Coates v. Jurado et al
Filing
59
OPINION AND ORDER adopting in part 30 Report and Recommendation ; granting 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
EMANUEL SHAWN COATES,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-15529
v.
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan
JEMER JURADO, SUBRINA
AIKEN, and CORIZON,
INCORPORATED,
Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
On December 17, 2012, Plaintiff Emanuel Coates, a state prisoner, instituted
this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Nurse Practitioner Jemer Jurado,
Registered Nurse Subrina Aiken, and Corizon, Inc. are named as defendants.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide him
with a replacement hearing aid. Plaintiff further contends that Defendants violated
Title II of the ADA. On April 12, 2013, Defendant Aiken filed a summary
judgment motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Soon thereafter,
the Court referred the lawsuit to Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives for all pretrial
matters proceedings, including a hearing and determination of all non-dispositive
matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or a report and recommendation
on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). Presently before
the Court are Plaintiff’s objections to two Report and Recommendations (“R&R”)
filed in connection with Defendant Aiken’s Motion. For the reasons stated herein,
the Court grants Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment and dismisses Aiken from
this action.
I.
A.
FACTUAL1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Facts Regarding Plaintiff’s Hearing Loss
Sometime in 1996, Plaintiff began noticing that his ability to hear was
deteriorating but did not seek treatment because he lacked health insurance. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 8.) In 1997, while incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility
in Adrian, Michigan, Plaintiff’s diminished hearing began deleteriously impacting
his daily activities: he had difficulty communicating with prison guards and
inmates and withdrew from Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”)
sponsored programs because he could not hear his instructors. (Id. at ¶ 9.) Soon
thereafter, Plaintiff sought medical attention from health care services. (Id.)
1
The pertinent factual allegations have been drawn from Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 52), which Magistrate Judge Komives allowed
Plaintiff to file pursuant to an Order dated August 8, 2013. (ECF No. 40.) The
facts are limited to those pertinent to the instant motion and, therefore, focus on
Defendant Aiken.
2
In early September of 1997, Plaintiff was taken to the Jackson Hearing
Clinic at Duane Waters Hospital in Jackson, Michigan. (Id. at ¶ 10.) An
audiogram performed by an audiologist revealed that Plaintiff suffered from
significant hearing loss and would benefit from a hearing aid device. (Id.)
Plaintiff was approved for the hearing aid and an MDOC health contractor
provided Plaintiff with one. (Id.) The hearing aid “enabled [Plaintiff] to maintain
some degree of safety and security in the” prison environment. (Id. at ¶ 11.) In
April of 2008, Plaintiff saw an audiologist and received a new hearing aid because
his hearing ability had eroded further. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.)
From September 1997 until Plaintiff’s release on parole on May 4, 2011,
Plaintiff was provided with a hearing aid and batteries and medical staff monitored
his hearing loss. (Id. at ¶ 14.) Sometime during the nine months that Plaintiff was
on parole, however, he lost his hearing aid. (Id. at ¶ 15.) Despite efforts to obtain
a replacement before returning to MDOC custody for violating his parole, Plaintiff
was unsuccessful. (Id. at ¶ 16.)
Upon returning to state custody, Plaintiff was placed at a reception center in
Jackson, Michigan. (Id.) He informed a health care provider at this facility of his
need for a hearing aid and the provider submitted “a consult” for an audiogram.
(Id. at ¶ 17.) Before the audiogram occurred, however, Plaintiff was transferred to
3
the Cooper Street Correctional Facility. (Id. at ¶ 18.) The incidents giving rise to
the instant action occurred at Cooper Street.2 (Id. at ¶ 3.)
Upon his transfer to Cooper Street, Plaintiff informed health services that he
was awaiting an audiogram so that he could be provided with a hearing aid. (Id. at
¶ 18.) In early June 2012, Plaintiff was seen by Defendant Jurado, a nurse
practitioner. (Id. at ¶ 19.) Jurado acknowledged Plaintiff’s history of hearing loss
and told Plaintiff that the audiogram request would have to be resubmitted. (Id.)
