Kensu v. Buskirk et al

Filing 172

ORDER Granting In Part 142 Motion for Attorney Fees and Denying Motions 143 , 146 and 164 . Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (LVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
TEMUJIN KENSU,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-10279
Honorable Victoria A. Roberts

v.
JOSHUA BUSKIRK, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________/
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S POST-JUDGMENT MOTIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION
On March 28, 2016, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff Temujin Kensu

(“Kensu”) in the amount of $325,002, finding that five defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The
Court entered a judgment closing the case on March 30, after which Kensu filed four
motions: (1) motion for attorney fees; (2) motion for equitable relief; (3) motion to
compel the production of records; and (4) motion for an indicative ruling. These motions
are fully briefed. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART Kensu’s
motion for attorney fees, as explained below, and DENIES his other motions.
II.

BACKGROUND
Kensu began this prisoner civil rights action on January 22, 2013, alleging an

Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, a First Amendment retaliation claim,
and a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; he filed an amended complaint
the following month alleging only the deliberate indifference claim. Oliver Law Group,
P.C. (“Oliver Law”) represented Kensu from the outset of the litigation until October

2013, when the Court granted its request to withdraw as counsel. Kensu proceeded pro
se until retaining Solomon Radner (“Radner”) in April 2015.
The suit proceeded to a jury trial in March 2016 against 8 defendants: Jeffrey
Stieve, Susan McCauley, Mary Zamora, Charles Turner, William Borgerding, Lloyd
Rapelje, Russell Vittitow, and Jeannie Stephenson. On March 28, 2016, a jury returned
a verdict in favor of Kensu, finding that Stieve, McCauley, Zamora, Borgerding, and
Rapelje (“Defendants”) were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The
jury found Stieve, McCauley, and Borgerding liable for compensatory damages of
$25,000, $5,000, and $10,000, respectively, and assessed punitive damages against
them, respectively, in the amounts of $150,000, $70,000, and $65,000. The jury
rendered an award of $1.00 in nominal damages against each Zamora and Rapelje.
The following day, the Court entered a judgment in accordance with the verdict, closing
the case.
On April 11, 2016, Kensu filed a motion for attorney fees. Oliver Law responded,
seeking to recover for work performed prior to withdrawing as Kensu’s counsel by either
enforcing a lien pursuant to the terms of a contingent fee agreement or by payment of
attorney fees on a per-hour basis. Defendants filed a late response to Kensu’s motion,
but they did not address Oliver Law’s fee request. Kensu filed a reply.
Kensu also filed a motion for equitable relief, in which he seeks an order:
declaring that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; preventing the Michigan Department of
Corrections (“MDOC”) from transferring him to a different facility without Court approval;
and requiring Defendants to provide him with several different medical treatments,

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examinations, and accommodations. While the motion was pending, Defendants filed a
Notice of Appeal to the Sixth Circuit. Subsequently, they filed an objection to Kensu’s
motion for equitable relief, stating that their notice of appeal divested the Court of its
jurisdiction to decide the motion.
Agreeing that the Court could no longer grant him the equitable relief he sought
due to Defendants’ appeal, Kensu filed a motion for the Court to enter an indicative
ruling stating that if the case were remanded, it would decide his motion for equitable
relief.
In his other motion before the Court, Kensu seeks an order compelling
Defendants and/or MDOC to produce phone call records and recordings.
III.

MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES
A.

Legal Standard

District courts have discretion to award attorney fees to a “prevailing party” in a
civil rights suit. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). However, the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”) limits the award of attorney fees in prisoner civil rights suits. 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(d)(1). The PLRA allows an award of attorney’s fees in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim
brought by a prisoner only to the extent that the fee “was directly and reasonably
incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights . . . and the amount of the
fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation. . . .” §
1997e(d)(1)(A). In determining an attorney fees dispute under the PLRA, the Court
follows a four-step approach: (1) determine whether plaintiff prevailed for the purposes
of § 1988; (2) calculate the amount of attorney fees due under the “lodestar” method; (3)
determine whether the amount of the fee is proportionate to the court ordered relief for

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the violation; and (4) apply a portion of the judgment, not to exceed 25%, to attorney
fees. Siggers-El v. Barlow, 433 F. Supp. 2d 811, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
Defendants concede that Kensu is a “prevailing party” under § 1988. Thus, the
Court must determine the reasonable attorney fees under the lodestar method, and
ensure that they comply with the PLRA.
B.

