Hollingsworth v. Ford Motor Company et al

Filing 87

OPINION and ORDER re GRANTING #50 MOTION for Summary Judgment, DENYING #74 MOTION for Sanctions, GRANTING #52 MOTION for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Sean F. Cox. (JMcC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

Harry L. Hollingsworth,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-11625
Honorable Sean F. Cox

Ford Motor Co. and International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America, Local 600,
Defendants.
______________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING UAW’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
GRANTING FORD’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, AND DENYING
FORD’S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
This case is, at its core, a contract dispute. Plaintiff Harry Hollingsworth (“Plaintiff”) alleges
that Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”) breached a Grievance Settlement Agreement that was
negotiated by Defendant International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural
Implement Workers of America (“UAW”) on Plaintiff’s behalf after Ford terminated Plaintiff’s
employment. Plaintiff also alleges that the UAW breached its duty of fair representation when it
failed to file a grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf regarding Ford’s alleged breach of the Grievance
Settlement Agreement.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant UAW’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. #50), Defendant Ford’s Motion for Summary
Judgment Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. #52), and Defendant Ford’s Motion
for Sanctions Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. section 1927 (Doc. #74).
The motions have been fully and extensively briefed by the parties, and the Court heard oral

arguments on December 4, 2014.
For the following reasons, this Court shall GRANT UAW Local 600's Motion for Summary
Judgment, GRANT Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENY Ford’s Motion for Sanctions.
BACKGROUND
A.

Plaintiff’s Termination From Ford and the Grievance Settlement Agreement
Plaintiff Harry Hollingsworth was terminated from his employment at Ford Motor Company

on May 18, 2009 for allegedly misusing company funds. (Pl.’s Stmt, Doc. #57, at ¶ 2; UAW Stmt.
At ¶ 2; Pl. Dep., attached to UAW Mo. at Ex. A p. 144). He had been employed by Ford since 1978.
(Pl.’s Stmt, Doc. #57, at ¶ 1; UAW Stmt. at ¶ 1). As a then-active union member, Plaintiff
complained about his termination to his union, UAW Local 600. UAW Local 600 then filed a
grievance on Plaintiff’s behalf on May 20, 2009. (Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶ 3; UAW Stmt. at ¶ 3;
UAW Mo. at Ex. B). The grievance procedure between the UAW and Defendant Ford is governed
by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”). (Dep. of Anthony Richard, Pl. Stmt. Doc. #57 at
Ex. E, p. 16).
On August 25, 2010, the UAW, Ford, and Plaintiff settled the grievance. (Pl. Stmt., Doc.
#57 at 4; UAW Stmt. at ¶ 4; see Grievance Settlement Agreement, attached to UAW Mo. at Ex. C).
The Grievance Settlement Agreement provided that
[Plaintiff] will be reinstated and afforded the opportunity to elect one of the
separation packages for which he is eligible. A lump sum payment of $20,000 is
awarded as full and complete settlement . . . Reinstatement under this grievance
settlement is for the sole purpose of allowing [Plaintiff] to apply for a separation
package and will not allow [Plaintiff] to return to active employment within Ford
Motor Company or activate any other economic benefit (i.e. vacation entitlement,
Christmas bonus, lump-sum payments, etc.) associated with active employment
status.
(Grievance Settlement Agreement, UAW Mo. at Ex. C) (emphasis added).
2

Plaintiff elected to receive a Special Retirement Incentive separation package worth an
additional pre-tax amount of $40,000. (Special Retirement Incentive Request, attached to UAW Mo.
at Ex. D). At his deposition, Plaintiff was asked whether he understood that deductions could be
made from his lump-sump grievance settlement check, and he agreed that he did have that
understanding:
Q:

You understood that your lump sum would be in the pre-tax amount of
$20,000, and applicable taxes would be deducted, correct?

A:

Um-hmm. Yes.

Q:

Okay. And you also understood that the payment would be reduced by any
outstanding debts to the company or trustees of any company benefit plan or
program including unrepaid overpayments under the SUB plan, correct?

A:

Correct.

(Pl. Dep., UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p. 87-88). Plaintiff’s retirement from Ford became effective on
September 1, 2010. (Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶16; Pl. Dep, UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p. 88).
B.

