Coleman v. Palmer

Filing 9

OPINION and ORDER Denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Denying Certificate of Appealability. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ANTHONY COLEMAN,
Case No. 12-cv-15048
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

Petitioner,
v.
CARMEN PALMER,
Respondent.
/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS (ECF #1) AND DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Petitioner Anthony Coleman (“Petitioner”) has filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

(See the “Petition,” ECF #1.)

Petitioner is in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections pursuant to
convictions for conspiracy to commit armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws §
750.157a; armed robbery, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.529; two counts of carrying or
possession a firearm during the commission of a felony, Mich. comp. Laws §
750.227b; felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f; and
carrying a concealed weapon, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227. Petitioner seeks
habeas relief on the grounds that (1) the prosecutor committed misconduct during
Petitioner’s criminal trial; and (2) the trial court denied him his right to present a
defense when it excluded certain evidence. For all of the reasons stated below, the

Court denies the Petition and denies a Certificate of Appealability.
I. Background and Procedural History
Petitioner’s convictions arise from the robbery of a 7-11 store in Saginaw,
Michigan. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the circumstances leading to
Petitioner’s convictions as follows:
Christopher Hill testified that he formerly worked the
third shift at a 7-11 convenience store in Saginaw,
Michigan. He related that he was smoking a cigarette
outside near his truck during the early morning hours of
December 13, 2007, when a tall man – about 6 feet 1 or 2
inches – approached the store’s entrance. Hill remarked
that the man had a ski-mask covering his face. Hill asked
him to remove the mask, but he did not.
Hill said he went into the store shortly after the man
entered. The man went to a cooler, got a pop, and then
walked to the counter. Hill passed the man on his way to
the counter and the man “was acting like he was maybe
digging for change to pay for his pop....” So Hill walked
passed him to go behind the counter. As he passed by,
the man put a gun to Hill’s back. After Hill opened the
register, the man took the cash – a handful of ones, fives,
[and] maybe one ten.” The man then left. Hill called the
police and he saw officers driving around the area
“within the minute” – “they responded very quick.”
Matthew McMahon testified that he lived about a block
from the 7-11 store involved in the robbery. He was up
because he worked third shift and stayed up late. He had
opened a second story window and leaned out to smoke a
cigarette before going to bed at about 3:30 or 3:45 in the
morning. As he smoked, he noticed a car parked across
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the street “kind of blocking” his neighbor’s driveway.
The car was white with a dark cloth top on the back half.
McMahon said that the car appeared empty, but then it
suddenly started up and the lights came on. The driver
pulled away and drove toward Main Street, which was
near the location of the 7-11, performed a U-turn,
returned and stopped in the middle of the road.
McMahon said that the driver got out of the car at about
the time another man appeared “running around the
corner coming from Main Street towards the car, and I
heard the driver saying, ‘Come on, come on, come on.’ “
McMahon thought the other man must have gotten into
the car because he did not see the man after the driver got
back into the car and drove off.
Officer Douglas Jordan testified that he responded to a
dispatch about a robbery that had occurred at a 7-11
store. It was 3:38 in the morning on December 13, 2007.
Jordan proceeded to the store, spoke to Hill, and took a
description of the man that robbed the store: a black
male, 33 to 38 years of age, 6 foot 4, 230 pounds, and
wearing a beige ski mask, gloves, sweatpants, and dark
jacket. Jordan said he put out the description over his
radio.
Detective Matthew Gerow testified that he was a
patrolman back in December 2007 and that he was
patrolling Saginaw’s southwest side when he heard a
dispatch concerning an armed robbery at a 7-11 store.
