Morrow v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 13

OPINION and ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 8 MOTION for Summary Judgment and Granting 11 MOTION for Summary Judgment (and brief in support) - Signed by District Judge Laurie J. Michelson. (JJoh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

SHERREE MORROW,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-11913
Hon. Laurie J. Michelson
Mag. Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________________/

OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [8] AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT [11]
In 1998, a sciatic nerve condition left Plaintiff Sherree Morrow in bed for six weeks,
during which time her employer terminated her employment. (Id.) Morrow also has a long
history of severe migraine headaches that continue to this day. In 2009, Morrow, believing that
her back condition and headaches prevent her from engaging in full-time work, applied for
disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act.
Morrow claimed that she had been disabled since 1998. An administrative law judge, acting on
behalf of Defendant Commissioner of Social Security, disagreed. Morrow appeals that decision
here.
Each party has moved for summary judgment, Morrow seeking a reversal of the
Commissioner’s disability determination or a remand to the Administration for further
adjudication, the Commissioner asking the Court to affirm her decision. (See Dkts. 8, 11.) The
Court has reviewed the administrative record, the ALJ’s decision, and the parties’ briefs. Under
the governing deferential standard of review, the Court finds that Morrow has not shown that the

administrative law judge’s credibility assessment was error or that he improperly used vocational
expert testimony at step four. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 8), GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 11), and
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s disability determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
I. BACKGROUND
A. Medical Records
Although Morrow has alleged disability beginning in January 1998, the administrative
record does not say much about her condition before 2006. An emergency-room record from
2000 indicates that Morrow sought treatment for her “wors[t] headache . . . ever . . . .” (Tr. 229.)
The pain was in the frontal occipital region, and included pounding, photophobia, and multiple
episodes of vomiting. (Tr. 229.) A brain CT-scan was normal. (Tr. 230.) Emergency-room notes
indicate that Morrow’s medical history included migraines, epilepsy, and chronic thoracic back
pain. (Tr. 229.) At the time of her emergency-room visit, Morrow was taking Dilantain, an antiseizure medication, Norflex, a pain reliever for muscular-type injuries, and Imitrex, a migraine
medication. (Tr. 230.)
In February 2006, Morrow, apparently still suffering from migraines, underwent a CTscan of her head. It revealed mild sinusitis, but was otherwise normal. (Tr. 308.)
The next month, Morrow saw Dr. Henry Hagenstein. (Tr. 316-18.) Morrow reported that
her headaches had started “in childhood[,] years ago” and that her mother suffered from
migraines and her sister from cluster headaches. (Tr. 317.) Morrow stated that her headaches
were triggered by hunger, stress, and strong odors. (Tr. 316.) They occurred several times per
week, and usually lasted several days. (Tr. 316.) She explained to Dr. Hagenstein that the pain
was primarily in her right temporal region and behind her right eye and would peak at an “11” on

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a scale where “10” meant unbearable pain. (Tr. 316.) Morrow reported that nausea, vomiting,
photophobia, and dizziness accompanied her headaches. (Id.) Triptan agents like Imitrex
improved her headaches, but various medications (beta blockers, anti-convulsants, and calcium
channel blockers) had been intolerable or ineffective at preventing her headaches. (Id.) Dr.
Hagenstein assessed: “Migraine headache without aura; I suspect that she has analgesic rebound
headaches, probably from excessive Imitrex use.” (Tr. 318.) He wanted Morrow to stop smoking,
as that was a “major contributor to the refractory nature of her headaches,” and to reduce the use
of analgesics. (Tr. 318.) He thought that Topamax, Depakote, and a tricyclic antidepressant (e.g.,
Elavil) could work as preventative agents. (Id.)
In May 2006, Morrow apparently lost consciousness and therefore underwent a head CTscan. (See Tr. 307.) The scan showed no evidence of infarct, hemorrhage, or mass effect. (Id.)
In October 2006, Morrow had a visit with her long-time physician, Dr. Brian Beck. (Tr.
271.) It appears (much of Dr. Beck’s notes are illegible) that Morrow explained that she was
having rebound headaches, and that Dr. Beck prescribed Elavil, Depakote, and (perhaps)
Tramadol. (Tr. 271.) At the end of October, Dr. Beck provided Morrow with a Toradol injection.
(Tr. 270.) Toradol is a short-term pain reliever which is first provided via injection and then
continued for five days orally. Medline Plus, Ketorolac, http://goo.gl/Z5kK9W (last visited May
1, 2014).
In November 2006, Morrow reported that her headaches had decreased. (Tr. 269.)
Indeed, Dr. Beck noted, “Better!!” and “Best in Years!” (Id.)
Nonetheless, Morrow’s headaches continued for the remainder of the disability period at
issue in this case. In January, February, and March 2007, Dr. Beck, or someone in his office,
provided Morrow with Toradol injections. (Tr. 264, 267.) In June 2007, it appears (insofar as Dr.