Plaintiff’s Alleged Debt Owed To Ford
Prior to Plaintiff’s retirement, Ford had been deducting $100.00 from each of Plaintiff’s

paychecks because Ford’s records showed that Plaintiff had previously received a benefit
overpayment. (UAW Stmt. at ¶ 17, 18; Pl. Dep., UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p. 89; see Benefit
Overpayment Letter, attached to UAW Mo. at Ex. G). Plaintiff denies that he received a benefit
overpayment prior to his retirement. (Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶ 17; Pl. Dep., UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p.
89).
Also prior to his retirement, Ford was attempting to recover a “Visa balance” of $6,140.36
from Plaintiff. (UAW Stmt. at ¶ 20; Pl. Stmt. at ¶ 20; Pl. Dep., UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p. 99). Ford
appears to claim that Plaintiff accrued this debt by misusing a Ford-issued credit card for non3

approved expenses. Plaintiff disputes that he owed a Visa balance to Ford, as he claims he did not
have a Ford-issued credit card. (Pl. Dep., UAW Mo. at Ex. A, p. 99; Pl. Aff., attached to Pl. Stmt.,
Doc. #57, at Ex. B).
C.

Ford’s Erroneous Payments To Plaintiff After His Termination
During discovery, Plaintiff produced several checks that he received from Ford after his

September 2010 retirement.
On September 1, 2010, Plaintiff received a check for a “SUB” (supplemental unemployment
benefits) payment in a gross amount of $403.69. (UAW Mo. at Ex. K; Pl. Dep. at 115). Plaintiff
produced four additional checks issued by Ford to him for SUB payments, each in the gross amount
of $403.60. (UAW Mo. at Ex. K).
Plaintiff received another check, dated November 7, 2010, for vacation pay in a gross
amount of $4,272.00. (UAW Mo. at Ex. J). Additionally, it is undisputed that Plaintiff receive a
profit sharing check for a gross amount of $831.10, net amount of $510.39, in March of 2011.
(UAW Mo. at Ex. M; Pl. Dep. at 119). It is unclear whether Plaintiff admits that he cashed any or
all of these checks, but Plaintiff does not dispute that he did not return any of these checks back to
Ford. (Pl. Dep at 115; Pl. Stmt., doc. #57 at ¶ 27; UAW Stmt. at ¶ 27).
Ford maintains that all of these checks bestowed upon Plaintiff benefits to which he was not
entitled, and were therefore issued in error. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was not entitled to
receive the vacation benefits, SUB benefits, or profit sharing bonuses. (Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶ 25;
UAW Stmt. at ¶ 25; Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶ 14; UAW Stmt. at ¶ 14). Plaintiff also appears to agree,
as he must, that the Grievance Settlement Agreement expressly states that Plaintiff’s reinstatement
was not intended to activate any other economic benefit. (Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at ¶ 8; UAW Stmt.

4

at ¶ 8).
D.

Ford’s First Two Separation Payments To Plaintiff
In November 2010, Plaintiff received two separation checks from Ford. The first check had

a gross amount of $20,000 and a net amount of $9,696.77. (Pl. Aff., attached to Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57
at Ex. B ¶ 28; UAW Mo. at Ex. I) (“Check #1”). Check #1 indicates that deductions were made for
taxes, as well as a “benefit overpa” in the amount of $2,403.23. (UAW Mo. at Ex. I). Plaintiff
agrees that, at least according to Ford’s records, he owed them $2,403.25 for benefit overpayment.
(Pl. Dep at 103-104).
The second check (“Check #2”) was issued for a gross amount of $20,000, but a net amount
of $12,100. (UAW Stmt. at ¶ 21; Pl. Stmt. at ¶ 21; Pl. Dep. at 100-101; Check #2, attached to UAW
Mo. at Ex. H). The only deductions made from Check #2 were for federal, state and local income
taxes. (UAW Mo. at Ex. H).
E.

Plaintiff’s Final Grievance Settlement Check
On April 6, 2011, Plaintiff received a third and final separation check from Ford. (Pl. Aff.,

attached to Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57 at Ex. B ¶ 29). This check contained the word “GRIEVANCE” in
the description line. (“Grievance Check,” UAW Mo. at Ex. N). The Grievance Check was issued
for a gross amount of $20,000, but a net amount of $3,692.10. (UAW Mo. at Ex. N). It appears,
from the face of the Grievance Check, that Ford made a “base adjustment” of $13,276.02, which
resulted in an adjusted pre-tax amount of $6,728.98. (UAW Mo. at Ex. N). Plaintiff claims that he
misplaced the Grievance Check after it was initially issued, but found it after the time for depositing
it had expired. (Pl. Dep. at 134-135). Plaintiff contacted Ford in September 2012, and Ford reissued
the Grievance Check, which Plaintiff promptly deposited. (Id.).

