Meadows v. Wahler Automotive System

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's 14 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
VONETTA MEADOWS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-11926
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
WAHLER AUTOMOTIVE
SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #14)
INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Vonetta Meadows (“Meadows”), a former employee
of Defendant Wahler Automotive Systems, Inc. (“Wahler”), claims that Wahler
subjected her to a hostile work environment and unlawfully terminated her
employment in retaliation for her filing of a discrimination charge with the
Michigan Department of Civil Rights (the “MDCR”) and the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”). Wahler denies Meadows’
allegations and has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons stated below,
the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Wahler’s motion.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Alleged Harassment
Wahler

manufactures

automotive

thermostats

and

other

products.

(Deposition of Wahler Vice President Jerry Howe (“Howe”), ECF #14-2 at 25-27,
Pg. ID 120-122.) In July 2010, Advanced Staffing, an employment agency, hired
Meadows and assigned her to work at Wahler as a temporary employee. (See, e.g.,
Meadows Dep., ECF #14-3 at 10-11, Pg. ID 153.) In December 2010, Wahler
hired Meadows directly on a permanent basis. Meadows worked on Wahler’s
assembly line as both an “inspector” and a “machine operator.” (Id. at 12-13, Pg.
ID 153.) Paul Belleperche (“Belleperche”), Wahler’s plant manager, supervised
Meadows. (Id. at 24, Pg. ID 155; see also Howe Dep., ECF #15-13 at 31, Pg. ID
329.)
Meadows says that between October and December 2010 Belleperche
sexually harassed her “every single day.” (Meadows Dep. at 55, Pg. ID 163).
Meadows alleges that Belleperche’s harassment included the following:
 Belleperche told Meadows that she had “a nice ass [a]ll the time” and got
“very upset” if Meadows did not “give him any attention.” (Meadows’
Handwritten Notes, ECF #15-2 at 3, Pg. ID 256; see also Meadows Dep. at
66, Pg. ID 166);
 Belleperche stared at Meadows’ rear end and told her “to lift up [her] shirt
because he wanted to look at [her] butt.” (ECF #15-2 at 4-5, Pg. ID 257258; see also Meadows Dep. at 73-74, Pg. ID 168);

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 Belleperche “approached [Meadows] with a dollar bill and tried to put the
dollar bill in [her] pocket” – as a patron would do in a strip club – and he did
so in front of Meadows’ co-workers. (ECF #15-2 at 4, Pg. ID 257; see also
Meadows Dep. at 68, Pg. ID 166);
 Belleperche brushed against Meadows’ breast as he was placing something
in a refrigerator. (See ECF #15-2 at 3, Pg. ID 256; see also Meadows Dep.
at 65, Pg. ID 165);
 Belleperche fed Meadows crackers in front of her co-workers even though
Meadows told Belleperche she didn’t want to eat any crackers. (See ECF
#15-2 at 4, Pg. ID 257; see also Meadows Dep. at 67, Pg. ID 166);
 Belleperche told Meadows that he had “all kinds of nuts” in a Christmas gift
box but that his “nuts” were “too big to fit in that box.” (ECF #15-2 at 5, Pg.
ID 258; see also Meadows Dep. at 74-75, Pg. ID 168);
 Belleperche “pulled on [Meadows’] belt loop more than once” even though
she told “him [to] stop doing that.” (ECF #15-2 at 2, Pg. ID 255; see also
Meadows Dep. at 61, Pg. ID 164);
 Belleperche asked Meadows to go to Brazil, offered to buy her lunch, and
asked her to go to a bar after work “to have a couple drinks.” (ECF #15-2 at
2, Pg. ID 255; see also Meadows Dep. at 57-58; Pg. ID 163-164); and
 Belleperche texted Meadows on her personal cell phone on multiple
occasions. (See ECF #15-2 at 2, Pg. ID 255; see also Meadows Dep. at 5960, Pg. ID 164.)1

1

Wahler has proffered benign explanations for many of Belleperche’s purported
comments and actions. For instance, Wahler justifies Belleperche’s request that
Meadows travel to Brazil with him on the ground that “Wahler has a facility in
Brazil.” (Wahler Br., ECF #14 at 4, Pg. ID 95.) Likewise, Wahler explains that
while Belleperche offered to buy Meadows lunch, he “also bought other workers
lunch.” (Id. at 5, Pg. ID 96.) But, on summary judgment, the Court must view
Meadows’ allegations in the light most favorable to her.
3

Meadows repeated throughout her deposition that Belleperche’s harassment
was continuous and relentless. She insisted that his misconduct occurred “every
single day … from the time [she] walked in until the time [she] went home.” (Id. at
75-76, Pg. ID 168; see also id. at 61, Pg. ID 164 (testifying that Belleperche
“always pulled on my belt loop”); id. at 66, Pg. ID 166 (testifying that Belleperche
would stare at her and make offensive comments “every single day”); id. at 75-56,
Pg. ID 168 (testifying that Belleperche would “always” tell her how he felt about
her “every single day”).) Meadows says that the sexual harassment “died down” in
December 2010, but she insists that Belleperche “still messed with [her] every
single day” even after that time. (Meadows Dep. at 86, Pg. ID 171.)
Meadows also asserts that she heard “racial comments [] while working.”
(ECF #15-2 at 5, Pg. ID 258.) However, she was able to identify only a few such
comments.

As one example, Meadows claims that Belleperche said that the

different ethnicities of Wahler’s employees made it “like a rainbow in here.” (Id.)
Meadows could not identify or remember any other racial comments Belleperche
made, but she insists that he said “a lot of racial things … that [she] didn’t like.”
(Meadows Dep. at 78, Pg. ID 169.)
B.

