Meeks et al v. Larsen et al

Filing 36

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. Signed by District Judge Gershwin A. Drain. (Bankston, T)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EUGENE MEEKS, SYLVIA MEEKS,
GABRIELLE NEELY, MICHAEL MEEKS,
THOMAS PIATEK, DAVID STONE, JR.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

CIVIL NO. 13-cv-11371
HON. GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
MAG. J. MICHAEL J. HLUCHANIUK

SANDRA LARSEN, LESLIE,
LARSEN, STEPHEN HAUG,
D. CHRISTOPHER ALLEN,
Defendants.
/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION AND
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED
I.

Introduction

Plaintiffs Eugene Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, Michael Meeks, Thomas Piatek (“Piatek”) and
Gabrielle Neely initiated this 42. U.S.C. § 1983 action on March 27, 2013, and filed an Amended
Complaint with this Court on September 30, 2013. The Amended Complaint added Plaintiff
David Stone, Jr. (“Stone”). Plaintiffs named Sandra Larsen (“S. Larsen”), Leslie Larsen (“L.
Larsen”), Christopher Allen (“Allen”), and Steven Haug (“Haug”) as Defendants.1 See Dkt. #23.

1

Pursuant to the Federal Employee Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679, the Court
Entered an order substituting the United States for Allen and L. Larsen for Counts 5, 11, 13, and 14

Plaintiffs did not challenge the substitution. The instant matter stems from the investigation of a
militia group calling themselves the “Hutaree” and the subsequent execution of four search
warrants on the Plaintiffs’ homes.
On March 27, 2010, federal agents executed a search warrant on Plaintiffs’ Eugene
Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, and Gabrielle Neely’s home. Agents searched the home of Plaintiff
Thomas Piatek (“Piatek”) on the same day. Agents searched the home of Michael Meeks on
March 30, 2013.

These searches were pursuant to warrants obtained as a result of the

information of Defendant Steven Haug (“Haug”) gained in his capacity as an undercover officer.
Haug conveyed this information to Defendant Leslie Larsen (“L. Larsen”). L. Larsen used this
information in her warrant affidavits in order to obtain the warrants that authorized the searches
in question. Defendant Sandra Larsen (“S. Larsen”) also used Haug’s information to assist in
obtaining the warrants. Defendant Christopher Allen (“Allen”) was the lead officer of the team
of officers that executed the warrants.
In their Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs argue Haug’s information was false and
misleading, he deliberately provided this information to L. Larsen, and L Larsen and S. Larsen
deliberately or with reckless disregard for the truth used this information to obtain a probable
cause determination for the search warrants. The Plaintiffs allege Defendants violated their First,
Second, Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights in the execution of the search warrants. Plaintiffs
also allege various tort claims against Defendants. The individual Defendants have moved for
dismissal for Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The United States
moves for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim for
which relief can be granted. The Court held a hearing on Defendants’ Motions on Tuesday,
February 18, 2014.
2 

II.

Factual Background

On March 23, 2010, a grand jury issued an indictment charging Plaintiffs David Stone, Jr.
(“Stone”), Piatek, and Michael Meeks with various federal crimes. Defs.’ Ex. 2. The indictment
contained several counts. The most important count was Seditious Conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §
2384.2 The indictment alleged Plaintiffs are part of an anti-government militia group called the
Hutaree. Magistrate Judge Virginia Morgan issued a search warrant for the home of Eugene
Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, and Gabrielle Neely on the same day the grand jury issued its indictment.
Judge Morgan also issued search warrants for the homes of Piatek and Stone on March 27, 2010.
On March 30, 2010, Magistrate Judge Donald Scheer issued the search warrant for Michael
Meeks’ home. S. Larsen’s affidavit was used to secure each of these warrants. Defs.’ Ex. 10.
The affidavit chronicled information the government received from confidential informants. Id.
S. Larsen declared that evidence of seditious conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 2384, would likely be
found at the addresses of Stone, Michael Meeks, and Piatek. Id. The warrants gave agents
executing the search warrants the authority to search “for any and all records, documents, and
materials pertaining to” seditious conspiracy and the other offenses.