Jurado apparently engaged in rudimentary hearing tests, asking Plaintiff to repeat
things she said, but did not administer hearing tests Plaintiff deems medicallyappropriate. (Id. at ¶ 20.) In a follow-up visit with Jurado on June 20, 2012, Jurado
informed Plaintiff that the insurance contractor denied the resubmitted audiogram
request. (Id. at ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff filed a Step I grievance in effort to obtain a hearing aid and once the
time for a response to that grievance lapsed, Plaintiff filed a Step II grievance. (Id.
at ¶¶ 22-23.) Toward the end of July 2012, a registered nurse interviewed Plaintiff
on his Step I grievance and informed Plaintiff that Jurado, not the insurance
contractor, denied the request for an audiogram because, according to Jurado’s
2
Plaintiff has since been transferred to the Carson City Correctional Facility.
(Am. Compl. ¶ 3.)
4
treatment notes, “inmate does not currently meet the criteria for hearing aids.” (Id.
at ¶ 24.)
On or about August 13, 2012, Defendant Aiken began investigating
Plaintiff’s Step II grievance. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Aiken reviewed Plaintiff’s medical
records, which documented a long history of hearing loss. (Id.) Although “Aiken
possessed the authority to grant a Step II grievance where undisputed medical
information reveal[ed] that the grievant has been denied adequate medical care[,]”
Aiken denied the grievance finding that “Grievant is being evaluate[d], treated,
diagnostic testing conducted and monitored by the Medical Provider (‘MP’).” (Id.
at ¶ 29.)
Without a hearing aid, Plaintiff’s ability to interact with his surroundings is
diminished. He fears being “tasered by corrections officers for failing to comply
with an order . . ., an order he most likely would not hear because” of his hearing
loss and his lack of a corrective device. (Id. at ¶ 30.) He also alleges that he
“run[s] the risk of being run over by one of the many delivery and maintenance
vehicles used within the confines of the prison.” (Id. at ¶ 31.) The untreated
hearing loss also precludes Plaintiff from effectively communicating with prison
staff or other inmates. (Id. at ¶ 32.)
B.
Commencement of Civil Action
5
Plaintiff instituted the present action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title
II of the ADA by filing a complaint with this Court on December 17, 2012. As
relevant to the instant motion, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contends that
Defendant Aiken – who is sued in both her individual and official capacities (Am.
Compl. ¶ 5) – was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs
when she denied his Step II grievance because Plaintiff had a documented history
of using a hearing aid. (Id. at ¶ 42.3) Plaintiff further alleges that Aiken actively
participated in or knowingly acquiesced to Jurado’s unconstitutional conduct when
she denied his Step II grievance on the basis that Plaintiff was being evaluated,
monitored, and treated by the medical provider. (Id. at ¶ 43.) Lastly, Plaintiff
alleges that Aiken’s “actions . . . in her intentional fabrication that, ‘Grievant is
being evaluate[d], treated, diagnostic testing conducted and monitored by the
[MP],’ in support of her denial of Plaintiff’s Step II grievance, constitutes a
violation of the . . . ADA . . . by way of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment which incorporates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel
and unusual punishment.” (Id. at ¶ 44.)
C.
Post-Complaint Procedural Matters
3
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint contains two paragraphs labeled as
paragraph 41. The Court refers to the second paragraph 41 as 42 because the
Amended Complaint continues with paragraph 43.
6
On April 12, 2013, Defendant Aiken filed a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 arguing that she is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim
because she was not personally involved in the deprivation of Plaintiff’s hearing
aid and that she is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title II claim
because Title II does not provide for individual liability. (ECF No. 18.) This
Court referred the action to Magistrate Judge Komives on April 18, 2013 for all
pretrial matters proceedings, including a hearing and determination of all nondispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or a report and
recommendation on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
(ECF No. 20.) Plaintiff responded to Aiken’s motion on May 28, 2013. (ECF No.
24.)
Magistrate Judge Komives filed an R&R on July 15, 2013 recommending
that the Court grant Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment for the reasons set
forth in her brief. (ECF No. 30.) At the conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge
Komives advises the parties that they may object to and seek review of the R&R
within fourteen (14) days of service upon them. Plaintiff filed objections to this
R&R on August 5, 2013.4 (ECF No. 38.)
4
Plaintiff’s objections, though filed more than fourteen days after service of
the R&R, were timely as the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for enlargement of
7
While the above-described R&R was pending before the Court, Plaintiff sent
a letter to the Court seeking clarification of certain docket entries and indicating
that although he filed a Rule 56(d) affidavit seeking additional discovery before the
Court issued a decision regarding Aiken’s summary judgment motion, the affidavit
was not addressed in Magistrate Judge Komives’s R&R. (ECF No. 25.) Further,
on August 5, 2013, Plaintiff sought leave to file an amended complaint, (ECF No.