5

Ford maintains that the deductions from the Grievance Check were made to reclaim the
amounts issued to Plaintiff in error, including the profit sharing check, the SUB checks, and the
vacation pay check. Plaintiff claims that the first time he received an explanation regarding the
separation check deductions was on December 11, 2012 when Ford responded to his attorney’s
inquiry regarding the same. (Pl. Add’l Stmt., Doc. #57, p. 22 ¶ 43).
F.

Plaintiff’s Communications With UAW Local 600 Regarding Grievance Check
Deductions
Plaintiff claims that, on the day he received the Grievance Check, he contacted UAW Local

600 regarding the deductions. (Pl. Dep. at 139). Plaintiff testified that he spoke to Anthony
Richard, (“Richard”) who is the first vice president of UAW Local 600. (Dep. of Anthony Richard,
attached to Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57, at Ex. E p. 12). By way of affidavit, Plaintiff testified that, at that
time, he “was informed by Michael Robison and Anthony Richard that they and UAW Local 600
were communicating with Ford on [his] behalf throughout 2011 and 2012 regarding Ford’s wrongful
withholdings from” two of the separation checks. (Pl. Aff, attached to Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57 at Ex.
B ¶ 41). Plaintiff claims that he called Anthony Richard “thousands of times” to follow up with him
concerning the allegedly erroneous deductions. (Pl. Dep. at 140). Plaintiff was asked if he “talk[ed]
to [his] union representative [who was Tony Richard]” about the Grievance Check and the first
separation check, both from which deductions were made by Ford. Plaintiff responded:
Well, I just told him that I had received a SUB check and that – the check for the
510. And he told me he didn’t have no knowledge of what that was all about, and
that he was still trying to file a grievance as to what was the money taken out check
for. That was what I was told, he was still working on it.
(Pl. Dep. at 187).
Anthony Richard testified that Plaintiff never asked him to file a grievance. (Richard Dep

6

at 98). However, Richard testified that Plaintiff called him and asked him “to look into why money
was deducted” from Plaintiff’s April 2011 Grievance Check. (Richards Dep. at 52).
Richard testified that he did investigate why the money was deducted by contacting Evell
Walk in Ford’s Human Resources Department. (Richard Dep. at 52-53). Richard did not get an
immediate answer, but Walk told him that he would try to get an answer. (Richard Dep. at 53).
Richard later followed up with Walk, and Walk stated that he was still trying to get an answer.
(Richard Dep. at 53).
Richard never obtained an explanation for the deductions from Walk. (Richard Dep. at 53).
According to Richard, Walk represented to him that “they [Ford] were going to give him [Plaintiff]
an answer.” (Richard Dep. at 54). Richard further elaborated on his subsequent discussions with
Plaintiff:
Q:

Were you updating Mr. Hollingsworth during, you know, these conversations
you had during the summer of 2011 with Evell Walk?

A:

Eventually he would call, or I would see him at social events.

Q:

Did Mr. Hollingsworth continue asking you what was going on with the
deductions, why the money was taken?

A:

He would ask me, or I would ask him if he had an answer yet, and his
response was no, he hadn’t had an answer yet.

Q:

Did he ask you to continue following up?

A:

No.

Q:

He didn’t?

A:

As a courtesy, I told him I would follow up.

Q:

Did you ever express to Mr. Hollingsworth that you would not continue to
follow up with Ford regarding these deductions?

7

A:

No, ‘cause I never knew if he had an answer or not.

Q:

And you never put anything in writing to Mr. Hollingsworth saying that the
union would not continue to pursue the deductions from the checks?

A:

Right.

...
Q:

So Mr. Hollingsworth would have no reason to know that the union was not
following up with these deductions from the checks?

A:

You say the union is following up with the deductions, he wouldn’t have any
reason of knowing?

Q:

He wouldn’t have any reason of knowing that they were not going to follow
up with the checks?

A:

Never said that they weren’t –

Q:

Okay.

A:

– going to follow up with the checks.

Q:

So it’s accurate that Mr. Hollingsworth would have thought the union was
following up with these checks, the deductions taken out of the checks?

A:

I did it as a courtesy for him to check, to find out what deductions were being
taken out. I felt, from a union standpoint, the company should have at least
told him what those deductions were. And all my efforts were from a
courtesy standpoint to find out what those deductions, he should know what
those deductions were.

Q:

What do you mean by “courtesy standpoint”?

A:

He was retired, so his conversations with me were basically, when we were
at a function, he would mention it. He would say, “Hey, I still need to know
what those deductions were.” I’d say, “Okay, I’ll doublecheck.”

Q:

Don’t you have a duty, wouldn’t the union or yourself, since you were a large
part of the . . . grievance settlement –

A:

Right.

