Novak v. Prison Health Services, Inc et al

Filing 56

OPINION AND ORDER granting 27 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 35 Motion to Dismiss; adopting in part 44 Report and Recommendation on 49 Motion to Dismiss, 35 Motion to Dismiss,, 29 Motion for Summary Judgment, 52 Motion to Dismiss,, 27 Motion for Summary Judgment, 44 Report and Recommendation, ; granting 49 Motion to Dismiss; granting 52 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
THEODORE NOVAK,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-11065

v.

Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

PRISON HEALTH SERVICES,
INC., CORIZON, PHS, DOCTOR
MILES, DOCTOR VEMURI,
RICHARD RUSSELL, ALFRED
JONES, JOHN DOE, JOSHUA
SCHAD, and DEBRA SCUTT,

Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder

Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER (1) ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION IN PART (2) GRANTING THE MDOC
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (3) GRANTING
CORIZON’S MOTION TO DISMISS, (4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, (5) GRANTING DR. MILES’S
MOTION TO DISMISS, AND (6) GRANTING DR. VERMURI’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
On March 8, 2013, Plaintiff Theodore Novak, who was paroled in April of
2013, instituted this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1983 by
filing a complaint with this Court. (ECF No. 1.) In his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks
to state a claim of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation
of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Complaint also
contains various state-law tort claims. At all times relevant to the allegations

contained in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff was in the custody of the Michigan
Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) and housed at the G. Robert Cotton
Correctional Facility located in Jackson, Michigan. The following parties are
named as defendants: Prison Health Services (“PHS”), now known as Corizon
Health, Inc. (hereinafter “Corizon”); Dr. Miles; Dr. Vemuri; Richard Russell;
Alfred Jones; John Doe; Joshua Schad; and Debra Scutt.1 Plaintiff has named each
defendant in both their official and individual capacities. (ECF No. 1 at 8-9.)
This prisoner’s civil rights case is before the Court on Magistrate Judge
Charles E. Binder’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), Plaintiff’s objections
to that R&R, and two dispositive motions that have been filed since the issuance of
the R&R. Upon carefully reviewing both the R&R and Plaintiff’s objections, the
Court adopts the R&R in part. For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and grants the MDOC Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss, Dr. Miles’s Motion
to Dismiss, and Dr. Vemuri’s Motion to Dismiss.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1

The Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”) was also initially
named as a defendant. On May 30, 2013, this Court conducted an initial review of
Plaintiff’s Complaint, determined that the MDOC was entitled to sovereign
immunity by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment, and therefore summarily
dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC. (ECF No. 7.)
2

A.

The Complaint 2
Plaintiff, filing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contends that the named

defendants displayed deliberate indifference towards his serious medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff also alleges various state law claims,
specifically, “the torts of negligence, misrepresentation and fraud concerning
contractual agreements to treat inmates[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) The basis of these
allegations are Plaintiff’s contentions that he was “denied service, delayed service,
and held up for over a year to finally determine the severity of his medical problem
as it pertains to his shoulder.” (Id. at 16.) With respect to the misrepresentation
and fraud allegations, Plaintiff references a “Contract between PHS[, now
Corizon,] and MDOC” that “has been breached severely, which affected Plaintiff’s
health[.]” (Id. at 23.)
B.

Post-Complaint Procedural Matters
On July 17, 2013, the Court referred the lawsuit to Magistrate Judge Binder

for all pretrial matters, proceedings, including a hearing and determination of all
non-dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and/or a report and
recommendation on all dispositive matters pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
(ECF No. 19.) On August 9, 2013, Defendants Jones, Russell, Schad, and Scutt

2

Magistrate Judge Binder’s R&R describes the factual allegations in
Plaintiff’s Complaint with great detail and the Court incorporates those facts
herein.
3

(collectively, the “MDOC Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (ECF No. 25), which was amended
on August 12, 2013, (ECF No. 27).3 On September 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed his
own summary judgment motion. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff subsequently responded
in opposition to the MDOC Defendants’ Motion. (ECF No. 38.) The MDOC
Defendants and Corizon both filed responses to Plaintiff’s Motion. (ECF Nos. 32,
34.) On the same day that it filed a response to Plaintiff’s Motion, Corizon filed a
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 35), to which Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 39), and
Corizon replied (ECF No. 41).
C.