Gerow said that he drove to the area and began to circle
the nearby blocks “listening for dogs barking or chain
link fence rattling, any sign of movement in the blocks
there.” As he was driving down one street, he heard
someone shout “Officer, Officer.” Gerow looked up and
saw a man leaning out of a second story window. The
man asked him if “something had happened” and Gerow
asked why he asked.
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McMahon testified that, five to seven minutes after the
man in the white car drove off, he saw a police officer
driving down his street with no lights on. He yelled to
the officer and told him about the white car and the man
running from Main Street. Gerow said that the man in
the window told him that he “just seen a black guy
wearing all dark clothing with a knit hat jump into a
vehicle that ... sped off.” Gerow took a description of the
vehicle and put it out “over the police radio.”
Officer Anthony Teneyuque testified that he was driving
toward the 7-11 store after hearing the dispatch
concerning an armed robbery. He said he heard the
description of the suspect – a tall, heavy, black man in
dark clothing – and of the white car with the cloth top.
Teneyuque stated that there were no cars on the roads at
the time. As he was crossing the Center Street Bridge on
the way to the 7-11 store, he noticed a white car with a
cloth top being driven in the opposite direction. He
decided to turn around and speed up to investigate the
white car. He stopped the car and walked up to the
driver’s side door.
Teneyuque said that Coleman was the driver and that
there was no other person in the car. He asked Coleman
to get out, which Coleman did, and then explained that he
was investigating an armed robbery. He also asked
Coleman if he could search his car and Coleman told him
that he could. For reasons of safety, Teneyuque placed
Coleman in the back of his patrol car before he searched
Coleman’s car. He said that he did not find anything in
the car and, because Coleman did not match the
description of the suspect, he thought there was no
further reason to detain him. However, when he went to
report the stop by radio, he stood near the white car’s
trunk and heard a noise coming from it. He opened the
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trunk and discovered a large man, who was later
identified as Corey Harper, lying inside in a half-fetal
position.
Harper was wearing dark clothing and
clutching a handful of cash. He later found gloves and a
handgun in the trunk. Teneyuque noted that the stop
occurred at 3:46 a.m.
Coleman testified on his own behalf. Coleman said that,
on the morning at issue, he was out at a friend’s house
and got a call that another friend’s home “had got shot
up.” He decided to go visit this friend at about two in the
morning to see if he was ok. However, he was having
trouble finding the home where this friend went to stay
after the shooting, so he was driving up and down the
road. At that time, Harper came running up to him and
related that someone was trying to kill him. Coleman
said that he knew Harper from the neighborhood.
Coleman testified that he decided to help Harper; so he
put him in the trunk. Coleman explained that Harper was
“too big” and he was afraid that whoever was trying to
kill Harper might “shoot the whole car up”, if they saw
Harper in the car. Coleman said that he did not see
Harper with gloves or a gun. He said he was merely
trying to take Harper back to their neighborhood, where
he would be safe, when an officer pulled him over.
Coleman admitted that he did not flag down an officer to
help with Harper’s situation. He stated that he did not
seek an officer’s help because “they never help us.” He
also admitted that he did not tell the officer who pulled
him over that Harper was in the trunk. Teneyuque
testified that he asked Coleman why he did not reveal
that Harper was in the trunk and Coleman responded that
he “didn’t want to get into Mr. Harper’s business.”
Coleman testified that he did not tell Teneyuque about
Harper because he knew that Harper was in a gang and
he feared retaliation. He also explained that people from
his neighborhood “don’t talk to police.”
5

People v. Coleman, No. 299517, 2011 WL 4950003 at *2-3 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct.
18, 2011).
Petitioner was tried twice in the Saginaw County Circuit Court. Petitioner’s
first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury could not reach a verdict.