37), which Magistrate Judge Komives granted on August 8, 2013, (ECF No. 40).
As a result of these events, Magistrate Judge Komives filed a Supplemental R&R,
also on August 8, 2013, “address[ing] the issues raised by [P]laintiff’s letter and
amended complaint as relevant to [D]efendant Aiken’s motion for summary
judgment.”
In the Supplemental R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives concludes (1) that
Plaintiff did not discharge his burden of showing an entitlement to additional
discovery prior to ruling on the pending summary judgment motion, (2) that all of
Plaintiff’s exhibits were considered prior to the issuance of the initial R&R, and (3)
that the allegations contained in the amended complaint do not alter Aiken’s
entitlement to summary judgment. (ECF No. 39.) Magistrate Judge Komives
informs the parties that any objections to the R&R must be filed within fourteen
time and extended the due date of the objections to August 12, 2013. (ECF No.
34.)
8
days. (Id.) Plaintiff filed objections to the Supplemental R&R on August 21,
2013. (ECF No. 47.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party may object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive orders. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The reviewing court must affirm the
magistrate judge’s ruling unless the objecting party demonstrates that the
magistrate judge’s ruling is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” Id. The
“clearly erroneous” standard does not empower a reviewing court to reverse a
magistrate judge’s finding because it would have decided the matter differently.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573-74, 105 S. Ct. 1504
(1985). Instead, the “clearly erroneous” standard is met when despite the existence
of evidence to support the finding, the court, upon reviewing the record in its
entirety, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525,
542 (1948). An order is contrary to law “when it fails to apply or misapplies
relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park
Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
When objections are filed to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on a dispositive matter, the Court “make[s] a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
9
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court,
however, “is not required to articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party’s
objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(citations omitted). A party’s failure to file objections to certain conclusions of the
report and recommendation waives any further right to appeal on those issues.
Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.
1987). Likewise, the failure to object to certain conclusions in the magistrate
judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to independently review those
issues. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472 (1985).
III.
ANALYSIS
The Court addresses Plaintiff’s objections to the July 15, 2013 R&R before
proceeding to Plaintiff’s objections to the August 8, 2013 Supplemental R&R.
These objections all pertain to the Magistrate Judge Komives’s recommendation
that the Court grant Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
A.
Objections to July 15, 2013 R&R
Objection 1
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives recommends that the Court dismiss
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Aiken because
Aiken’s only involvement in the denial of Plaintiff’s medical care was that she
denied his Step II grievance. (R&R 5.) Because “[i]t is well established that a
10
defendant’s failure to respond, or an inappropriate response, to a prisoner’s
grievance is insufficient to hold the defendant personally liable[,]” (id. (quoting
Martin v. Harvey, 14 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The denial of the
grievance is not the same as the denial of a request to receive medical care.”)
(additional quotation omitted)), Magistrate Judge Komives determined that
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim fails as a matter of law. See also Skinner v.
Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim
against defendant who, according to plaintiff, failed to respond appropriately to
plaintiff’s grievance appeal); Martin, 14 F. App’x at 309 (affirming dismissal of
claims against a defendant whose only involvement in the matters giving rise to the
§ 1983 action was his denial of the appeal of the plaintiff-prisoner’s grievance);
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.2d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (reversing denial of summary
judgment to prison officials whose only involvement was the denial of
administrative remedies).
Plaintiff objects to Magistrate Judge Komives’s conclusion that Plaintiff
cannot show that Aiken was personally involved in the denial of his medical care.
Plaintiff argues that Aiken had medical records demonstrating that he suffered
from hearing loss and that, given her power to rectify the situation when
addressing his Step II grievance, her refusal to do so rendered her complicit in the
denial of his medical care.
11
In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites Hill v. Marshall, 962 F.3d 1209
(6th Cir. 1992). This case, however, is inapposite. In Hill, the Sixth Circuit
permitted a prison official to be held liable in a supervisory capacity for
“abandoning the specific duties of his position – reviewing and responding to
inmates’ complaints about medical needs – in the face of actual knowledge of a
breakdown in the proper workings of the department.” Id. at 1213 (emphasis
added). The defendant “by his own admission, had referred inmates’ complaints of
not getting medication to the head nurse, the very person whom he knew to be
wrongly altering and destroying some of the inmates’ prescriptions.” Id. Because
the defendant’s job was to address prisoners’ complaints regarding medical care,
his referral of complaints to an individual he knew would not be responsive meant
that defendant was derelict in his duties. The court determined that defendant’s
failure to perform his job directly resulted in the violation of the prisonerplaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights. Id. The court did not hold the defendant
liable for the head nurse’s misconduct but rather held him accountable for his
failure to intervene despite actual knowledge of such misconduct.