Oliver Law is Entitled to Attorney Fees

Before determining the merits of Kensu’s motion for attorney fees, the Court must
address a procedural matter regarding Oliver Law’s fee application. Oliver Law seeks
to recover for time spent representing Kensu by either enforcing a lien pursuant to a
retainer agreement, or by receiving an award of fees on an hourly basis. Although
Kensu primarily addresses the validity of the lien in his motion for attorney fees, he does
acknowledge that Oliver Law may be entitled to either a quantum meruit fee or a
recovery of fees on an hourly basis, by application. Since Kensu and Oliver Law agree
the quantum meruit approach may resolve this dispute, the Court analyzes the issue on
this basis.
Oliver Law may recover attorney fees under both Michigan law and the PLRA.
Prior to withdrawing, counsel combed through extensive records, filed a comprehensive
complaint and an amended complaint, and successfully defended against a motion to
dismiss. Thus, the fees which Oliver Law seeks to recover fall within the scope of the
PLRA, as they were “directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of
the plaintiff’s rights.” § 1997e(d)(1)(A).
Under Michigan law, an attorney on a contingent fee arrangement is entitled to a
quantum meruit recovery of attorney fees if she rightfully withdraws from a matter, is

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wrongfully terminated by a client, or is terminated by a client for cause but has not
engaged in disciplinable misconduct prejudicial to the client's case or contrary to public
policy. Idalski v. Crouse Cartage Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 730, 741 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(citing Polen v. Melonakos, 222 Mich. App. 20, 24, 27 (1997)). A quantum meruit award
is “generally determined by simply multiplying the number of hours worked by a
reasonable hourly fee,” but Courts must also look to the contractual terms. Island Lake
Arbors Condo. Ass’n v. Meisner & Associates, PC, 301 Mich. App. 384, 401 (2013)
(citation omitted). Because Oliver Law withdrew at such an early stage in this litigation,
enforcing the contingency fee agreement would result in an excessive fee award.
Quantum meruit means “as much as deserved.” Id. at 402 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Here, an award of fees based on the lodestar approach under the
PLRA is appropriate and will compensate Oliver Law the amount it deserves.
C.

Lodestar Calculation

The “starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable attorney fee is the
‘lodestar’ amount which is calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably
expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Imwalle v. Reliance Med.
Prods., Inc., 515 F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2008). The party seeking to recover fees bears
the initial burden to substantiate the hours worked and the rate claimed. Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).
Here, Radner seeks total attorney fees in the amount of $48,355.62, as follows:
(i) 156.75 hours at $217.50 per hour for himself; (ii) 4 hours at $217.50 per hour for
attorney Ari Kresch; and (iii) 121.25 hours at $110.00 per hour for three non-attorneys.

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Oliver Law submits 50.32 attorney hours and 98.59 non-attorney hours at the same
hourly rates as Radner, for a total of $21,796.03.
Radner also submits $2,213.44 in litigation costs, to which Defendants do not
object. Thus, Kensu may recover $2,213.44 in costs.
1. Hours Reasonably Expended
The jury found that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Kensu’s serious
medical needs, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Thus, the Court may only
award fees that were “directly and reasonably incurred in proving [that] violation of his
rights. . . .” § 1997e(d)(1)(A).
One primary issue of dispute is whether Kensu may recover fees for work
performed by non-attorney staff members. Fees for non-attorneys who perform work
traditionally performed by attorneys are recoverable. See Richards v. Johnson &
Johnson, No. 2:08-CV-279, 2010 WL 3219138, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. May 12, 2010)
(citation omitted). See also ABA Definition of Legal Assistant/Paralegal, A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/paralegals/resources/current_aba_definition_of_leg
al_assistant_paralegal.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2008) (“A legal assistant or paralegal
is a person, qualified by education, training or work experience who . . . performs
specifically delegated substantive legal work for which a lawyer is responsible.”).
However, “[i]t is well-settled that purely clerical tasks, even performed by a
paralegal, cannot be included in an award of attorney’s fees.” Salamango v. NCSPlus
Inc., No. 2:14-CV-10189, 2014 WL 3900583, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2014) (citation
omitted); Richards, 2010 WL 3219138, at *7 n. 4 (disallowing fees for clerical tasks
performed by paralegals such as document review, locating registered agents,