At the

second trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of conspiracy to commit armed
robbery, armed robbery, two counts of felony firearm, felon in possession of a
firearm, and carrying a concealed weapon. On October 15, 2009, the state trial
court sentenced Petitioner to 25 to 50 years in prison for the armed robbery,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery, being a felon-in-possession, and carrying a
concealed weapon convictions, all to be served concurrently. The trial court also
sentenced Petitioner to two years’ imprisonment for each of the felony-firearm
convictions, to be served concurrently with one another but prior to the other four
sentences.
Petitioner filed an appeal of right in the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising
these claims: (i) prosecutorial misconduct; (ii) that the trial court denied him the
right to present a defense when it excluded evidence he intended to introduce to
show that he had a legitimate source of income; and (iii) that the trial court denied
him the right to present a defense when it excluded evidence related to his learning
disability. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner’s convictions. See
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Coleman, 2011 WL 4950003.
Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan
Supreme Court, raising the same claims he raised in the Michigan Court of
Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. See People v.
Coleman, 491 Mich. 888 (Mich. 2012).
Petitioner thereafter filed the pending habeas Petition.

(See ECF #1.)

Petitioner raises these claims:
I.
Petitioner was denied his right to due process by
prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during closing
argument;
II.
Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to
present a defense when the trial court excluded defense
evidence for a discovery violation, regarding Petitioner’s
sources of income; and
III. Petitioner was denied his constitutional right to
present a defense when the trial court excluded evidence,
due to a discovery violation, regarding Petitioner’s
learning disability.
II.

Governing Legal Standard
Review of the Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner is entitled to
a writ of habeas corpus only if he can show that the state court’s adjudication of his
claims –
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(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceedings.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ . . . clearly established law if it
‘applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court
cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a
decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from
[this] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam)
(quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). “[T]he ‘unreasonable
application’ prong of the statute permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if
the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme]
Court but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts’ of petitioner’s case.”
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003) (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413).
Furthermore, “[i]n order for a federal court find a state court’s application of
[Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’ the state court’s decision must have
been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state court’s application must have

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been ‘objectively unreasonable.’”

Id. at 520-21 (citations omitted); see also

Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. In other words, “[a] state court’s determination that a
claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists
could disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v.
Richter, 562 U.S. 86, ––, 131 S. Ct. 770, 789 (2011), (quoting Yarborough v.
Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Finally, a federal habeas court must

presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. See 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e)(1).

A petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and

convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
III.

Discussion
A.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim

Part of Petitioner’s defense at trial was that he had no motive to commit a
robbery for a small amount of money because earned a sufficient income working
in lawn care and snow removal for a realtor. To support this defense, Petitioner
sought to introduce purported “receipts” of the payments he received. But “the
trial court … precluded the admission of the receipts, which were apparently hand
written by Coleman’s wife, because Coleman did not reveal the existence of the
receipts until just before the [second] trial.” Coleman, 2011 WL 495003 at *3.

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Petitioner now argues that he is entitled to habeas relief because the
prosecutor wrongly took advantage of this evidentiary ruling when he (the
prosecutor) said in his rebuttal argument that Petitioner had failed to corroborate
his claim that he was employed at the time of the robbery. The prosecutor argued
to the jury as follows:
Why don’t you tell your probation officer you’ve been working?
Because you haven’t been? Can you really buy the argument he
wouldn’t say that because that was October and the grass cutting is
over? Aren’t you supposed to be trying to impress your probation
officer with all the things you’re doing right? But, no, he doesn’t
bring it up at all. As a matter of fact, he tells him not working, doing
odd jobs, yet we hear about him working for some guy, Wesley Stone
I think he said, who mails him checks for lawn work. He’s in Bay
City. Remember? Where’s Wesley? Where’s the guy that’s writing
the checks? Where are the checks? Where’s anything?
Id. at *4.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor knew that corroborating evidence existed, but
that the evidence was excluded on a procedural ground.
The “clearly established Federal law” relevant to a habeas court’s review of
a prosecutorial misconduct claim is the Supreme Court’s decision in Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986). See Parker v. Matthews, — U.S.—, 132 S.
Ct. 2148, 2153 (2012). In Darden, the Supreme Court held that a “prosecutor’s
improper comments will be held to violate the Constitution only if they ‘so

