Tabitha Nahabedian v. Onewest Bank, FSB
Filing
8
Memorandum and Order Granting Defendant's 4 Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (SCha)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TABITHA NAHABEDIAN, as an
individual and AS PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE
OF RICHARD F. NAHABEDIAN,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No. 13-10122
ONEWEST BANK, FSB, a/k/a
INDYMAC MORTGAGE SERVICES, INC.,
HON. AVERN COHN
Defendant.
______________________________________/
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 4)1
I. INTRODUCTION
This is another one of many cases pending in this district involving a default on a
mortgage and subsequent foreclosure proceedings.
As will be explained, Richard
Nahabedian (Nahabedian) defaulted on a mortgage loan used to finance the purchase of
residential property located at 29654 S. Meadowridge #17, Farmington Hills, Michigan (the
property). Foreclosure by advertisement proceedings have concluded and the redemption
period has expired. Nevertheless, plaintiff Tabitha Nahabedian (plaintiff), the personal
representative of Nahabedian’s estate,2 and Nahabedian’s widow, contends that
1
Upon review of the papers, the Court deems this matter appropriate for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2).
2
Plaintiff was appointed the Personal Representative of Nahabedian’s estate on
December 5, 2012. Nahabedian passed away on October 12, 2012.
Nahabedian’s estate has a right to the property. Plaintiff also claims a right to the property
individually. Plaintiff is suing defendant OneWest Bank, FSB (OneWest), the mortgagee
at the time of the foreclosure.
Plaintiff’s complaint is in three counts, phrased as follows:
Count I:
Count II:
Count III:
Fraud and Misrepresentation;
Violation of MCL 600.2305c; and
Action to Quiet Title and Set Aside Sheriff Sale.
(Doc. 1-2 at 1-8).
Before the Court is defendant’s motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment.
(Doc. 4). For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
II. BACKGROUND
On July 27, 2006, Nahabedian executed a mortgage on the property and a
promissory note in the amount of $206,425.00. (Doc. 4 at 25-39). Nahabedian’s mortgage
on the property identifies Quicken Loans Inc. as lender, Nahabedian as borrower, and
MERS as mortgagee and nominee for the lender. (Id. at 25-26). The mortgage was
recorded on August 3, 2006, Liber 37932, Page 457, Oakland County Records.
On December 17, 2009, MERS, as nominee for Quicken Loans Inc. assigned the
mortgage to OneWest. (Id. at 41). This assignment was recorded on January 13, 2012,
Liber 41767, Page 205, Oakland County Records.
On July 12, 2009, Nahabedian conveyed the property as a married man to himself
and his wife, the plaintiff, by quit claim deed. (Id. at 43). This conveyance was recorded
on October 12, 2010, Liber 42453, Page 432, Oakland County Records.
Nahabedian defaulted on his mortgage loan, and attempted to work out a loan
modification after his receipt of a notice letter from OneWest’s counsel, Trott & Trott, P.C.
2
(Trott & Trott) and after notice was published informing him of the right to request a meeting
with Trott & Trott as agent for the mortgage holder and/or servicer within thirty days. (Id.
at 45-46). The letter is dated April 11, 2012. As of April 11, the total amount due and
owing under the mortgage loan was $252,913.07. (Id. at 45).
Nahabedian contacted IndyMac Mortgage Services, Inc. (IndyMac)3 and requested
a loan modification. (Doc. 5-2 at 5). IndyMac confirmed receipt of Nahabedian’s request
for a loan modification and informed him that he would need to submit certain “missing”
documents:
Borrower Response Package: Your recent submission for a
mortgage loan modification was missing your borrower
response package. Please submit your complete borrower
response package to us as soon as possible, so we may
continue to evaluate your documentation for a mortgage loan
modification.
(Id. at 14). Further, IndyMac informed Nahabedian that it was reviewing his application and
financial situation for eligibility. (Id. at 16).
On May 23, 2012, after Nahabedian failed to contact a housing counselor or Trott
& Trott directly, OneWest commenced foreclosure by advertisement under Mich. Comp.
Laws 600.3201, et seq.
On June 12, 2012, IndyMac informed Nahabedian that he was not eligible for
modification due to the imminent foreclosure sale:
While modification programs are designed to help borrowers
who are experiencing financial hardship, not all borrowers will
meet the eligibility requirements, and therefore, not all
borrowers are eligible for a loan modification.