The list included

computers, books, firearms munitions, and explosive materials.3
Eugene Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, and Gabrielle Neely were not charged in the indictment.
Eugene and Sylvia are Michael Meeks’ parents. Defs.’ Ex. 9. Gabrielle Neely was in Eugene
and Sylvia’s home at the time of the search. Michael Meeks, Stone, and Piatek were charged in
a federal criminal case (“Criminal Case”) United States of America v. Stone, et al., No. 10                                                            
2

The remaining counts in the indictment included Attempt To Use Weapons of Mass Destruction, 18 U.S.C. §
2332a(a)(2); Teaching and/Demonstrating Use of Explosive Material, 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2); Carrying, Using,
Possessing a Firearm During and in Relation to a Crime of Violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c)(1), and other offenses.
3
A full list is attached to each warrant.

3 

20123.

In the Criminal Case, the United States charged them with Seditious Conspiracy,

Conspiracy to Use Weapons of Mass Destruction, and various firearm offenses. According to S.
Larsen’s search warrant affidavit, Stone, Michael Meeks and Piatek planned to attack police
officers with firearms and improvised explosive devises, also known as IEDs, in an effort to
spark an uprising against the government. Defs.’ Ex. 10. Defendants executed the warrants on
March 27, 2010 and March 30, 2010.
During the Criminal Case, Piatek moved to quash the warrant that authorized the search
of his home, challenging the existence of probable cause. Defs.’ Ex. 11. Stone and Michael
Meeks joined the Motion to Quash. Stone also filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence.4 Defs.’ Ex.
13. Michael Meeks and Piatek joined Stone’s Motion to Suppress as well.
Magistrate Judge Paul Komives issued a Report and Recommendation on the Motions.
Defs.’ Ex. 16. Magistrate Judge Komives recommended that the court conclude the “affidavit on
its face establishes probable cause …” Id. at 18. He also concluded Plaintiffs failed to show the
need for a Franks hearing, and that the Motions to Suppress should be denied. Id. at 27. Judge
Victoria Roberts adopted both recommendations after a de novo review. Defs.’ Ex. 17. Judge
Roberts held there was a “sufficient nexus between the places to be searched and the evidence of
the crime to provide probable cause to issue the warrants.” Id. at 2. She also held that Plaintiffs
had not established that the warrants contained deliberately or recklessly false material
statements or omissions. Id. The Motions to Quash and Suppress were denied. The court in the
Criminal case, however, issued an Order stating that statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s Stone,
Piatek, and Michael Meeks was tolled for the Purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act.5 See

4

These Motions are also called Franks Motions. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Although this negates the government’s tolling argument against Stone, these claims still fail under qualified
immunity. Plaintiffs effected by this order, however, still have a right to bring these claims.
5

4 

Defs.’ Ex. 17. In the Criminal Case, Plaintiffs successfully moved for a Judgment of Acquittal
and the charges were dismissed. Pls.’ Ex. 1.
III.

Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows the court to dismiss a
complaint if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims therein. On a 12(b)(1) motion,
the plaintiff has the burden of proving jurisdiction. Moir v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit
Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990); Rogers v. Stratton Indus., Inc., 798 F.2d 913, 915 (6th
Cir. 1986). Motions under Rule 12(b)(1) are either facial attacks or factual attacks. United
States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). A facial attack challenges the pleading itself.
When presented with a facial attack, the court takes all material allegations in the complaint as
true and construes them in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. The factual attack,
however, challenges the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The court does not
presume the truth of the complaint’s allegations, and is free to “weigh the evidence and satisfy
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Id. The United States’ Motion is a
factual attack.
Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Although
this standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require more than “labels and
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows the court to make an assessment as to whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Under the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, the court must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, accept
5 

the allegations of the complaint as true, and determine whether plaintiff=s factual allegations
present plausible claims. To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiff=s pleading for
relief must provide Amore than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements
of a cause of action will not do.@ Ass=n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d
545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007).