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infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process.’” Id. (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). “To
constitute a denial of due process, the misconduct must be so pronounced and
persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.” Byrd v. Collins, 209
F.3d 486, 529 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pritchett v. Pitcher, 117 F.3d 959, 964 (6th
Cir. 1997)). This standard is not easy to satisfy. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit “has
been reluctant to grant habeas petitions based on improper prosecutorial statements
at closing argument.” Wilson v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 2001).
When confronted with this issue on Petitioner’s direct appeal, the Michigan
Court of Appeals reasoned, in relevant part:
It is ... well-settled that, once a defendant presents a particular theory
to the jury for consideration, the prosecutor can comment on the
defendant’s failure to present evidence to support that theory. See
People v. Fields, 450 Mich. 94, 115–116; 538 N.W.2d 356 (1995).
Here, Coleman’s defense was that he was the victim of circumstance.
To bolster this theory, he testified that he had no motive to commit a
robbery for a few dollars because he was “well off” and working in
lawn care and snow removal. ... [W]hen Coleman presented evidence
that he had no motive to commit the robbery, the prosecutor had every
right to comment on the weakness of Coleman’s evidence showing a
lack of motive. Fields, 450 Mich. at 115–116. As can be seen from
the remarks about which Coleman complains, the prosecutor
emphasized that the evidence that Coleman never told his parole
officer about his new employment, despite the fact that one would
presumably want one’s parole officer to be aware of such an
important fact. The prosecutor also noted – in passing – that Coleman
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had not called his purported employer to the stand or offered any
checks into evidence that would show how much he had earned.
These remarks were all proper; Coleman was in a better position to
reveal who his employer was and to call him to the stand to
corroborate his employment claims. But he failed to call Stone to the
stand. Coleman presumably also had access to the checks or copies of
the checks from his employment, but did not produce them. Indeed,
Coleman failed to reveal his employment in lawn care and snow
removal during discovery, during his preliminary examination, during
his last trial, or before the present trial. Given the testimony from his
parole officer, the prosecutor could properly argue that the reason
Coleman did not produce Stone or Stone’s checks was because he was
not actually working for Stone. Id.
In addition, the remarks cannot be said to exploit the trial court’s
decision – as Coleman claims on appeal – to prohibit him from
presenting “employment corroboration” evidence. This is because the
trial court made no such prohibition; it precluded him from presenting
newly “discovered” receipts drawn up by his wife, because he had not
disclosed the receipts – or indeed his employment history – until the
second day of the present trial, which the court determined amounted
to a discovery violation. And, contrary to Coleman’s claim at trial, the
prosecutor did not directly comment on his failure to produce
“receipts.” Rather, the only comment that could even be considered
improper was the prosecutor’s closing comment, “Where's anything?”
This last remark might – in a stretch – be considered an improper
reference to Coleman’s failure to produce the precluded receipts. But
it can just as easily be understood as a summation of the prosecutor’s
statements immediately preceding that remark; namely, that Coleman
did not call Stone to the stand and did not present copies of Stone’s
checks to show that he was actually “well off” and, therefore, did not
need to commit a robbery to get money. When this isolated remark is
considered in light of Coleman’s trial counsel’s closing argument and
the evidence adduced at trial, we cannot conclude that it was
improper. . . .

12

Even if this two-word comment could be considered improper, we do
not agree that it deprived Coleman of a fair trial. Id. at 266–267. The
evidence that Coleman knowingly participated in Harper’s robbery of
the 7-11 store – although circumstantial – was quite strong.
Coleman’s convoluted explanation of the circumstances that
innocently explain how Harper came to be found in his trunk during a
traffic stop shortly after an early morning robbery is so far-fetched
that it actually served to highlight the strength of the circumstantial
evidence tending to show that he agreed to provide Harper with the
transportation for the robbery. . . . [A]nd the fact that Coleman had
employment did not, in any event, negate the motive of pecuniary
gain – it is entirely plausible that Coleman would participate in the
robbery to obtain additional money despite being “well off.” Given
that Coleman’s motive theory was weak, that the evidence tended to
show that he was not actually working despite his testimony to the
contrary, and that the purportedly improper comment was quite minor,
even if improper, the comment does not warrant relief.
Coleman, 2011 WL 4950003 at *4-5.
The Michigan Court of Appeals’ holding was detailed, persuasive, and not
an unreasonable application of Darden. It was not out of bounds for the prosecutor
to identify the lack of evidence supporting Petitioner’s no-motive theory. And the
complained-about statement was an isolated remark in a rebuttal argument, not the
central theme of the prosecution’s closing argument.

