Arredondo v. General Motor Corporation

Filing 40

Order Granting Defendant's 29 Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiff's 35 Motion for Complete Personnel File and Dismissing Case. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (SCha)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

RICARDO ARREDONDO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-11433
HON. AVERN COHN

GENERAL MOTORS LLC,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc.
29) AND DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR COMPLETE PERSONNEL FILE
(Doc. 35) AND DISMISSING CASE

I. INTRODUCTION
This is an employment discrimination case.

Plaintiff Ricardo Arredondo

(Arredondo), appearing pro se, is suing Defendant General Motors (GM), alleging
discrimination based on his race and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
Now before the Court is GM’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29).1 For the
reasons that follow, GM’s motion will be granted.
Arredondo has also submitted a “Motion for Complete Personnel File from General
Motors Corporation” (Doc. 35), and states in his response to GM’s motion for summary
judgment that he has not received his complete personnel file from GM. GM argues in
response that (1) Arredondo’s discovery request in the form of a motion is improper,
and (2) that the request is untimely, violating the Court’s previous Pretrial and
Scheduling Order of March 25, 2014, which required discovery to be completed by July
24, 2014 and provided a motion cut-off deadline of August 25, 2014. In addition, GM
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II. BACKGROUND2
A.
Arredondo is Hispanic; he was born in Mexico. He is currently employed by GM.
He began working at GM’s Detroit Hamtramck assembly plant in 1998. He is a member
of the UAW and has primarily worked on the assembly line, in machine operation, and
in unloading and delivering materials using a forklift.
To monitor and correct unacceptable workplace behavior, GM utilizes a six-step
progressive disciplinary procedure, consisting of: (1) written reprimand; (2) balance of
shift (“BOS”) plus 1 day disciplinary layoff; (3) BOS plus 1 week disciplinary layoff; (4)
BOS plus 2 weeks disciplinary layoff; (5) BOS plus 30 days disciplinary layoff; and (6)
discharge.
From January 1999 through March 2012, Arredondo was disciplined on
numerous occasions for various conduct violations.

The disciplinary actions were

issued by different supervisors, and were either progressive in nature or repeated from
prior steps. In addition, Arredondo was disciplined on several occasions for attendance
violations.

Arredondo’s employment record shows that his discipline progressed

through Step 3, for stopping work prior to a designated work period (September 22,
2010); Step 4, for sleeping on the job, threatening a supervisor, and for refusing to
states that it has already provided Arredondo with his complete personnel file. GM
states that any deficiencies that Arredondo has noted in his file (such as a lack of
records regarding his supervisors’ race, the workplace setup, or the types of cars
Arredondo worked on) is a matter of human resources recordkeeping, rather than a
failure to provide Arredondo with his complete personnel file. These arguments are
persuasive. Arredondo’s Motion for Complete Personnel File (Doc. 35) is therefore
DENIED.
2
Because Arredondo did not submit a counter-statement of material facts, the facts set
forth here are based primarily on GM’s Statement of Material Facts (Doc. 30), as
supplemented by consideration of facts disputed in Arredondo’s response brief (Doc.
36).
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comply with the supervisor’s instructions (May 12, 2011); and Step 5, for not following
work procedure by improperly installing seats into the wrong vehicles resulting in
downtime and multiple repairs (October 20, 2011).
Beginning in late 2011, Arredondo was assigned to work as a forklift operator.
His duties included delivering material to/from the receiving docks using a forklift. On
March 1, 2012, Arredondo’s supervisor, Leonard Piecuch, noticed Arredondo had been
missing from the dock area for a significant amount of time. When Arredondo returned,
Piecuch advised him that he was taking too long with the delivery, to which Arredondo
replied, “This is bullshit,” and told Piecuch to step away from the forklift because he was
too close. Piecuch instructed Arredondo to park and dismount the forklift; however,
Arredondo left the forklift by the employee break area where another employee had to
move it.

Arredondo was instructed to report to Labor Relations for a disciplinary

interview the following Monday, March 5, 2012. The interview was conducted by Bob
Tarrant, Labor Relations Supervisor. Piecuch and Arredondo’s union representative
also participated in the interview. In addition to the events of March 1, it was also noted
in the interview that Arredondo had, just one day before, been given a similar warning
by Piecuch when Arredondo did not timely return after a scheduled break. Management
did not believe that Arredondo provided a sufficient explanation for his behavior and his
repeated absences.

Because Arredondo had progressed to the Step 6—the final

disciplinary step—he was discharged.
Arredondo later initiated a grievance challenging his discharge. Because of a
negotiated resolution between GM and the UAW, Arredondo’s employment was
reinstated on September 3, 2013. He continues to work at the Hamtramck facility.

