Walsh v. Social Security, Commissioner of
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting 12 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 14 Motion for Summary Judgment; rejecting Report and Recommendations re 17 Report and Recommendation on 17 Report and Recommendation, 12 Motion for Summary Judgment, 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MICHAEL JAMES WALSH,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 12-cv-15128
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff applied for Social Security benefits on September 1, 2009, alleging
that he became disabled on March 28, 2009. The Social Security Administration
denied Plaintiff’s application for benefits initially. Upon Plaintiff’s request,
Administrative Law Judge Paul R. Armstrong (“ALJ”) conducted a de novo
hearing on September 1, 2010. The ALJ issued a decision on October 28, 2010,
finding Plaintiff not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and
therefore not entitled to benefits. The ALJ’s decision became the final decision of
the Social Security Commissioner (“Commissioner”) when the Social Security
Appeals Council denied review. Plaintiff thereafter initiated the pending action.
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment, which this Court
referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder. On October 17, 2013, Magistrate
Judge Binder filed his Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that
this Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s
motion. At the conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge Binder advises the
parties that they may object to and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of
service upon them. Plaintiff filed objections to the R&R on October 31, 2013.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g):
Any individual, after any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to
which he was a party . . . may obtain a review of such
decision by a civil action . . . The court shall have the
power to enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or
reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social
Security, with or without remanding the cause for a
rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner of Social
Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g)(emphasis added); see Boyes v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 46 F.3d 510, 511-12 (6th Cir. 1994). “Substantial evidence is defined as
‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.’” Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 1427 (1971)). The
Commissioner’s findings are not subject to reversal because substantial evidence
exists in the record to support a different conclusion. Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.2d
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535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing Baker v. Kechler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir.
1984)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, a
reviewing court must affirm. Studaway v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 815
F.2d 1074, 1076 (6th Cir. 1987).
The court reviews de novo the parts of an R&R to which a party objects. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich.
2001). However, the Court “is not required to articulate all the reasons it rejects a
party’s objections.” Id.
ANALYSIS
An ALJ considering a disability claim is required to follow a five-step
process to evaluate the claim. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). If the ALJ determines
that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at a step, the ALJ makes his or her
decision and does not proceed further. Id. However, if the ALJ does not find that
the claimant is disabled or not disabled at a step, the ALJ must proceed to the next
step. Id. “The burden of proof is on the claimant through the first four steps . . . If
the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not
disabled, the burden transfers to the [defendant].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health and
Human Servs., 14 F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482
U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S. Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5 (1987).
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The ALJ’s five-step sequential process is as follows:
1.
At the first step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(a)(4)(i).1
2.
At the second step, the ALJ considers whether the claimant has a
severe medically determinable physical or mental impairment that
meets the duration requirement of the regulations and which
significantly limits the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(ii) and (c).2
3.
At the third step, the ALJ again considers the medical severity of the
claimant’s impairment to determine whether the impairment meets or
equals an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,
Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s
impairment meets any Listing, he or she is determined to be disabled
regardless of other factors.3 Id.
4.
At the fourth step, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) and past relevant work to determine whether the
claimant can perform his or her past relevant work.4 20 C.F.R. §
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The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since March 28, 2009. (A.R. at 71.)
2
The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: left
arm crush injury with multiple surgical corrections. (A.R. at 71.) While finding
that Plaintiff has some mental impairments, the ALJ concluded that these
impairments were mild and therefore should be considered only in determining his
residual functional capacity. (Id. at 71-73.)
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The ALJ analyzed whether Plaintiff’s impairments met any of the listed
impairments and determined that they did not. (A.R. at 73.)
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When assessing Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), ALJ
Armstrong noted that Plaintiff previously filed a claim for benefits that was denied
in an unfavorable decision by an ALJ on April 1, 2009. (A.R. at 74.) ALJ
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404.1520(a)(4)(iv).
5.
At the fifth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC, age,
education, and past work experience to see if he can do other work.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1420(a)(4)(v). If there is no such work that the
claimant can perform, the ALJ must find that he or she is disabled.5
Id.
Plaintiff raises a number of objections to the R&R. First, Plaintiff claims
that the ALJ erred in failing to consider his mental impairments in connection with
his physical/medical impairments in assessing his RFC. Second, Plaintiff argues
Armstrong explained that he is bound by the previous ALJ’s decision unless there
is new and material evidence relating to such a finding or a change in the law. (Id.)
Finding no such evidence or change in the law, ALJ Armstrong adopted the prior
RFC, which was as follows:
[T]o perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1456(b) and
416.967(b) with the following restrictions: i) lifting and carrying
limited to ten pounds with the right arm and two pounds with the left,
non-dominant arm; ii) no repetitive manipulative work with the left
hand (frequent manipulative work is permissible); iii) only occasional
stooping, crouching, kneeling and crawling; and iv) no climbing of
ropes, ladders, or scaffolds.