3
IndyMac is a division of OneWest and serviced the loan.
3
In reviewing your loan for a possible modification, we have
determined that we are not able to fulfill your request for
a modification due to an imminent foreclosure sale of the
subject property.
If your situation has changed since you applied for this
modification you may reapply. Please note, submitting a new
application does not guarantee that we will review your loan for
a modification. Also, a new application does not guarantee
that we will suspend foreclosure proceedings.
(Doc. 5-2 at 18) (emphasis in original).
OneWest published notice of a June 26, 2012 sheriff’s sale in the Oakland County
Legal News for four consecutive weeks prior to the sale, and a similar notice was posted
on the property on May 26, 2012.
On June 26, 2012, a sheriff’s sale was held, and OneWest was the purchaser of the
property for $255,293.98. The sheriff’s deed was recorded on July 3, 2012, Liber 44380,
Page 601, Oakland County Register of Deeds. (Doc. 4 at 48).
On July 20, 2012, OneWest conveyed by quit claim deed its interest in the property
to the Federal National Mortgage Corporation (Fannie Mae). (Id. at 59). This conveyance
was recorded in August of 2012, Liber 44488, Page 725, Oakland County Records. (Id.).
On October 21, 2012, Nahabedian passed away. On December 5, 2012, plaintiff
was appointed personal representative of Nahabedian’s estate. Two days later, on
December 7, 2012, plaintiff filed a complaint in Oakland County Probate Court. Plaintiff
claimed that OneWest failed to provide a loan modification and violated Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 600.3205c. Plaintiff asked for title to be quieted in favor of the estate or herself
individually. The case was removed to this Court on January 14, 2013.
Under Michigan law, Nahabedian and his estate had six months to redeem the
4
property.
See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3236.
The redemption period expired on
December 26, 2012. Neither Nahabedian or his estate redeemed the property within the
six-month statutory redemption period, and title to the property vested in Fannie Mae on
that date. See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3236.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a
complaint.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint's “factual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). See also Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of
Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). The court is “not bound to accept as
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, “[o]nly a complaint
that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Id. at 679. Thus, “a
court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.”
Id. “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. In sum, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
5
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment will be granted when the moving party demonstrates that there
is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue of material
fact when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986). The nonmoving party may not rest upon his pleadings; rather, the nonmoving
party’s response “must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Chappell
v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 2009). The Court “must construe the
evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Hawkins
v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). Determining credibility,
weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are left to the trier of fact. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Although plaintiff did not file a motion to remand this case to state court, her
response to OneWest’s motion argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
hear the case based on the “probate exception” to federal jurisdiction. Plaintiff is mistaken.
Objections to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Henderson v.
Shinseki, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011). “Indeed, a party may raise such an objection even
if the party had previously acknowledged the trial court’s jurisdiction.” Id. (citation omitted).
1. The “Probate Exception” To Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Tracing its origin to the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court has “recognized
6
a ‘probate exception,’ kin to the domestic relations exception, to otherwise proper federal
jurisdiction.” Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307 (2006) (citations omitted); see also
Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946) (“[A] federal court has no jurisdiction to
probate a will or administer an estate. . . .”). “[T]he probate exception reserves to state
probate courts the probate or annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s
estate; it also precludes federal courts from endeavoring to dispose of property that is in
the custody of a state probate court.” Marshall, 547 U.S. at 311-12. As the Sixth Circuit
has explained, “ ‘[t]he probate exception is a practical doctrine designed to promote legal
certainty and judicial economy by providing a single forum of litigation, and to tap the
expertise of probate judges by conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the probate court.’ ”
Lepard v. NBD Bank, 384 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Cenker v. Cenker, 660 F.
Supp. 793, 795 (E.D.Mich. 1987)). Even when the requirements of diversity jurisdiction
have been met, the probate exception strips the federal courts of jurisdiction over probate
matters. Id. (citing Storm v. Storm, 328 F.3d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 2003); Markham, 326 U.S.
at 494).
The test used to determine if federal court jurisdiction is appropriate is “whether
under state law the dispute would be cognizable only by the probate court.” Id. (citation
omitted). In Markham, the Supreme Court explained that the probate exception is limited
in scope:
[W]hile a federal court may not exercise its jurisdiction to
disturb or affect the possession of property in the custody of a
state court, it may exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate rights
in such property where the final judgment does not undertake
to interfere with the state court’s possession save to the extent
that the state court is bound by the judgment to recognize the
right adjudicated by the federal court.
