RUTH v. MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRETIONS et al

Filing 33

OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Motion to Dismiss; finding as moot 31 Motion to Amend/Correct. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MARIUM MERRITT RUTH,
personal representative of the
ESTATE OF SIDNEY GURLY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:12-cv-15251
Hon. Patrick J. Duggan

v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
GUS HARRISON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
PAUL KLEE, Warden of Gus Harrison Correctional
Facility, OFFICER LATA, ANIL PRASAD, M.D.,
ROSILYN JINHDAL, P.A., SAVITHIV KAKAN, P.A.,
DANIEL DUCATT, M.D., and nurses PAUA MEYER,
KIMBERLY MCGUIRE, BETH FRITZ, and JAMES
MACNAMARA,
Defendants.
____________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
This action, initiated by Marium Merritt Ruth (“Plaintiff”) as personal
representative of the estate of Sidney Gurly (“Gurly”), arises from events
transpiring while Gurly was an inmate at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility.
Plaintiff alleges that Gurly became ill after consuming a prison meal, that he
repeatedly sought medical treatment, that the treatment provided was inadequate,
and that he was ultimately found dead in his jail cell. Plaintiff, filing suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Gurly’s

serious medical needs in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiff states two additional counts arising under the laws of the
State of Michigan.
Two motions are presently before the Court: (1) a motion to dismiss filed
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by Defendants Prasad,
Jindahl, and Kakan; and (2) Plaintiff’s motion to amend filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Having determined that oral argument would not
significantly aid the decisional process, the Court dispensed with oral argument
pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2). For the reasons
stated herein, the Court grants the Motion to Dismiss and denies Plaintiff’s Motion
to Amend as moot.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2009, Plaintiff’s decedent Sidney Gurly was incarcerated at the Gus
Harrison Correctional Facility (“GHCF”) located in Adrian, Michigan. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 33, 1, ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff alleges that after eating a meal at GHCF,
Gurly began “feeling ill[,] was not able to pass bowels[, and] began experiencing
piercing abdominal pain which caused him to defecate, vomit and urinate blood.”
(Id. at ¶¶ 35-36.) Gurly, believing that he had food poisoning, “notified various
unit officers that he required immediate medical attention[,]” but that these unit

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officers “instructed him to wait two or three days before he could seek medical
attention from the GH[CF] Healthcare facility.” (Id. at ¶¶ 37-38.)
Gurly visited the healthcare facility on August 3, 2011, and “healthcare staff,
without an examination, prescribed him cholesterol medicine[.]” (Id. at ¶ 39.)
This cholesterol medication exacerbated Gurly’s pain, so he sought medical
attention again. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Gurly’s condition left him in a weakened state, so
much so that “other inmates had to assist him walking to the Healthcare facility.”
(Id. at ¶ 41.) During this visit to the healthcare facility, “the healthcare staff and
Defendant GH[CF] failed and/or refused to properly medically treat PlaintiffDecedent but instead, told him to return to his cell and ordered” that he “stay in
bed.” (Id. at ¶ 42.)
After continuing to experience pain, Gurly “notified other inmates and
Defendants that he was peeing blood, could no longer stand straight, and that
despite his requests for medical attention, the Defendants refused to adequately
treat him.” (Id. at ¶ 43.) At this point, “Gurly’s medical needs were so apparent
that other inmates . . . notified the defendants of Gurly’s noticeably declining
health[]” to no avail. (Id. at ¶ 45 (capital lettering removed).) Gurly “wrote
several medical request forms (‘kites’) and complaints stating that his abdominal
pain had not abated and that he needed extensive medical treatment; however, the
Defendants failed and refused to provide adequate medical treatment.” (Id. at ¶

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46.) In the early morning hours of August 6, 2012, Gurly was found deceased in
his cell. (Id. at ¶ 47; Defs.’ Answer to Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 47.1)
On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a
Complaint with this Court on November 29, 2012, naming Michigan Department
of Corrections (“MDOC”), Warden Paul Klee, Officer Latta, and seven John Does
as defendants. The original Complaint alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as
well as a state law gross negligence claim (Counts I and II, respectively),
contending that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to Gurly’s serious
medical needs in violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
On March 5, 2013, MDOC, Klee, and Latta filed an Answer. The following day,
Magistrate Judge Laurie Michelson conducting a telephonic status conference with
counsel for Plaintiff and the served Defendants to discuss pending motions, and on
March 7, 2013, Magistrate Judge Michelson issued an Order summarizing the
discussions. (3/7/13 Order, ECF No. 16.) Of relevance to the matters presently
before the Court, Magistrate Judge Michelson’s Order indicates that the served
Defendants would provide Plaintiff with certain medical records so that Plaintiff
could identify the John Doe Defendants, file an amended complaint, and serve the
John Doe Defendants within sixty days.

