Stachura v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 27

ORDER granting 25 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman for District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT R. STACHURA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 2:12-cv-13078
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

CAROLYN W. COLVIN, acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
AT A SESSION of said Court, held in the United States Courthouse,
in the City of Port Huron, State of Michigan, on January 7, 2015
PRESENT: THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s application for attorney fees and expenses
under the Equal Access to Justice Act [dkt. 25]. Defendant filed a response, and Plaintiff did not
file a reply. The Court finds that the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the
parties’ papers such that the decision process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
Therefore, pursuant to E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(2), it is hereby ORDERED that the motion be
resolved on the briefs submitted, without oral argument. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s
application for attorney fees is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
On July 12, 2012, Plaintiff Robert Stachura (“Plaintiff”) filed the underlying complaint
seeking judicial review of the unfavorable decision denying benefits made by the Social Security

Commissioner (“Defendant”) [dkt. 1].1 On July 13, 2012, the Court referred Plaintiff’s complaint
to Magistrate Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk [dkt. 3]. After the parties had filed cross motions for
summary judgment, Magistrate Hluchaniuk issued a Report and Recommendation [dkt. 20]. On
October 17, 2013, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation, and entered judgment in
accordance with it [dkt. 23–24].
Based on the analysis contained in the Report and Recommendation, the Court ordered
that the parties’ motions for summary judgment be granted in part and denied in part. The Report
and Recommendation found that the ALJ erred by failing to properly consider whether Plaintiff’s
impairments satisfied the Listing for a Central Nervous System Vascular Accident (“Listing
11.04”). In doing so, the Report and Recommendation stated that:
The ALJ . . . provided no analysis whatsoever or even mentioned this Listing, let
alone any evaluation and explanation sufficient for meaningful review. While the
Commissioner’s motion contains some discussion as to why Plaintiff does not not
[sic] meet the criteria of Listing 11.04, the ALJ did not engage in that same
analysis . . . [t]hus, this matter should be remanded for further consideration under
Listing 11.04.
On January 15, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney fees and expenses under the Equal
Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”),2 seeking $5,406.00 in fees for 31.8 hours of work performed by
his attorney and $105.40 in expenses incurred [dkt. 25].
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to the EAJA:
a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United
States fees and other expenses . . . incurred by that party in any
civil action . . . including proceedings for judicial review of agency
action, brought by or against the United States in any court having
jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of

1

Although Plaintiff’s original complaint was filed against Michael Astrue, Plaintiff subsequently changed the
named Defendant to reflect the current Social Security Commissioner: Carolyn W. Colvin.
2
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412. 

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the United States was substantially justified or that special
circumstances make an award unjust.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Thus, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a prevailing party; (2)
Defendant’s position lacked substantial justification; and (3) no special circumstances exist that
would warrant a denial of fees. See Ratliff v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 465 F.App’x 459, 460 (6th
Cir. 2012); Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991). Only after these elements are
established should the Court consider the amount of fees that may be properly awarded.
“Whether or not the position of the United States was substantially justified shall be
determined on the basis of the record (including the record with respect to the action or failure to
act by the agency upon which the civil action is based) which is made in the civil action for
which fees and other expenses are sought.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 2412(d)(1)(B). The Supreme Court
has determined that a position is “substantially justified” if it is “justified to a degree that could
satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988). The Sixth Circuit
has interpreted this requirement to find that a “position is substantially justified when it has a
reasonable basis both in law and fact.” Howard v. Barnhart, 376 F.3d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 2004)
(internal citations omitted). Defendant bears the burden of proving its position was substantially
justified. See Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401, 403 (2004).
The EAJA directs courts to award a prevailing party “fees and other expenses . . .
incurred by that party[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(a); see also Richlin Sec. Service Co. v.
Chertoff, 553 U.S. 571, 576 (2008). The EAJA indicates that “[f]ees and other expenses” include
“reasonable attorney fees,” which should be based upon:
prevailing market rates for the kind and quality of the services furnished, except
that . . . attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless the
court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as