Meadows Receives Wahler’s Anti-Harassment Policy
When Wahler hired Meadows as a permanent employee in December 2010,

it gave her a copy of its employee handbook. (See id. at 11, Pg. ID 153; see also

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the “Wahler Handbook,” ECF #14-4.) The Wahler Handbook contained an “antiharassment” policy (the “Policy”). (See id. at 10-11, Pg. ID 183-184.) In the
Policy, Wahler “affirm[ed] its commitment to provide a work environment free
from intimidation and harassment. Abuse of the dignity of anyone though ethnic,
racist or sexual slurs or though other derogatory or objectionable conduct is
offensive employee behavior.” (Id. at 10, Pg. ID 183.) The Policy warned Wahler
employees that “[if] you harass another employee of the Company … because of
race, religion, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, physical or mental disability,
medical condition, marital status, sex, age, wright, heights, or any other protected
classification … you will be subject to disciplinary action, including discharge.”
(Id.) With respect to sexual harassment, the Policy further provided:
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination … It is the
express policy of [Wahler] that sexual harassment of employees
… by you or agents of the company, is unacceptable and will
not be tolerated. Unwelcome or unwanted sexual advances,
requests for favors or other visual, verbal or physical conduct
will be deemed sexual harassment when:
[….]
(3) Such behavior has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.
(Id.)
The Policy also instructed Wahler employees to raise instances of
harassment promptly with management in an informal manner: “Likewise, if you

5

feel you have been the object of harassment or intimidation based upon the
aforementioned, you are to institute the procedures indicated below.” (Id.) These
“procedures” required:
(1) Any employee who believes he or she has been the
subject of illegal harassment should report the alleged
act(s) promptly (within two working days) to his/her
immediate supervisor and Resident Vice-President giving
details as related to the complaint.
(2) [Wahler], upon receipt of the complaint, shall take
immediate and appropriate steps to investigate the
complaint. Confidentiality is mandatory to the maximum
extent possible, but cannot be guaranteed.
(3) Following the investigation of the complaint,
[Wahler] shall weigh the facts and determine the validity
of the charge. If the complaint is determined to be valid,
the offender(s) shall face immediate and appropriate
disciplinary action based upon the severity of the charge.
This may include written warning and/or suspension
and/or discharge. If the offender is a supervisor he/she
may be demoted. If the complaint is found invalid, the
complaint party may [submit a written request for review
of the complaint … to the President and/or his designee].
(Id.) Finally, the Policy detailed “a formal procedure” that Wahler employees
could follow “where [a] complaint has not been satisfactorily resolved [by the]
informal [process].” (Id. at 11, Pg. ID 184.)
C.

Meadows Eventually Informs Wahler That Belleperche Harassed Her,
and Wahler Investigates and Responds to Her Claims
Around the time that Wahler hired Meadows as a permanent employee,

Meadows began secretly tape recording her Wahler co-workers. (See Meadows
6

Dep. at 26-29, Pg. ID 156.) Meadows says that she made these recordings to
document the “sexual harassment [and] racial comments” she was experiencing
and hearing. (Id. at 26, Pg. ID 156.) Meadows testified that in one of these
recordings, Wahler employee Dee Manakis (“Manakis”), a Caucasian woman,
made negative comments about Meadows that made Meadows “mad.” (See id. at
34-37, Pg. ID 158.)
On March 14, 2011, Meadows argued with Manakis about the recorded
conversation. (Id. at 36-37, Pg. ID 158.) During the argument, Belleperche “came
over … told [Meadows and Manakis] to quit arguing or stop talking and do [their]
work.” (Id. at 40, Pg. ID 159.) However, Meadows and Manakis continued to
argue, and Belleperche told Meadows – but not Manakis – “to leave” Wahler’s
facility. (Id. at 42-44, Pg. ID 160.)
Less than twenty-four hours later, Meadows returned to Wahler’s offices and
delivered to Wahler Vice-President Jerry Howe a set of handwritten notes that
detailed the alleged harassment by Belleperche described in section A above. (See
id. at 50-51, Pg. ID 162; See also ECF #15-2.) Meadows had largely completed
the notes in “December of 2010,” but she did not provide them to Wahler until the
incident with Manakis. (Id. at 51-53, 57 Pg. ID 162-163.) Nor, prior to that time,
had Meadows otherwise informed Wahler that Belleperche was allegedly harassing
her. (Id.)

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Meadows’ claims of harassment “came as a complete surprise” to Howe,
and he “needed more time to sort [her allegations] out.” (Howe Dep. at 96-97, Pg.
ID 145-146.) Howe told Meadows to stay away from Wahler’s offices and plant
while he looked into her allegations. (See id.)
Howe says that he then “immediately took action to begin a process to find
out what the heck [was] going on.” (Id. at 96-98, Pg. ID 145-147.) As part of this
“process,” Howe hired an outside investigator – attorney Jonathon A. Young
(“Young”) – to review Meadows’ allegations. (Id. at 96-97, Pg. ID 145-146.)
Howe “wanted somebody else to come in and make evaluations.” (Id.)
On March 16, 2011, only two days after Meadows first informed Howe of
Belleperche’s harassment, Young began interviewing “numerous present and
former Wahler employees,” including Meadows. (See ECF #14-7 at 2, Pg. ID
195.) Young investigated both the Meadows/Manakis incident and Meadows’
allegations of harassment.
Young ultimately determined that “some of [Meadows’] allegations were not
supported or were inconclusive, while others were substantiated.” (Id. at 4, Pg. ID
197.)