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Beck’s short-hand can be deciphered) that Dr. Beck noted that Morrow was having headaches
every 12 to 14 days which either then increased in frequency or had increased in frequency. (Tr.
263.) They lasted 24 to 26 hours with vomiting. (Tr. 263.) In September and October 2007, Dr.
Beck provided Morrow with osteopathic manipulative treatment on her cervical spine. (Tr. 262.)
In November 2007, Morrow’s chief complaint was a sinus infection and headache. (Tr. 261.)
Dr. Beck’s treatment notes from 2008 and 2009 are terse and hard to read. It appears that
in June 2008, Dr. Beck noted that Morrow’s headaches increased with stress. (Tr. 259.) In July
and August 2008, Dr. Beck prescribed Imitrex or Treximet, another migraine medication. (Tr.
257.) In January 2009, Morrow was due for physical therapy (perhaps the osteopathic
manipulative treatment) and a shot, but, because of a severe migraine headache, “she wanted
only a shot.” (Tr. 289.) In April and May 2009, Dr. Beck provided Toradol treatment. (Tr. 28889.) In September 2009, Morrow called Dr. Beck’s office with a complaint of sciatic nerve pain
and to report that she had run out of Imitrex (or Treximet). (Tr. 252.) Later that month, Dr. Beck
provided another Toradol injection. (Tr. 252.) Dr. Beck also continued to provide Morrow with
osteopathic manipulative treatment. (Tr. 254, 256, 257, 259, 260.)
Morrow continued to see Dr. Beck for headaches in 2010. But in January, her primary
complaint was lower back pain that radiated down her whole right leg and her left leg to her
knee. (Tr. 251.) A lumbar-spine x-ray revealed moderate disc space narrowing at the L4-L5 and
L5-S1 vertebrae and moderate facet arthropathy. (Tr. 291.) In February 2010, Morrow reported
to Dr. Beck that she had been having a headache for three days, and, apparently, that her leg was
keeping her from sleeping. (Tr. 250.) Later that month, Dr. Beck’s plan included physical
therapy, an MRI, “surgeon” or “surgery,” and Vicodin. (Tr. 249.)