8

Q:

– have a duty to see those terms were fully satisfied, whether Mr.
Hollingsworth’s retired or not?

A:

From a UAW standpoint, those terms were obligated because of the $20,000,
which the check . . . shows, he had $20,000. That was the settlement, is
$20,000.

...
A:

. . . I don’t have anything to do with the deductions. The gross amount on the
agreement was $20,000, and that’s what he got. If they took anything else
beyond that, I do not know. The settlement was for $20,000. That’s what I
agreed on, that’s what he agreed upon, that’s what we signed on, and that’s
what the check was for, $20,000. As to what his net is, I have no control over
that.

(Richard Dep., Doc. #57, Ex. E at pp. 52-57).
Plaintiff has no record indicating that he sent any written correspondence to UAW Local 600
before his attorney contacted them in January of 2013. (Pl. Dep at 156.). Plaintiff has no evidence
indicating that he filed any charges pursuant to the bylaws of the Local 600 claiming that he was not
being properly represented. (Pl. Dep. at 156).
It is also undisputed that no grievance regarding the deductions was ever filed on Plaintiff’s
behalf. Plaintiff claims that “the Union led [him] to believe for over 1.5 years that it would file a
grievance on his behalf against Ford and then refused to do so on January 17, 2013.” (Pl. Add’l
Stmt., Doc. #57 at p. 22 ¶ 42).

G.

UAW Constitution
Article 33 of the International UAW Constitution (“UAW Constitution”) provides for an

internal appeals procedure from actions of a Local Union, or any of its units, committees, officers,
committeepersons, or stewards. (International UAW Constitution, attached to UAW Mo. at Ex. Q,

9

p. 87). The UAW Constitution provides that
in any challenge to the handling or disposition of a grievance: Where the challenge
is against a Local Union committeeperson, steward, Bargaining Committee, officer
or other Local Union official the levels of appeal are first to the unit of an
Amalgamated Local Union, then to the Union; then to the Internal Executive Board
and then to the Convention Appeals Committee, or where appropriate the Public
Review Board . . . .
(UAW Constitution, UAW Mo. at Ex. Q, p. 87). In an appeal to the Amalgamated Local Union, the
appeal “must be made first at a meeting of the membership body of the appellant’s unit or in writing
addressed to the Recording Secretary or Chairperson of the appellant’s unit.” (Id. at 89). Article
33, section 4 provides that “[a]ny appeal . . . shall be made in writing, except as otherwise provided
for in this Constitution . . .” (Id. at p. 94). Article 33, section 5 of the UAW Constitution requires
that an aggrieved member must fully exhaust all internal union appeals “before going to a civil court
or governmental agency for redress.” (UAW Mo. at Ex. Q p. 96).
UAW claims that Plaintiff never made or filed any complaint or appeal pursuant to the UAW
Constitution. (UAW Stmt. at ¶ 44). Plaintiff attempts to deny this allegation by way of affidavit.
(Pl. Stmt., Doc. #57 at ¶ 47; Pl. Aff. at ¶¶ 43, 45). However, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on this
issue is clear:1
Q:

Okay. Did you ever file a complaint or charge against any member of Local
600 pursuant to the International Constitution that you were dissatisfied with
the representation you received from Local 600?

A:

Do I have anything in writing?

1

A party may not create a factual issue by filing an affidavit, after a motion for summary
judgment has been made, which contradicts her earlier deposition testimony. Reid v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1986); Peck v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 237 F.3d
614, 619 (6th Cir. 2001) citing Reid, 790 F.2d at 460. Therefore, where Plaintiff’s June 2014
affidavit directly contradicts his prior deposition testimony, the prior deposition testimony
controls.
10

Q:

Yeah. Did you submit anything in writing pursuant to the International UAW
Constitution saying you were not satisfied or that you were complaining
about the acts of any representative of Local 600 in representing you?

A:

No, I don’t have anything in writing.

Q:

So you never filed anything in writing with the International?

A:

No.

Q:

Okay.

A:

I went to the International and talked to them about it.

Q:

You didn’t file anything in writing, though, did you as required by the
Constitution?

A:

No.

Q:

All right.

(Pl. Dep at 156-157). It is therefore undisputed that Plaintiff did not file a written appeal pursuant
to the UAW Constitution. Nor does Plaintiff claim that he made an oral appeal at an Amalgamated
Local Union Meeting.
H.

