Coates v. Jurado et al

Filing 133

OPINION and ORDER re 97 MOTION for settlement conference, 123 MOTION to Quash , Brief in Support, Index of Exhibits, and Proof of Service, 114 MOTION for Sanctions, 131 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 125 MOTION for Summary Judgment , Brief in Support and Proof of Service, 98 MOTION TO EXTEND Time for Discovery; Brief in Support; and Proof of Service, 119 MOTION to Appoint Counsel, 105 MOTION for Order, 117 MOTION for service on defendant Harriet Squier., 121 MOTION for Extension of Time to File Response/Reply as to 114 MOTION for Sanctions, 113 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Jemer Jurado, 105 MOTION for Order. Signed by Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford. (Williams, Marlena)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EMANUEL COATES,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 12-15529
Honorable Laurie J. Michelson
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth A. Stafford

v.
JEMER JURADO, et al.,

Defendants.
__________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING
MULTIPLE NON-DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Emanuel Coates (“Coates”), a pro se prisoner, alleges that

Defendants Jemer Jurado, N.P. (“Jurado”), and Corizon Health, Inc.
(collectively “Defendants”)1 were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eight Amendment by failing to provide him
with a replacement hearing aid. [52]. On January 12, 2015, this case was
referred to the undersigned to resolve all pretrial matters pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). [130]. Before the Court are several nondispositive motions.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court ORDERS that:
1

Coates also named Subrina Aiken, R.N., as a defendant; however, the
Court dismissed her from this action on September 25, 2013. [See 59].

1. Coates’ Motion for Settlement Conference [97] is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
2. Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery [98] is
GRANTED IN PART2 as follows:
a. Discovery is extended for Defendants until MARCH 31,
2015, but only with regard to their prior discovery requests
related to Coates’ parole;
b. The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended until
APRIL 24, 2015;
c. On or before MARCH 6, 2015, Coates must provide
substantive responses to Defendants’ discovery requests
seeking the identification of his medical providers and
employers while on parole, details of how he lost his hearing
aid, and the steps he took to get his hearing aid replaced;
and
d. Coates must comply with the foregoing even if he appeals
this Order to the District Judge. If he fails to timely respond
to Defendants’ discover, Defendants may move to dismiss
this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
3. Coates’ Motion for Sanctions Against Jurado [114] and Motion for
Extension to File Reply [121] are DENIED. Coates’ Motion to
Compel Jurado [105] is MOOT;
4. Coates’ Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Counsel [119] is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
5. Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena [123] is MOOT;
6. Coates’ Motion for Extension of Time to Respond to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment [131] is GRANTED IN PART. His
response is due MARCH 31, 2015 and Defendants’ reply is due
April 17, 2015;
2

Defendants’ request for a 60-day extension is denied.
2

7. Coates’ Motion for Service on Harriet Squier, M.D. [117] is MOOT;
8. Corizon, Inc. is TERMINATED from this action; and
9. Unless ordered otherwise by the Court, the filing of an appeal to
the District Judge DOES NOT STAY the parties’ obligations in this
Order.
II.

BACKGROUND
From September 1997 until May 2011, when he was paroled, Coates

was in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”).
During that time, he was provided a hearing aid and batteries. Coates says
he continued to use his hearing aid while on parole, but that he lost it in
January 2012. On February 7, 2012, Coates’ parole was revoked. Coates
claims that, despite trying, he could not obtain a replacement hearing aid
before he returned to prison. Coates alleges that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by not providing him a
hearing aid after he returned to MDOC custody.
On February 11, 2014, Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives entered an
opinion and order addressing, among other things, competing motions for a
protective order concerning the extent to which Coates’s medical records
were discoverable. Judge Komives found that all of Coates’ medical
records from January 1, 2009 to the present were relevant, including
medical records from his time on parole, and he ordered Coates to sign a
3

medical release form authorizing Defendants to receive the records. He
also ordered Defendant Jurado to supplement her responses to Coates’
discovery requests within 14 days of receiving the medical records, and he
extended the discovery deadline until April 7, 2014 and the deadline to file
dispositive motions until May 7, 2014. Coates appealed Judge Komives’s
order, arguing that his mental health records were not relevant to his
deliberate indifference claim. [83].
Defendants received Coates’ medical records shortly thereafter, but
they left the records sealed pending resolution of his appeal. Because
Coates’ discovery requests concerned his medical records, Jurado did not
supplement her responses within 14 days, as ordered. Three of Coates’
pending motions address Jurado’s failure to comply with Judge Komives’
order. [See 105, 113, 114].
On May 20, 2014, Judge Laurie J. Michelson entered an order
affirming Judge Komives’ order in part. [111]. She found that, except for
mental health records, Coates’ medical records from April 1, 20093 to the
present were relevant. Because discovery closed before Judge Michelson
ruled on Plaintiff’s objections, several discovery disputes remain

3

Judge Michelson substituted January 1, 2009 with April 1, 2009, because
Defendants did not seek records earlier than April 1, 2009.
4

outstanding. Below, the Court addresses each motion in turn, adding
relevant background as needed.
III.

