Knight v. Wayne County Prosecutors Office et al

Filing 14

OPINION and ORDER summarily dismissing 1 Complaint Signed by District Judge Bernard A. Friedman. (CMul)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JEROME LIONELL KNIGHT,
Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 13-cv-10345
HON. BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN

v.
WAYNE COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S
OFFICE, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
I. Introduction
On January 29, 2013, pro se plaintiff Jerome Knight filed this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is a state prisoner incarcerated by the Michigan Department of
Corrections, currently housed at the Charles Egeler Reception and Guidance Center in Jackson,
Michigan, where he is serving a life sentence for first-degree murder. He names the following as
defendants: (1) the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and prosecutors Maria Miller, Kym
Worthy, First Name Unknown (FNU) Brown; (2) the Detroit Police Department; (3) the Wayne
County Sheriff’s Office and Benny Napoleon and Warren Evans; (4) the State Attorney
General’s Office; (5) the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC); (6) employees from the
Wayne County Jail; (7) employees from the State of Michigan; (8) Rodney Coleman; (9) Edward
Petty; and (10) several John and Jane Does. He states that defendants, in various ways,
maliciously prosecuted him and conspired to bring about his first-degree-murder conviction.
Specifically, plaintiff claims that the prosecutor’s office and the police department forced
and coerced defendants Coleman and Petty to testify against him. He asserts that such a

conspiracy brought about his conviction in a malicious manner. He also states that, while he was
incarcerated in the Wayne County jail, his legal rights to challenge his conviction were violated,
he was forced to wear the same clothing for a month, to clean certain areas without the proper
supplies, and was denied proper medical treatment for his knee and back pain, all in violation of
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. He seeks, among other things,
release from prison.
II. Background
Plaintiff and co-defendant Gregory Rice were convicted of murdering plaintiff’s former
girlfriend, Yahnica Hill, following a 1998 joint jury trial in Wayne County Circuit Court. After
their convictions and sentences, they filed separate direct appeals. At first, the Michigan Court
of Appeals affirmed the plaintiff’s judgment of conviction, People v. Knight, No. 231845, 2002
WL 31310146 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2002), but the Michigan Supreme Court later vacated
and remanded the matter for reconsideration under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
People v. Knight, 468 Mich. 922 (2003). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the
judgment of conviction, People v. Knight, No. 231845, 2003 WL 22300857 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct.
7, 2003), and the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently upheld that decision. People v. Knight,
473 Mich. 324 (2005).
Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Michigan. The case was assigned to The Honorable Paul L.
Maloney. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the petition be denied, but in
the interim, co-defendant Rice filed his habeas petition in this district court. His case was
assigned to The Honorable Denise Page Hood. On March 31, 2010, Judge Hood issued an

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opinion and order conditionally granting Rice’s habeas petition on the basis of Batson. Rice v.
White, No. 06-11610, 2010 WL 1347610 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2010). The Sixth Circuit
affirmed Judge Hood’s decision. Rice v. White, 660 F.3d 242 (6th Cir. 2011). The United States
Supreme Court denied Rice’s petition for a writ of certiorari. Rice v. Michigan, 546 U.S. 1043
(2005).
As a result of the Rice decision, Judge Maloney conditionally granted the plaintiff’s
habeas petition and ordered a new trial. Knight v. Harry, No. 06-105 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 7,
2012). Plaintiff was granted bond and released from prison on November 29, 2012. Shortly
thereafter, however, the Michigan Court of Appeals revoked the bond order, People v. Knight,
No. 313584 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2012), and plaintiff was incarcerated in the Wayne County
jail pending trial. After a week and a half long proceeding, a jury once again convicted plaintiff
of first-degree murder. The instant allegations stem from plaintiff’s second trial and his
incarceration at the Wayne County jail.
III. Standard of Review
Since plaintiff is pursuing this litigation in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(a), the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires this Court to sua sponte dismiss
the complaint in the event the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such
relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Similarly, the Court must dismiss
an action seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees if the complaint is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

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A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In other words, a complaint is frivolous if it is “based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory,” or “clearly baseless” facts, “a legal interest which clearly
does not exist” or “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-328. Additionally, the Court
will dismiss the complaint, whether or not a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, if it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Although the pleadings of pro se litigants are generally held to a “less stringent standard”
than ones drafted by attorneys, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), they must still
contain sufficient facts demonstrating that a legal wrong has been committed and that relief is
warranted. In the context of a section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant is
a person who acted under color of state or federal law, and (2) the defendant’s conduct deprived
the plaintiff of a federal right, privilege, or immunity. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 15557 (1978); Brock v. McWherter, 94 F.3d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). In view of the aforementioned
standards, the Court finds that the complaint is subject to dismissal.
IV. Discussion
A. Heck v. Humphrey claim
As an initial matter, to the extent the plaintiff seeks release from prison, no such relief is
available under section 1983. To challenge his confinement in state custody, the plaintiff’s only
federal remedy is to seek a writ of habeas corpus, which requires that he first exhaust his
remedies in state court. Release from confinement cannot be obtained by filing suit under
section 1983. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-487 (1994) (holding that a state prisoner
does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his imprisonment if a ruling on his