Plaintiff’s Union Membership
Ford terminated Plaintiff’s employment on May 19, 2009. Plaintiff formally retired on

September 1, 2010. Plaintiff is no longer an active member of UAW Local 600, although it is
unclear exactly when his active membership in UAW Local 600 ceased. (Pl. Dep. at 158). It is
undisputed that Plaintiff no longer pays dues to the UAW Local 600. (Pl. Dep. at 159). Rather, he
is a dues-paying member of the retiree chapter. (Pl. Dep. at 159).
I.

Procedural History
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in 36th District Court, Wayne County, Michigan on March 12,

2013. (Notice of Removal, Doc. #1). The Complaint alleges Count I - Breach of Contract as to
11

Ford; and Count II - Violation of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),
29 U.S.C. section 185 as to Ford and UAW Local 600. (Doc. #1). In Count II of Plaintiff’s
Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that “Ford’s material breach of the Grievance Settlement
and Separation Package violates the collective bargaining agreement between Ford and UAW Local
600.” (Pl.’s Compl. at ¶ 38).
On April 10, 2013, Ford removed the case to this Court on the basis of federal question
jurisdiction. (Doc. #1). On April 15, 2013, Ford filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). (Doc. #8). In its motion, Ford argued, in pertinent part, that
Plaintiff’s LMRA claim was a “hybrid” section 301 claim, and that Plaintiff’s state-law breach of
contract claim was preempted by the LMRA. (Doc. #8).
This Court converted Ford’s motion for judgment on the pleadings to a motion for summary
judgment.2 At that point, the only documents the Court had for its consideration consisted of the
pleadings and a few affidavits, including an affidavit from Plaintiff.
On December 30, 2013, this Court issued an Opinion and Order Granting in Part and
Denying in Part Defendant Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. #25). In that Opinion and
Order, this Court held that Plaintiff’s state-law breach of contract claim was preempted by the
LMRA. (Doc. #25 at 6-7). The Sixth Circuit has explained that when a state-law claim would
require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, it is preempted by section 301 of the

2

Ford originally styled its motion as one for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(c). However, because both parties attached evidence to their briefs that was not
attached to or contained in the pleadings, the Court allowed the attachments and converted
Ford’s motion to one for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, as required by Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(d). (Doc. #21). The Court permitted the parties to file any additional materials for
the Court’s consideration, although Ford’s motion was filed pre-discovery.
12

LMRA. (Doc. #25 at 6-7, citing Paul v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514, 519
(6th Cir. 2012) and Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991)).
Based on the parties’ submissions, and Plaintiff’s Complaint in particular, the Court found
that Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim would require interpretation of the CBA because Plaintiff
specifically alleged, and intended to prove, that 1) Ford breached the CBA between it and UAW
Local 600, and 2) UAW Local 600 breached its duty of fair representation. (Doc. #25 at 7-8; see
also Pl. Compl. at ¶ 38). Accordingly, this Court determined that Plaintiff’s state-law breach of
contract claim could not proceed alongside Plaintiff’s hybrid section 301 LMRA claim and held that
the LMRA preempted Plaintiff’s state-law breach of contract claim.
On May 23, 2014, UAW filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s remaining
claim. (Doc. #50). Plaintiff responded, (Doc. #56), and UAW replied. (Doc. #63).3
On May 23, 2014, Ford filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, (Doc. #52), with a separate
Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (Doc. #51). Plaintiff responded, (Doc. #55) with a
separate Counter-Statement of Material Facts Not In Dispute (Doc. #58). Ford replied, (Doc. #65),
and also filed a response to Plaintiff’s counter-statement of facts (Doc. #64).
On June 20, 2014, Magistrate Judge Michael Hluchaniuk extended the original discovery
deadline of April 22, 2014 for the sole purpose of allowing the depositions of Kathleen Beaudoin
(“Beaudoin”) and Cathy Carpenter (“Carpenter”) to proceed. (Doc. #62).
On September 3, 2014, this Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Supplemental
Oppositions to Defendants’ Summary Judgment Motions (Doc. #67) to incorporate the testimony

3

This Court later struck UAW’s reply for failure to comply with the Local Rules and
Practice Guidelines (Doc. #81). It was re-filed as Doc. #82.
13

of Beaudoin and Carpenter. Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to Ford’s motion (Doc. #68).
Plaintiff filed a supplemental response to UAW’s motion (Doc. #69) to which UAW replied. (Doc.
#70).
STANDARD OF DECISION
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1984), quoting FED. R. CIV. P.
56(c).
“The party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there are no
genuine issues of material fact in the case.” LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376,
378 (6th Cir.1993). “The moving party may meet its burden by showing that the nonmoving party
lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case.” Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling
Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir. 1993). The plaintiff must come forth with more than a “mere
scintilla of evidence” in support of his or her position in order to survive summary judgment.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986). “The court must view the evidence, all
facts, and any inferences that may permissibly be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
ANALYSIS
I.