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In March 2010, Dr. Samiullah Sayyid evaluated Morrow for Michigan’s Disability
Determination Service (“DDS”), a state agency that helps the Social Security Administration
evaluate claimants in Michigan. (Tr. 321.) Morrow’s chief complaint was “back ache” and
migraines. (Tr. 321.) Morrow stated that her back pain radiated into her right leg, nearly to her
foot, with some paresthesia and weakness. (Id.) She reported having migraines with nausea,
occasional vomiting, and photophobia about three to four times per month, each lasting 24 to 36
hours. (Tr. 321.) Morrow told Dr. Sayyid that her migraines began in childhood. (Id.) Upon
exam, Dr. Sayyid noted that Morrow’s “lumbosacral spine was tender with diminished
movements.” (Tr. 322.) Morrow was able to walk normally and “walk on [her] heels and toes,
squat and recover, and get on and off the [exam] table without difficulty.” (Id.) Dr. Sayyid’s
impression: “Chronic back ache with right lower extremity sciatica, rule out disc problems.
Migraine headaches.” (Id.)
Morrow next saw Dr. Beck in April 2010. He wrote, “migraine – chronic” and something
else illegible. (Tr. 248.)
In June 2010, Morrow underwent a second DDS consultative exam; this one was related
to possible emphysema and was performed by Dr. Richard Gause. (Tr. 312-15.) Dr. Gause noted
that Morrow was “unsure whether or not she ha[d] a problem with her breathing” and that
Morrow had been “told by a physician, in passing, that she had emphysema.” (Tr. 312.) Dr.
Gause wrote: “She feels she can walk 12-15 blocks on a flat surface and can climb two flights of
stairs, without having to stop.” (Tr. 312.) After performing an examination and pulmonary
function study, Dr. Gause concluded that Morrow had “essentially no exertional dyspnea” and
that her “pulmonary exam was normal.” (Tr. 314.)

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The administrative record contains a “Report of Surgical Procedure” form from June
2010. (Tr. 246.) The form is sparsely noted and Dr. Beck’s handwriting is again illegible. (Id.)
In late June 2010, Dr. U. Gupta reviewed Morrow’s medical file and opined on her
residual functional capacity for the DDS. (Tr. 53-54.) He thought that Morrow could lift 20
pounds occasionally, 10 pounds frequently, stand or walk for about six hours in an eight-hour
day, and sit for about six hours in an eight-hour day. (Tr. 53.) He included some postural
limitations, such as only “occasional[]” climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. (Id.)
According to a form that Morrow completed in connection with her disability application,
in September 2010, she was taking Dilantin for her epilepsy, Flexeril for her pain, and Treximet
for her migraines. (Tr. 211.)
The administrative record ends in November 2010. (Tr. 243, 335.) In early November,
Dr. Beck provided Morrow with osteopathic manipulative treatment and noted “C-D pain”
(perhaps cervical-disc pain) and “migraine.” (Tr. 234.) A treatment note from mid-November
states, “wants a migraine shot”; Dr. Beck provided a Toradol injection. (Tr. 243.)
B. Hearing Before the ALJ
In June 2011, Morrow, then 56 years old, appeared before Social Security Administrative
Law Judge Troy M. Patterson to testify about her back pain and migraines. Morrow explained, “I
woke up one morning [in 1998] and I couldn’t move. I just couldn’t move, and I’d never been
quite that bad before.” (Tr. 40.) She went to the hospital and learned that she had a problem with
her sciatic nerve. (Id.) Morrow said she was bed-ridden for about six weeks, and, because her
employer needed to find someone who could work, she was let go. (Id.) Morrow stated that her
back pain was always present “to a degree,” but that she was able to “cope with it on most days.”
(Tr. 41.) “[B]ut,” said Morrow, “there are times where it’s so severe that I cannot get out of bed

