Gleed v. AT&T Mobility Services, LLC
Filing
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OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 39 Motion in Limine and Bifurcating Trial. Signed by District Judge Paul D. Borman. (DTof)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DANIEL GLEED,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-12479
v.
Paul D. Borman
United States District Court
AT&T SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S MOTION IN LIMINE
(ECF NO. 39) AND BIFURCATING TRIAL PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 42
Before the Court is Defendant AT&T Services Inc.’s Motion in Limine filed on
September 21, 2015. (ECF No. 39). Plaintiff Daniel Gleed filed a Response and Defendant
thereafter filed a reply. (ECF Nos. 42 & 43). A hearing on this matter was held on October 29,
2015. For the reasons set forth below the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendant’s
Motion in Limine and bifurcate the trial – liability trial first; damage trial second – pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
I. BACKGROUND
This action arises from Plaintiff Daniel Gleed’s allegations of disability discrimination
against his previous employer, Defendant AT&T Mobility Services, LLC (“Defendant”).
Plaintiff worked as a Retail Sales Consultant at Defendant’s retail store in Jackson, Michigan. In
November 2011, Plaintiff alleges that he presented his manager, Erick Smith, with a note from a
nurse practitioner providing that he be allowed to sit as needed to accommodate the cellulitis
(skin infection) he suffered on his legs and the eczema on his feet. Plaintiff claims that Smith
refused to allow him to sit and refused to include the pertinent nurse’s note in his file. Smith, on
the other hand, testified he instructed Plaintiff that he could use a stool to sit and prop up his leg
on the table while on the sales floor or he could take extra breaks to sit in the back room. Smith
also testified that Plaintiff did in fact sit on a stool and prop his leg up while on the sales floor.
Seven months later, after visiting the emergency room because of his skin infection,
Plaintiff was told he needed to come to the doctor’s office “each day for up to six weeks for
hour-long IV treatments.” (ECF No. 38, Sixth Circuit Opinion Order, at 2). Plaintiff then
sought to adjust his work schedule “so that he could receive the treatments without missing
work” (Id.). Smith allegedly denied the request. Thereafter, Plaintiff spoke with a representative
from Defendant’s Human Resource department who offered him unpaid leave and the chance to
later apply for back-pay. Plaintiff did not ask the HR representative for an adjustment to his
schedule. (Id.). Plaintiff then told Smith he was resigning and sent him an email stating the
same later that day.
Plaintiff’s complaint sets forth three counts: (1) a claim of disability discrimination for
failure to provide a reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (2) a claim of reverse gender discrimination pursuant
to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 and (3) a claim of
“constructive discharge”. This Court previously granted summary judgment to Defendant on all
three claims (ECF No. 28). The Sixth Circuit reversed this Court’s Judgment as to Plaintiff’s
ADA claim, finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff
was denied a reasonable accommodation in November 2011 to sit as needed for his medical
condition. (ECF No. 28, Opinion and Order at * 3-5). The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s
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dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination and constructive discharge as well as
Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant failed to accommodate his IV treatments. (Id. at * 6-7).
Defendant has filed a motion in limine requesting that this Court (1) find that Plaintiff’s
resignation email is relevant and admissible, but subject to a limiting instruction, and to preclude
evidence as to the events or reasons leading up to Plaintiff’s resignation; (2) exclude evidence
regarding Plaintiff’s medical condition after November 2011 as “irrelevant and potentially
confusing to the jury”; and (3) exclude any evidence regarding Erick Smith’s change from a
management position as irrelevant and prejudicial.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“The Federal Rules of Evidence, the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedure and
interpretive rulings of the Supreme Court and this court all encourage, and in some cases require,
parties and the court to utilize extensive pretrial procedures – including motions in limine – in
order to narrow the issues remaining for trial and to minimize disruptions at trial.” United States
v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 970 (6th Cir. 1999); Louzon v. Ford Motor Co., 718 F.3d 556, 560
(6th Cir. 2013) (“A motion in limine is any motion, whether made before or during trial, to
exclude anticipated prejudicial evidence before the evidence is actually offered.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). District courts have broad discretion over matters involving the
admissibility of evidence at trial. United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 494 (6th Cir. 1991).
III. ANALYSIS
A.
Bifurcation of Trial
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court has explained the proper
analysis for ordering bifurcation of a trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b):
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A court may bifurcate a trial “in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice,
or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy.” In
determining whether separate trial are appropriate, the court should consider
several facts, including “the potential prejudice to the parties, the possible
confusion of the jurors, and the resulting convenience and economy.”
Wilson v. Morgan, 477 F.3d 326, 339 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citations omitted). The decision
to bifurcate a trial is within the court’s discretion and can be made upon the court’s own motion.
Saxion v. Titan-C-Mfg., Inc., 86 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir. 1996).