For example, Young found that Belleperche “engaged in or allowed

inappropriate conduct to occur…” (Id. at 5, Pg. ID 198.) Young also concluded
that Belleperche “likely … [made] sexual and racial jokes/comments” and “blurred
the line between management and the hourly workers and inadvertently created a

8

work environment that lacks professionalism.” (Id. at 3, Pg. ID 196.) Even though
Young did not believe such conduct “rose to the level of creating a hostile work
environment,” Young nevertheless recommended that Howe instruct Belleperche
that “[t]his kind of conduct by someone in [Belleperche’s] position of authority is
absolutely unacceptable.” (Id.)
Following receipt of Young’s report, Howe took numerous actions. First,
Howe directed Belleperche – both orally and in a memorandum placed in
Belleperche’s personnel file – to immediately stop “any sexual or racial
jokes/comments;” to “eradicate” such comments from Wahler’s workplace; to
“attend training regarding unlawful harassment;” and to “not retaliate against
[Meadows]” for making her complaints.

(See ECF #14-8.)

Howe also told

Belleperche that if Belleperche violated Wahler’s “anti-harassment policy [in the
future]…his employment [would] be terminated.” (Id.)
Second, Howe scheduled a training session for all Wahler employees with
the MDCR. The session focused on sexual discrimination and sexual harassment.
(See Meadows Dep. at 89-90, Pg. ID 171-172). All Wahler employees – including
Belleperche – attended this training session. (See id.)
Finally, Howe wrote to Meadows. (See ECF #14-9 at 2, Pg. ID 214.) Howe
first told Meadows that he found her harassment allegations “quite disturbing but
also very puzzling.” (Id. at 2, Pg. ID 214.) Howe was puzzled because Meadows

9

had never before mentioned any “incidents of sexual harassment, hostile
environment, or any other activity that would make [Meadows] or any other
employee feel threatened or uncomfortable in the workplace…” (Id.)
Howe also told Meadows that after reviewing the results of Young’s
“impartial and unbiased investigation,” he (Howe) had concluded that Meadows
had “instigated the confrontation” with Manakis and that her “actions were
seriously disruptive and threatening.” (Id.)

Howe reminded Meadows that

“[i]ssues with co-workers are to be reported to the Production Manager in
accordance with the requirements outlined in the [Wahler] Handbook.”

(Id.)

Howe also told Meadows that Young’s investigation had substantiated some, but
not all, of Meadows’ allegations of harassment by Belleperche. (Id. at 2-3, Pg. ID
214-215.)

Howe assured Meadows that as a result of Young’s investigation,

Wahler was taking steps to “enforce [its anti-harassment] policies … with
increased vigilance.” (Id. at 5, Pg. ID 216.)
Howe then wrote that “[a]fter giving the matter much thought,” Wahler was
“willing to give [Meadows] an opportunity to return to work” even though
Meadows had started the confrontation with Manakis, had been secretly tape
recording her co-workers, and had failed to comply with the reporting
requirements in the Policy. (Id. at 3, Pg. ID 215.) Howe told Meadows that she
could “move [] to the afternoon shift” – during which Belleperche did not work – if

10

that would make her more comfortable. (Id. at 5, Pg. ID 216.) But Howe also told
Meadows that she would have to agree to a number of conditions if she wished to
return to work, including that:
 “[T]hreatening conduct [was] absolutely unacceptable” and “if [she] felt that
a coworker [was] picking on [her]” that Meadows would “immediately
direct [her] complaint to [her] Production Manager.” (Id. at 3, Pg. ID 215.);
 Any threatening outburst or insubordination to superiors or coworkers would
result in immediate termination of her employment. (See id.);


She would not make any “audio or video recordings anywhere or anytime
on [Wahler] property…” (Id.); and



If she “witness[ed] any sexual or hostile comments/jokes in the future, or [if
she] experience[d] retaliation or any harassment or discriminatory conduct,
[that she would] follow the anti-harassment policy set forth in the [Wahler
Handbook] and immediately report the incident to the Senior Company
Manager.” (Id.)

Howe required Meadows to acknowledge in writing that her failure to “abide by
any one of [the conditions] … [would] result in her immediate dismissal.” (Id.)
Meadows did so on April 18, 2011, and she thereafter returned to work.2
(See ECF #14-11.)

2

Howe first listed these conditions in a letter to Meadows dated March 28, 2011.
Meadows refused to sign that letter because the listed conditions were preceded by
a description of Meadows’ conduct, and Meadows found the description to be
inaccurate. (See Meadows March 20, 2011, Letter, ECF #14-10.) Howe then
revised the letter – to eliminate the disputed descriptions but leaving intact the
conditions that Meadows had to fulfill – and Meadows signed the revised letter on
April 18, 2011. (See ECF #14-11.)
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Meadows says that following her return, there were “no more sexual
comments” and “no more sexual jokes.” (Id. at 106, Pg. ID 176.) Meadows also
says that she did not hear any offensive racial comments after she returned. (See
id. at 108-109, Pg. ID 176.) Meadows contends, though, that Belleperche did
continue to stare at her. (See id. at 106-107, Pg. ID 176.)
D.