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again, without help at least.” (Id.) Morrow thought that her pain had worsened over time, but that
even during the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, i.e., the period around her alleged disability onset
date, her pain disrupted her sleep. (Tr. 41.) Morrow also indicated that in the late 1990’s and the
early 2000’s she would have 10 bad days per month where she would have to lie down most of
the day. (Tr. 42.)
Regarding her migraines, Morrow testified, “it seems like as I get older the headaches get
worse, and actually become more frequent.” (Tr. 43.) She stated that in the years following her
alleged disability onset date, she was having “[p]robably at least three to four, up to half a
dozen” migraines per month. (Tr. 43.) Morrow described her headaches this way: “I just pretty
much stayed in bed. A lot of—they’re terrible. There’s a lot of crying going on. I just, I feel
absolutely terrible. It’s hard to explain to someone who’s never had one that, you know, you ever
got to the point where you just wish you weren’t alive even. And there is no medication that will
actually take care of it.” (Tr. 43-44.) She explained that taking Tylenol was “like just eating
candy” and that only Imitrex or Treximet worked but she could not afford them. (Tr. 44.)
Morrow stated that her migraines would last from 24 to 36 hours, and even after that she would
suffer “after effects” where she would still feel “terrible” and “very fatigued” to the point where
she could “barely move.” (Tr. 44.)
C. The Disability Framework and the ALJ’s Decision
Under the Social Security Act, disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income “are available only for those who have a ‘disability.’” See Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d
727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). The Act defines “disability,” in relevant part, as the
inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months.
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42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (DIB); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905 (SSI).
The Social Security regulations provide that disability is to be determined through the
application of a five-step sequential analysis:
1. If claimant is doing substantial gainful activity, he is not disabled.
2. If claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity, his impairment must be
severe before he can be found to be disabled.
3. If claimant is not doing substantial gainful activity and is suffering from a
severe impairment that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous period of
at least twelve months, and his impairment meets or equals a listed impairment,
claimant is presumed disabled without further inquiry.
4. If claimant’s impairment does not prevent him from doing his past relevant
work, he is not disabled.
5. Even if claimant’s impairment does prevent him from doing his past relevant
work, if other work exists in the national economy that accommodates his residual
functional capacity and vocational factors (age, education, skills, etc.), he is not
disabled.
Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. “The burden of proof is on the claimant throughout the first four
steps . . . . If the analysis reaches the fifth step without a finding that the claimant is not disabled,
the burden transfers to the [Commissioner].” Preslar v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 14
F.3d 1107, 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
ALJ Patterson applied this five-step disability analysis and concluded that Morrow was
not under a disability as that term is used in the Act. In particular, at step one, he concluded that
Morrow had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged disability onset date of
January 24, 1998. (Tr. 21.) At step two, the ALJ found that Morrow suffered from the following
severe impairments: “back pain (degenerative disc disease) and migraine headaches.” (Tr. 22.)
At step three, the ALJ concluded that Morrow’s impairments, alone or in combination, did not

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meet or medically equal any of the Administration’s listed impairments for presumptive
disability. (Tr. 22.) Next, the ALJ determined that Morrow had the residual functional capacity to
“perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).” (Tr.
22.)1 At step four, relying on vocational expert testimony, the ALJ concluded that Morrow was
capable of performing her past relevant work as a file clerk. (Tr. 25.) The ALJ thus determined
that Morrow was not under a disability between her alleged onset date of January 24, 1998, and
the date of his decision, September 28, 2011. (Tr. 26.)
The Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council denied Morrow’s request to
review the ALJ’s decision. (Tr. 1.) Thus, the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the
Commissioner. Morrow asks this Court to find that decision erroneous.
II. ANALYSIS
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). But judicial review is limited: the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s
conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal
standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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“Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or
carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very little, a
job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it involves
sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To be considered
capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the ability to do
substantially all of these activities.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). Social Security
Ruling 83-10 further defines “a good deal of walking or standing” as “standing or walking, off
and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251,
at *5.
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support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently
and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health
& Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
Morrow raises two claims of error but the Commissioner says that the Court need only
address one. In particular, the Commissioner says that Morrow’s argument that the ALJ erred in
assessing her credibility has been waived. (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 8-10.) The Commissioner
points out that while Morrow’s counsel recites the testimony that the ALJ allegedly should have
credited, her counsel does not say why the ALJ should have credited that testimony. (Def.’s Mot.
Summ. J. at 9-10.) The Commissioner stresses that this is not the first time that the law firm
Morrow has retained has submitted social-security appeal briefs with arguments that are too
cursory to warrant a court’s attention. (Def.’s Mot. at 8 & n.4 (citing Burger v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 12-11763, 2013 WL 2285375 (E.D. Mich. May 23, 2013); Bush v. Astrue, No. 1211790, 2013 WL 1747807 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by
2013 WL 1747828 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 23, 2013); Dice v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-11784,
2013 WL 2155528 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2013); Deguise v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-10590,
2013 WL 1189967 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by 2013
WL 1187291 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 22, 2013); Jackson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-14672, 2013
WL 1148417 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19, 2013), report and recommendation adopted by 2013 WL
1148416 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 19, 2013)).)
The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the credibility argument presented by
Morrow’s counsel is not well developed. Morrow’s brief recites her testimony. (Pl.’s Mot.