The R&R
On December 9, 2013, Magistrate Judge Binder issued an R&R addressing

(1) the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, (2) Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, and (3) Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss. After thoroughly
analyzing each of Plaintiff’s claims, Magistrate Judge Binder recommends that this
Court grant both the MDOC Defendants’ and Corizon’s motions and deny
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment with prejudice with regard to the claims
brought against these defendants. (R&R 13-14.) With respect to Dr. Miles and Dr.
Vemuri, who had not been served at the time the R&R was issued, Magistrate
Judge Binder recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment be
3

Because the initial motion for summary judgment was amended, the Court
terminates the original motion.
4

denied without prejudice. Subsequent to the issuance of the R&R, however,
Defendants Dr. Miles and Dr. Vemuri were served and each filed separate motions
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF Nos. 49,
52.) Plaintiff did not respond to either motion. At the conclusion of the R&R,
Magistrate Judge Binder advises the parties that they may object to and seek
review of the R&R within fourteen (14) days of service upon them. (Id. at 13.)
The R&R also advises the parties that the “[f]ailure to file specific objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right of appeal. (Id. at 14 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff filed timely objections to the R&R on December 19, 2013. (ECF No. 47.)
Defendant Corizon responded on December 31, 2013. (ECF No. 50.)
II.
A.

REVIEW OF R&R AND PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTIONS

Standard of Review
A party may object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive orders. Fed. R.

Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). The reviewing court must affirm the
magistrate judge’s ruling unless the objecting party demonstrates that the
magistrate judge’s ruling is “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(A). The “clearly erroneous” standard does not empower a reviewing
court to reverse a magistrate judge’s finding because it would have decided the
matter differently. See, e.g., Anderson v. Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 57374, 105 S. Ct. 1504 (1985). Instead, the “clearly erroneous” standard is met when
5

despite the existence of evidence to support the finding, the court, upon reviewing
the record in its entirety, “is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,
395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 542 (1948). An order is contrary to law “when it fails to apply
or misapplies relevant statutes, case law, or rules of procedure.” Catskill Dev.,
L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78, 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
When objections are filed to a magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation on a dispositive matter, the Court “make[s] a de novo
determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court,
however, “is not required to articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party’s
objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131 F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001)
(citations omitted). A party’s failure to file objections to certain conclusions of the
report and recommendation waives any further right to appeal on those issues.
Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.
1987). Likewise, the failure to object to certain conclusions in the magistrate
judge’s report releases the Court from its duty to independently review those
issues. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472 (1985).
B.

Analysis

6

Plaintiff’s Objections, filed on December 19, 2013, and responded to by
Corizon on December 31, 2013, lack specificity. (ECF Nos. 47, 50.) Plaintiff
merely indicates that he “does NOT agree with” the following: (1) “the decision of
summary judgment for the MDOC defendants[,]” (2) “the PERSONAL
CAPACITY Claims being dismissed[,]” (3) “Defendant CORIZON’S MOTION
TO DISMISS, BREACH OF CONTRACT[,]” (4) Defendants MOTION TO
DISMISS Fraud Claim[,]” (5) “Defendants MOTION TO DISMISS be granted[,]”
and (6) Defendants MOTION TO DISMISS DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE
claim be granted.” (ECF No. 47.) “[G]eneral objection[s] to a magistrate judge’s
report[ that] fail[] to specify the issues of contention[] do not suffice to preserve an
issue for appeal.” Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing
Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 508-09 (6th Cir.
1991)); Cole v. Yukins, 7. F. App’x 354, 356 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The filing of vague,
general, or conclusory objections does not meet the requirement of specific
objections and is tantamount to a complete failure to object.”); Miller v. Currie, 50
F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the
magistrate’s recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings . . . believed in
error” are too general). As the Sixth Circuit explained in Howard:
A general objection to the entirety of the magistrate’s report has the
same effects as would a failure to object. The district court’s attention
is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the
initial reference to the magistrate useless. . . . This duplication of time
7

and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs
contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act.
932 F.2d at 509. As this authority suggests, Plaintiff’s Objections are insufficient
and the Court therefore reviews the R&R pursuant to the clearly erroneous or
contrary to law standard. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
1.

The MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Binder concludes that the MDOC Defendants

are entitled to summary judgment on the § 1983 claims brought against them in
their official capacities because such claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. (R&R 8.) With respect to the individual capacity claims, Magistrate
Judge Binder concludes that Defendants Scutt, Russell, Jones, and Schad are
entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff neglected to allege any conduct or
action by them that rises to the level necessary to state a civil rights claim. (Id. at
9.) More specifically, because the Complaint attributes no conduct to Jones,
dismissal is proper. Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948
(2009) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through
the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”) With respect
to Defendants Schad and Russell, the Complaint suggests that they should be held
liable because of their involvement in reviewing Plaintiff’s grievances. Magistrate
Judge Binder recommends dismissal of these two defendants on the basis that the
mere denial of a prisoner’s grievance states no claim of constitutional dimension.
8

(R&R 10 (citing Alder v. Corr. Med. Servs., 73 F. App’x 839, 841 (6th Cir. 2003).)
Lastly, the Complaint seeks to hold Defendant Scutt, the former warden of the
facility, liable because she “knew” that Plaintiff “was being maltreated and failed
to act[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 33.) Because supervisory personnel cannot be held liable
under a theory of respondeat superior without some personal involvement,
Magistrate Judge Binder recommends dismissing Defendant Scutt. See Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S. Ct. 598 (1978). Upon review of these conclusions, the
Court finds no error and therefore agrees with Magistrate Judge Binder’s
conclusion that the Plaintiff’s claims against the MDOC Defendants fail as a
matter of law. Accordingly, the Court grants the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment.
2.

Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss 4

4

Although Corizon labeled its motion as being brought pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Corizon filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Complaint
on August 5, 2013. (ECF No. 23.) Because the MDOC Defendants filed an
Answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is untimely. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (explaining
that motions filed pursuant to the rule “must be made before pleading if a
responsive pleading is allowed”). Insofar as this Answer constitutes a “pleading”
as defined by Rule 7(a)(2), the proper motion to file would be a Rule 12(c) motion
for judgment on the pleadings. This technical defect is not fatal, however, as the
same standard of review governs motions filed under both Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule
12(c). EEOC v. J.H. Routh Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court construes the MDOC Defendants’ postanswer motion to dismiss as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
9

In the R&R, Magistrate Judge Binder also recommends granting Corizon’s
Motion to Dismiss. With respect to the breach of contract claim, Magistrate Judge
Binder points out that Plaintiff has no standing to bring such a claim as he was not
a party to the contract and the contract specifically disclaims all third-party
beneficiary rights. (R&R 10-11.) As it pertains to Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud,
Plaintiff alleged no specific misrepresentation on which he relied to his detriment.
Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a viable claim of fraud. (Id. at 12.)
Lastly, Magistrate Judge Binder concludes that a private corporation (such as
Corizon) cannot be liable for deliberate indifference on the basis of respondeat
superior or vicarious liability. (Id. (citing Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d
810, 818 (6th Cir. 1996).) After analyzing the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint,
Magistrate Judge Binder explains this principle and indicates that Corizon cannot
be held accountable for the alleged acts of two doctors because such conduct falls
short of showing the existence of a policy or practice as caselaw requires. (Id. at
13.) Having reviewed the pleadings and the various motions and briefs filed in
connection with this action, the Court agrees with the conclusions reached by
Magistrate Judge Binder. Accordingly, the Court grants Corizon’s Motion to
Dismiss.5

5

Further, having reviewed the allegations made against the two doctors, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate indifference
against either Dr. Vemuri or Dr. Miles. See infra. Because it is well-settled that
10

3.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
As Magistrate Judge Binder explains in his R&R, having determined that

both the MDOC Defendants and Corizon are entitled to dismissal, it necessarily
follows that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary is denied.
4.

Conclusion
Having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds that the conclusions therein are

wholly justified in fact and in law. The Court, therefore, adopts the R&R’s
conclusions regarding the motions discussed above. Further, the Court believes
that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state any viable claim against a still unidentified
John Doe defendant and therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s Complaint against Doe.
The Court does not adopt the portion of the R&R dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint
against Defendants Dr. Miles and Dr. Vemuri without prejudice because these
defendants have responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint since the issuance of the R&R.
The Court now turns to these motions.
III.

MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Defendant Dr. Miles seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis
that (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as required by 42

liability cannot arise under Monell without an underlying unconstitutional act,
Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 340 (6th Cir. 2007), Plaintiff’s failure to state a
claim against the doctors precludes any possibility that Corizon can be held liable
under § 1983. This provides another justification for dismissing Plaintiff’s § 1983
claim against Corizon.
11

U.S.C. § 1997e and (2) that Plaintiff’s allegations concerning his medical treatment
are insufficient to state a claim of deliberate indifference.6 Because the second
argument is dispositive, the Court does not address the exhaustion argument. Dr.
Vemuri’s Motion to Dismiss also sets forth several reasons this Court should
dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Court, however, chooses to address only the
argument that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
A.