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preparing summonses, electronic court filings, keeping track of deadlines, and mailing
documents). To distinguish between fees that are recoverable and ones that are purely
clerical, the Court should assess whether the task involves legal skills. See Allison v.
City of Lansing, 2007 WL 2114726, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 19, 2007) (distinguishing
“proofing, printing, and mailing” from “professional” tasks that required legal skills, such
as “editing and revising [an] appellate brief and cross-referencing to the appendix”).
a.

Radner’s Hours

The Court reviewed Radner’s timesheets and finds that all of the attorney hours
billed were directly and reasonably incurred to prove Kensu’s deliberate indifference
claim. The Court finds that Radner and Kresch may recover fees for 160.75 attorney
hours, and notes that Defendants do not object to any specific billings submitted by
Radner or Kresch.
On the other hand, the timesheet Radner submits for his non-attorney staff
contains tasks that are not recoverable. In particular, Kensu cannot recover for the four
entries from March 14 to March 18, 2016, in which non-attorney staff members billed a
total of 28 hours for copying exhibits and preparing exhibit books. These tasks are
strictly clerical in nature. See Allison, 2007 WL 2114726, at *1. Similarly, Kensu may
not recover for 0.75 hours billed on 4/16/15 for drafting and filing a notice of
appearance; 0.25 hours billed on 4/22/15 for “communicating with Kensu’s prior
counsel”; 0.25 hours billed on 7/9/15 for drafting and sending request for medical
records, or 4.25 hours billed for editing final pretrial order to include exhibit numbers and
filing it on 2/10/16 and 2/16/15. In addition, the Court finds that Kensu may only recover
four of the eight non-attorney hours billed on 6/30/15 for reviewing and organizing

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medical records in chronological order, and only 2.75 of the 5.5 hours billed on 7/20/15
for reviewing and organizing medical records. With the exception of the June 30 and
July 20, 2015 entries, which the Court finds contain both clerical and non-clerical work,
each of the above-referenced tasks is purely clerical, and therefore not recoverable.
See id. The Court reduces Radner’s non-attorney request by 40.25 hours; with this
reduction, Kensu can recover for 81 non-attorney hours.
b.

Oliver Law’s Hours

A review of Oliver Law’s timesheet shows that several billing entries relate to
claims filed in the initial complaint but abandoned in the amended complaint, and other
entries relate entirely to a different case Kensu brought in this Court, in which Oliver
Law also represented him. See Kensu v. Rapelje, Case No. 12-11877. A nonexhaustive list of these entries include: research for First Amendment retaliation claims
on 2/23 and 2/24/12; a phone call regarding retaliation claims on 2/28/12; drafting a
letter to the warden regarding mail being opened on 3/13/12; call with client regarding
musical equipment being taken on 4/9/12; meet with client regarding shoulder and diet
cases on 4/12/12; review write-up regarding “mp3 player scam” on 5/3/12; call with
client regarding smoke exposure suit on 6/18/12; several entries regarding striking a
complaint in an earlier filed suit in August 2012; and several entries regarding amending
the complaint for claim-splitting purposes. The hours Oliver Law submitted for billings
not related to Kensu’s deliberate indifference claim are not recoverable under the PLRA.
See § 1997e(d)(1) (fees only awarded if they were “directly and reasonably incurred in
proving an actual violation of the plaintiff’s rights . . . .”).