Even though the complaint need not contain Adetailed@ factual

allegations, its Afactual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true.@ Id. To survive a
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009).
When deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court can take into account matters of
public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the
complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). The court can properly
treat documents the defendant attaches to its motion as pleadings if those documents are central
to the plaintiffs complaint and its claims. Werner v. Klais & Co., Inc., 108 F.3d 86, 88 (6th Cir.
1997).
B. Defendants’ Motions
i.

Defendant United States’ Motion

The United State moved for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The United States argues Plaintiffs have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, therefore, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over their claims, and
their claims are subject to dismissal. Plaintiffs failed to respond to this motion. As such, they
have waived their claims asserted against the United States. See Humphrey v. United States AG
6 

Office, 279 F.app’x 321, 331 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[W] here, as here, plaintiff has not raised
arguments in the district court by virtue of failure to oppose defendant’s motion to dismiss, the
arguments have been waived.”)
After substitution of the United States for Allen and L. Larsen, the Plaintiffs’ claims of
trespass to chattels (Counts 5 and 11), false arrest (count 13), and false imprisonment (Count 14)
arise under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) & §§ 2671-2680. The
FTCA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that allows plaintiffs to bring tort claims
against the United States, its agencies, and employees. See § 1346(b); §§ 2671-2680; Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 203-04 (1993). Courts must construe the requirements of the FTCA
strictly because it is a waiver of sovereign immunity. Blakely v. United States, 276 F.3d 853,
864 (6th Cir. 2002). Congress listed the requirements for waiver of sovereign immunity in the
FTCA, and exhaustion of administrative remedies is one of the requirements Congress placed in
the act. So. Rehab. Group, P.L.L.C. v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 732 F.3d 670, 676-77
(6th Cir. 2013). Congress has explicitly stated:
An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money
damages for injury or loss of property … caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
omission of an employee of the [United States] while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate
Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing[.]
28 U.S. C. § 2675(a). The text of the FTCA makes it clear that claimants must bring their claim
to the appropriate federal agency, and the agency must make a final determination in writing
denying the claim before the claimant can bring the claim in district court. McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 107 (1993). Section 2675(a) shows Congress’ intention for exhaustion of
administrative remedies “before invocation of the judicial process.” Id. at 112.

7 

Moreover, the FTCA “forever bar[s]” claims if the claimant does not bring them to the
appropriate agency within two years after the claim accrues. § 2401(b). The claim accrues when
the plaintiff knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known he was injured
and knew the cause of the injury. United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 11, 121-24 (1979); see also
Hertz v. United States, 560 F.3d 618-19 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating the general rule that tort claims
accrue at the time of injury).
Plaintiffs Eugene Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, and Gabrielle Neely’s home, located 13531
Bemis Road Manchester, Michigan, was searched on March 27, 2010. They were not charged in
the indictment, but their address is listed in the search warrant affidavit of S. Larsen as “the
Meeks residence” because it is listed on Plaintiff Michael Meeks’ driver’s license. Defs.’ Ex. 9.
Officers executing the search warrant at the Bemis road residence seized seventeen items that
were related to the indictment’s seditious conspiracy and other counts.
None of the residents of the Bemis road residence filed an administrative claim with the
FBI for the return of their property. The United States has supplied a declaration stating there
has been no administrative tort claim filed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Def. U.S.
Ex. 5. They were not a party to the 41(g) Motion in the Criminal Case. A final administrative
ruling is a condition precedent to bringing a FTCA claim in federal court. See McNeil, 508 U.S.
at 112. Moreover, the statute of limitations has run on the cause of action. Eugene and Sylvia
Meeks and Gabrielle Neely had until March 27, 2012 to bring a tort claim at the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (“FBI”). Their failure to do so results in this Court not having subject matter
jurisdiction over their claim. Therefore, the Court will DISMISS Count 5.
Plaintiffs Michael Meeks and Piatek allege trespass to chattels in Count 11, false
imprisonment in Count 13, and false arrest in Count 14. Michael Meeks and Piatek similarly
8 