Moreover, as the court

properly pointed out, the prosecutor’s argument that Petitioner failed to provide
corroboration for his claimed employment did not necessarily reference the
absence of receipts.

13

Finally, the Michigan Court of Appeals’ conclusion that any prosecutorial
misconduct amounted to harmless error was not unreasonable.

Moreover,

Petitioner has not shown that the purported error of the trial court “had [a]
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.”
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. U.S., 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). As described above, the complained-of statement was
ambiguous, was only a small part of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, and there
was other evidence of Petitioner’s guilt. And Petitioner could have attempted to
corroborate his testimony that he was employed in other ways, such as calling
additional witnesses to confirm his employment. But Petitioner did not do so, and
he has not claimed that he was prevented from doing so. Moreover, the trial court
instructed the jury that Coleman was presumed innocent and that the prosecutor
had the burden of proving Coleman’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which
mitigated any improper inference that may have been taken from the prosecutor’s
rebuttal argument. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
B.

Right to Present a Defense

In his second and third claims for habeas relief, Petitioner argues that two of
the trial court’s evidentiary rulings denied him his right to present a defense.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that the trial court violated his right to present a
14

defense when the court excluded the purported work receipts from evidence and
when it excluded testimony related to his learning disability.
The right of a defendant to present a defense has long been recognized as “a
fundamental element of due process of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,
19 (1967). It is one of the “minimum essentials of a fair trial.” Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).

Because criminal defendants are

guaranteed a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense,” courts
cannot exclude defense evidence under evidentiary rules that “serve no legitimate
purpose or that are disproportionate to the ends that they are asserted to promote.”
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 325-26 (2006).
In determining whether the exclusion of evidence infringes upon a weighty
interest of the accused, the question is whether the defendant was afforded “‘a
meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 683, 690 (1986), (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
The prosecutor’s case must “encounter and ‘survive the crucible of meaningful
adversarial testing.’” Id. at 690-691 (1984), (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 656 (1984)). But the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the Due
Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned
review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules.” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S.
15

422, 438 n. 6 (1983).
Petitioner argues that the trial court’s exclusion of the receipts prevented him
from showing that he had ample funds and thus no motive to commit the robbery.
The Michigan Court of Appeals considered and rejected this argument:
Although a defendant has a constitutional right to present
a defense, that right is not absolute; the defendant must
still comply with the rules and statutes designed to ensure
that the trial is fair. Yost, 278 Mich.App at 379. Here,
Coleman waited until the second day of his second trial
to reveal the existence of the receipts. And, despite his
claim that he could not have revealed them earlier
because he had thought them lost, he also failed to
disclose the existence of this employment prior to the
present trial. That is, it was not just that he failed to
disclose the existence of the receipts, he also failed to
disclose that he worked for a man named Stone
performing lawn care and snow removal prior to this
trial. By failing to disclose these claims, he prevented the
prosecutor from investigating this employment prior to
trial. Further, the receipts were apparently hand written
by Coleman's wife. Hence, in order to adequately
challenge the receipts, the prosecutor would have
required time to try and locate Stone, investigate
Coleman's bank accounts, and ultimately depose
Coleman's wife. As such, the late production of these
receipts was highly prejudicial to the prosecution and
could likely only be remedied through an adjournment of
the trial. Likewise, the receipts had limited relevance to
show that Coleman had income during the period at issue
and Coleman still had the opportunity to present other
less prejudicial evidence tending to show that he had a
source of income. Given these considerations, we cannot
conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when it
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prohibited the use of these receipts. Id.
Coleman, 2011 WL 4950003 at *6.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the trial court’s
exclusion of the receipts was a measured response to a discovery violation that
otherwise would have prejudiced the prosecution.

