Wilcox et al v. Detroit, City of et al

Filing 39

ORDER granting in part 32 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants and granting in part 24 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs. Defendants Dunagan and City of Detroit are dismissed from the case. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (MLan)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

GERALD WILCOX, ET AL.,
Case No. 13-11679
Plaintiffs,
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
ARTHUR J. TARNOW

v.
CITY OF DETROIT, ET AL.,

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID R. GRAND

Defendants.
/

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT [24] AND GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [32]

Due to an accusation against a significantly younger man who shared his
name, Plaintiff Gerald Wilcox became a suspect in the investigation of an armed
robbery he did not commit. Defendants Eric Smigielski and Brian Headapohl,
Detroit police officers, arrested Mr. Wilcox in his home without a warrant at the
direction of their supervisor, Defendant Diaz Graves. Defendant Samuel Dunagan
was placed in charge of Mr. Wilcox’s investigation. Mr. Wilcox was charged with
the robbery and spent fifteen days in jail before being released on bond. The
prosecution eventually dismissed the charges for lack of evidence.
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Mr. Wilcox and his wife, Alecia Wilcox, bring constitutional and common
law claims for false arrest against Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski, Graves, and
City of Detroit, as well as constitutional and common law claims for malicious
prosecution against Defendant Dunagan. Defendants move for summary judgment
on all claims. Plaintiffs move for summary judgment only on the constitutional
and common law false arrest claims against Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski,
and Graves. After a hearing on January 20, 2016, the Court took the parties’
motions for summary judgment under advisement.
For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
[Dkt. #24] is GRANTED with respect to their Fourth Amendment false arrest
claims against Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski, and Graves. Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is DENIED on those claims. With respect to
all other claims, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED
and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, if applicable, is DENIED.
Defendants Dunagan and City of Detroit are DISMISSED from the case, which
remains open only to determine the damages to be awarded in the judgment against
Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski, and Graves on the Fourth Amendment false
arrest claims.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 30, 2013, a man robbed a Family Dollar Store in Detroit at
gunpoint. He drew his gun on cashier Lashawnda Everett and demanded the
contents of the cash register. Everett lacked access to the register, but store
manager Cynthia Jackson opened it and gave the robber the cash. David Windon,
another employee present at the time, hid after observing the robber draw his gun.
Meanwhile, retired Detroit police officer Pride Johnson was in the parking
lot. When he witnessed the robbery through the glass doors, he called the Detroit
police and described the robber as a six-foot-tall Black man with medium
complexion, a heavy build, and an afro hairstyle, wearing a balaclava or half ski
mask. He did not describe the robber’s age. Johnson observed the robber leave the
store and take off in a car. He gave the car’s license plate number to the police.
Shortly thereafter, two officers went to the store while two others went to the
home where the car was registered. The officers at the home filed a report stating
that they talked to Beatrice McKinney, who owned the home and the car. They
reported that she speculated that her nephew, Gerald Wilcox, had taken the car
without her permission, as he had done before. The officers also learned that she
owned a handgun, which turned out to be missing; McKinney speculated that
Wilcox had taken the gun too. At her deposition, McKinney testified that she gave
the officers a description of Wilcox and told them that he was twenty-two or
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twenty-three years old. However, the officers’ report lists Wilcox’s age as fortyfive. McKinney testified that she told the officers she did not know where Wilcox