7
326 U.S. at 494 (internal citations omitted). More recently, in Marshall, the Supreme Court
observed that Markham’s “enigmatic words” proscribe “ ‘distrub[ing] or affect[ing] the
possession of property in the custody of a state court.’ ” 547 U.S. at 311. Specifically, the
Supreme Court reasoned that Markham is “essentially a reiteration of the general principle
that, when one court is exercising in rem jurisdiction over a res, a second court will not
assume in rem jurisdiction over the same res.” Id. (citations omitted). Federal courts, the
Supreme Court explained in Markham, “have jurisdiction to entertain suits ‘in favor of
creditors, legatees and [heirs]’ and other claimants against a decedent’s estate ‘to establish
their claims’ so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings
or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the custody of the
state court.” 326 U.S. at 494; see also Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3610 (2012) (“[T]he probate exception to diversity of citizenship jurisdiction is
narrow, preventing federal courts only from probating wills or administering estates, or
taking any action that would interfere with property that is in the custody of a state court.”).
2. The “Probate Exception” Does Not Apply
As another court has explained, “[d]etermining whether a case falls within the
probate exception requires a two-part inquiry.” Abercrombie v. Andrew Coll., 438 F. Supp.
2d 243, 252 (S.D. N.Y. 2006). “First, the district court sitting in diversity must determine if
it is ‘being asked to directly probate a will or administrate an estate.’ If so, the action is
outside of the court’s jurisdiction, as such actions are ‘purely probate’ in nature.” Id. (citing
Markham, 326 U.S. at 296; Moser v. Pollin, 294 F.3d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 2002)). This is not
the case here. Plaintiff is not asking the Court to directly probate Nahabedian’s will or to
administer his estate.
8
“Second, if the first question is answered in the negative, the court must determine
if the case at hand would require the district court to ‘interfere with the probate proceedings,
[ ] assume general jurisdiction of the probate[,] or control [ ] property in the custody of the
state court. In any of these situations, the district court must dismiss the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Moser, 294 F.3d at 340; Markham, 326 U.S. at 494)
(alterations in original). Plaintiff claims the latter, that the Court’s adjudication of this case
would exercise control over property that is controlled by the probate court. Plaintiff
misinterprets the case law.
Plaintiff’s argument that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the probate
exception is premised on her misconception that the property is “in the custody” of the
probate court. As will be explained, the estate does not have an interest in the property
because the redemption period has expired and the property was not redeemed. Plaintiff
fails to make a showing of fraud or irregularity sufficient to unwind the foreclosure
proceedings. Thus, the probate court could not exercise in rem jurisdiction over the
property. The property is not an asset of the estate.
Other courts have declined to extend the probate exception in analogous situations.
In Abercrombie v. Andrew College, 438 F. Supp. at 254-55, the court reasoned that
property that was transferred inter vivos by the decedent was not considered an asset of
the estate. The court reached this conclusion even though the decedent’s estate was
challenging the validity of the deed. Id. at 255. The court explained, “[U]nless and until
some judicial authority accepts Abercrombie’s objections to the validity of the Deed, which
was recorded on March 11, 1992, the Property is not part of Ms. Murphy’s estate, but in
fact belongs to Andrew College. Id. at 255 (citing Mich. Tech. Fund v. Century Nat’l Bank
9
of Broward, 680 F.2d 736, 740–41 (11th Cir. 1982); Bugbee v. Donahue, 483 F. Supp.
1328, 1331 (E.D. Wis. 1980)).
Like Abercrombie, in Bugbee v. Donahue, 483 F. Supp. at 1329, the estate of the
decedent challenged the conveyance of certain property as fraudulently obtained. The
court explained why the real estate in question was not part of the estate, and, therefore,
not “in the custody” of the state court:
The real estate involved in this case, although listed as an
asset in the decedent’s estate, is in fact an asset only if the
plaintiff is successful in his claim against the defendants.
Thus, this Court in allowing the action to continue will not be
assuming control of property in a state court’s custody, nor will
it be assuming general jurisdiction of the probate of the
decedent’s estate.
Id. at 1331.
This case is no different than Abercrombie and Bugbee. The property is not an
asset of the estate. Rather, it is owned by Fannie Mae, as is evidenced by the record chain
of title. At best, when plaintiff initiated the probate action, the estate had a potential interest
in the property if it was ultimately successful in this lawsuit. This does not strip the Court
of subject matter jurisdiction under the probate exception. In any event, as explained in
more detail below, the estate does not have a valid claim to the property.
