Watkins v. JPMorgan Chase Bank & Co.

Filing 31

ORDER denying 23 Motion for Attorney Fees. Signed by District Judge George Caram Steeh. (MBea)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

STEPHANY WATKINS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 12-CV-15629
vs.
HON. GEORGE CARAM STEEH
JPMORGAN CHASE
US BENEFITS EXECUTIVE,
Defendant.
_____________________________/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
This ERISA denial of benefits case arises out of plaintiff Stephany Watkins’ claim
that defendant JPMorgan Chase US Benefits Executive (“Chase”) wrongfully denied her
claim for lump sum retirement benefits. Watkins retired from Chase’s predecessor,
First Chicago NBD, in October, 1997, and filed an election form to receive a lump sum
payment of retirement funds in May, 1998. Some twelve years later, Watkins filed her
complaint in state court, later removed here, alleging that Chase had failed to pay her
claim. After this action was stayed pending administrative review, the plan
administrator denied Watkins’ claim. On October 31, 2013, this court affirmed the plan
administrator’s decision finding that Watkins claim was time-barred, and in addition,
Chase had submitted unrebutted proofs that Watkins received a check for
approximately $18,000, less tax withholdings, in 1998. Now before the court is Chase’s
motion for attorney fees, as the prevailing party, in the amount of $25,703.04. For the
reasons set forth below, Chase’s motion shall be denied.
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ERISA allows the court discretion to award attorney fees to the prevailing party
under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). In determining whether to award fees, the court may
consider five factors: “(1) the degree of the opposing party’s culpability or bad faith; (2)
the opposing party’s ability to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees; (3) the deterrent effect
of an award on other persons under similar circumstances; (4) whether the party
requesting fees sought to confer a common benefit on all participants and beneficiaries
of an ERISA plan or resolve significant legal questions regarding ERISA; and (5) the
relative merits of the parties’ positions.” Secretary of Dep’t of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d
666, 669 (6th Cir. 1985). The King factors are not statutory and none of them is
necessarily dispositive, but they set forth a flexible approach that may help the court’s
analysis. Ciaramitaro v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of America, 521 Fed. App’x 430, 437 (6th
Cir. 2013).
Attorney fees are not warranted under the King five-factor test. First, and
perhaps most importantly, under the second factor, Watkins has shown that she would
be unable to pay the award sought. She is now and has been represented in this case
by a family friend acting pro bono. She does not own a home and her only asset is a
2003 Dodge Durango. It also strikes the court that it would be unreasonable to award
defense counsel more in fees than what was at stake in the underlying lawsuit. Here,
Watkins sought only $18,000 in retirement benefits, while defense counsel seeks over
$25,000 in fees.
Consideration of the remaining four King factors also lead this court to conclude
that attorney fees are not warranted. As to the first factor, nothing suggests that
Watkins proceeded in bad faith. True, she slept on her rights and delayed in bringing
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this lawsuit to her own detriment. But her mere dilatoriness does not amount to bad
faith. Chase argues that the third factor is met because awarding fees would serve as
a deterrent to those proceeding with stale claims. The dismissal of Watkins’ claim
based on the statute of limitations defense is deterrence enough. Consideration of the
fourth factor also leads this court to conclude that it should not award Chase attorney
fees. Chase’s defense of Watkins’ ERISA action here did not resolve any significant
legal question nor could it be said to have conferred any substantial benefit to other
participants and beneficiaries of the plan. Finally, the court considers the relative merits
of the parties’ positions. Chase maintains that Watkins’ claim was patently frivolous.
Watkins supported her claim, however, by pointing to the absence of a canceled check,
lack of a W-2, or Form 1099-R from her former employer. While this court held that
Chase could not be faulted for failing to produce such information given the twelve
years that had lapsed since Watkins first requested lump sum retirement benefits, the
lack of such evidence gave Watkins an arguable, albeit weak, basis for proceeding with
her claim.
In sum, because Watkins lacks the ability to pay the attorney fees sought, and
having failed to otherwise meet the King five-factor analysis, Chase’s motion for
attorney fees (Doc. 23) hereby is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 15, 2014
s/George Caram Steeh
GEORGE CARAM STEEH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Copies of this Order were served upon attorneys of record on
January 15, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Marcia Beauchemin
Deputy Clerk

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