Meadows Files a Charge of Discrimination With the EEOC and MDCR
On March 26, 2011 (before Meadows had received Howe’s letter inviting

her back to work under certain conditions), she filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the EEOC and MDCR. (See the “March 26 Charge,” ECF #14-6.) In the
March 26 Charge, Meadows wrote that she was “a Black woman and [she]
believe[d] [she had] been subjected to unwanted sexual harassment around October
1, 2010, December 16, 2010, and December 21, 2010…by [her] male supervisor.”
(Id.) Meadows also alleged that she was subjected to disciplinary action “on
March 14, 2011 based on [her] sex and race.” (Id.) Meadows wrote that she “was
involved in a verbal altercation with a White co-worker [Manakis]” and that after
the confrontation she was sent home “while [Manakis] was allowed to continue
working.” (Id.)
E.

Howe Fires Meadows, and Meadows Files a Second Charge of
Discrimination
On August 4, 2011, Meadows refused to follow “team leader” John Jolly’s

instruction to pack certain parts. (See Meadows Dep. at 114, Pg. ID 178.)
12

Meadows told Jolly that it was not her job to pack parts. (See id.) Meadows
thereafter went to Belleperche, who supervised both Jolly and Meadows, to
complain that Jolly had ordered her to perform a task that, Meadows believed, fell
outside of her “job description.” (Id. at 114-115, Pg. ID 178.) Belleperche told
Meadows to pack parts as Jolly had instructed. (See id. at 116, Pg. ID 178.)
Meadows still refused to do so, and she “went straight to [Howe]” to complain
about the requirement that she pack parts. (Id. at 116-117, Pg. ID 178.) According
to Meadows, Howe immediately fired her when she presented her complaint to
him. (See id. at 117-118, Pg. ID 178-179.)
Howe remembers this incident differently. Howe says that he did not fire
Meadows immediately, but that he instead explained to Meadows that “[t]here’s
nothing wrong or unusual about [Jolly] asking [Meadows] to pack some parts.”
(Howe Dep. at 99, Pg. ID 148.) According to Howe, he fired Meadows only after
she persisted in her refusal to follow directions from her superiors and failed to
communicate with him in an appropriate tone and manner. (See id.) Howe says
that “ultimately [he] made a decision [to fire her] because [he] could not get her
calmed down in 10 to 12 minutes …and [he could not] have an employee
challenging [his] authority, [his] position, and refusing to take simple work
instructions that are well within the definition of the scope of work which she’s
hired to do.” (Id. at 99-100, Pg. ID 148-149.) Howe contends that before this

13

incident he was not predisposed to fire Meadows; in fact, he called her “one of the
best employees [Wahler] ever had.” (Id. at 80, Pg. ID 136.)
On August 5, 2011 – the day after Howe fired Meadows – Meadows filed a
second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC and MDCR. (See the “August 5
Charge,” ECF #15-14.) In the August 5 Charge, Meadows alleged that “[o]n
August 4, 2011, [she] was discharged without reason. Non-Black and non-male
employees are not subjected to such unfair treatment.” (Id.) Meadows wrote that
she “believe[d] [Wahler’s] decision to discharge [her] was based solely on [her]
race, sex, and in retaliation for [her] filing a previous complaint of discrimination”
against Wahler. (Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND CLARIFICATION OF MEADOWS’
CLAIMS AGAINST WAHLER
Meadows filed her four-count Complaint against Wahler on April 30, 2013.
(See Complaint, ECF #1.)

In Count I of the Complaint, entitled “Sexual

Harassment,” Meadows alleges that Wahler violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (“Title VII”), and Michigan’s ElliotLarsen Civil Rights Act, MCL § 37.2101 et seq. (the “ELCRA”), by allowing its
supervisory employees to engage in sexually-harassing conduct that was
“sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of [Meadows’]
employment and create an abusive working environment.” (Compl. at ¶19.)

14

In Count II, entitled “Racial Harassment,” Meadows alleges that Wahler
violated Title VII and the ELCRA by allowing its supervisory employees to
engage in racially-harassing conduct that was “sufficiently severe or pervasive
enough to later the conditions of [Meadows’] employment and create an abusive
working environment.” (Compl. at ¶25.)
In Count III, entitled “Hostile Work Environment,” Meadows alleges that
Wahler violated Title VII and the ELCRA by creating or tolerating a workplace
“filled with intimidation, insult or ridicule sufficiently severe or pervasive enough
to alter the conditions of [Meadows’] employment and create an objectively hostile
and abusive working environment.” (Compl. at ¶30.)

Meadows’ counsel

acknowledged at oral argument that Count III is duplicative of Counts I and II in
that Count III is simply a combination of the sexually-hostile work environment
claim from Count I with the racially-hostile work environment claim from
Count II.
In Count IV, mis-labeled as Count III and entitled “Retaliatory Discharge,”
Meadows alleges that Wahler violated Title VII and the ELCRA by firing her, “at
least in part, in retaliation for the filing and prosecution” of the March 26 Charge.
(Id. at ¶¶35, 39.)
Finally, Meadows does not allege in her Complaint that Wahler acted
unlawfully when Howe decided to keep her out of work for a period of time in

15

March 2011 – while Young investigated her allegations of harassment. Indeed,
Meadows’ Complaint nowhere mentions nor challenges that action by Howe. This
clarification of Meadows’ claims is important because in opposition to Wahler’s
summary judgment motion, Meadows argues that she has established a “prima
facie case” that her March 2011 “suspension” by Howe was the result of race
and/or gender discrimination. (See Meadows Resp. Br. at 26-29, Pg. ID 246-249.)
Meadows’ Complaint, however, does not include a discrimination claim related to
her suspension; such a claim is simply not before the Court. Likewise, while
Meadows alleged in the August 5 Charge that she was unlawfully terminated based
upon her race and gender, she does not include such a claim in her Complaint. The
only count of the Complaint challenging Meadows’ firing – Count IV – rests
entirely upon the theory that Wahler discharged Meadows for engaging in
protected activity (i.e. the filing of the March 26 Charge), not on the theory that
Wahler fired Meadows due to her race or gender.
Wahler has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (See ECF #14.) The
Court heard oral argument on the motion on August 5, 2014.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact....” U.S. SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services,
Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,

16

477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. However, summary judgment is not
appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Id. at 251-252. When reviewing the record, “the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge…” Id. at 255.
ANALYSIS
A.