Here, unlike in Hill, Plaintiff seeks to hold Aiken vicariously responsible for
Jurado’s conduct. Plaintiff has not presented evidence that Aiken, who reviewed
Plaintiff’s grievance, had actual knowledge of Jurado’s alleged misconduct in
denying Plaintiff an audiogram and hearing aid. Although Plaintiff alleges that
12
Aiken’s statement in response to his Step II grievance was false (the statement that
Plaintiff was receiving treatment, being evaluated, and being monitored), Plaintiff
has not presented any evidence or argument showing that Aiken knew or believed
that Plaintiff was not receiving adequate medical treatment. Such a failure makes
the instant case distinguishable from Hill and precludes Plaintiff from stating a
valid § 1983 claim against Aiken.
For these reasons, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Komives that
Plaintiff cannot state a viable cause of action against Aiken on the basis that she
denied his Step II grievance. This warrants a ruling in Aiken’s favor.
Objection 2
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives concludes that Aiken is entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim involving Title II of the ADA, which
provides, in pertinent part, that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the
benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The ADA defines “public
entity” as “(A) any State or local government; (B) any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government;
and (C) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority
. . . .” Id. at § 12132(1).
13
Magistrate Judge Komives correctly notes that the statute, by its very terms,
does not apply to individuals but rather only to public entities. Id.; cf. Carten v.
Kent State Univ., 282 F.3d 391, 396 (6th Cir. 2002) (providing that the proper
defendant in a Title II claim is the public entity or an official acting in his or her
official capacity) (citation omitted). As such, Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Aiken
fails as a matter of law to the extent it is brought against Aiken in her individual
capacity. As Plaintiff notes in his objections, however, Aiken is named as a
defendant in both her individual and official capacities. The R&R did not address
Plaintiff’s official capacity Title II claim. This is likely because neither Aiken’s
summary judgment motion nor Plaintiff’s response to that motion raised any
arguments regarding the official capacity claim. In fact, Plaintiff’s response does
not discuss the ADA claim at all.
“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather a suit against the official’s office . . . as such, it is no
different from a suit against the State itself.” Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d
769, 776 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989)); see also Briner v. City of Ontario, 370
F. App’x 682, 699 (6th Cir. 2010) (“An official capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted). Thus, Plaintiff’s ADA claim against Aiken in her
14
official capacity is a claim against the MDOC, the public entity that employs
Aiken.
Because Aiken’s motion did not include any discussion of the official
capacity claim, an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense was not
raised. Even if it an immunity defense was raised, however, the State of Michigan
(acting through the MDOC) is not necessarily immune from Plaintiff’s claims
under the ADA. The ADA “validly abrogates state sovereign immunity” for
“conduct that actually violates the Fourteenth Amendment[.]” United States v.
Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 159, 126 S. Ct. 877, 882 (2006) (emphasis in original). In
Georgia, the Supreme Court mandated a procedure for lower courts to follow when
confronted with a state’s claim of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in
cases involving ADA Title II.5 Georgia instructs lower courts:
to determine in the first instance, on a claim-by-claim basis,
(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title
II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the
Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct
violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of
sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless
valid.
Id.
5
The Court acknowledges that the State of Michigan did not invoke the
Eleventh Amendment. However, because the State could invoke such a defense on
appeal, the Court does not believe that it is wise to ignore the issue at this stage of
the litigation. Nair v. Oakland Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469,
474 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678, 94 S. Ct. 1347
(1974)).
15
In his objections, Plaintiff contends that he may pierce any claim of state
sovereign immunity the State of Michigan may raise. Plaintiff explains that he has
satisfied the Georgia three-step because “Plaintiff’s [C]omplaint set[s] forth that
[D]efendant Aiken denied him a hearing aid and was deliberate[ly] indifferen[t] to
his serious medical needs which is an Eighth Amendment violation. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.” (Pl.’s Objections
5; see also Am. Compl. ¶ 44 (“The actions of . . . Aiken in her intentional
fabrication that, “Grievant is being evaluate[d], treated, diagnostic testing
conducted and monitored by the Medical Provider . . . ,’ in support of her denial of
Plaintiff’s Step II grievance, constitutes a violation of the [ADA] by way of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which incorporates the Eighth
Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.”).)