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Thus, because Arredondo is once again employed by GM, the current claim of
discrimination and wrongful termination based on race and national origin applies to the
period from March 5, 2012 to September 3, 2013.
B.
Arredondo now claims that GM discriminated against him based on his race and
national origin. In support, he states that GM fabricated incidents for which it could
discipline him, ultimately resulting in his discharge. He further say that management—
specifically Piecuch and Tarrant—wanted to discharge him so that they could hire their
own relatives at an hourly rate lower than that of Arredondo. Arredondo also claims he
overheard a conversation between Piecuch and a team leader over a two-way radio, in
which Piecuch stated at some point, “we stick with this lazy Mexican,” to which the team
leader responded, “we need to get rid of him.” Finally, Arredondo says that on one
occasion, a team leader offered overtime to certain forklift operators but not to him.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The summary judgment standard of review under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is well
known and not repeated here. Ultimately a district court must determine whether the
record as a whole presents a genuine issue of material fact drawing “all justifiable
inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,” Hager v. Pike Cnty. Bd.
of Ed., 286 F.3d 366, 370 (6th Cir. 2002).
When reviewing pro se papers, the Court must employ standards less stringent
than if they had been drafted by counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972);
Puckett v. Cox, 456 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1972).
IV. ANALYSIS

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A.
In its motion for summary judgment, GM argues that Arredondo fails to present a
viable wrongful termination claim.
1.
In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Arredondo must
demonstrate: (1) his membership in a protected class; (2) that he was qualified for the
job in question; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) that he was replaced by
someone outside the protected class, or was treated less favorably than a similarly
situated individual outside of the protected class. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534
U.S. 506, 510 (2002); Johnson v. University of Cincinnati, 215 F.3d 561, 572-73 (6th
Cir. 2000).
2.
Once Arredondo establishes a prima facie case, GM has the opportunity to offer
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge. Johnson, 215 F.3d at 573.
Once GM proffers a legitimate reason for its decision, the burden shifts back to
Arredondo to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason was a pretext
for discrimination. Id. To demonstrate that a nondiscriminatory reason for his discharge
is pretextual, Arredondo must prove “‘(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact,
(2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate his [discharge], or (3) that they
were insufficient to motivate discharge.’” Chattman v. Toho Tenax America, Inc., 686
F.3d 339, 349 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original) (quoting Manzer v. Diamond
Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994)).
B.

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First, GM argues that Arredondo fails to establish a prima facie case of race or
national origin discrimination. Specifically, it claims that Arredondo fails to satisfy the
fourth prong—that he was treated less favorably than or replaced by a similarly situated
non-protected employee.
1.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that when a plaintiff lacks direct evidence of
discrimination, to establish that another employee is “similarly situated,” “the plaintiff
must show that the ‘comparables’ are similarly-situated in all respects . . . ” Ercegovich
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir.1992)). The plaintiff must “prove that all of the
relevant aspects of his employment situation were ‘nearly identical’ to those of [the nonminority’s] employment situation.” Id. (emphasis and brackets in original) (quoting
Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir.1994)).

In the

disciplinary context, “the individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare his/her
treatment must have dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same
standards and have engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or
mitigating circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s
treatment of them for it.” Id. (quoting Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583).
2.
In response, Arredondo says that he was treated less favorably than other
employees, who were subject to discipline but were not ultimately discharged.
Arredondo says that several other employees were discharged from the Hamtramck
facility in 2005 after they were arrested for possession of illegal substances, but were

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reinstated shortly thereafter. However, Arredondo fails to present any evidence—or
make any statement whatsoever—relating to these unnamed employees’ race or
national origin.

Nor does he claim or present evidence suggesting that these

employees had similar disciplinary records. Such unsupported evidence is insufficient
to establish that there were similarly situated, non-protected employees that were
treated more favorably than Arredondo.
3.
In addition, to demonstrate that he was treated less favorably than other
employees, Arredondo says that GM improperly terminated him—specifically, that he
was discharged without ever having reached disciplinary Step 6. However, as noted,
Step 6 of GM’s progressive disciplinary procedure results in discharge. The record
clearly shows that Arredondo had reached Step 5 as the result of an incident on
October 20, 2011 (See Doc. 31-1 at 52). After the incident on March 1, 2012, the next
step was therefore discharge under Step 6 (See Doc. 31-1 at 53).

Arredondo’s

argument that he was terminated without having reached Step 6 is without merit.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Arredondo has failed to demonstrate that similarly
situated employees outside the protected class were treated more favorably than him.
Therefore, Arredondo cannot establish a prima facie case for Title VII race and national
origin discrimination. GM’s motion is therefore GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: January 20, 2015
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13-11433 Ricardo Arredondo v. General Motors, LLC
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, January 20, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.

S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, [phone]

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