Wahler Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Meadows’ Title VII
Sexual Harassment Hostile Work Environment Claim (Counts I
and III)
“Title VII affords employees the right to work in an environment free from

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 517 F.3d 321, 332-333 (6th Cir. 2008). An employer who fails to provide an
environment free from such harassment may be liable for damages under Title VII.
“In order to establish a prima facie case of a hostile work environment based on
sexual harassment [under Title VII], [a] plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
the evidence: (1) that she was a member of a protected class; (2) that she was

17

subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on
sex; (4) that the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance by
creating a hostile, offensive, or intimidating work environment; and (5) that there
is a basis for employer liability.” Thornton v. Federal Express Corp., 530 F.3d
451, 455 (6th Cir. 2008).
Wahler argues that Meadows’ sexual harassment hostile work environment
claim fails because the alleged harassment by Belleperche “was neither severe nor
pervasive” and “did not change [Meadows’] terms and conditions of employment.”
(Wahler’s Br. at 18, Pg. ID 109.) Wahler stresses that “simple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to
discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment’” and are thus
insufficient to give rise to employer liability under Title VII. (Id. at 16, pg. ID 107,
quoting Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).) Wahler insists that
the incidents involving Belleperche “were few and isolated and occurred over a
four-month period ending with Meadows receiving employment with Wahler and a
pay raise.” (Id. at 18, Pg. ID 109.) But the evidence Meadows presented, when
viewed in her favor, creates a material factual dispute as to whether the harassment
by Belleperche was severe or pervasive enough to establish a hostile work
environment.

18

“To determine whether a work environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive,’ courts
look at the totality of the circumstances. The factfinder must evaluate the conduct
at issue by both an objective and subjective standard.” Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 333
(internal citations omitted). To satisfy these standards a plaintiff must “establish
both that the harassing behavior was ‘severe or pervasive’ enough to create an
environment that a reasonable person would find objectively hostile or abusive,
and that he or she subjectively regarded the environment as abusive.” Id.
“The determination of whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to establish a hostile work environment is not susceptible to a
mathematically precise test.”

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

“A

nonexhaustive list of factors for the court to consider include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In
addition, “sexual comments and harassing acts of a continual nature are more
likely to be deemed pervasive,” and “harassment involving an element of physical
invasion is more severe than harassing comments alone.” Id. at 333-334 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
“Whether harassing conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive to establish a
hostile work environment is quintessentially a question of fact.”

19

Id. at 333

(quotation marks omitted). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence
is so one-sided that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether there
was a hostile work environment.” Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Meadows has established a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether she was subject to a hostile work environment at Wahler. As described in
detail above, Meadows testified that Belleperche subjected her to repeated
unwanted physical contact – including brushing against her breast, putting a dollar
bill in her back pocket, pulling on her belt loop, and feeding her crackers – and that
Belleperche made sexually harassing comments to her on a continual basis. A
reasonable person could certainly conclude that Belleperche’s physical and verbal
conduct created a hostile and abusive atmosphere. And Meadows insists that this
conduct humiliated her in front of her co-workers and that she subjectively
regarded the conduct as abusive.

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that

evidence like that presented by Meadows is sufficient to establish a material
factual dispute as to the existence of a hostile work environment. See Williams v.
General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 563 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that harassing
sexual comments and one act of touching that contained an element of physical
invasion “at minimum …. raise[d] a question of fact for the jury”); Clark v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 400 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that employer was
not entitled to summary judgment where plaintiff presented evidence of “an

20

ongoing pattern of unwanted conduct and attention”); Hawkins, 517 F.3d at 333
(holding that question of fact existed on hostile work environment claim in part
because conduct was alleged to be “ongoing and continual” and involved “acts of
touching and unwelcome physical contact that establish an element of physical
invasion”).
Wahler next argues that even if Belleperche’s misconduct created a hostile
work environment, it (Wahler) is nonetheless entitled to summary judgment
because it promptly and “effectively remedied the alleged harassment.” (See
Wahler Br. at 18-19, Pg. ID 109-110.)

The Court agrees that Wahler acted

promptly, and that it effectively remedied the harassment, but these facts, standing
alone, are plainly not a sufficient defense to Meadows’ Title VII claim.
In support of its no-liability-because-we-remedied-the-harassment defense,
Wahler relies upon the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Wathen v. General Electric
Company, 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir. 1997). As Wahler correctly notes, Wathen fairly
stands for the proposition that “an employer avoids liability for hostile work
environment claims if it adequately investigated and took prompt remedial action
upon notice of the alleged harassment.” (Wahler Reply Br., ECF #16 at 1-2, Pg. ID
354-55.) The problem for Wahler is that this aspect of Wathen was abrogated by
the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher.

