Mathis et al v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC et al

Filing 6

ORDER denying 2 Motion for TRO; denying 2 Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Lawrence P. Zatkoff. (MVer)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VERDELL MATHIS and
ELEANOR L. MATHIS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Case No. 13-10695
Hon. Lawrence P. Zatkoff

NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC,
FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION, GMAC MORTGAGE, LLC,
and GMAC INSURANCE MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
___________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Docket #2), filed on February 18, 2013, and received by
the Court on February 19, 2013. The purpose for Plaintiffs’ motion is to ensure that defendants take
no action to dispose of Plaintiff’s property in Southfield, Michigan (the “Property”), to the extent
that such disposal would cause irreparable harm to Plaintiffs. The Court notes that, following
Plaintiffs’ default on its mortgage on the Property, one or more of the defendants obtained a
foreclosure on the Property and a sheriff’s sale was held. The applicable six-month redemption
period under Michigan law expires at the end of today, February 21, 2013.

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A court is to consider the following four factors in determining whether a plaintiff is entitled
to a temporary restraining order or other preliminary injunctive relief:
(1)

whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of
success on the merits;

(2)

whether the movant has shown that he or she would suffer irreparable harm if the
preliminary relief is not issued;

(3)

whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction will not cause substantial harm to
third parties; and

(4)

whether the public interest would be served by the issuance of a preliminary
injunction.

Sandison v. Michigan High School Athletic Association, Inc., 64 F.3d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1995);
UASCO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Mason County Med.
Ass’n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th Cir. 1977). The standard for preliminary injunction is not
a rigid and comprehensive test, and the four factors are to be balanced, not prerequisites that must
be satisfied, but instead “these factors simply guide the discretion of the court; they are not meant
to be rigid and unbending requirements.” In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. 963 F.2d 855, 859 (6th Cir.
1992).

III. ANALYSIS
No defendant has answered Plaintiffs’ Complaint or filed a response to the Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order (in fact, the Court is not aware that any defendant has received a copy
of the Complaint or the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order). The Court has, however,
received an email from legal counsel for Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the defendant that

allegedly obtained the foreclosure, facilitated the sheriff’s sale and would take further action to
dispose of the Property. That email states, in relevant part:
It is our understanding that the plaintiff in this case has asked for a
temporary restraining order in connection with the property. ...
[A]lthough the redemption period following the mortgage foreclosure
sale for this property is schedule to expire tomorrow, 2/21/13, we will
put a temporary hold on the file and we will not act until we have a
chance to review the complaint, once received.
Based on that email from legal counsel for Defendant Nationstar Mortgage LLC, the Court
concludes that there is no danger of irreparable harm to Plaintiffs, insofar as defendants will not
dispose of the Property by the end of the day today, February 21, 2013, as Plaintiffs alleged. As
such, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order must be denied.
The Court notes that this is the second motion for temporary restraining order that Plaintiffs
have filed regarding the disposal of the Property. More significantly, the Court notes that even
though Plaintiffs have had the same legal counsel for nearly the past year, including six months ago
when the sheriff’s sale occurred, Plaintiffs did not file anything in any court between the date of the
sheriff’s sale (August 21, 2012) and February 18, 2013. Based on the timing the Motion itself and
the reasons set forth in the opinion dismissing Plaintiffs’ prior legal proceeding related to the
Property (filed June 18, 2012 by the Honorable Leo Bowman, Oakland County Circuit Judge), it
appears to the Court that the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order recently filed in this Court
may be nothing more than a delay tactic to stall the ultimate disposal of the Property. As such, the
Court intends to resolve Plaintiffs’ case in as expedient a manner as the Court’s docket permits.

IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Docket #2) is DENIED.
The Court FURTHER ORDERS that Plaintiffs immediately notify the Court upon service of the
Complaint and the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunctive Relief upon
all defendants so that this Court may address the matters herein as expediently as the Court’s docket
schedule permits.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Lawrence P. Zatkoff
LAWRENCE P. ZATKOFF
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: February 21, 2013