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claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement invalid, until and unless the reason
for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called into question by a federal court’s issuance
or a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
500 (1973) (same). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Heck, 512
U.S. at 487-489. Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a
state prisoner’s section 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)–no matter the relief
sought (damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct
leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings)–if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
81-82 (2005) (citations omitted).
Since the validity of plaintiff’s continued confinement would be called into question if
her were to prevail on his claims, they are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
B. Claims against Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office
In any event, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and the individually named
defendants are all entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for their decision to prosecute
plaintiff.
“Absolute prosecutorial immunity, like absolute judicial immunity, is a common law
principle that shields a prosecutor from [section] 1983 liability.” Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d
937, 946 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). A prosecutor has absolute immunity for all acts
“intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,” such as “initiating a
prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431

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(1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held:
Those acts that occur in the course of the prosecutor’s role as an advocate for the
state, e.g., acts taken to prepare for the initiation of judicial proceedings or to
prepare for trial, are protected by absolute immunity. By contrast, a prosecutor
who “performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or
police officer” such as “searching for the clues and corroboration that might give
him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested” is entitled only at
most to qualified immunity.
Cooper, 203 F.3d at 947 (internal citations omitted). As with judicial immunity, the motives of
the prosecutor are irrelevant for purposes of immunity. Eldridge v. Gibson, 332 F.3d 1019, 1021
(6th Cir. 2003). Indeed, absolute prosecutorial immunity is not overcome by a showing that the
prosecutor acted wrongfully or maliciously, “or because the criminal defendant ultimately
prevailed on appeal or in a habeas corpus proceeding.” Grant v. Hollenbach, 870 F.2d 1135,
1138 (6th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). Thus, the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office and
defendants Miller, Worthy, and Brown are absolutely immune from liability for their decision to
charge plaintiff with first-degree murder.
C. Claims against the Detroit Police Department
The complaint must also be dismissed as to the Detroit Police Department because it is
not an entity that is subject to suit. Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citation omitted); Laise v. City of Utica, 970 F. Supp. 605, 607 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (dismissing
claim against Utica Police Department because it is not an entity capable of being sued).
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against defendants Evans and Napoleon must be dismissed
as well. Plaintiff asserts, without any factual elaboration, that defendants Evans and Napoleon
conspired with other named defendants to deprive him of his federal constitutional rights. “It is
well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague

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and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state a claim
under [section] 1983.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted). The plaintiff’s conspiracy claims are conclusory and therefore fail to state a claim
under section 1983.
Furthermore, these defendants must be dismissed because they cannot be held liable for
the alleged misconduct of other defendants. A civil rights plaintiff must allege the personal
involvement of a defendant in the violation of his constitutional rights. See Monell v. Dept. of
Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-692 (1978) (holding that section 1983 liability cannot be based
upon respondeat superior); Taylor v. Michigan Dept. of Corr., 69 F.3d 76, 81 (6th Cir. 1995)
(requiring plaintiff to allege facts demonstrating the defendant participated, condoned,
encouraged, or knowingly acquiesced in alleged misconduct to establish liability). Here,
plaintiff’s contention that these defendants failed to properly supervise other employees and
should, therefore, be held vicariously liable for their actions is insufficient to state a claim under
section 1983.
D. Claims against the State Attorney General’s Office
Insofar as plaintiff sues the Michigan Attorney General’s Office and its staff members,
his claim must fail. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit
against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As such, it is no different from
a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(citations omitted). “[N]either a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under [section] 1983.” Id.; see also Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 267 (6th Cir.
1997) (citations omitted) (same). Moreover, the State is entitled to Eleventh Amendment

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immunity because it has not consented to be sued for civil rights actions commenced in federal
court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986); see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
341 (1979) (reaffirming that section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity).
E. Medical claims
Plaintiff alleges that the Wayne County jail and the MDOC denied him proper medical
care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The United States Supreme Court
has held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted). The deliberate indifference standard
requires an inmates to show that prison officials acted with a reckless disregard of a known risk
of serious harm to the prisoner. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994). A plaintiff
may establish deliberate indifference by a showing of grossly inadequate medical care. See
Terrance v. Northville Reg’l Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, the
plaintiff makes no such showing as he failed to allege that defendants acted with deliberate
indifference to his condition or intentionally acted to cause him injury or pain. Conclusory
allegations are insufficient to state a civil rights claim. While plaintiff may disagree with the
course of treatment he received, the complaint is devoid of sufficient detail to support his claim.
Insomuch as plaintiff’s allegations could be construed as asserting medical malpractice,
they are not cognizable under section 1983. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Collins v. Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 127-128 (1992) (stating that an injury caused by negligence does not
constitute a deprivation of any constitutionally protected interest); Lewellen v. Metro. Gov’t of
Nashville & Davidson County, 34 F.3d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1994).

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Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that since the Court finds that an appeal from this order
would be frivolous it cannot be taken in good faith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pending motions in this matter are denied as moot.

_s/ Bernard A. Friedman________________
BERNARD A. FRIEDMAN
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: _May 20, 2013___
Detroit, Michigan

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