21

In those cases, the

Supreme Court held that an employer may avoid liability for a supervisor’s3
creation of a hostile work environment where it establishes both “(a) that [it]
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (emphasis added); Faragher, 524 U.S.
at 778. After Ellerth and Faragher, it is crystal clear that under Title VII an
employer may no longer avoid liability for a supervisor’s harassment solely by
taking effective remedial action.
Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has expressly recognized that Ellerth and Faragher
abrogated the rule from Wathen on which Wahler relies. In Williams, supra, the
Sixth Circuit explained that Ellerth and Faragher “invalidate[d] a portion of prior
caselaw in [the Sixth Circuit] and require that [courts] recast the analytical
framework for a hostile-work-environment claim based on a supervisor's actions.”
Williams, 187 F.3d at 560.4 After Faragher and Ellerth, “it is no longer enough

3

It is undisputed that Belleperche – Wahler’s plant manager who had the authority
to send Meadows home from work – was Meadows’ supervisor. (See Meadows
Dep. at 24, Pg. ID 155; Howe Dep. at 31, Pg. ID 329 and 88, Pg. ID 341.) Indeed,
Wahler emphasized Belleperche’s status as Meadows’ supervisor in its written
submissions to the Court. (See Wahler Reply Br. at 7, Pg. ID 360.)  

4

There is no doubt that the portion of Wathen cited by Wahler lies within the
“prior caselaw” that Ellerth and Faragher abrogated. The court in Wathen held
that its prior decision in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184 (6th
22

for an employer to take corrective action; employers now have an affirmative duty
to prevent sexual harassment by supervisors.” Id. at 561 (emphasis added). Thus,
Wahler is not entitled to summary judgment solely on the basis that it promptly
and effectively remedied the harassment.
But Wahler would be entitled to summary judgment if it could also establish
that it took effective steps to prevent the harassment. Wahler has failed to do so.
In fact, Wahler has presented very little evidence concerning any affirmative steps
it may have taken to prevent sexual harassment.
The sole evidence in the record concerning harassment prevention by
Wahler is the fact that the Wahler Handbook contained the Policy (recited above).
But the mere existence of the Policy does not establish that Wahler took sufficient
steps to prevent harassment. First, the Policy does not satisfy the Sixth Circuit’s
minimum requirements for Ellerth/Faragher purposes.

As that court has

explained: “While there is no exact formula for what constitutes a ‘reasonable’
sexual harassment policy, an effective policy should at least: (1) require
supervisors to report incidents of sexual harassment; (2) permit both informal and
formal complaints of harassment to be made; (3) provide a mechanism for

Cir. 1992) (employer not liable for hostile work environment if it took prompt and
effective remedial action), was “dispositive” on the question of the employer’s
liability. Wathen, 115 F.3d at 15. In Williams, the court specifically cited the
employer liability standard from Kauffman as the one that Ellerth and Faragher
“invalidate[d].” Williams, 187 F.3d at 560-61. 
23

bypassing a harassing supervisor when making a complaint; and (4) and provide
for training regarding the policy.” Clark, 400 F.3d at 349-350 (emphasis added).
Here, the Policy does not require supervisors to report incidents of sexual
harassment, never mentions any training, and does not provide a clear mechanism
for bypassing a harassing supervisor when making a complaint.5
Second (and just as importantly), Wahler has not presented any evidence
concerning how it actually implemented or enforced the Policy. For instance,
while the record indicates that Meadows received the Policy, there is no evidence

5

The reporting procedures under the Policy are not entirely clear. The Policy
seems to create a two-phase reporting process – an “informal” phase followed by a
“formal” phase. The Policy first provides that employees “should report”
harassment to their “immediate supervisor and Resident Vice-President.” (Wahler
Handbook at 10, Pg. ID 183.) The Policy then stresses that Wahler has an “open
door policy” under which employees may bring harassment “complaints to [their]
supervisor for resolution.” (Id. at 11, Pg. ID 184.) The Policy also provides that
“where the complaint has not been satisfactorily resolved [by the] informal
[process],” Wahler will undertake “a formal procedure” to review the complaint.
(Id.) The supervisor may also play a role in this “formal procedure.” The formal
process begins with the employee submitting his or her complaint to unidentified
“management or [its] designee” with a separate request for a meeting. (Id.) If the
“problem is not resolved during this meeting management or [its] designee will
give the employee a written resolution…” (Id.) If the employee is “not satisfied”
with this written resolution, the employee may then “submit a written request for
review of the complaint … to the President or his/her designee.” (Id.) The
President (or his/her designee) may then “call a further meeting to explore the
problem,” a meeting that includes the employee’s “immediate supervisor.” (Id.)
Given the language of the Policy, it would not be unreasonable for an employee
who wishes to make a harassment complaint against his supervisor to conclude that
(1) she must present her complaint informally before commencing the formal
process and (2) the informal process requires a report to her supervisor. Nor would
it be unreasonable for an employee to conclude that the supervisor would be
involved in the formal process.
24

to establish how many other Wahler employees, if any, also received, or were told
about, the Policy. There is no evidence that the Policy was posted in Wahler’s
facility. Nor does the record contain any evidence that, prior to Meadows’
complaints of harassment, Wahler ever offered any training related to the Policy or
to harassment prevention in general. And the anecdotal evidence concerning the
environment at Wahler before Meadows complained – including reports of
recurring vulgar and offensive behavior by a number of Wahler employees (see,
e.g. Young’s Investigative Report, ECF #14-7; William Tolliver’s Charge of
Discrimination, ECF #15-15; John Jolly Dep., ECF #15-11, 25-27, Pg. ID 304306) – further creates a question as to whether Wahler acted reasonably to prevent
harassment. Simply put, there is a material question of fact as to whether, prior to
Meadows’ complaints, Wahler “promulgated and enforced” a sufficient antiharassment policy, see Thornton, 530 F.3d at 456, and otherwise acted reasonably
to prevent sexual harassment. Accordingly, Wahler is not entitled to summary
judgment on the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense. 6

6

This affirmative defense is only available where the alleged harassment does not
“culminate[] in a tangible employment action, such as a discharge, demotion, or
undesirable reassignment.” Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765. In light of the Court’s ruling
that Wahler has thus far failed to satisfy the elements of the defense, the Court
does not reach Meadows’ argument that Wahler took a tangible employment action
against her – thereby rendering the defense unavailable – when Howe ordered her
to stay away from the office and plant for a period of time in March 2011.
25

B.