failed to first bring an administrative tort claim with the FBI for their trespass to chattels claim.
See Def. U.S. Ex. 5. Therefore, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this claim.
Therefore, the Court will DISMISS Count 11 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Plaintiffs’ false imprisonment and false arrest claims are exempted from the FTCA
because the court in the Criminal Case determined the officers acted pursuant to valid arrest
warrants. See § 2680(h); see also Williams v. United States, 54 F. App'x 290, 291 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding section 2680(h) bars a cause of action against the United States “arising out of
… false imprisonment [or] false arrest[.]”).
This section of the act exempts these torts when officers are acting lawfully, i.e. pursuant
to a valid search warrant. Id. The Court will DISMISS counts 13 and 14 because the officers
were acting lawfully.
ii.

Individual Defendants’ Motion

The individual Defendants argue the remainder of the Amended Complaint fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. The remaining claims argue a variety of constitutional
claims pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens actions are judicially created causes of action for damages against
an individual for violation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 403. In
Bivens, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff can recover damages from federal agents for
injuries that violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 396-97. Bivens actions have also been
extended to Fifth Amendment violations as well. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 234
(1979). Courts are cautioned against expanding Bivens to other constitutional violations when
there is a existing remedy under the Constitution that is equally effective at vindicating
constitutional rights. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
9 

The Individual Defendants argue the Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the statute of
limitations, qualified immunity, and collateral estoppel. There is no federal statute of limitations
for Bivens actions, thus, courts apply the statute of limitations for personal torts in the state
where the claim arose. Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538 (1989).
Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a doctrine that applies when an issue has been
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, making that decision conclusive in subsequent legal
action involving that same issue. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The
doctrine applies when: (1) the precise issue has been raised and actually litigated in the prior
proceedings, (2) the determination of the issue must have been necessary to the outcome of the
prior proceedings, (3) the prior proceedings must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits,
and (4) the party against whom estoppel is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Cobbins v. Tenn. Dep’t of Transp., 566 F.3d 582, 590
(6th Cir. 2009).
Qualified immunity is a defense government officials can raise when claims arise from
the performance of their discretionary functions. Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1007 (6th Cir.
1999). The doctrine provides government officials with immunity from personal civil liability as
long as their “actions do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.” Sutherland v. Mizer, 625 F. Supp.2d 492, 498 (E.D.
Mich. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)).

Protection under

qualified immunity turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the officers’ actions in light
of legal rules established at the time of their action. Id. Therefore, government officials are not
personally liable if they act under an objectively reasonable belief that their actions are lawful.
Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372-73 (6th Cir. 1999). Even though the government official
10 

must plead this as a defense, the plaintiff must show the government official cannot use this
doctrine as a defense to their actions. Blake, 179. F.3d at 107.
The Court can best analyze the Plaintiffs’ claims by grouping the claims by issue. The
Plaintiffs argue the search warrants were defective and lacked probable cause, which violated
each Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights.

They also argue the seizure of their firearms

constituted a Second Amendment violation, the seizure of their Bibles was a First Amendment
violation, and the initiation of criminal proceedings violated their Fifth Amendment rights.
a. Malicious Prosecution
In Counts 12 and 16, Michael Meeks, Piatek, and Stone allege malicious prosecution
claims against L. Larsen. A valid malicious prosecution claim must state facts that show there
was no probable cause to justify the plaintiff’s arrest or prosecution. See Thacker v. City of
Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 259 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Oatman v. Potter, 92 F. App’x. 133, 142
(6th Cir. 2004). An indictment is prima facie evidence of probable cause. Harris v. United
States, 422 F.3d 322, 327 (6th Cir. 2005). The statute of limitations in Michigan for the tort of
malicious prosecution is two years. MICH. COMP.

LAWS

§ 600.5805(5) (2013). All other

personal injury torts have a three year statute of limitations under Michigan law. Id. at (10).
Plaintiffs argue L. Larsen caused the grand jury investigation through her use of illegally seized
evidence and information, and they argue the grand jury proceedings lack probable cause.
Plaintiffs argue there was no probable cause for their subsequent criminal prosecution as well.
The statute of limitations on a constitutional malicious prosecution claim begins to run after
dismissal of criminal charges or the termination of criminal proceedings in the plaintiff’s favor.
Wolfe v. Perry, 412 F.3d 707, 715 (6th Cir. 2005).