UAW’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has chosen to proceed in this case on a hybrid section 301 claim under the LMRA.

29 U.S.C. § 185. Section 301 of the LMRA provides that “[s]uits for violation of contracts between

14

an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce .
. . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties . . . .”
29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
“A hybrid § 301 suit implicates the interrelationship among a union member, his union, and
his employer.” Vencl v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, Local 18, 137 F.3d 420, 424 (6th Cir.
1998), citing White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 1990). “To recover
against a union under § 301, the union member must prove both (1) that the employer breached the
collective bargaining agreement and (2) that the union breached its duty of fair representation.”
Garrish v. Int’l Union United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 417 F.3d 590,
594 (6th Cir. 2005), citing Vencl, 137 F.3d at 424. “If both prongs are not satisfied, Plaintiffs cannot
succeed against any Defendant.” Id. Therefore, if this Court grants UAW’s motion for summary
judgment, it must also grant Ford’s motion for summary judgment automatically; under a hybrid
section 301 theory of recovery, Plaintiff cannot recover against either Defendant unless he can prove
his claims against both of them individually.
UAW argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because 1) Plaintiff’s claim is timebarred; 2) Plaintiff failed to exhaust internal union remedies before filing suit; 3) Plaintiff has no
evidence that UAW breached its duty of fair representation, and 4) UAW did not owe Plaintiff a
duty of fair representation because Plaintiff was a retiree at the time of Ford’s alleged breach of the
Grievance Settlement Agreement.
A.

UAW Did Not Owe Plaintiff, A Retiree, A Duty of Fair Representation.

UAW argues that it did not owe Plaintiff a duty of fair representation because, after Plaintiff
retired September 1, 2010, he was no longer an active member of UAW Local 600. Plaintiff admits

15

that he is no longer an active, dues-paying member of UAW Local 600. (Pl. Dep. at 158-159).
The Court finds Plaintiff’s retiree status warrants the grant of summary judgment in
Defendants’ favor. The case law appears to be settled on this issue: “[b]ecause retired workers are
no longer employees included in the collective bargaining unit, ‘the bargaining agent is under no
statutory duty to represent them.’” Yolton v. El Paso Tennessee Pipeline Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 1023,
1033 (E.D. Mich. 2009), quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404
U.S. 157, 181 n. 20 (1971); Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, & Agr. Implement Workers of Am.
(UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476, 1484 (6th Cir. 1983) (“the union has no duty to represent
retirees with the employer, although it may choose to do so . . . .”); Mochko v. Acme-Cleveland
Corp., 826 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1987) (“It is settled law that retirees, not meeting the definition of
‘employees’ under the Labor Management Reporting Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), are not entitled to
representation by the union, since such representation would actually give rise to a conflict of
interest between the demands and concerns of active employees and retirees.”); Benedict v. United
Inter-Mountain Tel. Co., 820 F. Supp. 354, 356 (E.D. Tenn. 1993) (“Because these retirees are not
current employees, and even though they may have been members of the bargaining unit at one time,
the Court finds that the defendant unions in this case owed these retirees no duty in regard to health
benefits . . . .”).
Plaintiff officially retired from Ford on September 1, 2010. Plaintiff has admitted that he is
not an active member of UAW Local 600. He pays dues to the retiree chapter, not to UAW Local
600. (Pl. Dep. at 159). Plaintiff could not point to any language in the collective bargaining
agreement that would permit him to file a grievance as a retiree. (Pl. Dep. at 163). Plaintiff has
come forth with no evidence that UAW Local 600 had a duty to him, as a retiree, to further represent

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him regarding disputes between him and Ford that developed post-retirement. The Court finds that
Plaintiff has failed to identify a genuine issue of material fact to warrant trial. Therefore, the Court
shall GRANT UAW’s Motion for Summary Judgment because UAW did not owe Plaintiff a duty
of fair representation at the time Ford allegedly breached the Grievance Settlement Agreement.
II.

Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment
In order for Plaintiff to prevail on his hybrid section 301 LMRA claim, he must prove both

that the union breached its duty of fair representation and that his employer breached the CBA.
Garrish, 417 F.3d at 594, citing Vencl, 137 F.3d at 424. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff
cannot prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation, the Court shall GRANT Ford’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
III.