Wahler Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Meadows’ ELCRA Sexual
Harassment Hostile Work Environment Claims (Counts I and III)
Wahler argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Meadows’ sexual

harassment hostile work environment claims under the ELCRA because it
promptly and effectively remedied Meadows’ alleged harassment. (See Wahler Br.
at 18-19, Pg. ID 109-110.)

While this argument was insufficient to defeat

Meadows’ Title VII claim, it does defeat her ELCRA claim. Unlike under Title
VII, a plaintiff asserting a hostile work environment claim under the ELCRA “can
hold [an] employer liable … for [her] supervisor's harassing behavior only if [the
plaintiff] shows that the employer failed to take prompt and adequate remedial
action after having been put on notice of the sexual harassment.” Collette v. SteinMart, Inc., 126 Fed. App’x 678, 687-688 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Chambers v. Trettco, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 910,
916 (Mich. 2000) (reiterating “requirement that a plaintiff [asserting an ELCRA
hostile work environment claim] prove that the employer failed to take prompt
remedial action upon notice of the creation of a hostile work environment”).
Meadows has failed to satisfy her burden here. As the Sixth Circuit has
explained, “[t]he most significant immediate measure an employer can take in
response to a sexual harassment complaint is to launch a prompt investigation to
determine whether the complaint is justified. By doing so, the employer puts all
employees on notice that it takes such allegations seriously and will not tolerate
26

harassment in the workplace.” Collette, 126 Fed. App’x at 686 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). That is exactly what Wahler did. Within two days of
Meadows’ complaints, Wahler hired outside counsel to investigate her accusations,
interview Wahler employees, and draft a detailed report that included
recommendations for improvements. (See ECF #14-7.)
Wahler then promptly acted to correct the alleged harassing behavior by,
among other things, warning Belleperche that he must immediately cease all
harassing activities or be fired and by having the MDCR present sexual harassment
prevention training for its employees.

Notably, Meadows admitted that the

sexual/racial conduct and comments that she found offensive stopped almost
entirely when she returned to work in April 2011 (see Meadows Dep. at 106-109,
Pg. ID 176), and her admission underscores the effectiveness of Wahler’s response
to her allegations.7 Because Wahler effectively remedied Meadows’ complaints of

7

Meadows appears to argue that Wahler’s training was not effective because in
2012, a Wahler employee named Jeffrey Phill (“Phill”) made inappropriate racial
comments at a going-away party for another Wahler employee. (See Meadows
Resp. Br. at 13, Pg. ID 241.) However, Phill’s comments occurred months after
Wahler’s training by the MDCR, and Phill’s far-removed and isolated incident of
misconduct falls far short of showing that the Wahler’s response was ineffective –
especially when Meadows admitted that the misconduct essentially ceased after
she returned to work at Wahler in April 2011. Moreover, Phill’s alleged
misconduct occurred many months after Meadows left Wahler, and thus Phill’s
conduct is entirely irrelevant as to whether Wahler’s response to Meadows’
allegations was effective as to Meadows.  
27

sexual harassment, Wahler is entitled to summary judgment on Meadows’ ECLRA
sexual harassment hostile work environment claim.
C.

Wahler Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Meadows’ Racial Hostile
Work Environment Claims (Counts II and III)
In order to establish a prima facie case on her racial harassment hostile work

environment claims under both Title VII and the ELCRA, Meadows must
establish, among other things, that the harassment was “sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and create an abusive
working environment.” See, e.g., Reed v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 556 Fed.
App’x 421, 431-432 (6th Cir. 2014) (Title VII); see also In Re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d
1001, 1010 (6th Cir. 2007) (ELCRA). Meadows has failed to do so.
Meadows has produced no evidence that she experienced “severe or
pervasive” racial harassment. Meadows stresses that certain Wahler employees
confirmed to Young (during his investigation) that racial jokes were made in the
workplace. (See, e.g., Meadows Resp. Br. at 13-14, Pg. ID 233-234 and 23, Pg. ID
243.) However, Meadows has not cited any evidence that she personally heard the
overwhelming majority of these comments or that she even knew about them while
working for Wahler. (Id.) Instead, Meadows argues that the walls at Wahler were
“paper thin” and that the “human voice” could “be heard [through the walls] when
spoken in a normal tone.” (Meadows Resp. Br. at 15, Pg. ID 235.) But Meadows’
description of the walls’ density is no substitute for actual evidence that she, in
28

fact, heard or knew about the racial comments and jokes that she now claims made
her environment a hostile one.