Standard of Review
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion allows a court to make an assessment as to whether

a plaintiff’s complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Put slightly differently, it is a procedural mechanism to test the
sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations.
As articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States, “[t]o survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 555, 570, 127 S.

6

Dr. Miles also presents arguments regarding Plaintiff’s contract and fraud
claims. Because Dr. Miles was not a party to the contract Plaintiff alleges was
breached and because Plaintiff’s fraud claim fails for the reasons set forth in
Magistrate Judge Binders R&R, the Court does not address these arguments. To
the extent that the contract and fraud claims are brought against Dr. Miles and/or
Dr. Vemuri, the Court finds that the claims are insufficient as a matter of law and
therefore dismisses them.
12

Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007)). This facial plausibility standard requires claimants to put
forth “enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of” the requisite elements of their claims. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127
S. Ct. at 1965. Even though a complaint need not contain “detailed” factual
allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502
F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965)
(internal citations omitted). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965). In this regard, “[a] claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant” is responsible for the conduct alleged
in the complaint. Id. (citation omitted).
While courts are required to accept the factual allegations in a complaint as
true, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, the presumption of truth does
not apply to a claimant’s legal conclusions, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S. Ct. at
1949. Therefore, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff’s pleading for relief
must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, 502
13

F.3d at 548 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1964-65) (internal
citations and quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that
states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]”) (emphasis added). Ultimately,
“[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of [a legal transgression], the
complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – ‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2))
(internal citations omitted).
In conducting this analysis, courts may consider the complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case,
and exhibits attached to defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred
to in the complaint and are central to the claims contained therein. Bassett v.
NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 F.3d
493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001)).
Compared to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, a generally less stringent
standard is applied when construing the allegations pleaded in a pro se complaint.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S. Ct. 594, 596 (1972); see also
14

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (reaffirming
rule of more liberal construction with pro se complaints less than two weeks after
issuing Twombly). The leniency with which courts construe pro se plaintiffs’
complaints, however, does not abrogate basic pleading requirements and pro se
plaintiffs must provide more than bare assertions of legal conclusions to survive a
motion to dismiss. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 577 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988)).
B.

Governing Legal Standards
The Eighth Amendment embodies “‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . .,’ against which [courts] must
evaluate penal measures.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102, 97 S. Ct. 285, 290
(1976) (internal citation omitted). These principles give rise to a governmental
“obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by
incarceration.” Id. at 103, 97 S. Ct. at 290; see also Baker v. City of Detroit, 217 F.
App’x 491, 495 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“The Supreme Court in Deshaney
[v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S. Ct.
998, 1005 (1989)] recognized a line of cases ‘stand[ing] . . . for the proposition that
when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will,
the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some
responsibility for his safety and general well-being.’”). Such an obligation arises
15

because inmates “must rely on prison authorities to treat [their] medical needs; if
the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103,
97 S. Ct. at 290. Even in non-life-threatening cases, “denial of medical care may
result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological
purpose.” Id.
To sustain a § 1983 claim arising from the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment and based on inadequate medical treatment,
Plaintiff must demonstrate that Dr. Miles and Dr. Vemuri acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs in diagnosing or treating him. See, e.g.,
Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). Deliberate
indifference claims consist of two components, one objective and the other
subjective. “Satisfying the objective component ensures that the alleged
deprivation is sufficiently severe, while satisfying the subjective component
‘ensures that the defendant prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind.’” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 681 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2003)). The objective
component requires proof that “a substantial risk to [the prisoner’s] health or safety
existed.” Villegas v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 709 F.3d 563, 571 (6th Cir. 2013).
The subjective component requires proof that (1) “the official being sued
subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk to the [prisoner],”
16

(2) the official “did in fact draw that inference,” and (3) the official “then
disregarded that risk.” Quigley, 707 F.3d at 681 (internal quotations omitted).
While deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence
or even gross negligence, the standard is satisfied by something less than acts or
omissions for the purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1978 (1994); see also
Wright v. Taylor, 79 F. App’x 829, 831 (6th Cir. 2003). In short, “[d]eliberate
indifference is the reckless disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm[.]”
Wright, 79 F. App’x at 831 (citation omitted); accord Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836-38,
114 S. Ct. at 1978-79 (equating “deliberate indifference” to the “recklessness”
standard under criminal, not civil, law).
“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is
over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second
guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). The Sixth Circuit
acknowledges that “[a] claim of inadequate medical treatment[,]” as opposed to a
claim of a complete denial of medical treatment, “may state a constitutional claim”
but cautions that such claims are generally limited to situations where “the
treatment rendered is ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’”

17

Clark v. Corrs. Corp. of Am., 98 F. App’x 413, 416 (unpublished) (citing Westlake,
537 F.2d at 860-61).
C.