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Moreover, Oliver Law admits that, despite attempts to include only billing entries
related to this case, some of their entries reflect billings that apply to Kensu generally.
Examples of these entries include: “meeting with [Kensu’s] wife” on 10/12/11; “meeting
with client” on 11/28/11 for 8.33 hours and 12/16/11 for 7.75 hours; “client call” on
1/6/12; “call with client re several issues” on 6/7/12; numerous phone calls with the
prison to set up visits; “review documents” on 9/13/11, and many other entries for
general document review; and several entries regarding compiling and delivering
Kensu’s records to him after withdrawing as counsel. Although vague descriptions like
these may normally not be an issue, where, as here, counsel represented Kensu in
more than one case, the vague descriptions prevent the Court from determining if the
fees were incurred directly and reasonably in furtherance of this case.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, it is clear that many of the hours Oliver Law
billed were incurred in litigating Kensu’s deliberate indifference claim. As discussed
above, counsel drafted comprehensive pleadings and defended a motion to dismiss.
However, in light of the above-described deficiencies in the Oliver Law’s timesheet,
some reduction in the amount of fees sought is warranted. “The common practice in
this circuit, and in others, when the court is confronted with a request for the award of
attorney’s fees in the face of inadequate billing records, is across-the-board fee
reductions.” Helfman v. GE Grp. Life Assur. Co., No. 06-13528, 2011 WL 1464678, at
*8 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2011) (reducing the total fee requested by 20% due to block
billing and vague entries) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
reduces Oliver Law’s total fee request by 20% based on its vague billing descriptions
and entries that concern claims other than Kensu’s deliberate indifference claim.

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In addition, Oliver Law’s timesheet contains numerous entries for the following
types of tasks: drafting and/or reading emails; organizing, mailing, scanning, printing,
and/or saving documents; and logging into electronic docket and filing documents.
These are all purely clerical in nature. See Allison, 2007 WL 2114726, at *1. Rather
than go line-by-line to deduct each specific clerical billing, the Court reduces Oliver
Law’s total fee request by an additional 10%. See Helfman, 2011 WL 1464678, at *8.
2. Reasonable Hourly Rate
The parties agree that $217.50 is a reasonable hourly rate for attorneys.
However, this rate violates § 1997e(d)(3), which provides that no fee awarded may be
“based on an hourly rate greater than 150 percent of the hourly rate established under
[18 U.S.C. § 3006A] for payment of court-appointed counsel.” Section 3006A is the
Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”); it establishes the maximum allowable fees for courtappointed counsel representing indigent defendants in federal criminal cases. Hadix v.
Johnson, 398 F.3d 863, 865 (6th Cir. 2005). In the Sixth Circuit, “the maximum
allowable attorney fees under the PLRA [is] based on the amount authorized by the
Judicial Conference.” Id. at 868. The current CJA rate is $129.00 per hour. See
Judicial Conference, Guide to Judiciary Policy, Vol. 7, Part A, § 230.16; see also White
v. Bell, No. 3:10-00863, 2015 WL 5123906, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2015) (using
2015 CJA rate of $127.00 per hour). Thus, the maximum hourly rate under the PLRA is
$193.50 per hour (i.e., 150% of $129.00). This is a reasonable hourly rate in this suit.
Radner and Oliver Law both request an hourly rate of $110 for non-attorneys.
Kensu sets forth sufficient evidence for the Court to find that this is a reasonable hourly
rate for non-attorneys in this district, and Defendants do not challenge the proposed rate

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– other than their blanket objection to any recovery for non-attorneys. The Court uses
the rate of $110 per hour to calculate the amount recoverable for work performed by
non-attorneys.
D.

Proportionality of Attorney Fees to Relief Awarded

Defendants say the Court should award Kensu no more than 15% of his
requested attorney fees, because the $325,002 award “was not a complete success”
based on his counsel’s remark during opening statements that the evidence would
support a verdict of $5 million. This argument lacks merit.
Defendants rely on Cramblit v. Fikse, 33 F.3d 633 (6th Cir. 1994), which is
distinguishable from this case. In Cramblit, the Sixth Circuit found that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to award attorney fees where plaintiff was only
awarded nominal damages. Id. at 635-36. Here, Kensu was awarded $40,000 in
compensatory damages and $285,000 in punitive damages.
These are significant awards, especially when considering that this is a prisoner
civil rights case. See Farella v. Hockaday, 304 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1081 (C.D. Ill. 2004)
(“Rare is the prisoner who succeeds in winning a case at all, much less winning more
than nominal damages.”). Kensu’s award of $325,002 is not nominal; Defendants
assertion that the award was not a complete success is baseless. See, e.g., Tanner v.
Borthwell, No. 07-14579, 2013 WL 1148411, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Seven
thousand dollars is not a small punitive damage award, particularly in a prisoner civil
rights case.”). The award of attorney fees is proportional under the PLRA.

