Underwood v. Heyns et al

Filing 6

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

TRAVIS MICHAEL UNDERWOOD, #413128,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 2:12-CV-15679
HONORABLE LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF

v.
DANIEL HEYNS, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Michigan prisoner Travis Michael Underwood (“Plaintiff”) has filed a pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants, Michigan Department of
Corrections officials, administrators, and medical personnel, have failed to provide him with proper
medical care for his left shoulder. He sues the defendants in their personal and official capacities
and seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed
without prepayment of the fees and costs for this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II. DISCUSSION
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to sua
sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it determines that the
action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to dismiss a complaint seeking redress
against government entities, officers, and employees which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable
basis in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325 (1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint set
forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” as well
as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3). The purpose of this rule is to “give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). While this notice pleading standard
does not require “detailed” factual allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal
principles or conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned,
the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A
pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 557).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) he was
deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution or laws of the United
States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Flagg Bros.
v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville, 583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that the defendants denied him proper medical care in violation

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of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The United States Supreme Court has held that
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
104 (1976). The deliberate indifference standard requires an inmate plaintiff to show that prison
official defendants acted with a reckless disregard of a known risk of serious harm to the prisoner.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A plaintiff may establish deliberate indifference
by a showing of grossly inadequate medical care. See Terrance v. Northville Regional Psychiatric
Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff, however, has made no such showing. He admits
that he received medical attention for his left shoulder problems, including an X-ray, an MRI,
physical examination, a Cortisone injection, various pain medications, plans for exercises and
restrictions on activities, and a sling and extra pillow for sleeping. He alleges no facts to show that
the defendants acted with deliberate indifference or intentionally acted to cause him injury or pain
with respect to his medical treatment. Conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights
claim. See, e.g., Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1007 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Crawford-El v.
Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998). While Plaintiff may disagree with the course of treatment
provided and/or certain treatments may not have been fully effective, he has not alleged facts or
presented documentation to show that the defendants acted unconstitutionally.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that claims of negligence concerning a prisoner’s medical
treatment, i.e. medical malpractice, are not cognizable in a civil rights action brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. An “injury caused by negligence does not constitute
a deprivation of any constitutionally-protected interest” and a claim that officials have engaged in
negligent conduct does not state a claim under §1983. Collins v. City of Harker Hgts., 503 U.S. 115,

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127-28 (1992); Lewellen v. Metropolitan Gov't. of Nashville & Davidson Co., Tenn., 34 F.3d 345,
348 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has thus failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under
§ 1983.
Moreover, Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to
defendants Heyns, Bergh, Pandya, Bailey, Powell, Aiken, Kinder, Lomerson, Schad, Washington,
Lockhart, and Russell because he has not alleged facts demonstrating their personal involvement in
any improper medical care. It is well-settled that a plaintiff must allege the personal involvement
of a defendant to state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens. See Monell v.
Department of Social Svs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) (Section 1983 liability cannot be based
upon a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th
Cir. 2009) (same); see also Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 69 F.3d 716, 727-28 (6th Cir.
1995) (plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant participated, condoned, encouraged,
or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish liability). Plaintiff has not done so.
Plaintiff’s assertions that the foregoing defendants failed to supervise an employee, should
be vicariously liable for another employee’s conduct, erred in denying his grievances, and/or did not
sufficiently respond to the situation is insufficient to state a civil rights claim. See, e.g., Shehee v.
Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Martin v. Harvey, 14 F. App’x 307, 309 (6th
Cir. 2001). Plaintiff also has not alleged facts which show that any injury he suffered is the result
of any policy or regulation, or that any improper conduct arose from the deliberate failure to
adequately investigate, train, or supervise employees. See Ellis v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 455
F.3d 690, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (setting forth three-part test for such claims). Plaintiff has thus failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted as to defendants Heyns, Bergh, Pandya, Bailey,
Powell, Aiken, Kinder, Lomerson, Schad, Washington, Lockhart, and Russell for this additional

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reason. His complaint must be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted in his complaint. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the civil rights
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 30, 2013

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