Dr. Miles
In this case, Plaintiff’s Complaint states that Dr. Miles “did not order

recommended MRI as indicated prior to my incarceration[.]” (ECF No. 1 at 34.)
The Complaint also indicates that Dr. Miles was aware of Plaintiff’s suffering
because Plaintiff told him and also sent many medical kits. (Id.) These allegations
are insufficient to demonstrate deliberate indifference.
In Durham v. Nu’Man, 97 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 1996), prison medical
providers failed to diagnose plaintiff’s broken arm and he subsequently brought
suit alleging deliberate indifference. The Sixth Circuit agreed with the lower court
that a broken arm constituted a serious medical condition and that the plaintiff had
therefore satisfied the objective component of the deliberate indifference
framework. Id. at 869. Moving to the subjective component, the court noted that
there was a complete lack of evidence tending to show reckless disregard and
pointed to the fact that the plaintiff had received medical attention from the health
facility staff soon after his injury occurred. Id. As a result, the Sixth Circuit
determined that the plaintiff’s “complaints [went] to the adequacy of the medical
care; they [did] not raise an issue of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as

18

required under Estelle.” In conclusion, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to
demonstrate deliberate indifference. Id.
In the portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint entitled “Denial of Proper MRI to
Determine Cause of Injury,” Plaintiff alleges that a radiology report dated March
11, 2011, interpreting a series of shoulder x-rays ordered by Dr. Miles, shows that
Plaintiff had “A PROBLEM that need[ed] to be addressed,” but that Plaintiff’s
complaints were ignored. (ECF No. 1 at 30.) Similar to the plaintiff in Nu’Man,
these allegations indisputably show that Plaintiff received some medical treatment:
he saw Dr. Miles, voiced his concerns, and Dr. Miles ordered x-rays. That Plaintiff
did not receive the treatment he desired does not mean that Dr. Miles violated the
Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir.
2001) (indicating that even if treatment is furnished “carelessly or inefficaciously,”
such treatment does not mean the medical provider “displayed a deliberate
indifference to the prisoner’s needs, but merely a degree of incompetence which
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation”); Williams v. Mehra, 186
F.3d 685, 691 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] complaint that [medical personnel have] been
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim
of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”). Further, that Dr. Miles’s
opinion regarding the necessity of an MRI differed from a doctor Plaintiff saw
prior to his incarceration does not render the failure to order an MRI deliberately
19

indifferent. Reid v. Sapp, 84 F. App’x 550, 552 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] difference in
medical opinion does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and
unusual punishment.”).
On the basis of the authority discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to state an actionable claim of deliberate indifference against Dr.
Miles. Accordingly, the Court grants Dr. Miles’s Motion to Dismiss and dismisses
Plaintiff’s Complaint against him with prejudice.
D.

Dr. Vemuri
Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Dr. Vemuri was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s serious medical needs because she changed his pain medications and did
not properly reduce the dosages of the medications prior to changing them. (ECF
No. 1 at 28.) As with the claim against Dr. Miles, Plaintiff’s allegations do not
state a claim of deliberate indifference. Plaintiff received medical attention from
Dr. Vemuri. That Plaintiff was dissatisfied with the course of treatment does not
mean that Dr. Vemuri violated Plaintiff’s constitutionally-protected rights. Cf.
Westlake, 537 F.2d at 860 n.5 (“Where a prisoner has received some medical
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are
generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize
claims which sound in state tort law.”). Accordingly, the Court grants Dr.
Vemuri’s Motion to Dismiss.
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IV.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

For the reasons stated herein, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Binder’s
R&R with respect to the MDOC Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss, and Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. It
does not adopt the portion of the R&R suggesting that this Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint against Defendants Dr. Miles and Dr. Vemuri without prejudice
because these defendants have responded to Plaintiff’s Complaint since the
issuance of the R&R.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the MDOC Defendants’ Amended Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED and that the original Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 25) is TERMINATED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Corizon’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No.
35) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF No. 29) is DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dr. Miles’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 49) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Dr. Vemuri’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 52) is GRANTED;
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) is
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Date:
PATRICK J. DUGGAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Theodore Novak
605 N Saginaw Street, Suite 2
Flint, MI 48502
Kimberley A. Koester, Esq.
Ronald W. Chapman, Esq.
Robert J. Jenkins, A.A.G.
Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder

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