Defendant Ford’s Motion for Sanctions
On September 5, 2014, with this Court’s permission, Plaintiff filed supplemental briefs in

response to Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. (Docs. #68, 69). Plaintiff’s supplemental
briefs were based on the deposition testimony of Beaudoin, who was the Ford payroll analyst who
processed Plaintiff’s settlement/separation checks. (Beaudoin Dep., attached to Ford’s Mo., Doc.
#74, at Ex. 2 p. 13-15). The parties did not depose Beaudoin until after the discovery deadline; at
that point, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment had already been fully briefed.
In Plaintiff’s Supplemental Opposition to Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff
argued that Beaudoin’s testimony was further evidence that there was a genuine issue of material
fact for trial. Specifically, Plaintiff made four arguments related to Beaudoin’s testimony:
1)

“Ms. Beaudoin never actually saw, or even considered, the Grievance Settlement prior to
calculating the wrongful deductions.” (Pl. Supp. Resp., Doc. #68, at 2, citing Beaudoin Dep.
at pp. 1-12; 50, 61).

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2)

“Significantly, Ms. Beaudoin testified that she was aware of the Grievance Settlement but
admitted that that [sic] she never saw or used the Grievance Settlement signed by Plaintiff
when she calculated the wrongful deductions.” (Pl. Supp. Resp., Doc. #68, at 4, citing
Beaudoin Dep. at p. 15).

3)

“Defendant Ford’s own employee admits that she never even looked at the language in the
Grievance Settlement, let alone made the wrongful deductions pursuant to any supposed
language in the Grievance Settlement.” (Pl. Supp. Resp., Doc. #68, at 5, citing Beaudoin
Dep. at pp. 15, 61).

4)

“Ms. Beaudoin unequivocally admitted in her deposition testimony that she never saw the
Grievance Settlement and that she never used the Grievance Settlement signed by Plaintiff
when she calculated the wrongful deductions.” (Pl. Supp. Resp., Doc. #68, at 6-7, citing
Beaudoin Dep. at p. 15).
Ford argues that “Plaintiff’s brief is a complete distortion of the record and attempts to

mislead the Court by mischaracterizing Ms. Beaudoin’s testimony.” (Ford. Mo., Doc. #74, at 3).
Ford claims that Plaintiff intentionally declined to include or acknowledge these other relevant
portions of Beaudoin’s testimony:
Q:

I’m going to hand you what was previously marked as [the Grievance
Settlement]. Miss Beaudoin, have you ever seen this document before?

A:

I’m not sure if this was the exact document. Actually, no. I have not seen
this one.

...
Q:

Can you explain what you saw that was not exactly this document?

A:

It would be a final settlement letter that was written up I believe.

Q:

And you didn’t have any other authority [to make the deductions] other than
the Grievance Settlement? Well, strike that. You testified earlier that you
had never seen [the Grievance Settlement], correct . . . .

A:

I testified that I don’t know if I received this one. What I received for the
settlement, the Grievance Settlement, had verbiage that has the same
verbiage. I don’t know if this was the exact form that was sent to me to
process the grievance payment, but the verbiage was the same verbiage on
the form that I received. We’re going back three years.
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(Ford Mo., Doc. #74, at Ex. 2 pp. 15, 61-62). Ford argues that, by intentionally omitting this portion
of Beaudoin’s testimony from its supplemental brief, Plaintiff has blatantly misstated the evidence
and mislead the Court, and therefore sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11 and 28 U.S.C. section 1927.
On September 25, 2014, four days before Ford filed the Motion for Sanctions, Plaintiff filed
a “Motion for Leave to File Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief In Clarification/Amendment.” (Doc.
#73). In that motion, Plaintiff disputes that it misrepresented Beaudoin’s testimony. However,
Plaintiff appears to argue that, even considering those previously-omitted portions of Beaudoin’s
testimony, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Grievance Settlement
Agreement permitted the deductions. (Doc. #73). The Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for leave
to file this supplemental brief on November 19, 2014, which Plaintiff filed on November 20, 2014.
(Doc. #84).
A.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 states, in pertinent part, that
“[b]y presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party
certifies that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
(2)

. . . the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;

(3)

the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery;