11 

The Criminal Case ended in a Judgment of Acquittal on March 27, 2012. On that day,
the statute of limitations for these Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim began to run. Thus the
statute of limitations expires on March 27, 2014, and their claim is timely. However, Michael
Meeks, Piatek and Stone fail to state a claim for which relief can be granted because they cannot
demonstrate an absence probable cause with respect to their arrest and subsequent prosecution.
They were indicted on several counts.

Moreover, they have failed to come forward with

“substantial evidence” such as proof of perjured grand jury testimony to rebut the presumption of
probable cause established by the indictment. See Harris, 422 F.3d at 327.
Additionally, Plaintiffs have already litigated this issue in the criminal case. Stone, along
with Meeks and Piatek, filed motions challenging the search warrants in their Criminal Case.
Defs.’ Ex. 16. The trial court ultimately denied their motions because there was probable cause
for the search of the Plaintiffs’ residences, and the warrants’ affidavits did not contain
deliberately or recklessly false material misstatements or omissions. Defs.’ Ex. 17. As such, the
parties have litigated this issue in a prior proceeding, its determination was necessary to the
disposition of the case, the proceeding terminated in Plaintiffs’ favor, and the parties extensively
briefed and litigated this issue. Cobbins, 566 F.3d at 590. Therefore, collateral estoppel also
prevents them from arguing this issue again. For the foregoing reasons, Court will DISMISSES
Counts 12 and 16 for malicious prosecution.
b. Unreasonable Search and Seizure in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment
The majority of the Plaintiffs’ claims are asserted against Defendants based on the search
of their respective homes.6 They argue Allen did not have probable cause to conduct the
searches. Probable cause for a search exists when in the totality of the circumstances, there is a

6

The Fourth Amendment claims are Counts: 1,3,7,9 and 17

12 

“fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 338 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S.
213, 238 (1981)). L. Larsen made statements in an affidavit that a magistrate judge reviewed
and relied upon in determining that probable cause existed to justify the searches. The issuing
judge may rely on an experienced officer’s conclusions regarding the existence of evidence of a
crime and the likelihood it will be found in certain locations. United States v. Rodrieguez-Suazo,
346 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2003). The court in the Criminal Case owed deference to the
magistrate judge that made the determination that there was probable cause for the search
warrant. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236. A Fourth Amendment challenge to a magistrate judge’s
probable cause determination fails if the magistrate judge had a “substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrong doing.” United States v. Frechette,
583 F.3d 374, 379 (6th Cir. 2009).
After applying these standards, Magistrate Judge Komives concluded the issuing
magistrate judge correctly concluded evidence of seditious conspiracy would likely be found in
the homes of Michael Meeks, Stone and Piatek. Defs.’ Ex. 16.
Plaintiffs Stone, Meeks, and Piatek also filed a Franks Motion in which they argued the
warrant affidavit contained material misstatements or omissions, and the items found pursuant to
the warrant should be suppressed. To succeed on this motion, the defendant in the criminal case
needs to establish: (1) “a factual statement made in an affidavit supporting a warrant is false; (2)
the affiant made the false statement knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for
the truth; and (3) without the false statements, the remainder of the affidavit is insufficient to
establish probable cause.” Delta Eng’g v. United States, 41 F.3d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1994).
Franks requires the party challenging the affidavit to “point out specifically the portion of the
13 