Based on the allegations in his pro se Complaint and Amended Complaint as
well as his subsequent filings in this Court, it is clear that Plaintiff relies on the
same conduct alleged in support of his Eighth Amendment claim to support the
Title II claim. In essence, Plaintiff relies on a predicate Eighth Amendment
violation to demonstrate a Fourteenth Amendment violation and then argues that
the Fourteenth Amendment violation supports liability on the Title II claim. The
Court, however, has already determined that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim
16
fails because Aiken’s actions in denying Plaintiff’s Step II grievance do not
constitute deliberate indifference and Plaintiff has presented no evidence that
Aiken’s (allegedly fabricated) statements were anything other than based on her
review of Plaintiff’s file. See supra.
To the extent Plaintiff suggests that he has alleged conduct that violates Title
II but does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court disagrees. Plaintiff
does not allege that Aiken discriminated against him on the basis of his hearing
loss nor does he allege any sort of claim sounding in equal protection.
In sum, Plaintiff’s allegations that Aiken wrongly denied his Step II
grievance are insufficient to find Aiken liable for violating Title II in her official
capacity. Accordingly, Aiken is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title
II claim in both her individual and official capacities.
Objection 3
Plaintiff’s third objection to the R&R is that Magistrate Judge Komives
erred in issuing the R&R before the close of discovery. Plaintiff indicates that he
has not received responses to his discovery responses as discovery was not set to
close until September 27, 2013. Lastly, Plaintiff draws the Court’s attention to the
Rule 56(d) affidavit filed in opposition to Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
17
The Court finds that these objections lack merit for the reasons set forth in
the Supplemental R&R, see infra, namely, that Plaintiff’s claims against Aiken fail
as a matter of law and cannot be saved by facts revealed during discovery.
B.
Objections to August 8, 2013 Supplemental R&R
Objection 1
Plaintiff’s first objection to the Supplemental R&R is that Magistrate Judge
Komives erred in concluding that additional discovery was not warranted prior to
issuing the original R&R. Plaintiff argues that this was error because Plaintiff filed
a Rule 56(d) affidavit indicating why he could not obtain information necessary to
opposing Aiken’s summary judgment motion.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) provides that “[i]f a nonmovant shows
by affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts
essential to justify its opposition” to a motion for summary judgment, “the court
may: (1) defer considering the motion or deny it; (2) allow time to obtain affidavits
or declarations or to take discovery; or (3) issue any other appropriate order.” The
evidence sought, however, must impact the non-movant’s ability to defeat
summary judgment. See, e.g., CenTra, Inc. v. Strin, 538 F.3d 402, 420 (6th Cir.
2008); Good v. Ohio Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 422 (6th Cir. 1998).
Magistrate Judge Komives did not err in concluding that Plaintiff’s medical
records would not alter Aiken’s entitlement to summary judgment. The Court is
18
not persuaded that Plaintiff’s medical records would show that Aiken – acting in
either her official or individual capacity – violated Title II by denying Plaintiff’s
Step II grievance.
Objection 2
Plaintiff’s second objection is that Magistrate Judge Komives continues to
err in concluding that Plaintiff cannot show that Aiken was personally involved in
the deprivation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Plaintiff again refers to Aiken’s
intentional fabrication regarding the care Plaintiff received and argues that this
willful deception evidences Aiken’s intent to violate Plaintiff’s rights. Because
this objection was addressed with respect to the original R&R, supra, the Court
declines to address it again.
IV.
SUMMARY AND ORDER
For the reasons set forth herein and in both of Magistrate Judge Komives’s
R&Rs, the Court concurs in the magistrate judge’s findings and conclusions
regarding Defendant Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court therefore
adopts the R&R with respect to claims brought against Aiken in her individual
capacity.
While the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Komives erred in not
considering Plaintiff’s official capacity claim against Aiken alleging a violation of
Title II of the ADA, the Court finds that this claim fails as a matter of law.
19
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Aiken’s Motion for Summary Judgment,
(ECF No. 18), is GRANTED and Defendant Aiken is dismissed from this action in
both her individual and official capacities.
Date: September 25, 2013
s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Emanuel Coates, #155262
Carson City Correctional Facility
10274 Boyer Road
Carson City, MI 48811
Cori E. Barkman, A.A.G.
Kandy C. Ronayne, A.A.G.
Kevin R. Himebaugh, A.A.G.
Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives
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