And, as discussed above,

Petitioner could have introduced evidence of his income in other ways, by, for
example, calling additional witnesses to corroborate his employment. The receipts
were simply not indispensable to Petitioner’s defense. Moreover, a jury would
have had plenty of reasons to question the validity of both the receipts and
Petitioner’s assertion he was employed. Petitioner could not initially remember the
same of the realtor who purportedly employed him, he admitted that he never told
his probation officer that he was employed, and the receipts Petitioner wanted
admitted were drafted by Petitioner’s wife. The exclusion of the receipts did not
deprive Petitioner of his right to present a defense.
Petitioner also argues that his right to present a defense was violated by the
trial court’s exclusion of evidence of his learning disability. The Michigan Court
of Appeals rejected this argument as well:
From the record, it is not clear that the trial court actually
precluded Coleman from testifying about his learning
disability for the purpose of explaining his inability to
17

remember the name of the man that he worked for.
Rather, the court seemed to preclude testimony that he
had a learning disability to show that he was not mentally
competent in a broader sense, which was proper. See
Yost, 278 Mich.App at 353–355. The court was also
plainly focused on Coleman's proclivity for interjecting
improper and non-responsive commentary on the
evidence, the court's rulings, and the prosecutor's
conduct. In any event, to the extent that the trial court
might have erred by precluding Coleman from offering
testimony about his learning disability for a proper
purpose, see id. at 355 (stating that a defendant might
properly present evidence of his or her limited
intellectual capabilities for a purpose other than to negate
specific intent), we cannot conclude that such an error
warrants relief.
Coleman's trial counsel presented evidence that Coleman
could not read or write, which tended to show that he
some sort of learning deficiencies and also tended to
explain why he might not be able to recall the names of
streets or the name of the man for whom he worked.
Thus, any additional testimony concerning a clinical
learning disability would have only marginal additional
relevance toward explaining his mnemonic shortcomings. Moreover, on the following day's testimony,
Coleman testified that he had difficulty remembering
names and that that difficulty was related to his inability
to read and write. He also testified that he is easily
confused. Finally, he testified that he refreshed his
recollection and recalled the name of the realtor for
whom he performed lawn work, which was Wesley
Stone. Consequently, the trial court actually allowed
Coleman to present significant testimony concerning his
limitations. Given this, we cannot conclude that any error
in the trial court's decision to limit Coleman's testimony
about his learning disability prejudiced his trial. See
18

People v. Lukity, 460 Mich. 484, 495–496; 596 NW2d
607 (1999).
Coleman, 2011 WL 4950003 at *7.
At trial, Petitioner was permitted some testimony on the subject of his
learning disability. Any limits imposed by the trial court on this subject were
reasonable and regarded only marginally relevant testimony. Thus, the Michigan
Court of Appeals’ decision that Coleman was not denied his right to present a
defense was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court
precedent.
IV.

Certificate of Appealability
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22 provides that an appeal of this

Opinion and Order may not proceed unless a certificate of appealability (a “COA”)
is issued under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Proceedings now requires that the Court “must issue or deny a certificate of
appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.”
A COA may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). A petitioner must
show “that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that)
the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues

19

presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (citation omitted). In this case, the Court
concludes that reasonable jurists would not debate the conclusion that the Petition
fails to state a claim upon which habeas relief should be granted. Therefore, the
Court will deny a certificate of appealability.
V.

Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for a Writ of Habeas

Corpus (ECF #1) is DENIED and the matter is DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a Certificate of Appealability is
DENIED.
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: March 5, 2015

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on March 5, 2015, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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