warrant affidavit that is claimed to be false; and they should be accompanied by a statement of
supporting reasons.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72. Magistrate Judge Komives found many of the
challenged statements were not false and the Franks hearing was unnecessary. Defs.’ Ex. 16.
Judge Victoria Roberts adopted Judge Komives’ findings of fact and conclusions of law on both
of these issues. Defs.’ Ex. 17. Whether there was probable cause for the search, arrest, and
prosecution of Michael Meeks, Piatek and Stone was an issue raised in the Criminal Case. For
the reasons explained in the analysis of Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claim, collateral
estoppel prevents Michael Meeks, Piatek and Stone from relitigating this claim.
In addition to collateral estoppel, the statute of limitations bars this claim as well.
Although federal courts borrow state statute of limitations, federal law governs when a Bivens
claim accrues. Eidson v. Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
The tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the
wrongful act or omission results in damages. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 391 (U.S. 2007).
The Sixth Circuit has found that generally the statute of limitations begins to run at the time of
the illegal search. Harper v. Jackson, 293 F. App'x 389, 392 n.1 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Michel
v. City of Akron, 278 F. App'x 477, 480 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding that the statute of limitations on
a Fourth Amendment illegal search claim begins to run on the day of the search). In Michigan,
personal injury torts have a three year statute of limitations. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.5805 (10)
(2013). As such, Plaintiffs should have filed the instant action on March 27, 2013, or threes year
after the execution of the search. However Plaintiffs did not file their claims until September 30,
2013. Moreover, in the absence of a criminal conviction, Stone, as well as Piatek and Michael
Meeks, cannot avail themselves of the Heck rule, which would toll the statute of limitation on
their claim. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393, see Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (holding

14 

accrual of a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 does not occur until the state drops pending
criminal charges or a criminal conviction is overturned). Furthermore, a timely filed civil case
could have been stayed during the criminal proceedings. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393. For the
foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs Stone, Piatek, and Michael Meeks’ Fourth Amendment claims,
Counts 7, 9, and 17, are DISMISSED.
The Fourth Amendment claims of Eugene Meeks, Sylvia Meeks and Gabrielle Neely in
Counts 1 and 3 require a different analysis because they were not indicted and did not file a Rule
41(g) Motion for Return of Property. Agents searched their home on March 27, 2010. The
statute of limitations on their Fourth Amendment claim began to run that day. These Plaintiffs
cite no applicable tolling rule for their claims. The statute of limitations on this claim expired on
March 27, 2013. Their claim is time barred. Therefore, the Court also DISMISSES Counts 1
and 3.
c. First Amendment Violation
In the search of Stone’s home, agents seized three copies of the Holy Bible.7 Stone
argues this seizure violated his First Amendment right of free exercise. He argues a reasonable
officer would not have believed it was lawful to seize a person’s Bible. The Defendants argue
this claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
The search of Stone’s property occurred on March 27, 2010, and was pursuant to a
validly issued warrant that contained no falsehoods or material omissions. The warrant indicated
evidence and instrumentalities of seditious conspiracy would be in Stone’s home. The warrant
authorized the seizure of any and all firearms and books. This includes the Bible. For reasons
stated earlier in this Order, this claim is time barred. See Harper, F. App’x 389 at 392 n.1.

7

Text widely used by Christians containing the tenants of the various subsets of Christianity.

