Hoagland v. University of Michigan et al
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 10 Motion to Dismiss& GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST TO AMEND COMPLAINT WITHIN 14 DAYS. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MELIISA HOAGLAND
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 12-13756
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN and
RITA MCPHERSON, in her individual
and official capacities,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT
On August 24, 2012, Plaintiff Melissa Hoagland (“Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit
against her former employer, the University of Michigan (“UofM”), and direct supervisor,
Rita McPherson (“McPherson”) (collectively “Defendants”). In her Complaint, Plaintiff
asserts the following counts against Defendants: (I) failure to accommodate in violation
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities
Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”); (II) discrimination in violation of the ADA and
PWDCRA; and, (III) retaliation, interference, coercion and/or intimidation in violation of
the PWDCRA.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6) on October 10, 2012. After receiving
Defendants’ stipulation to an extension of time, Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on
November 2, 2012, in which she also seeks leave to amend her complaint to add disability
discrimination and retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act against UofM and
McPherson in her official capacity. Defendants filed a reply brief on November 13, 2012,
and this Court held a motion hearing on December 17, 2012. For the reasons that follow,
the Court grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss and grants
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff was employed by UofM, most recently as a Senior Billing Clerk. (Pl.’s
Compl. ¶ 11.) She suffers from a disability, specifically chronic migraine headaches with
aura. (Id. ¶ 21.)
During her employment, Plaintiff requested reasonable accommodations for her
disability. (Id. ¶ 24.) In or around September 2009, Defendants denied Plaintiff’s
requests and withdrew previously granted accommodations. (Id. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff also
claims that beginning in or about June 2010, Defendants subjected her to disparate
treatment, discrimination and/or harassment on the basis of her disability and/or her
requests for reasonable accommodation. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff further claims that she
engaged in protected activity by opposing the above-mentioned acts and suffered
retaliation as a result. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 16.) Plaintiff asserts that her termination, effective
December 20, 2011, was retaliatory and that non-disabled employees were treated
differently. (Id. ¶¶ 18(q), 19.)
After her termination, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging discrimination on the basis of
her disability. (Id. ¶ 8.) On or about June 2, 2012, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a “right to
sue notice.” Plaintiff also filed a retaliation claim with the EEOC on September 6, 2012.
(Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 1.) This latter charge is currently pending before the agency.1 (Id.)
II.
Defendants’ Arguments and Plaintiff’s Response
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s ADA claims
against them and ask the Court to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
remaining state law claims.
In support of their request for dismissal, Defendants argue that the sovereign
immunity doctrine bars Plaintiff’s ADA claims against UofM, regardless of whether
Plaintiff is seeking damages or injunctive relief. As to McPherson in her official
capacity, Defendants argue that she too is immune from liability for damages pursuant to
the sovereign immunity doctrine and that Plaintiff fails to allege facts that would give rise
to an actionable claim for prospective or injunctive relief. Alternatively, Defendants
contend that McPherson is entitled to qualified immunity. With respect to Plaintiff’s
ADA claims against McPherson in her individual capacity, Defendants argue that there is
no individual liability under the statute.
In response to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff concedes that her ADA claims against
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In her response brief, Plaintiff alerts the Court and Defendants that she will seek
leave to further amend her complaint to allege retaliation in violation of the ADA once
the EEOC issues her a right to sue letter. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 11.)
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UofM are subject to dismissal. (Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 2.) She clarifies that she is pursuing
her ADA claim against McPherson in her official capacity, only. (Id. at 1.) Because
Plaintiff is seeking reinstatement, she argues that she has stated a viable claim for
prospective injunctive relief against McPherson, in her official capacity.2 Finally, as
indicated above, Plaintiff moves to file an amended complaint adding Rehabilitation Act
claims against Defendants.
Defendants, in reply, do not articulate a reason why the Court should deny
Plaintiff’s request to amend, indicating that they will “defer[] to this Court’s discretion as
to whether said motion should be granted.” (Defs.’ Reply Br. at 2.) Defendants continue
to argue, however, that Plaintiff’s ADA claims against McPherson in her official capacity
fail to state a claim.
III.
Standards for Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Amend3
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78
F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
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Plaintiff concedes that the Eleventh Amendment bars any claim for damages
under the ADA against McPherson in her official capacity.
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Plaintiff contends that the standard of review for Rule 12(b)(1) is moot based on
her concession that her ADA claims against UofM are barred by sovereign immunity.
(Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 2.) This Court agrees, given Plaintiff’s additional concession that the
Eleventh Amendment also bars any claim for money damages against McPherson. (See
id. at 3.) Accordingly, the only issue remaining in dispute is whether Plaintiff states a
claim for prospective injunctive relief against McPherson in her official capacity.