ANALYSIS
A.

Coates’ Motion for Settlement Conference [97] is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On April 2, 2014, Coates moved for an order compelling a settlement
conference, contending that the parties may be able to reach a
compromise in this matter because Defendants have “not totally rejected
such a proposition.” [97, Pg. ID 1318]. In their response, Defendants
disagreed, stating that they “will not consider settling this matter” until
Coates responds to discovery and they independently investigate his
claims. [100, Pg. ID 1415]. Since then, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment, which is not yet fully briefed. [125]. Since it is clear
Defendants would not consider resolving this dispute at this juncture, any
settlement conference would be futile.
Accordingly, Coates’ Motion for Settlement Conference [97] is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Coates survives summary judgment,
he may raise this matter again.

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B.

Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery
[98] is GRANTED IN PART

On April 3, 2014, before discovery closed and before Judge
Michelson ruled on Coates’ objections to Judge Komives’ order,
Defendants filed a Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery. [98].
Besides a discovery extension, Defendants sought an order stating that
discovery was not stayed pending Coates’ appeal to the district judge4 and
compelling Coates to respond to outstanding interrogatories and requests
for production. Defendants say Coates refuses to respond to discovery
regarding the identification of his outside treating providers and employers
while on parole, the details of how he lost his hearing aid, and the steps he
took to get it replaced. In their January 2, 2015 summary judgment motion,
Defendants say Coates still has not responded to this discovery. [125, Pg.
ID 1744].
In response, Coates correctly points out that Judge Komives’ order
stated that, “absent further Order from the Court, the filing of an appeal to
the District Judge does not stay the obligations of the parties as set forth in
this Order.” [80, Pg. ID 1076]. Coates says, therefore, the Court should
deny Defendants motion for extension, and instead sanction them for “such
blatant display of contempt.” [106, Pg. ID 1453]. While the Court agrees
4

Judge Michelson ruled on Coates’ appeal, so this issue is MOOT.
6

that Defendants did not need to move for an order stating discovery
continued during Coates’ appeal, there is no evidence they did so in bad
faith or with malice. The Court understands Defendants’ hesitation to
review Coates’ medical records in light of their confidential nature and the
pending appeal. The Court will not punish Defendants for acting with
caution.
Alternatively, Coates argues that the Court should not extend
discovery because he already responded to Defendants’ interrogatories
and document requests. However, a review of Coates’ responses shows
that he merely objected to the outstanding discovery “as being irrelevant
and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.” [106, Pg. ID 1457-60]. Coates’ responses are unsatisfactory.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provides that “[p]arties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense….Relevant information need not be admissible at trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.” Rule 26(b)(1). “[B]ecause discovery itself is
designed to help define and clarify the issue, the limits set forth in Rule 26
must be construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is
7

or may be in the case.” Conti v. American Axle and Mfg., Inc., 326 Fed.
Appx. 900, 904 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotations omitted).
The discovery Defendants seek includes the identification of Coates’
medical providers and employers while on parole, details of how he lost his
hearing aid, and the steps he took to get it replaced. The Court already
held that Coates’ medical records while on parole are relevant and
discoverable. [111]. Thus, the identification of Coates’ outside treating
providers while on parole is discoverable. 5
The Court finds that the remaining discovery sought also is relevant
and discoverable. Each of those discovery inquiries bears on issues that
are, or may be, in the case. One of Defendants’ defenses is that Coates’
hearing loss does not constitute a serious medical need. An issue related
to that defense is Coates’ ability to function without a hearing aid. The
discovery Defendants seek is reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence regarding that issue. Specifically, how Coates lost his hearing aid
and the efforts he took to obtain a replacement could shed light on his need
for a hearing aid and his ability to function without a one. Moreover,

5

Plaintiff says he never “indicated or expressly stated that he was
medically treated during the time he was on parole. It is the defendants
who have leap [sic] to such a conclusion….” [106, Pg ID 1452]. If Plaintiff
did not see a medical provider while on parole, he must assert that in his
response to Defendants’ discovery requests.
8