15 

For reasons stated earlier in this opinion qualified immunity and estoppel apply to the
Defendants’ actions. Furthermore, Bivens does not apply to First Amendment claims. See Patel
v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 515 U.S. at 813 n. 6; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675
(2009). For the foregoing reasons, Count 18 is Dismissed.
d. Second Amendment Violations
In Counts 2 and 8 of the Amended Complaint, Eugene Meeks, Sylvia Meeks, Gabrielle
Neely, Michael Meeks and Piatek allege interference with their Second Amendment right to bear
arms. This claim argues Bivens protection should be extended to the Second Amendment. The
Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to be reluctant to expand Bivens relief. Wilkie, 551
U.S. at 550. The Bivens remedy is appropriate when there is no “alternative existing process for
protecting” the constitutional interest at issue, and special factors counseling against expansion
of a judicially created remedy are absent. Id. Special factors generally include the presence of
another remedial process or the distinction between a lack of a remedy and awarding monetary
damages from an individual officer for an alleged injury. Giesse v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Serv., 552 F.3d 697, 707-08 (6th Cir. 2008). Even incomplete relief under a statute is sufficient
to prevent extending the Bivens remedy. Id.
The government argues special factors counsel against extending the Bivens remedy.
Plaintiffs Michael Meeks and Piatek filed a 41(g) Motion for Return of Property in the Criminal
Case. Michael Meeks and Piatek availed themselves to this method of recovery. Given this
alternative, the Court will not extend Bivens to Defendants’ actions in the seizure of the
Plaintiff’s firearms.
Defendants also argue qualified immunity applies to the seizure because a reasonable
officer would not have known seizing firearms pursuant to a valid search warrant was a violation
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of the Second Amendment. The legal contours of an individual’s Second Amendment rights are
not clearly defined. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008); see also United
States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (discussing dilemma faced by lower
courts on how far to extend the holding in Heller). In the absence of a clearly established right,
an officer is not aware of any illegal conduct on their part. Sutherland, 625 F.Supp.2d at 498
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982)). See Doutel v. City
of Norwalk, 3:11-cv-01164; 2013 WL 3353977 *25 (D. Conn. July 3, 2013) (holding in the
absence of controlling authority recognizing a Second Amendment violation for the seizure by
law enforcement officials of a particular firearm, qualified immunity applies). According to the
Defendants, Plaintiffs still could have owned and used firearms, and they have failed to plead
any facts that the agents took steps to prevent the exercise of their right to bear arms. Defs.’
Mot. at 25.

Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim, and Counts 2 and 8 are

DISMISSED
e. Substantive Due Process Violations
Counts 4 and 10 allege Defendant S. Larsen used Defendant Haug’s “false and
misleading statements” in her search warrant affidavit. This led to an investigation and trial in
violation of Plaintiffs’ “substantive due process rights … pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.”
Courts are reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process. Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); see also Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
273,275-76, 281 (1994).

If a specific amendment offers “an explicit textual source of

constitutional protection” against government behavior, that amendment will guide the analysis
of the claim rather than substantive due process. Albright, 510 U.S. at 273.

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The Fifth Amendment has no standard for the initiation of a criminal prosecution.
Albright, 510 U.S. at 282 (Kennedy, J. and Thomas, J., concurring). An indictment issued by a
legally constituted grand jury is sufficient to warrant a trial of the charges on the merits. Id.
Plaintiffs Michael Meeks and Piatek were charged with offenses in a lawfully issued indictment.
After motions for a Franks hearing, to Quash Search Warrants, and to Suppress Evidence, the
court in the Criminal Case found no deficiencies in the search warrant affidavits. In the absence
of false or misleading statements, the court concluded the agents violated no rights.
In an action against an officer for a constitutional violation, the Fourth Amendment
provides the plaintiff with a remedy, and the Court does not need to apply a substantive due
process analysis. See Id. at 271 (holding a plaintiff’s remedy in a §1983 claim is a vehicle for
defending federal rights conferred elsewhere); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 499
(1978) (stating the legal framework of §1983 applies to Bivens actions). The Fourth Amendment
provides Plaintiffs with a method to vindicate their constitutional rights and there is no standard
for instituting proceedings under the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs concede Count 4 cannot
proceed as pled, but ask the Court to grant leave to amend. The Court agrees that the count
cannot proceed and does not see a reason to allow plaintiffs to amend the count. For the
foregoing reasons, the Court DISMISSES Counts 10 and 4.
The remaining counts, 6, 15, and 19 are for exemplary damages. According to Plaintiffs,
these claims are derivative of the alleged constitutional violations.

The Court finds no

constitutional violations, therefore, the Court DISMISSES Counts 6, 15, and 19.

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IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ and the Individual Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss [#24, #25] are GRANTED. The First Amended Complaint is DISMISSED in its
entirety.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 28, 2014
Detroit, Michigan

s/Gershwin A. Drain
GERSHWIN A. DRAIN
United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
and any unrepresented parties via the Court's ECF System to their respective email or First Class
U.S. mail addresses disclosed on the Notice of Electronic Filing on February 28, 2014.
s/Tanya R. Bankston
TANYA R.BANKSTON
Case Manager  

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