference. The
subjective prong requires an inmate to show that prison officials had “a sufficiently
culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Brown, 207 F.3d at 867. Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence, but is satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Lang’s declaration in part
states that Pozios asked Lang to falsely testify on his behalf in this action.
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Additionally, Pozios told Lang that Pozios wished Plaintiff had died so that Pozios
could use Plaintiff’s death as an example to other prisoners who “act out on their
mental illness while housed at the Macomb Correctional Facility.” Page ID 1478.
Defendant uses ad hominen attacks against Lang and essentially argues that the Court
should believe Pozios’ word over Lang’s. However, as stated in the R&R [129], the
Court cannot make credibility determinations at the summary judgment stage.
Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905, 910 (6th Cir. 2013). Although Pozios did not make
the alleged statements to Lang on the date in question—March 30, 2012—a reasonable
jury could infer Pozios’s abiding state of mind from Lang’s testimony.
Defendant Pozios’s third objection is that the R&R erred in failing to consider
Plaintiff’s deliberate noncompliance with treatment. Plaintiff’s non-compliance with
any prescribed medication is irrelevant to the determination of deliberate indifference
here because medication non-compliance is a symptom of mental illness. It is
incongruous to accuse a person who has to be restrained from banging his head against
the wall of deliberately taking any course of action. Given the particular nature of
Plaintiff’s illness, it would be illogical to impute rationality to his resistance to
medication. All of the cases that Defendant cites in support of this argument are both
distinguishable from the facts here and are not binding on this Court.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court HEREBY ADOPTS IN PART AND
DECLINES TO ADOPT IN PART the R&R [129]. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [110] is
GRANTED as to Defendant LeDuc and DENIED as to Defendants Dahl, Beauvais,
and Sermo.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant LeDuc is DISMISSED from this
case.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Objection [132] is SUSTAINED
as to Defendants Dahl, Beauvais, and Sermo and OVERRULED as to Defendant
LeDuc.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Pozios Motion for Summary
Judgment [112] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant Pozios’ Objection [131] is
OVERRULED.
SO ORDERED.
s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge

Dated: November 12, 2014

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