lived, but that he had recently been kicked out his girlfriend’s house on Strathmore
Street. This information is not in their report.
Early the next morning (January 31, 2013), Defendant Graves, a unit
supervisor, received a report about the robbery and assigned it to Defendants
Headapohl and Smigielski. Using Michigan’s Law Enforcement Information
Network (LEIN), they found a record of a forty-three-year-old Gerald Wilcox
living in Saint Clair Shores. This was Plaintiff Gerald Wilcox. The record
included a photo of Mr. Wilcox. Headapohl and Smigielski went to the Family
Dollar Store and viewed surveillance footage of the robbery, but reached no
conclusion on whether the man in the footage was also the man in Mr. Wilcox’s
photo. They then went to McKinney’s house, but she was not home. They
presented their information to Defendant Graves, who authorized them to go to Mr.
Wilcox’s home and instructed them to arrest him.
Defendants Headapohl and Smigielski, along with four other officers, went
to Plaintiffs’ home the same day (January 31, 2013). Plaintiff Alecia Wilcox met
the officers at the door. The ensuing events are disputed. At their depositions,
Headapohl and Smigielski affirmed the description in Smigielski’s police report
from that day. According to the report, Mrs. Wilcox lied to the officers, saying her
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last name was Wilson and that nobody named Gerald lived there. At her own
deposition, however, Mrs. Wilcox denied lying to the officers. According to
Smigielski’s report, Mrs. Wilcox eventually looked towards the living room and
told someone that the police were looking for him. The officers then saw Mr.
Wilcox through the window. Mrs. Wilcox then “opened the door and let [the
officers] inside.” At her deposition, Mrs. Wilcox testified that the officers “just
came in the house when they saw him.” She further testified that before entering,
the officers had not told her why they were there. The officers arrested Mr. Wilcox
and took him to jail. Defendant Dunagan was then put in charge of investigating
the case against him. Dunagan testified that he never believed Mr. Wilcox was
actually the robber.
The next day (February 1, 2013), officers took written statements from
Everett, Jackson, and Windon (the store employees who witnessed the robbery).
Everett described the robber as “maybe 30 yrs old or under.” Jackson described
him as “early twenties to mid twenties.” Windon described him as between twenty
and thirty. Dunagan showed them photos of Mr. Wilcox and four other men, all of
whom were in their forties. Jackson and Windon did not identify any of them as
the robber. However, Everett identified Mr. Wilcox as the robber.
The next day (February 2, 2013), Dunagan took a statement from
McKinney, the owner of the car used in the robbery. She said that her relative
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Gerald Wilcox, who she had accused of being the robber, was only twenty-two or
twenty-three years old. She saw a picture of Plaintiff Gerald Wilcox and denied
knowing him. Dunagan obtained an arrest warrant for Plaintiff Gerald Wilcox.
Mr. Wilcox was arraigned the next day (February 3, 2013). Bond was set at
$100,000 cash. Officers took a statement from Pride Johnson (the retired police
officer who witnessed the robbery). Johnson did not describe the robber’s age.
Mr. Wilcox’s preliminary hearing was held on February 15, 2013. Judge
Shannon A. Holmes asked if McKinney—the only link between the robber and the
name Gerald Wilcox—had confirmed that Mr. Wilcox was the man she had
accused. Dunagan informed Judge Holmes that McKinney had denied knowing
Mr. Wilcox. Judge Holmes ordered Mr. Wilcox released on a $10,000 personal
bond, but declined to dismiss the charges.
On March 7, 2013, Pride Johnson (the retired officer) met Dunagan and the
prosecutor for a “walk-through.” He saw Mr. Wilcox and said that he was not the
robber. The prosecutor dismissed the charges. Dunagan testified that he did
nothing to find the actual robber after Mr. Wilcox was released, due to a heavy
caseload.
ANALYSIS
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
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that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving
party has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material
fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks
evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
A genuine issue for trial exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
I.