Coates’ employment history is relevant because Defendants could depose
employers or co-workers regarding whether Coates wore a hearing aid
consistently, regarding when he stopped wearing a hearing aid, and
regarding his ability to function when he did not wear a hearing aid. These
matters bear on, or could reasonably lead to other matters that could bear
on, an issue in this action. See Conti, 326 Fed. Appx. at 904.
Coates’ repeated refusal to respond to discovery requests regarding
his time on parole prevented Defendants from investigating allegations and
information related to a central issue in this action – i.e., whether Coates
can function without a hearing aid. Coates demonstrates that he
understands the legal standard for determining whether information is
“relevant” and discoverable. [See, e.g., 122, Pg. ID 1690 (Coates
discussing Rule 26’s allowance of “broad discovery”)]. Thus, Coates’
continued refusal to produce the above-referenced relevant discovery is
inexcusable, and the Court cautions him to review Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37 regarding sanctions that he may face if he continues to not
cooperate in discovery.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Extension of Time for Discovery
[98] is GRANTED IN PART, as follows:

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1. Discovery is extended for Defendants until MARCH 31, 2015,
but only with regard to their prior discovery requests related to
Coates’ parole;
2. The deadline to file dispositive motions is extended until APRIL
24, 2015;
3. On or before MARCH 6, 2015, Coates must provide
substantive responses to Defendants’ discovery requests
seeking the identification of his medical providers and
employers while on parole, details of how he lost his hearing
aid, and the steps he took to get his hearing aid replaced; and
4. Coates must comply with the foregoing even if he appeals this
Order to the District Judge. If he fails to timely respond to
Defendants’ discover, Defendants may move to dismiss this
action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v).
C.

Coates’ Motions Regarding Defendant Jurado’s Failure to
Comply With Court Order [105, 114, and 121]

On April 30, 2014, Coates filed a motion to compel Defendant Jurado
to comply with Judge Komives’ order requiring her to supplement her
responses to Coates’ discovery requests within 14 days of receiving his
medical records [see 80]. [105]. On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a motion
for default judgment against Jurado [113] and a motion for sanctions
against Jurado [114] for her failure to comply with Judge Komives’ order.
On May 28, 2014, Defendants filed a combined response to Coates’ three
motions showing that Jurado supplemented her responses to his discovery
on May 13, 2014. [116]. On June 9, 2014, Coates moved for an extension

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of time to reply to Defendants’ response. [121]. Coates’ four motions are
pending.6
Jurado did not timely supplement her responses to Coates’ discovery
because the discovery concerned his medical records and Defendants left
those records sealed pending resolution of the appeal to the district judge.
As discussed above, Jurado did not act in bad faith or with malice in failing
to timely supplement. Rather, Defendants’ decision to seek clarification in
light of Coates’ objection to Judge Komives’ order was done in good faith
and the Court will not sanction Jurado. Coates’ motion for sanctions
against Jurado [114] is DENIED. Because Jurado already supplemented
her responses to Coates’ discovery requests, Coates’ motion to compel
[105] is MOOT. However, if Coates has any other outstanding discovery
request to which Defendants have not responded, they must respond by
February 27, 2015.
The Court DENIES Coates’ motion for an extension of time to reply to
Defendants’ response [121]. Coates does not show good cause for such
an extension, and the Court finds that a reply would not assist in its
disposition of the three motions. The Court is well-apprised of the facts

6

The Court addresses Coates’ Motion for Default Judgment [113] in a
separate Report and Recommendation.
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based on the parties’ briefing of these motions and the extensive briefing of
other motions in this action.
D.

Coates’ Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of Counsel [119]
is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

On May 30, 2014, Coates moved, ex parte, for appointment of
counsel. [119]. This is his third motion to appoint counsel; the previous
motions were denied without prejudice. [See 21, 80, 111]. Coates says he
is entitled to counsel now because he is unskilled in the law and had
previously relied on the assistance of other prisoners, which is no longer
available.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may request an
attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” Appointment of
counsel under § 1915(e)(1) is not a constitutional right in a civil action; a
district court is vested with broad discretion to determine whether
“exceptional circumstances” warrant such an appointment. Lavado v.
Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604-606 (6th Cir. 1993). In making this
determination, the Court considers the nature of the case, the party’s ability
to represent himself, the complexity of the legal and factual issues, and
whether the claims are frivolous or have a small likelihood of success. Id.
Appointment of counsel pursuant to § 1915(e)(1) is rare because “there are
no funds appropriated to pay a lawyer or to even reimburse a lawyer’s
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expense.” Clarke v. Blais, 473 F. Supp. 2d 124, 125 (D. Me. 2007).
Considering the relevant factors, the Court finds that Coates does not
show exceptional circumstances that merit the appointment of counsel at
this juncture. This case is not overly complex; the factual and legal issues
in Coates’ deliberate indifference claim are relatively straightforward.
Furthermore, Coates’ reliance on his lack of training in the law does not
constitute an exceptional circumstance to justify his request for
appointment of counsel, as the same is true for the majority of pro se
litigants.
Coates’ Motion for Appointment of Counsel [119] is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Coates survives summary judgment, he may
raise this matter again.
E.

Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena [123] is MOOT

On September 2, 2014, Coates attempted to serve a subpoena on
Amy Gaskill, R.N., a MDOC employee, by having it delivered to “secure
Health Care drop box.” [123-1, Pg ID 1718]. The subpoena sought a copy
of documents describing the criteria used to determine a prisoner’s
eligibility for a hearing aid. On September 26, 2014, a MDOC official sent
Coates a letter stating, among other things, “RN Gaskill does not have
access to any document that is responsive to your request.” [Id.].
13

On October 21, 2014, Defendants moved to quash the subpoena,
arguing that Coates never notified them of the subpoena or gave them a
copy of it, as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1), and service of the
subpoena was improper. [123]. Coates responded to the motion to quash
on November 13, 2014, and attached a “Subpoena Notice” and “Certificate
of Service” that showed he attempted to notify the Defendants of the
subpoena on August 27, 2014. [124].
Regardless of whether Coates properly served the subpoena or
satisfied Rule 45’s requirements, the Court finds that Nurse Gaskill
complied with the subpoena by informing Coates that she does not have
documents responding to his request. Accordingly, the subpoena is of no
consequence going forward. Defendants’ Motion to Quash Subpoena [123]
is MOOT.
F.

Coates’ Motion for an Extension of Time to Respond to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [131] is
GRANTED IN PART

On January 2, 2015, Defendants moved for summary judgment.
[125]. The Court entered an order requiring Coates to respond to
Defendants’ motion by February 19, 2015. [129]. On January 15, 2015,
Coates moved for a 120-day extension of time, or until June 19, 2015, to
respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. [131].
14

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), “the court may, for
good cause, extend the time” for a party to act. Coates says good cause
exists for the requested extension because he fractured several bones in
his left wrist in late December 2014, which makes it is impossible for him to
write or draft pleadings. Defendants oppose Coates’ motion, but only as to
the length of time he requests. They say a 120-day extension is excessive
and would unfairly delay a final resolution in this action. [132].
Coates’ fractured wrist constitutes good cause. However, his request
for a 120-day extension is excessive and would unfairly delay these
proceedings. The Court finds that an extension until March 31, 2015 is
both reasonable and appropriate; it provides Coates a sufficient amount of
extra time to recover from or become accustomed to functioning with his
injury, and it does not unfairly delay the final resolution of this action.
Therefore, Coates’ Motion for an Extension [131] is GRANTED IN PART.
Coates must respond to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment [125]
no later than MARCH 31, 2015; Defendants’ reply is due April 17, 2015.
G.

Coates’ Motion for Service on Defendant Harriet Squier
[117] is MOOT

On May 27, 2014, Coates filed a Motion for Leave to Refile Second
Amended Complaint [118] seeking to add Harriet Squier, M.D., as a
defendant and add additional claims. Coates also moved for service on Dr.
15

Squier. [117]. In a separate Report and Recommendation, the Court
recommends denying Coates’ motion for leave. Thus, Dr. Squier is not a
defendant. Coates’ Motion for Service on Dr. Squier [117] is MOOT.
H.

Corizon, Inc. is Terminated From this Action

In his original complaint, Coates named Corizon, Inc. as a defendant.
In the First Amended Complaint, the operative complaint, Coates replaced
Corizon, Inc. with Corizon Health, Inc. [52]. Although Corizon, Inc. is no
longer a party to this action, it remains listed as an active defendant.
Accordingly, Corizon, Inc. is TERMINATED.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Coates’ Motion

for Settlement Conference [97] and Ex Parte Motion for Appointment of
Counsel [119] are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Defendants’ Motion
for Extension of Time for Discovery [98] is GRANTED IN PART; Coates’
Motion for Sanctions Against Jurado [114] and Motion for Extension to File
Reply [121] are DENIED; Coates’ Motion to Compel Jurado [105] and
Motion for Service on Harriet Squier [117] are MOOT; Defendants’ Motion
to Quash Subpoena [123] is MOOT; and Coates’ Motion for Extension of
Time to Respond to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [131] is
GRANTED IN PART.
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IT IS ORDERED.
s/Elizabeth A. Stafford
ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: February 12, 2015
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
The parties’ attention is drawn to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a), which
provides a period of fourteen (14) days from the date of receipt of a copy of
this order within which to file objections for consideration by the district
judge under 28 U.S. C. §636(b)(1). Unless ordered otherwise by the Court,
the filing of an appeal to the District Judge does not stay the parties’
obligations in this Order. See E.D. Mich. LR 72.2.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served
upon counsel of record and any unrepresented parties via the Court’s ECF
System to their respective email or First Class U.S. mail addresses
disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 12, 2015.
s/Marlena Williams
MARLENA WILLIAMS
Case Manager

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