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the limited availability of qualified attorneys or agents for the proceedings
involved, justifies a higher fee.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(D)(2)(A).
IV. ANALYSIS
In determining whether to grant Plaintiff’s application for attorney fees and expenses, the
Court’s task is twofold. First, the Court must determine whether the awarding of attorney fees
and expenses is permissible under the relevant fee-shifting statute: in this case, the EAJA.
Second, should the Court determine the awarding of attorney fees and expenses is permissible, it
must then determine the appropriate amount to award.
A. Defendant’s Position Was Not Substantially Justified
As indicated above, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a prevailing party; (2)
Defendant’s position lacked substantial justification; and (3) no special circumstances exist that
would warrant a denial of fees. In this case, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a prevailing
party, and Plaintiff provides compelling Supreme Court precedent to support his contention that
a party obtaining a sentence-four remand may be awarded attorney fees. See Shalala v. Schaefer,
509 U.S. 292, 301 (1993). Further, neither party suggests special circumstances exist in this case
that would warrant the denial of fees, and the Court finds no evidence to suggest such special
circumstances exist. Thus, the Court must consider only whether Defendant’s position was
substantially justified in order to determine whether the awarding of attorney fees is permissible.
It is undisputed that the ALJ failed to provide analysis, evaluation or explanation of any
degree with regards to Plaintiff’s argument that he met Listing 11.04. Despite this failure,
Defendant denied benefits to Plaintiff and defended that denial before this Court. The Court must
decide whether these decisions were substantially justified, a judgment made by determining

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whether the decisions had a reasonable basis in law and fact. See DeLong v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 727 (6th Cir. 2014).
The Court finds that Defendant’s decisions did not have a reasonable basis in law and
fact, and thus were not substantially justified. As Magistrate Hluchaniuk articulated in the Report
and Recommendation adopted by this Court, “[f]or meaningful judicial review, the ALJ must
actually evaluate the evidence, compare it to the criteria of the listing, and give an explained
conclusion.” Dkt. # 20, p. 40 (citing Reynolds v. Commissioner of Social Security, 424 Fed.
Appx. 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011)). In this matter, both parties agree that the ALJ failed to do just
that: although Plaintiff specifically argued that he met Listing 11.04 before the ALJ, the ALJ’s
decision to deny benefits fails to mention this listing whatsoever. The ALJ’s denial provided no
analysis of Plaintiff’s condition in conjunction with Listing 11.04, no evaluation of Plaintiff’s
assertion that his condition met the requirements of Listing 11.04, and no discussion of the
evidence provided to support Plaintiff’s claims. As the Report and Recommendation indicates,
“[the ALJ] skipped an entire step of the necessary analysis.” Id.
Despite this clear and critical omission, Defendant asserts it was substantially justified in
defending the ALJ’s decision. Defendant attempts to defend this position by reminding the Court
that it “rejected all but one of Plaintiff’s [other] arguments,” that the ALJ’s error was harmless
because the record did not reflect Plaintiff met Listing 11.04, and that this Court’s remand was of
a procedural, rather than substantive, nature. None of these explanations, however, address the
crux of the situation: Defendant acknowledged that the ALJ – the person tasked with the job of
ultimately determining Plaintiff’s disability status – failed to provide the requisite analysis
necessary to make that very determination. Defendant nevertheless defended this decision by
supplanting this analytical void with its own post-hoc “analysis” of Plaintiff’s condition. The

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Court will not adopt Defendant’s argument that such post-hoc determinations by the very party
that denied and opposed Plaintiff’s disability petition should be considered in lieu of an
administrative law judge’s analysis.
Accordingly, the Court finds Defendant was not substantially justified in denying
Plaintiff disability benefits and in defending its decision to deny such benefits before this Court.
B. Plaintiff’s Requested Fees and Expenses are Reasonable
Plaintiff asserts his counsel is entitled to $5,406.00 in fees and $105.40 in expenses.
Specifically, Plaintiff attaches affidavits and billing records claiming $5,406.00 in attorney fees
based on the time Attorney Eva Guerra spent pursuing Plaintiff’s case (31.8 hours) multiplied by
a billing rate of $170.00/hour. Plaintiff asserts that such an hourly rate is appropriate given the
prevailing market rate for practitioners of Attorney Eva Guerra’s caliber and experience.
Defendant asserts Plaintiff should not be awarded an hourly rate above $125.00, as Plaintiff fails
to show that the requested rate of $170.00/hour is in line with prevailing rates in the community
for similar legal services. Defendant does not object to the number of hours Attorney Eva Guerra
claims to have spent on this matter or the amount of expenses Plaintiff requests.
With the Court’s knowledge of the local legal market in mind, the Court finds that an
hourly billing rate for Attorney Eva Guerra of $170.00/hour is reasonable for this type of case
and this type of representation. The Court further finds that such rates are in line with those
awarded within this district for similar matters. Upon review of the documents submitted by the
Plaintiff, the Court also finds that the number of hours Attorney Eva Guerra claimed to have
worked is a fair representation of the work actually performed. Finally, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s requests for expenses are reasonable.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application for attorney fees and
expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act [dkt. 25] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to expenses of $105.40 and
reasonable attorney fees of $5,406.00, for an aggregate total of $5,511.40.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant shall pay the aggregate award of $5,511.40
to Plaintiff’s counsel within 15 days of the date of this Opinion and Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Bernard A. Friedman for
HON. LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Date: January 7, 2015

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