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contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974
(2007)). In deciding whether the plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the court must
accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id.; see also Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). This presumption, however, is not
applicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 668, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), leave to amend is freely granted
where justice so requires. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). “If the underlying facts or
circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he [or she]
ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. Foman v. Davis, 371
U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962). However, a motion to amend a complaint
should be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith or for dilatory purposes, results
in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile. Id. An amendment
is futile when the proposed amendment fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted and thus is subject to dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Rose v. Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2000).
IV.
Applicable Law and Analysis
A.
Whether Plaintiff states viable ADA claims against McPherson, in her
official capacity
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The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars “‘any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States.’” Carten v. Kent
State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. XI.) “The
amendment also bars suits for monetary relief against state officials sued in their official
capacity.” Thiokol Corp. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 987 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1993).
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, does not shield state officials sued in their
official capacities from claims for injunctive relief. Id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S.
123, 28 S. Ct. 441 (1908)). To proceed, such claims “must seek prospective relief to end
a continuing violation of federal law.” Id. (citing McDonald v. Vill. of Northport, Mich.,
164 F.3d 964, 970-72 (6th Cir. 1999)). Here, the survival of Plaintiff’s ADA claims
against McPherson in her official capacity depends on whether Plaintiff states a valid
claim for prospective relief.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff requests inter alia the following relief:
Award Plaintiff equitable relief including, but not limited to: an injunction
directing Defendants to cease their discriminatory conduct and practices;
full reinstatement to her employment and position with Defendants; and
injunctive relief directing Defendants to provide Plaintiff her requested
accommodations within a reasonable time . . .
(See Pl.’s Compl. at 7, 9, 11.) The Sixth Circuit has held “that claims for reinstatement
are prospective in nature and appropriate subjects for Ex Parte Young actions.” Carten,
282 F.3d at 396 (citing Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. and Corrs., 157 F.3d 453, 459
(6th Cir. 1998)). More recently, the court held that a state employee terminated by her
employer allegedly because of her disability stated a viable ADA claim against her
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supervisor, a state official, where the plaintiff requested reinstatement. Whitfield v.
Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 257 (6th Cir. 2011).
Defendants argue in reply that, in the above-cited cases, the Sixth Circuit failed to
apply the Supreme Court’s legal analysis from Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 106 S. Ct.
423 (1985). However, this Court must presume that the appellate court was aware of the
Supreme Court’s decision and concluded that it did not mandate a different result when
deciding Turker, Carten, and Whitfield. Whether or not the Sixth Circuit considered
Green, this Court is bound by the circuit court’s decisions. See Sykes v. Anderson, 625
F.3d 294, 319 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774
F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir.1985)) (indicating that a published prior decision from a panel of
the court “remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United
States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or [the Sixth Circuit c]ourt
sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.”). In any event, this Court does not believe
that Green is relevant as the Supreme Court had no need to address the plaintiffs’ request
for prospective injunctive relief in that case because a change of policy mooted the
request. See Green, 474 U.S. at 72, 106 S. Ct. at 427.
Defendants also argue that McPherson is entitled to qualified immunity. However,
qualified immunity is not a defense available to a state official sued in his or her official
capacity. Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S. Ct. 3099 (1985)) (“The only immunities that can be claimed in
an official-capacity action are forms of sovereign immunity that the entity, qua entity,
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may possess such as the Eleventh Amendment.”).
For the above reasons, the Court concludes that Plaintiff states viable ADA claims
for prospective injunctive relief against McPherson, in her official capacity, to survive
Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
B.
Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend
Plaintiff seeks to amend her complaint to add Retaliation Act claims against
Defendants. Defendants do not contest Plaintiff’s ability to assert viable claims under this
statute against them. In other words, Defendants do not claim that the proposed
amendment would be futile. The Court finds no other basis for denying Plaintiff’s
request.
Accordingly, the Court is granting Plaintiff’s request for leave to file an amended
complaint.
V.
Conclusion
As discussed above, Plaintiff concedes that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars
her ADA claims against UofM for monetary and/or injunctive relief and against
McPherson in her official capacity for monetary relief. Plaintiff, however, states viable
failure to accommodate and discrimination claims under the ADA for prospective
injunctive relief against McPherson in her official capacity. Plaintiff makes clear that she
is not suing McPherson individually under the ADA. The Court is allowing Plaintiff to
file an amended complaint to add Rehabilitation Act claims against Defendants.
Defendants also ask the Court to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
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PWDCRA claims, a request the Court declines.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED IN PART
AND DENIED IN PART;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint is GRANTED and Plaintiff has fourteen (14) days to file her
amended complaint.
Dated: December 18, 2012
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Kathleen L. Bogas, Esq.
Charlotte Croson, Esq.
Donica Thomas Varner, Esq.
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