Fourth Amendment false arrest
Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer “may not enter a private

home without a warrant absent an exigency or consent.” Smith v. Stoneburner, 716
F.3d 926, 929–30 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590
(1980)). The consent exception requires a free invitation into the home, rather than
mere acquiescence to the officer’s entry. Id. at 930 (citing United States v. Moon,
513 F.3d 527, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)). The exigency exception includes an exception
for “hot pursuit,” pursuant to which “an officer may chase a suspect into a private
home when the [suspect] has fled from a public place.” Id. at 931 (citing Warden
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v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967)). The exigency exception also permits
warrantless entry to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence, if supported by
a genuine exigency. Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 470 (2011). Finally, it
permits entry to protect an occupant from imminent injury. Id. at 460.
It is undisputed that Defendants Smigielski and Headapohl entered Mr.
Wilcox’s home and arrested him therein without a warrant. Plaintiffs argue that
the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment, bringing false arrest claims, pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Smigielski, Headapohl, Graves, and City of
Detroit.
A.

Smigielski and Headapohl

Plaintiffs move for summary judgment on their Fourth Amendment false
arrest claims against Smigielski and Headapohl. The officers move for summary
judgment as well, arguing that the in-home arrest was constitutional due to exigent
circumstances and consent.
No reasonable jury could find the officers’ warrantless entry into the home
justified by exigent circumstances. The hot pursuit exception does not apply
because the officers were not chasing Mr. Wilcox into his home after he fled from
a public place. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d at 931. Defendants rely on the allegation
that Mrs. Wilcox lied to the officers about her last name and the residence of a
person named Gerald. They argue that her deceptive, evasive behavior triggered
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the exigent circumstances exception because (1) the officers could have believed
she was buying time for Mr. Wilcox to destroy evidence, and/or (2) the officers
could have believed she was lying under threat of imminent harm, justifying entry
to protect her. Since there is a factual dispute regarding whether Mrs. Wilcox lied
to the officers at all, the alleged lies cannot support summary judgment for
Defendants. Further, the alleged lies do not preclude summary judgment for
Plaintiffs; even if Mrs. Wilcox lied as alleged, the lies and their context are
insufficient as a matter of law to support a reasonable belief of imminent
destruction of evidence or harm to Mrs. Wilcox. Indeed, Defendant Smigielski
testified at his deposition that he did not believe there were exigent circumstances.
More importantly, even under their own account, the officers did not enter the
home until after Mrs. Wilcox turned to look towards her husband and told him the
officers were looking for him. By that point, at least, the officers knew that Mrs.
Wilcox was not trying to hide his presence from them.
No reasonable jury could find that the officers entered with consent, either.
The officers rely on an arrest report written by Smigielski shortly after the arrest,
which states that after the officers saw Mr. Wilcox through the window, Mrs.

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Wilcox opened the door and let the officers in.1 That statement is ambiguous as to
whether she invited them in, which would satisfy the consent exception, or merely
acquiesced to their entry, which would not. Stoneburner, 716 F.3d at 930. This
ambiguity is insufficient to raise a jury question in light of the officers’ deposition
testimony. Both Smigielski and Headapohl testified at their depositions that after
officers saw Mr. Wilcos through a window, they simply walked into the house.
Neither testified that they asked Mrs. Wilcox if they could enter or that she invited
them in. Since Mrs. Wilcox asserts that she did not, and neither the officers’
deposition testimony nor the police report states that she did, the dispute over
consent is not “genuine.”
In sum, it is undisputed that Smigielski and Headapohl entered Plaintiffs’
home, and arrested Mr. Wilcox therein, without a warrant. There is no genuine
factual dispute concerning the existence of exigent circumstances or consent
sufficient to justify this warrantless entry and arrest. Therefore, Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgment [24] is GRANTED with respect to their Fourth
Amendment false arrest claims against Smigielski and Headapohl. Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is DENIED on these claims.

1

Plaintiffs argue that this statement is inadmissible hearsay. Because the Court
holds Plaintiffs entitled to summary judgment regardless of the statement’s
admissibility, the Court need not resolve the question.
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B.

Graves

Defendant Graves moves for summary judgment on the grounds that he did
not directly participate in arresting Mr. Wilcox, but only played a supervisory role.
“[E]ven if a plaintiff can prove a violation of his constitutional rights, his § 1983
claim must fail against a supervisory official unless ‘the supervisor encouraged the
specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.’”
Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 802–03 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 558 (6th Cir. 2002)). “At a minimum a plaintiff must
show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly
acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Id. at 803
(quoting Combs, 315 F.3d at 558).
Graves’ supervisory role is not a defense. Defendant Smigielski testified
that he and Headapohl were unsure if they had probable cause to arrest Mr. Wilcox
when they presented the results of their brief investigation to Graves. He further
testified that Graves, knowing that no warrant had been issued, instructed
Smigielski and Headapohl to go to Mr. Wilcox’s home and arrest him. This
testimony is undisputed (Graves testified that he did not recall what was said). A
reasonable jury would therefore necessarily conclude that Graves “at least
implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional
conduct.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [24] is
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GRANTED, and Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [32] DENIED, with
respect to the Fourth Amendment false arrest claim against Graves.
C.