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Summ. J. at 9-10.) It then asserts: “Due to the fact that Ms. Morrow has had numerous severe
impairments, it seems unlikely, and rather flawed, to find, as the ALJ did, despite not presenting
a hypothetical, that she would be capable [of] returning to her past relevant work.” (Id. at 10.)
The brief goes on to claim that Morrow’s migraines would require her to miss too many days
from work and that she could not otherwise perform the physical requirements of light work.
(Id.) The problem with this line of reasoning is that it starts from a premise that Morrow’s
counsel does not even attempt to establish. True, if Morrow’s testimony was fully credited, it is
likely that her back pain and migraines would preclude her from performing her past relevant
work (or any substantial gainful employment). But the ALJ did not find Morrow fully credible,
and Morrow’s counsel does not say why that was error.
Although the Court declines to find Morrow’s credibility argument waived, ultimately,
her counsel’s failure to argue why the ALJ’s credibility determination lacks substantial
evidentiary support is fatal to this claim of error. The Court notes that reviewing the
administrative record has led to some concern about the ALJ’s treatment of Morrow’s testimony
about her migraines. Morrow testified to having migraines three or four times per month, with
episodes lasting between 24 and 36 hours. (Tr. 43-44.) The episodes were described as largely
incapacitating. (See id.) This testimony has some support in the record. From January 2007 to
November 2010, Dr. Beck provided Morrow with Toradol injections on at least eight occasions
and also frequently prescribed Imitrex or Treximet for Morrow’s migraines. Yet the ALJ’s only
explicit mention of Morrow’s migraines in his credibility assessment was that Morrow “might be
able to decrease the frequency of her migraines if she stopped smoking and reduced her
medication intake.” (Tr. 24.) Still, Morrow’s counsel has not made the argument that Morrow’s
testimony about her migraines is corroborated by Dr. Beck’s treatment notes. Indeed, Morrow’s

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brief does not mention Dr. Beck at all and it is difficult to know, based on Morrow’s brief,
whether counsel even reviewed his treatment notes.
Further, this Court generally owes credibility determinations by an ALJ “great weight
and deference particularly since the ALJ has the opportunity, which [a court does] not, of
observing a witness’s demeanor while testifying.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,
476 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the ALJ gave at least two reasons supported by substantial evidence
for not fully crediting Morrow’s testimony. First, the ALJ correctly noted that in a function
report that Morrow completed in connection with her disability application, Morrow provided
that she could walk “a few feet to a couple yards” before needing to rest; yet, at her consultative
exam with Dr. Gause, Morrow thought she could walk 12 to 15 blocks and climb two flights of
stairs without having to stop. (Tr. 24; compare Tr. 202, with Tr. 312.) Notably, Morrow
completed the function report only four months before Dr. Gause’s exam. (See Tr. 204, 312.)
Second, the ALJ concluded, “[w]hile the claimant testified she had not worked since
1998, medical records show she was employed with a computer company in 2000, worked as a
medical assistant and carpenter in 2010, and was able to work with a saw in 2009.” (Tr. 24-25.)
Although the hearing transcript does not reflect that Morrow testified that she had not worked
since 1998, and the medical records that the ALJ cites are not as explicit as the ALJ implied, the
ALJ’s general point is still reasonable. On her work history report completed in February 2010,
Morrow listed only jobs as a cashier at a grocery store from 1994 to 1995, a file clerk (medical
assistant (see Tr. 321)) from 1996 to 1997, and a production seamstress making fishing nets. (Tr.
184-86.) Morrow also told Dr. Sayyid in March 2010 that she had not worked since 1998. (Tr.
321.) Yet, the medical records cited by the ALJ provide that in 2000 Morrow reported being
employed with a computer company (Tr. 229) and in 2009 Morrow saw Dr. Beck because she