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E.

Percentage of the Judgment Applied to Attorney Fees Award

Section 1997e(d)(2) requires the Court to apply “a portion of the judgment (not to
exceed 25 percent)” to the attorney fees awarded against Defendants. Defendants say
the Court should apply 25% of the judgment to the fees award; Kensu says only 1% of
the judgment should apply to the fees award.
Where a jury awards punitive damages, courts have found $1 to be an
appropriate amount of the judgment to apply to attorney fees. See Siggers-El, 433 F.
Supp. 2d at 815, 822-23 (requiring plaintiff to pay $1 in attorney fees out of the
judgment where the jury awarded $200,000 in punitive damages (citing Morrison v.
Davis, 88 F. Supp. 2d 799, 811 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (“In light of the facts of this case, the
constitutional rights implicated, and the jury’s clear signal that the Defendants should be
punished, the Court finds that a $1 assessment against the judgment is within its
discretion under § 1997e(d)(2).”))). Based on “the jury’s clear signal that the
Defendants should be punished,” the Court assesses 1% of the judgment – or
$3,250.02 – to attorney fees, as Kensu requests. See Morrison, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 811.
F.

Summary

Based on the foregoing, Kensu, as the prevailing party, is entitled to recover
attorney fees from Defendants in the following amounts:
1. Radner:
+
=

$31,105.12 for Attorney Hours (160.75 hours * $193.50/hr)
$8,910
for Non-Attorney Hours (81 hours * $110.00/hr)
$40,015.12 Total

2. Oliver Law: $9,736.92
for Attorney Hours (50.32 hours * $193.50/hr)
+ $10,844.90 for Non-Attorney Hours (98.59 hours * $110.00/hr)
= $20,581.82
Less 30% across-the board reduction: ($20,581.82 * 0.7)
= $14,407.27 Total

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3. Total: Oliver Law + Radner = $54,422.39
4. Less 1% of the judgment ($325,002 * 0.01) = $3,250.02
5. Grand Total ($54,422.39 - $3,250.02) = $51,172.37

Accordingly, Kensu’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART. The Court
AWARDS Kensu attorney fees in the amount of $54,422.39 – $3,250.02 = $51,172.37.
Of that amount, Oliver Law is entitled to $14,407.27. The Court also awards Kensu
costs in the amount of $2,213.44.
Moreover, although Kensu prevailed against five defendants, because the jury
awarded only nominal damages against Zamora and Rapelje, they are not liable for
attorney fees or costs. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (“When a
plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential
element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all.”)
(internal citation omitted); Cramblit, 33 F.3d at 635-36 (court did not abuse its discretion
in declining to award attorney fees where plaintiff was only awarded nominal damages).
Stieve, McCauley, and Borgerding are liable in an amount proportional to their
relative overall liability: i.e., Stieve is liable for 53.85% ($175,000/$325,000) of the
attorney fees and costs awarded, and McCauley and Borgerding are each liable for
23.075% ($75,000/$325,000) of the attorney fees and costs awarded.
IV.