B. Substantive Claims
Having determined that subject matter jurisdiction is not absent, the Court turns to
the substantive allegations in this case.
1. Fraud and Misrepresentation (Count I)
In count I, plaintiff claims that IndyMac sent Nahabedian a May 8, 2012 letter
acknowledging Nahabedian’s request for a loan modification. In this letter, IndyMac
10
informed Nahabedian that “no action is needed from you [Nahabedian] at this time.”
Plaintiff says that the representation that no further action was needed from Nahabedian
was false, and that Nahabedian lost the property by relying on that representation. Plaintiff
fails to make a showing of fraud and misrepresentation.
Under Michigan law, to prove a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation or common
law fraud, plaintiff must satisfy six elements:
(1) the defendant made a material misrepresentation; (2) the
representation was false; (3) when the representation was
made, the defendant knew that it was false, or made it
recklessly, without knowledge of its truth, and as a positive
assertion; (4) the defendant made it with the intention that the
plaintiff should act upon it; (5) the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the representation; and (6) the plaintiff thereby suffered
injury.
Roberts v. Saffell, 280 Mich. App. 297, 403 (2008) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff fails to show how IndyMac’s assertion, in response to Nahabedian’s request
for a loan modification, that “no action is needed from [Nahabedian] at this time” is a
fraudulent misrepresentation. Rather, this statement merely acknowledges that IndyMac
received Nahabedian’s request, and that it was being processed. This is evidenced by
reading the entire communication in context. The letter was sent to Nahabedian from Maria
Rangel, IndyMac’s customer contact manager.
(Doc. 5-2 at 15).
She informed
Nahabedian that she was the new customer contact manager assigned to his case, and
that she would be replacing the previous contact manager. (Id.). Rangel further stated:
No action is needed from you at this time. My team is
reviewing your current situation and evaluating possible
workout options to help you avoid foreclosure.
(Id.). On the same day, IndyMac sent Nahabedian another letter informing him that his
11
application for a loan modification was received, and that it was in the process of being
reviewed. (Id. at 16). The letter conveyed to Nahabedian that IndyMac was reviewing his
application. The statements made in the letter are not material misrepresentations; they
are an acknowledgment that Nahabedian’s application was recieved.
Plaintiff argues that she should be permitted to amend the complaint to state fraud
with particularity. Stating fraud with particularity, however, is not plaintiff’s problem.
Rather, plaintiff erroneously relies on communications that were sent to Nahabedian that
were meant to inform him that his application for a loan modification was received. Plaintiff
fails to establish the falsity in these communications. Accordingly, allowing plaintiff the
opportunity to amend the complaint would be futile.
2. Violation of MCL 600.3205c (Count II)
Count II of plaintiff’s complaint claims that IndyMac violated Michigan’s foreclosure
by advertisement statute, specifically, Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205c. Section 600.3205c
states, in pertinent part:
(1) If a borrower has, either directly or through a housing
counselor, contacted a person designated under section
3205a(1)(c) under section 3205b but the process has not
resulted in an agreement to modify the mortgage loan, the
person designated under section 3205a(1)(c) shall work with
the borrower to determine whether the borrower qualifies for a
loan modification.
The statute provides that the foreclosing party shall serve a written notice on the
borrower containing, among other things, “[t]he names, addresses, and telephone numbers
of the mortgage holder, the mortgage servicer, or any agent designated by the mortgage
holder or mortgage servicer.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(c). Under section
3205a(1)(c), the foreclosing party must designate “1 of the persons named in subdivision
12
(b) as the person to contact and that has the authority to make agreements under sections
3205b and 3205c.” If the borrower requests a meeting with the person designated under
subdivision (c), “foreclosure proceedings will not be commenced until 90 days after the date
the notice is mailed to the borrower.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3205a(1)(e).
Here, OneWest complied with the Michigan statute and designated Trott & Trott as
its contact in a letter to Nahabedian dated April 11, 2012. (Doc. 4 at 45). Nahabedian did
not contact Trott & Trott to request a statutory loan modification. Nor did Nahabedian
contact a housing counselor. Instead, sometime before the property was foreclosed,
Nahabedian contacted the mortgage servicer, IndyMac, directly.4 (Doc. 5-2 at 2).