(4)

the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonable based on belief or a lack
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of information.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2)-(4). This rule further provides that
[i]f, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
Rule 11(b) has been violated, the court may impose an appropriate sanction on any
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsible for the violation.
Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm must be held jointly responsible for a
violation committed by its partner, associate, or employee.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings. Cooter v. Gell
& Hartmax Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). “The first and most important factor [in determining
whether to make an award of sanctions] is deterrence.” Danvers v. Danvers, 959 F.2d 601, 605 (6th
Cir. 1992), citing Jackson v. Law Firm, 875 F.2d 1224, 1229-30 (6th Cir. 1989). The second factor
to be considered concerns compensating the non-violating party for the costs associated with the
violation. Id. (“[T]he sanctions are meant to compensate the party receiving the award for expenses
incurred in litigating the improperly filed suit and the sanctions motion.”). The third factor to be
considered is mitigation: “[t]he moving party must mitigate its expenses in responding to papers that
violate the rule.” Id. Good faith is not a defense to Rule 11 sanctions. Orlett v. Cincinnati
Microwave, Inc., 954 F.2d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 1992), citing Jackson, 875 F.2d at 1229.
A party intending to file a motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 must first comply with
the “safe harbor” provision of that rule. The “safe” harbor provision provides that the filing party
must first serve its motion for sanctions on the opposing party and then wait twenty-one (21) days.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). During that twenty-one day period after service of the motion, the
nonmoving party has an opportunity to “withdraw or appropriately correct” the challenged filing.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). If the non-moving party refuses to correct or withdraw the filing, then the
moving party may file its motion for sanctions with the Court.

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Here, Ford filed its Motion for Sanctions on September 29, 2014 (Doc. #74). It is undisputed
that Ford served its motion on Plaintiff twenty-one days before it filed the motion, on or about
September 8, 2014. Ford argues that Plaintiff “carved out” convenient parts of Beaudoin’s
testimony in an attempt to blatantly misstate the evidence and mislead the Court. (Doc. #74 at 5-6).

On September 25, 2014, prior to Ford’s filing of its motion, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for
Leave to File Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief In Clarification/Amendment.” (“Clarification Brief,”
Doc. #73). Plaintiff appears to dispute that he misrepresented Beaudoin’s testimony, and argues that
he was merely highlighting the inconsistencies in Beaudoin’s testimony. (Doc. #84). Nevertheless,
Plaintiff’s “clarification brief” acknowledges those portions of Beaudoin’s testimony that were
previously omitted from its supplemental brief.
The Court does not find that sanctions are warranted in this case because Plaintiff attempted
to correct the misrepresentation before the motion for sanctions was filed. Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief prior to Ford’s filing of its Motion for Sanctions. In its
Motion for Leave, Plaintiff sought to clarify his prior position and to acknowledge the previously
omitted testimony. (Doc. #73). This Court granted Plaintiff’s motion.
The crux of Ford’s accusation against Plaintiff is that he failed to accurately characterize
Beaudoin’s testimony in an attempt to stave off summary judgment. The Court finds that Plaintiff’s
supplemental brief effectively corrects this issue by acknowledging the previously omitted
testimony. Further, Ford has not provided this Court with authority to show that sanctions are
required under these circumstances. Therefore, the Court shall DENY Ford’s Motion for Sanctions
pursuant to Rule 11.

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B.

28 U.S.C. § 1927

28 U.S.C. section 1927 provides that the Court may require any attorney or person to pay
related costs, expenses and attorney’s fees if that party “multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably and vexatiously.” 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Sixth Circuit has held that “§ 1927 sanctions
require a showing of something less than subjective bad faith, but something more than negligence
or incompetence. Thus, an attorney is sanctionable when he intentionally abuses the judicial process
or knowingly disregards the risk that his actions will needlessly multiply proceedings.” Royal Oak
Entm’t, L.L.C. v. City of Royal Oak, 316 Fed. App’x 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2009). The statute’s
reference to vexatious multiplication of proceedings has been construed to “include conduct where
an attorney knows or reasonably knows that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that his or her litigation
tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of non-frivolous claims.” Id. (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s filing of the supplemental brief falls short of the standard
required to grant costs and fees under section 1927. It is true that Plaintiff omitted a portion of
Beaudoin’s testimony from his supplemental brief. Yet, Plaintiff would have nevertheless been
entitled to file a supplemental brief in order to apprise the Court of Beaudoin’s deposition testimony
because it was taken after the parties completed briefing on the summary judgment motions. The
Court finds that, in this way, Plaintiff’s filing of the supplemental brief did not “multiply the
proceedings” or “needlessly obstruct” litigation of this case. The Court shall DENY Defendant
Ford’s Motion for Sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1927.
CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that UAW Local 600's Motion for

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Summary Judgment (Doc. #50) is GRANTED; Defendant Ford’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. #52) is GRANTED; and Defendant Ford’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. #74) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
S/Sean F. Cox
Sean F. Cox
United States District Judge
Dated: December 17, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
December 17, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Jennifer McCoy
Case Manager

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