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had dropped a saw on her foot (Tr. 286). The ALJ did not unreasonably infer that Morrow’s use
of the saw in 2009 was work-related: as the ALJ recognized, in June 2010 Dr. Gause noted,
“Occupation: Medical assistant and carpenter.” (Tr. 330.)
In short, Morrow has not carried her considerable burden of showing that the ALJ’s
credibility assessment was error. See Daniels v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 152 F. App’x 485, 488 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“Claimants challenging the ALJ’s credibility findings face an uphill battle.”); Boley
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-15707, 2012 WL 7748910, at *10-11 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2012)
(Michelson, M.J.) (“Given the generalized nature of Plaintiff’s credibility argument, the Court
begins by emphasizing a matter of appellate procedure: it is Plaintiff’s burden to demonstrate
that the ALJ erred.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 1090531 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 15, 2013) (Murphy, J.).
Morrow also claims that the ALJ improperly “delegate[d]” his step-four fact-finding
responsibility to the vocational expert who testified at the administrative hearing. (Pl.’s Mot. at
7.) Morrow says that the ALJ was required to make specific findings of fact as to her residual
functional capacity assessment, the physical demands of her past job, and whether her residual
functional capacity would allow her to meet those demands. (Pl.’s Mot. at 8 (citing S.S.R. 8662p, 1982 WL 31386).)
The Court finds that the ALJ did not improperly delegate fact-finding at step four to the
vocational expert and that the ALJ made the requisite factual findings. In particular, the ALJ
adequately explained why he believed Morrow was capable of the full range of light work after
detailing the record evidence in his narrative. At the administrative hearing, the ALJ solicited
vocational expert testimony as to the exertional level of Morrow’s past work as a cashier and file
clerk. (Tr. 46.) The vocational expert testified that both positions were “light, semi-skilled.” (Id.)

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With his residual functional capacity assessment and the vocational expert’s testimony in hand,
the ALJ was in position to conclude at step four that Morrow could perform her past relevant
work as a file clerk. (Tr. 25.) The Court finds nothing improper about this mode of analysis.
Morrow, citing Dodds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 01-CV-72190-DT, 2002 WL 1880754
(E.D. Mich. June 30, 2002), implies that the ALJ erred in soliciting any vocational expert
testimony at step four. Apparently, it is Morrow’s position that the ALJ should have accepted her
description of her work as a file clerk rather than rely on the vocational expert’s classification of
the job as light work. The problem with this argument is that Morrow did not provide a
description of her file-clerk job at the hearing. And nothing suggests that the vocational expert’s
assessment of the file-clerk position was not based on Morrow’s description of the job in her
disability application. In any event, as the Commissioner points out, it is sufficient at step four
that the ALJ found that Morrow was capable of working as a file clerk as that job is generally
performed in the national economy—the ALJ did not need to find that Morrow was capable of
performing her job as she specifically performed it in the past. See Kenny v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 12-10182, 2013 WL 507730, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 15, 2013) (Michelson, M.J.), report and
recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 507918 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 12, 2013) (Rosen, J.).
III. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
The Court has reviewed the administrative record, the ALJ’s decision, and the parties’
briefs. Under the governing deferential standard of review, the Court finds that Morrow has not
shown that the ALJ’s credibility assessment was error or that he improperly used vocational
expert testimony at step four. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Dkt. 8), GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 11), and
AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s disability determination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

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SO ORDERED.

s/Laurie J. Michelson
LAURIE J. MICHELSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 13, 2014

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing document was served on the
attorneys and/or parties of record by electronic means or U.S. Mail on May 13, 2014.
s/Jane Johnson
Deputy Clerk

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