City of Detroit

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant City of Detroit is liable for Mr. Wilcox’s
unconstitutional arrest because it provided inadequate training on the constitutional
requirements for arrests in a suspect’s home. The City moves for summary
judgment (Plaintiffs do not).
To establish a city’s liability for a city officer’s constitutional violation
under a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must prove that the training was
inadequate for the tasks the officer was required to perform; that the inadequacy
resulted from the city’s deliberate indifference; and that the inadequacy actually
caused or was closely related to the constitutional injury. Shadrick v. Hopkins
County, Ky., 805 F.3d 724, 738 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Plinton v. Cnty. of Summit,
540 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008); Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036,
1046 (6th Cir. 1992)). It is insufficient to show that a single official was
unsatisfactorily trained; that an otherwise sound training program was administered
negligently; or that better or more training could have equipped the offending
official to avoid his particular injury-causing conduct, thereby sparing the plaintiff
his injury. Id. (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390–91). Instead, the plaintiff
must show either (1) the city adhered to its training even though it knew or should
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have known that the training failed to prevent a pattern of similar constitutional
violations, or (2) the city has failed to train its officers to handle a narrow class of
recurring situations that present an obvious potential for constitutional violations.
Id. at 738–39 (citing Connick v. Thompson, 131 S.Ct. 1350, 1360 (2011); Board of
County Com’rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409 (1997)).
The City is entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs cite no evidence of a
pattern of similar violations. Further, though arrests in a suspect’s home belong to
a “narrow class of recurring situations that present an obvious potential for
constitutional violation,” id., Plaintiffs present no direct evidence concerning the
content, duration, or frequency of the City’s training on the subject. Their
evidence of inadequacy is simply (1) the fact that the unconstitutional arrest
occurred; and (2) Defendant Smigielski’s testimony that the officers acted in
accordance with their training. Plaintiffs also point out that Defendant Dunagan
testified that he believes the arrest was illegal—but this actually undermines
Plaintiffs’ claim, since it suggests that Dunagan’s training adequately equipped
him to understand the constitutional requirements and recognize that they were not
followed in this case. Plaintiffs have presented no more than a scintilla of evidence
in support of their failure-to-train claim. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED on this claim.

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II.

Common law false arrest
Plaintiffs raise false arrest claims against Defendants Smigielski, Headapohl,

and Graves under Michigan common law. The parties devoted little attention to
these claims in their briefs and at oral argument, perhaps relying on their similarity
to the Fourth Amendment false arrest claims. Unlike the constitutional claims,
however, the common law claims are subject to the defense of Michigan
governmental immunity, which the officers raised as an affirmative defense in their
Answers. Under Michigan law, a governmental employee may establish immunity
to an intentional tort claim by showing the following:
(a) The acts were undertaken during the course of employment and
the employee was acting, or reasonably believed that he was acting,
within the scope of his authority,
(b) the acts were undertaken in good faith, or were not undertaken
with malice, and
(c) the acts were discretionary, as opposed to ministerial.
Odom v. Wayne County, 760 N.W.2d 217, 228 (Mich. 2008). The good faith
standard for Michigan governmental immunity, in contrast to the objective
standard used when evaluating federal qualified immunity, is a subjective test
based on the officers’ state of mind. Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401, 420 (6th Cir.
2015). To establish immunity, officers must prove that they did not act with intent
to harm or with indifference amounting to a willingness that harm will result. Id.
(citing Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 225). For instance, a police officer sued for arresting
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someone without probable cause can establish immunity by showing that he
“honestly believed that he had probable cause to arrest, even if he later learned that
he was mistaken.” Odom, 760 N.W.2d at 229.
Here, the officers’ testimony reflects an honest belief, at the time of the
arrest, that the arrest was lawful. Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence
placing the officers’ good faith in question. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ failure-to-train
claim rests on an argument that the officers misunderstood the law’s requirements,
rather than violating them in bad faith—an argument that they did not explicitly
raise in the alternative. The Court holds the officers entitled to Michigan
governmental immunity on the common law claims for false arrest. Plaintiffs’
Motion for Summary Judgment [24] is DENIED on these claims, while
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED.
III.

Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution
Plaintiffs raise a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim against

Defendant Dunagan. Defendant Dunagan moves for summary judgment.
“The Sixth Circuit recognizes a separate constitutionally cognizable claim of
malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, which encompasses wrongful
investigation, prosecution, conviction, and incarceration.” Sykes v. Anderson, 625
F.3d 294, 308 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
(quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 715–16 (6th Cir. 2006)). A Fourth
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Amendment malicious prosecution claim has four elements: “(1) the defendant
made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there
was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the
legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the
initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at
308–09). The “malicious prosecution” label is misleading, since “malice” is not an
element. Sykes, 625 F.3d at 310. Nevertheless, “there must be some element of
blameworthiness or culpability in the [defendant’s] participation” in the
prosecution, “something beyond mere negligence or innocent mistake.” Johnson v.
Moseley, 790 F.3d 649, 655 (6th Cir. 2015).
Dunagan asks the Court to find probable cause for the prosecution as a
matter of law. He emphasizes that Everett, one of the eyewitnesses, identified
Gerald as the robber during the photographic lineup. However, eyewitness
identification is insufficient to support probable cause where “there is an apparent
reason for the officer to believe that the eyewitness was lying, did not accurately
describe what he had seen, or was in some fashion mistaken regarding his
recollection.” Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 430 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Ahlers v. Schlebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 1999)). Dunagan had ample reason
to believe Everett was mistaken: (1) every eyewitness, including Everett herself
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before the lineup, described the robber as in his twenties; (2) McKinney had
described her relative—the one accused of briefly stealing the car used in the
robbery—as in his twenties and, when shown a photo of Mr. Wilcox, denied
knowing him; and (3) the photographic lineup only included pictures of men in
their forties, increasing the chance that Everett would misremember the robber’s
age. In fact, Dunagan did doubt the identification, since he testified that he never
believed Mr. Wilcox was the robber. Given the obvious reasons to doubt Everett’s
identification, it cannot overcome the rule that “[i]n general, the existence of
probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question.” Kinlin v. Kline, 749
F.3d 573, 578 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th
Cir. 1995)).
The genuine factual dispute over probable cause is immaterial, however,
because there is no genuine dispute regarding whether Dunagan acted with the
culpability required to sustain a Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
Dunagan’s reliance on Everett’s eyewitness identification precludes a reasonable
jury finding of any culpability greater than negligence. Negligence is insufficient
to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. Johnson, 790 F.3d at 655.
Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [32] is GRANTED with
respect to the Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.

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IV.

Common law malicious prosecution
Plaintiffs’ final claim is a common law malicious prosecution claim against

Defendant Dunagan. A malicious prosecution claim under Michigan law “requires
evidence that the officer knowingly swore to false facts.” Newman v. Township of
Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769, 773 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Payton v. City of Detroit,
536 N.W.2d 233, 242 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence that Dunagan
knowingly swore to false facts. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [32] is GRANTED with respect to this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above,
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment [24] is
GRANTED with respect to their Fourth Amendment false arrest claims against
Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski, and Graves. Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [32] is DENIED on those claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment [32] is GRANTED—and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, if
applicable, is DENIED—with respect to all other claims.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Dunagan and City of
Detroit are DISMISSED from the case, which remains open only to determine the
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damages to be awarded in the judgment against Defendants Headapohl, Smigielski,
and Graves on the Fourth Amendment false arrest claims.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: February 16, 2016

s/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge

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