(Id. at 73.) ALJ Armstrong concluded that Plaintiff could not perform his past
work with these limitations. (Id. at 78.)
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The ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, educational
background, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are a
significant number of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform based
on his exertional and non-exertional limitations. (A.R. at 78-79.) The ALJ
therefore concluded that Plaintiff is not under a “disability” as defined in the Social
Security Act. (Id.) Magistrate Judge Binder found substantial evidence in the
record to support this finding. (See ECF No. 17.)
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that Magistrate Judge Binder erred in finding that the ALJ was bound by the prior
ALJ’s RFC assessment, in light of “extensive evidence of a progression of
[P]laintiff’s condition since the prior decision.” (ECF No. 18 at 5.) Lastly,
Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Binder erred in excusing the ALJ’s error
in finding that Plaintiff could perform light work despite stating inconsistent
limitations.
Objection #1:
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to apply the appropriate analysis when
assessing whether he has a mental impairment. While doctors did conclude that
Plaintiff suffers from mental impairments, the ALJ sufficiently explained why he
was not relying on those findings and concluded instead that Plaintiff suffers from
mild mental impairments only. There was substantial evidence in the record to
support the ALJ’s conclusions.
The ALJ did not expressly include Plaintiff’s mild mental impairments in his
RFC assessment. As argued by the Commissioner, however, this error was
harmless. The vocational expert testified that the jobs she identified that Plaintiff
could perform with his physical impairments (such as machine tender, usher, and
sorter/inspector) were in the “light range of unskilled work[.]” (ECF No. 8-2 at Pg
ID 66-67, emphasis added.) Jobs that constitute “unskilled work” accommodate a
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limitation to “simple work” because “[u]nskilled work, by definition, is limited to
understanding, remembering and carrying out only simple instructions and
requiring little, if any, judgment.” Latare v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-13022,
2009 WL 1044836, at *3 (E.D. Mich. April 20, 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1568(a) (2008)).
The Court therefore finds no merit to Plaintiff’s first objection.
Objection #2:
Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ overlooked extensive evidence of a
progression of his condition since April 2009, and therefore the ALJ erred in
concluding that he was bound by a prior determination that he was not disabled.
Specifically, Plaintiff points to evaluations by two physicians: one who concluded
that Plaintiff “has essentially no use of the left hand and fingers as they are now
found in a fixed position” (ECF No. 12 at 10, quoting A.R. 349); and a second who
found that Plaintiff’s “activity is none due to inability to use his left arm and left
hand at all and also due to the other joint pain.” (Id. A.R. 355-56.) The ALJ
expressly considered these findings, however. He also explained why he did not
fully accept the opinions of these physicians. As Magistrate Judge Binder found,
there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s conclusions.
Thus this objection also does not warrant an outcome different than that
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recommended by Magistrate Judge Binder.
Objection #3:
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the physical limitations found by the ALJ are
inconsistent with the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform “light work.”
According to Plaintiff, under the Medical-Vocational Rules (known as the “grids”),
the limitations would have restricted him to “sedentary work” and once he attained
age fifty (i.e. two months before his date last insured), this would result in a
finding that he was disabled. (ECF No. 18 at Pg ID 481-82, citing 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Rule 201.10.) Plaintiff maintains that Magistrate
Judge Binder failed to appreciate the impact of the ALJ’s error.
This Court agrees that the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff could perform
light work was inconsistent with his lifting restrictions. According to the
regulations, “light work” requires in part “lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time
with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. . . .” 20
C.F.R. § 416.967(b). “Sedentary work” in comparison requires lifting no more
than 10 pounds at a time. Id. § 416.967(a). ALJ Armstrong concluded as part of
Plaintiff’s RFC, however, that he was limited to lifting ten pounds with the right
arm and two pounds with the left arm. (A.R. at 73.) Magistrate Judge Binder
concluded that this error was harmless because the vocational expert testified that
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if Plaintiff was limited to sedentary work, there were a significant number of jobs
in the national economy that he could perform. (ECF No. 17 at 14-15.) Yet this
overlooks the grids’ impact.
For this reason, the Court believes the matter should be remanded to the
Commissioner to correct this inconsistency and determine the impact of a finding
that Plaintiff is limited to sedentary work.
Summary
For the reasons stated, the Court finds that the ALJ erred in his analysis.
The Court therefore is rejecting Magistrate Judge Binder’s R&R, vacating the
Commissioner’s decision, and remanding the matter to the Social Security Agency
pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the decision of the Commissioner is
reversed and this matter is remanded to the Commissioner pursuant to sentence
four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
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Dated: December 19, 2013
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Diane M. Kwitoski, Esq.
AUSA Andrew Lievense
Allen Duarte, Esq.
Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder
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