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In the Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint filed on behalf of a group
of defendants employed by the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC
Defendants”), the MDOC Defendants indicate that Gurly was seen by medical staff
on August 5, 2012. (Defs.’ Answer to Pl.’s Am. Compl. ¶ 42, ECF No. 28.)

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On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, identifying the
John Doe Defendants and adding a third count entitled “Concert of Action.” (Am.
Compl., ECF No. 18.) On May 15, 2013, Defendants Rosilyn Jindahl, Savithiv
Kakan, and Anil Prasad (the “Non-MDOC Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).2 (Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 24.)
The remaining Defendants (“MDOC Defendants”) filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint on May 23, 2013. (Answer to Pl.’s Am. Compl., ECF No.
28.) On June 20, 2013, apparently in response to the Non-MDOC Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(a). (Pl.’s Mot., ECF No. 31.) The Non-MDOC Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend are presently before the Court.
II.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

allows the Court to make an assessment as to whether a plaintiff’s pleadings have
stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Under
the Supreme Court's articulation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, “[t]o survive a

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The Court notes that the Non-MDOC Defendants’ filings with this Court
provide the names “Rosilyn Jindal” and “Savithri Kakani.” Unless quoting from a
document filed by these Defendants, the Court uses the names as they appear on
the Court’s Electronic Case Filing system and intends no disrespect by using the
names as furnished by Plaintiff.

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motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)).
The facial plausibility standard requires a claimant to put forth “enough
fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the
requisite elements of their claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
Even though the complaint need not contain “detailed” factual allegations, its
“factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.” Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545, 548
(6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965) (internal
citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). In this regard, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant” is responsible for the conduct alleged
in the complaint. Id. (citation omitted).
While courts are required to accept the factual allegations in a complaint as
true, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, the presumption of truth does

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not apply to a claimant’s legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s pleading for relief
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502
F.3d at 548 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”).
Ultimately, “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw
on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of [a legal
transgression], the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal citations omitted).
B.

Motion to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides that a party may amend a

pleading once as a matter of course within twenty-one days after service of the
pleading, a responsive pleading, or a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). If a party
does not amend within the timeframe provided by Rule 15(a)(1), an amendment is

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permitted only with the consent of the opposing party or leave of the Court. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Pursuant to Rule 15(a)(2), leave to amend is to be “freely”
granted “when justice so requires. The United States Supreme Court has advised
that a plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to test a claim on the merits if the
facts and circumstances underlying the claim suggest that it may be a proper
subject of relief. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962).
However, the Court further instructed that a motion to amend a complaint should
be denied if the amendment is brought in bad faith or for dilatory purposes, results
in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile. Id.
III.
A.

APPLICATION

Motion to Dismiss
The Non-MDOC Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint on the basis that it “sets forth no specific facts whatsoever regarding the
alleged involvement of Dr. Prasad, P.A. Jindal, or P.A. Kakani in Plaintiff’s
decedent’s medical care[.]” (Defs.’ Br. 3.)
Plaintiff argues that dismissal is inappropriate because the Non-MDOC
Defendants “want the [C]ourt to dismiss the lawsuit for lack of specificity about
the defendants’ exact misconduct[]” even though Plaintiff has not had “the benefit
of any discovery about their specific conduct[.]” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. 12.)
This result, according to Plaintiff, cannot be correct because “[i]t would require

