King et al v. Williams

Filing 48

ORDER Sustaining in Part and Overruling in Part Defendant's 46 Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation; Adopting in Part and Rejecting in Part the 45 Report and Recommendation; and Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's 38 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHERYL KING and
KEVIN KING,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 12-cv-15116
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
T. WILLIAMS,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
ORDER SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION (ECF #46); ADOPTING IN PART
AND REJECTING IN PART THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
(ECF #45); AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #38)
Plaintiff Kevin King (“King”) is an inmate in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections. At all relevant times, King was incarcerated at the G.
Robert Cotton Correctional Facility (the “Cotton Facility”). On March 7, 2012,
King and his wife Cheryl King (collectively “Plaintiffs” or the “Kings”), filed an
Amended Complaint against Tiffaney Williams (“Williams”), a corrections officer
at the Cotton Facility. (See Am. Compl., ECF #12.) Among other things, the
Kings allege that Williams supervised the Cotton Facility’s visiting room and that,
in retaliation for earlier complaints the Kings made against her, she prohibited the

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Kings from sitting next to each other and embracing each other during a visit in
which such contact would otherwise be allowed. (See id. at ¶¶6-8.)
On March 7, 2013, Williams moved to dismiss the Kings’ Amended
Complaint. (See ECF #14) In her motion to dismiss, Williams argued that her
alleged retaliatory acts were de minimis and thus insufficient to support a
retaliation claim. (See id. at Pg. ID 93.) The Magistrate Judge then assigned to the
case recommended denying Williams’ motion to dismiss. (See ECF #22.) The
then-assigned Magistrate Judge concluded that Williams’ alleged actions were not
de minimis because her purported “threat to restrict visitation, her issuance of false
misconduct violations, and her deprivation of contact granted to prisoners and their
visitors during contact visits … could [] be found sufficient to deter a person of
ordinary firmness” from engaging in protected activity. (ECF #22 at 6, Pg. ID
149.) Williams did not file any objections to the recommendation to deny his
motion to dismiss, and the Court adopted the recommendation and denied
Williams’ motion to dismiss. (See ECF #27.)
Following discovery, Williams moved for summary judgment. (See ECF
#38.) In her motion, Williams again argued that her actions were de minimis and
insufficient to support a retaliation claim.

(See id. at 4-5, Pg. ID 208-209.)

Williams also argued that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PLRA”)
prohibited King from recovering damages for any mental or emotional harm. (See

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id. at 5-8, Pg. ID 209-212.) On August 18, 2014, the now-assigned Magistrate
Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (the “R&R”) recommending that the
Court deny Williams’ motion. (See ECF #45.)
In the R&R, the Magistrate Judge first recommended that the Court allow
the Kings’ retaliation claim to proceed to a jury. (See id. at 4-6, Pg. ID 408-410.)
The Magistrate Judged rejected Williams’ argument that her actions were “de
minimis” as a matter of law. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Williams had
not presented any evidence – such as facts demonstrating the falsity of the Kings’
allegations – that would warrant a retreat from the Court’s earlier ruling that the
Kings’ retaliation claim was viable. The Magistrate Judge also recommended that
the Court deny Williams’ partial summary judgment on King’s claim for mental
and emotional injuries. (See id. at 6-8, Pg. ID 410-412.)
Williams filed timely objections to the R&R.

(See ECF #46.)

In her

objections, Williams first repeats her argument that her actions prohibiting
Plaintiffs from sitting next to each other and embracing during a contact visit were
“de minimis” and do not “rise to the level of being constitutional violations.” (Id.
at 3, Pg. ID 418.) But Williams has identified no binding authority in which a
similar retaliatory act was found to be de minimis. And the Sixth Circuit has
explained that “in most cases, the question of whether an alleged retaliatory action
poses a sufficient deterrent threat to be actionable will not be amendable to

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resolution as a matter of law … unless the claimed retaliatory action is truly
inconsequential, the plaintiff’s claim should go to a jury.” Bell v. Johnson, 308
F.3d 594, 603 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court agrees
with the Magistrate Judge that the retaliatory action here – Williams’ refusal to
allow Plaintiffs to sit next to each other and embrace during a visit where such
conduct would otherwise have been allowed – is not so “inconsequential” that this
case should not proceed to a jury on that question. Indeed, Williams substantially
understates the value of human contact in general and its special value to the
Kings.1 Touching each other, even briefly, is the sole form of intimacy that the
Kings may share, and it was certainly meaningful for Williams to deprive them of
physical contact. The Court therefore overrules Williams’ first objection and will
adopt the R&R to the extent it recommends denying Williams’ summary judgment
on this ground.

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Myriad sources, easily located via a quick internet search, explain in detail the
important role that physical human contact plays in our lives. See, e.g., Rick
Chillot, The Power of Touch, Psychology Today, March 11, 2013; see also
Benedict Carey, Evidence That Little Touches Do Mean So Much, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 23, 2010, at D5. The Court is certainly not making any definitive
proclamation concerning the role of touch and physical contact. Rather, the Court
cites these sources as support for its conclusion that Williams has dismissed the
importance of touch far too easily – and has not demonstrated the depriving two
people of otherwise-permitted touching is, as a matter of law, merely a “de
minimis” adverse action.

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In her second objection, Williams argues that the Magistrate Judge erred
when he denied her motion for summary judgment on that portion of Kevin King’s
claim seeking damages for mental or emotional injuries. The Court sustains this
objection. The applicable provision of the PLRA states that “[n]o federal civil
action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional
facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a
showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). There is no dispute that (1)
King is a “prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,” (2) the
injuries he claims to have suffered occurred “while in custody,” and (3) King has
made no showing of “physical injury.” Under the plain language of the PLRA,
King thus may not recover damages for mental or emotional injuries. Geiger v.
Jowers, 404 F.3d 371, 374 (5th Cir. 2005) (“To the extent [plaintiff] seeks
compensation for [emotional distress] injuries alleged to have resulted from a First
Amendment violation, the district court properly determined that his claim is
barred by the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e)”). Indeed, while the Sixth
Circuit has not yet decided whether § 1997e(e) bars a claim for mental/emotional
damages in the First Amendment context, that court has noted that “the majority of
courts hold § 1997e(e) applies to all federal prisoner lawsuits. Taylor v. United
States, 161 Fed. App’x 483, 486-487 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original).

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The Court acknowledges that other courts have reached a contrary
conclusion for different reasons – including that the PLRA cannot sensibly be
interpreted to apply to First Amendment retaliation claims because those claims
rarely, if ever, involve physical injury and that applying the PLRA to First
Amendment retaliation claims would be unconstitutional. See, e.g. Cannell v.
Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998); Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433
F.Supp.2d 811, 815-817 (E.D. Mich. 2006). However, King has not persuaded the
Court that applying the PLRA to him would violate the constitution, and the Court
believes that the plain language of the PLRA controls in this case. The Court will
therefore sustain Williams’ second objection and will reject the R&R to the extent
that it recommends denying Williams’ partial summary judgment on King’s claim
for mental/emotional damages. This holding, however, does not prohibit King
from potentially obtaining nominal and/or punitive damages against Williams, and
it has no effect on the damages Cheryl King may recover.

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Therefore, for all the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
THAT (1) Williams’ Objections to the R&R (ECF #46) are sustained in part and
overruled in part; (2) the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (ECF #45) is adopted in part and
rejected in part; (3) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #38) is
granted as to King’s claim for mental/emotional damages; and (4) Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF #38) is denied in all other respects.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 29, 2014

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on September 29, 2014, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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