MOTION TO COMPEL THE PRODUCTION OF RECORDS
Kensu moves the Court for an order compelling Defendants and/or MDOC to

disclose records of phone calls he made to specific phone numbers, the costs
associated with those calls, and the corresponding recordings for those calls. In

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response, Defendants produced the phone records and cost information Kensu sought,
but they objected to producing the recordings under MDOC policy and Michigan law.
Kensu’s counsel states that he needs the recordings so he can determine which
calls’ costs are recoverable, and so that he can provide the Court with relevant calls to
resolve Oliver Law’s lien dispute. Neither reason is persuasive. Kensu does not need
the recordings to determine which calls’ costs are recoverable. His attorneys submitted
timesheets based on contemporaneous time records; based on those and the call logs
Defendants produced, Kensu could have submitted a supplement to his attorney fees
application setting forth the costs he sought to recover related to phone calls, but he
failed to do so. Moreover, since Oliver Law is entitled to attorney fees on an hourly
basis – as explained above – there is no longer a lien dispute. Because Kensu fails to
set forth a reason that warrants production of the phone call recordings, there is no
need to address the merits of Defendants’ objections.
Kensu’s motion for an order compelling Defendants and/or MDOC to produce
records (Doc. # 146) is DENIED.
V.

MOTIONS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF AND FOR AN INDICATIVE RULING
On April 11, 2016, Kensu filed a motion for equitable relief, seeking an order:

declaring that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
violation of his Eighth Amendment rights; preventing MDOC from transferring him to a
different facility without Court approval; and requiring Defendants to provide him with
several different medical treatments, examinations, and accommodations. On April 26,
2016, Defendants filed a notice of appeal.

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The notice of appeal divested the Court of jurisdiction to grant Kensu’s requested
relief. However, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1(a): “If a timely motion is
made for relief that the court lacks authority to grant because of an appeal that has
been docketed and is pending, the court may . . . (2) deny the motion. . . .” See also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 62.1, Advisory Committee Notes (2009) (“After an appeal has been
docketed and while it remains pending, the district court … can entertain [a] motion and
deny it.”). Finding that Kensu is not entitled to the relief he requests, the Court
proceeds under Rule 62.1(a)(2).
In his motion, Kensu says the Court stated during the final pretrial conference
that it would consider any equitable relief by way of motion after the jury trial ended.
However, on March 28, 2016, after the trial ended, the Court asked the parties if there
was anything else to be considered, and Kensu’s counsel stated, “Not from Plaintiff.”
(Doc. # 158, PgID 2416). The Court docketed the verdict form the following day, and on
March 30 it entered a judgment, “resolv[ing] the last pending claim and clos[ing] the
case.” (Doc. # 141). Courts routinely enter a judgment closing a case after the end of a
jury trial. Despite this routine procedural step, Kensu failed to raise the issue of
equitable relief when questioned if there were any outstanding matters. Thus, the Court
finds that Kensu waived his right to request equitable relief. The result would be the
same even if Kensu had moved for equitable relief before the Court closed the case; he
fails to show he is entitled to such relief.
A declaration that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights would be duplicative of the Jury
Verdict and the Judgment. Thus, there is no need for the relief.

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Kensu’s request for an order preventing MDOC from transferring him from
Macomb Correctional Facility without Court approval fails on multiple grounds. First,
this was not a First Amendment retaliatory transfer case, and Kensu fails to provide
legal justification for the Court to grant him relief. Moreover, Kensu is no longer at the
Macomb Facility, rendering this request moot. Henderson v. Martin, 73 Fed. Appx. 115,
117 (6th Cir. 2003) (“a prisoner’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against
certain prison officials became moot once the prisoner was transferred from the prison
of which he complained to a different facility”). Similarly, Kensu’s transfer renders moot
his request for an order directing Defendants to provide certain medical treatments and
accommodations. Id. And, even if the claim was not moot, the Court would deny relief
because it is not qualified to make decisions regarding necessary medical treatment.
Moreover, several policy and safety considerations weigh against the Court micromanaging Defendants and/or MDOC under these circumstances.
Based on the foregoing, and because Kensu failed to establish that he is entitled
to any requested relief under governing law, the Court DENIES Kensu’s motion for
equitable relief (Doc. # 143) and DENIES his motion for indicative ruling (Doc. # 164).
VI.

CONCLUSION
Kensu’s motion for attorney fees is GRANTED IN PART, as explained above,

and his motions to compel, for equitable relief and for an indicative ruling are DENIED.
IT IS ORDERED.
S/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: November 1, 2016

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The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of
record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on
November 1, 2016.
s/Linda Vertriest
Deputy Clerk

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