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Plaintiff to know and plead specifically what each individual did before the lawsuit
is filed.” (Id.) Rather, because the instant action alleges “inadequate medical
care[,] . . . it makes good sense to look” to the medical staff that “had the
responsibility to provide that care.” (Id.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint makes the following allegations with respect
to the Non-MDOC Defendants: (1) that Dr. Prasad, physician’s assistant Jindahl,
and physician’s assistant Kakan are all “licensed to practice in the State of
Michigan, employed in the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility, . . . and at all times
relevant hereto held [themselves] out to Plaintiff’s decedent[] as being skilled,
careful[,] and diligent in the practice of [their] profession[,]” (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1113); (2) that Defendants Prasad, Jindahl, and Kakan were “acting under the color of
law[,]” (id. at ¶¶ 21-23); (3) that each of the aforementioned is being sued in his or
her individual capacities, (id.); and (4) that “Defendants were aware of” the facts
alleged in the Amended Complaint regarding Gurly’s deteriorating medical
condition, (id. at ¶ 44). The Court agrees with the Non-MDOC Defendants that
these allegations are insufficient to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall woefully short of “showing” an entitlement
to relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff provides no provide factual content
indicating how each Non-MDOC Defendant was involved in Gurly’s care and
makes only a vague allegation that all “Defendants were aware” of the facts

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alleged. (Am. Compl. ¶ 44.) While Plaintiff is not required to make “detailed
factual allegations[]” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the pleading requirements
imposed by Rule 8 “demand more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965); see also id. (“Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.”)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted). While Plaintiff generally alleges that
“Defendants” acted improperly in each of the three counts contained in the
Amended Complaint, there are no facts permitting this Court to infer that the NonMDOC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Gurly’s serious medical needs,
that they were grossly negligent, or that they acted in concert.
Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the impropriety of dismissal demonstrate a
fundamental misunderstanding of federal pleading requirements. Contrary to
Plaintiff’s assertion about not having had “the benefit of any discovery about [the
Non-MDOC Defendants’] specific conduct,” (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. 12),
Plaintiff implicitly acknowledges possessing the documentation that would have
allowed more specific factual allegations to be made, (id. at 7 (explaining that the
Amended Complaint identifying the John Doe Defendants was filed after
“Defendant Department of Corrections . . . allow[ed] Plaintiff’s counsel to inspect
the decedent’s medical records to identify the defendants listed with fictitious

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names”)). Perhaps of greater import, Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678-79, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
Moreover, while this is a case about the adequacy of medical treatment, that
fact alone does not mean that Plaintiff has stated a viable claim against the medical
staff that responsible for providing such treatment. (Pl.’s Resp. to Defs.’ Mot. 12.)
Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary fails to appreciate that factual enhancement is
required to “nudge[] the[] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct at 1974. While the allegations in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint give rise to a possibility that someone acted improperly in
connection with Gurly’s medical treatment, “a complaint plead[ing] facts that are
‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129
S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S. Ct. at 1966).
Having concluded that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim against
the Non-MDOC Defendants, dismissal is warranted.
B.

Motion to Amend
After the Non-MDOC Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff filed a

Motion to Amend arguing that “Plaintiff should be allowed to amend its complaint

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to add proper parties[.]”3 (Pl.’s Br. 3.) However, Plaintiff’s April 25, 2013
Amended Complaint identifying the former John Doe Defendants by name was
filed in accordance with Magistrate Judge Michelson’s March 7, 2013 Order, and,
is therefore already properly before the Court. Because the proposed amendment
would not cure the deficiencies identified by the non-MDOC Defendants and
because the Amended Complaint is already properly before the Court,4 the Court
denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend as moot.
IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against
the Non-MDOC Defendants. The Court also concludes that Plaintiff’s Motion to
Amend is moot as the Amended Complaint identifying the previously unnamed
John Doe Defendants has already been properly filed.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Non-MDOC Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,
(ECF No. 24), is GRANTED and that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to Defendants Prasad, Jindahl, and Kakan;

3

Plaintiff did not attach a proposed amended complaint suggesting that the
amendment is being sought for any reason other than to add the proper parties.
4

That the MDOC Defendants answered Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
bolsters the conclusion that the Amended Complaint has already been properly
filed with the Court.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend, (ECF No.
31), is DENIED AS MOOT.
Dated: July 24, 2013
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
James W. McGinnis, Esq.
A. Peter Govorchin, AAG
Cori E. Barkman, AAG
Carly A. Van Thomme, Esq.
Ronald Chapman, Esq.

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