Indeed, “[c]omments or conduct of which a

plaintiff had no knowledge cannot be said to have made [an] work environment
hostile.” Armstrong v. Whirlpool Corporation, 363 Fed App’x 317, 328 (6th Cir.
2010).
Finally, the very few racial comments that Meadows did hear, such as
Belleperche’s reference to Wahler’s multi-cultural workforce as a “rainbow,” are
too isolated and not sufficiently severe to establish a hostile working environment.
See, e.g., Reed, 556 Fed. App’x at 433 (holding that isolated “offensive
utterance[s]” that did not include direct threats did not create a racially hostile
work environment); Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., Inc., 643 F.3d 502, 513 (6th Cir.
2011) (holding that racially insensitive statements such as “calling Jesse Jackson
and Al Sharpton ‘monkeys’ and saying that black people should ‘go back to where
[they] came from’ are certainly insensitive, ignorant, and bigoted” but that they
cannot form the basis of a hostile work environment claim because “they more
closely resemble a ‘mere offensive utterance’ than conduct that is ‘physically
threatening or humiliating’’”). Wahler is thus entitled to summary judgment on
Meadows’ claims for racially harassment hostile work environment.

29

D.

Wahler is Entitled to Summary Judgment on Meadows’ Retaliatory
Discharge Claim (Count IV)
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII, Meadows

must establish that “1) [s]he engaged in protected conduct, (2) [Wahler] had
knowledge of [her] protected activity, (3) [Wahler] took an adverse employment
action against [her], and (4) a causal connection exists between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Reed, 556 Fed. App’x at 430. The
requirements under the ELCRA are similar. See In Re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d at
1011) (“A plaintiff alleging retaliation in violation of the ELCRA must establish
the following elements of a prima facie case: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a
protected activity, (2) that this was known by the defendant, (3) that the defendant
took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”)
(quoting Barrett v. Kirtland Comm. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Mich. App. 2001)).
Moreover, “[t]o establish causation [under the ELCRA], the plaintiff must show
that his participation in activity protected by the ELCRA was a significant factor in
the employer's adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link
between the two.” Id.
Meadows alleges that she was fired because she filed the March 26 Charge
with the EEOC, but she has failed to establish a causal connection between that

30

filing and her discharge.8 Meadows attempts to establish causation by arguing that
Howe “was predisposed to discriminate against [her] due to her complaints of
harassment” (Meadows Resp. Br. at 22, Pg. ID 250), but she has not identified any
evidence in the record to support such a finding. In fact, the evidence before the
Court shows that Howe specifically instructed Belleperche not to retaliate against
Meadows for her complaints of harassment and discrimination. (See ECF #14-8.)
Moreover, the evidence shows that, far from being predisposed to discriminate
against Meadows, Howe considered her “one of the best employees [Wahler] ever
had.” (Howe Dep. at 80, Pg. ID 136.)
Furthermore, Meadows cannot establish the required causation based upon
the temporal proximity between the March 26 Charge and her August firing. The
Sixth Circuit has held that multi-month gaps between protected activities and
discharge – like the over four-month gap that exists here – create no more than a
“loose temporal proximity” that is “insufficient to create a triable issue [on

8

In Meadows’ response to Wahler’s Motion, she argues for the first time that she
was discharged not just for filing the March 26 Charge, but also for her
“presentation of allegations of racial and sexual harassment to company
management,” which Meadows says led to Wahler imposing “more onerous
reporting requirements” on her related to disputes Meadows had with her
supervisors and co-workers. (Meadows Resp. Br. at 21-22, Pg. ID 249-250.) But
Meadows’ Complaint does not contain any allegations related to this new theory.
In fact, Meadows’ “retaliatory discharge” claim in her Complaint is explicitly and
exclusively tied to her filing of the March 26 Charge and no other conduct. (See,
e.g. Compl. at ¶¶35, 39.) Meadows’ new allegations are therefore not part of her
current action.
31

causation].” Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1999) (two to five
month gap between protected activities and discharge insufficient to create factual
dispute on causation); see also Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265,
1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding insufficient temporal proximity to support an
inference of retaliation where employer discharged plaintiff within four months of
the protected conduct).9
For these reasons, Meadows has failed to establish a material factual dispute
as to whether there was a causal connection between the March 26 Charge and her
dismissal.

Wahler is therefore entitled to summary judgment on Meadows’

retaliatory discharge claim (Count IV of Meadows’ Complaint).
E.

The Court Will Not Allow Meadows to Assert a Discrimination Claim
Based Upon Her Suspension
A plaintiff may not assert a new claim or theory of recovery in response to a

summary judgment motion. See, e.g., Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, et al., 407
F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005). Here, as described above, Meadows’ opposition to
Wahler’s motion raises a new discrimination claim: that in March 2011, Wahler
unlawfully suspended her based upon her race and/or gender.

Meadows’

9

It is further undisputed that (a) Meadows accused only Belleperche, and not
Howe, of misconduct in the March 26 Charge and (b) Howe, alone, made the
decision to terminate Meadows’ employment in August. “It is difficult to believe
that [Howe] would wait so long to retaliate [for the March 26 Charge] that did not
implicate [him] in any way.” Kroll v. Disney Store, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 344, 348
(E.D. Mich. 1995.)
32

suspension is never mentioned in her Complaint, and the Complaint plainly does
not contain a claim seeking recovery based upon the suspension. The Court will
not, at this late stage, allow Meadows to assert a claim based upon her suspension.

CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, Wahler’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF #14) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED
IN PART.

Wahler is entitled to judgment in its favor on all counts of the

Complaint other than that portion of Count I asserting a claim for sexual
harassment hostile work environment under Title VII and that portion of Count III
asserting a claim for sexual harassment hostile work environment under Title VII.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 12, 2014

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on September 12, 2014, by electronic means
and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

33