Plaintiff says that, when Nahabedian contacted IndyMac and requested a loan
modification, it required foreclosure proceedings to be held off until July 11, 2012, which
is ninety days after Trott & Trott’s 3205a notice was sent. Thus, plaintiff says that the
sheriff’s sale on June 26, 2012 violated the statute. As such, plaintiff says the Court must
unwind the foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff is mistaken.
Nahabedian’s actions in contacting IndyMac directly did not trigger the ninety-day
extension contained in the statute. In order to trigger the ninety-day extension, Nahabedian
was required to contact OneWest’s designate, Trott & Trott, or a housing counselor directly.
See, e.g., Smith v. Litton Loan Servicing, LP, No. 12-1684, 2013 WL 888452, at *2 (March
12, 2013). Nahabedian did neither. He tried to obtain a loan modification directly from
IndyMac. Thus, he did not trigger the ninety-day extension contained in the statute, but
instead attempted to work out a loan modification with the mortgage servicer on his own.
4
Nahabedian’s letter to IndyMac requesting a loan modification is not dated.
13
In any event, even if contacting IndyMac triggered the ninety-day extension,
Nahabedian’s application for a loan modification was never approved. Plaintiff’s allegation
that Nahabedian was “discussing” a modification of the loan with IndyMac when OneWest
prematurely foreclosed on the property does not render the foreclosure that has now
occurred void ab initio. Goryoka v. Quicken Loan, Inc., No. 11-2178, 2013 WL 1104991,
at *2 (6th Cir. March 18, 2013). Rather, the foreclosure is voidable on a showing of
prejudice relating to the foreclosure process itself. Kim v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,
493 Mich. 98, 115 (2012). “To demonstrate such prejudice, [plaintiff] must show that
[Nahabedian or the estate] would have been in a better position to preserve their interest
in the property absent defendant’s noncompliance with the statute.” Id. at 115-116.
Indeed, “Michigan courts have held that once the statutory redemption period lapses, they
can only entertain the setting aside of a foreclosure sale where the mortgagor has made
‘a clear showing of fraud, or irregularity.’ ” Conlin v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc.,
___ F.3d ___, 2013 WL 1442263, at *3 (6th Cir. 2013).
Here, the six-month statutory redemption period has lapsed and Nahabedian and
the estate did not redeem the property. The filing of this lawsuit did not toll the redemption
period. Id. (citing Overton v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 284950, 2009 WL
1507342, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 28, 2009)). Thus, plaintiff must show that Nahabedian
and the estate would have been in a better position to preserve their interest in the property
had the foreclosure sale occurred on July 11, 2012, as opposed to June 26, 2012. Plaintiff
fails to make such a showing. Indeed, Nahabedian and the estate had until December 26,
2012 to redeem the property but did not make any attempt to do so. Nor has plaintiff
proffered any evidence showing that Nahabedian and the estate would have been in a
14
better position– i.e. that they would have been able to pay for the property– if the
foreclosure was delayed sixteen days.
Further, a violation of the loan modification statute gives the plaintiff an option to
convert a foreclosure by advertisement proceeding to a judicial foreclosure. Mich. Comp.
Laws § 600.3205c(6). It does not, standing alone, amount to fraud or irregularity sufficient
to unwind a completed foreclosure sale. Thus, plaintiff’s claim does not have any merit.
3. Quiet Title (Count III)
In count III, plaintiff claims a legal right to the property herself, as Nahabedian’s wife,
under the July 17, 2009 quit claim deed in which Nahabedian conveyed the property from
himself to both himself and plaintiff. The Sixth Circuit has recently explained that quiet title
is a remedy and not a separate cause of action. Goryoka v. Quicken Loan, Inc., No. 112178, 2013 WL 1104991, at *3 (6th Cir. March 18, 2013). Plaintiff’s basis for the quiet title
claim is the alleged Mich Comp Laws § 600.3205c violation explained above. As discussed
above, plaintiff’s claim
is defective.
Plaintiff has not made a showing that either
Nahabedian, the estate, or herself would have been in a better position to pay for the
property if the foreclosure was delayed until July 11, 2012. Therefore, there is no basis to
quiet title in her name.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendant’s motion to dismiss and/or for summary
judgment has been granted.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: April 12, 2013
15
13-10122 Tabitha Nahabedian v. Onewest Bank, FSB
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of record
on this date, April 12, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
16
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?