The Court finds that judicial economy would be best served in this case by bifurcation of
the liability and damages phases of the trial. The Court notes, in particular, that Plaintiff seeks to
introduce medical evidence that postdates the date of his request for an accommodation,
November 2011, and that bears only on the issue of establishing his damages and is not relevant
to establishing a violation of disability discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Further, the
Court finds that medical evidence postdating Plaintiff’s resignation, July 1, 2012, and relating to
a request for an accommodation that is no longer a viable claim could easily confuse the jury
because the critical issues in this case only relate to whether Plaintiff was denied a reasonable
accommodation to sit in November 2011. Therefore, the threat of prejudice and juror confusion
also weighs in favor of bifurcation.
Consequently, when the jury trial commences it will first determine the issue of liability.
If the jury returns a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on the issue of liability, then the second phase of
the trial to determine damages will immediately commence and utilize the same jury.
B.
Resignation Email
Defendant notes that the sole remaining claim in this action is whether Defendant
violated the ADA by refusing to accommodate Plaintiff’s medical condition by allowing him to
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use a chair to sit as needed during his shifts in November 2011. Defendant posits that Smith did
in fact allow Plaintiff to use a chair, which Plaintiff denies, and therefore the litigation is likely
to turn on the credibility of Plaintiff and Smith.
To this end, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s resignation letter of June 29, 2012 is
relevant to the credibility of Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s June 29, 2012, resignation email stated:
Erick
Sunday July 1st will be my last day as an employee of AT&T. Beginning Monday
July 2nd I am promoting myself to customer. It has been a pleasure being part of
your team. You are the best manager I have ever had the pleasure of working for.
I appreciate you always leading by example and taking time to teach and coach
me. If I’m working for someone else I’m building someone else’s dreams. My
dreams have always been bigger than my paycheck so I’m officially retiring from
the at&t slave camp.
Freedom Awaits (
Best of luck to you and your family.
Sincerely
Daniel Gleed
(Def.’s Mot., Ex. 1, Resignation Email, 6/29/12). Defendant argues that this email, which is full
of positive comments regarding Smith, could undermine Plaintiff’s claims regarding whether
Smith denied his request for a chair, and is therefore relevant as to Plaintiff’s credibility.
Defendant further argues that Plaintiff should be precluded from discussing his reasons
for resigning or what was happening in the workplace at the time of his resignation, i.e. that
Plaintiff quit because Defendant would not accommodate his IV treatments. Defendant also
requests that the Court give the jury a limiting instruction such that the jury should only consider
the resignation email for the purposes of credibility and “be told that Gleed’s resignation is
otherwise not at issue at trial.” (Def.’s Br. at 2-3).
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Plaintiff agrees with Defendant that the letter of resignation is relevant and admissible,
however, he argues, without any analysis, that Defendant’s request for a limiting instruction be
denied because the reasons for his resignation are “clearly relevant and admissible”. (Pl.’s Resp.
at 4). Plaintiff explained during oral argument that he should be allowed to discuss all of the
circumstances surrounding his resignation because those circumstances are relevant to why he
authored the letter and would therefore bear upon his credibility.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides that evidence is relevant if “(a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.” However, relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is “substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” FED. R. EVID. 403.
The Court will grant Defendant’s request to admit the resignation letter as it is relevant to
the Plaintiff’s credibility and Plaintiff agrees that the email is relevant and admissible. The
Court will deny Defendant’s request to exclude all testimony regarding the circumstances
surrounding Plaintiff’s decision to author the resignation letter as such testimony is also relevant
to Plaintiff’s credibility. Indeed, the reasons why Plaintiff authored the resignation letter or used
certain language in the email would be relevant to his motivation and therefore ultimately also
bear upon his credibility.
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s testimony regarding his reasons for authoring the
resignation email could be confusing or prejudicial to the jury, because Plaintiff’s claims of
constructive discharge and failure to accommodate his IV treatments have been dismissed.
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Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendant that a limiting instruction to the jury regarding the
relevance of the resignation email is appropriate. Defendant shall draft a proposed limiting trial
instruction for review to be submitted to the Court and Plaintiff prior to trial.
C.
Medical Records and Testimony about Medical Condition after November 2011
Defendant next asks the Court to exclude Plaintiff’s medical records and testimony
regarding his medical condition postdating his pertinent request for an accommodation in
November 2011. Defendant acknowledges that evidence or testimony regarding Plaintiff’s
medical condition in November 2011 would be relevant to the pertinent issue of whether
Plaintiff suffered from a protected disability in November 2011. Defendant argues, however,
that medical evidence or testimony regarding Plaintiff’s condition after November 2011 should
be precluded because such evidence: (1) is not relevant because it does not concern the pertinent
time period when Plaintiff requested the sitting accommodation; (2) such evidence was not
produced to Defendant during Plaintiff’s employment and therefore could not have been
considered by Defendant regarding allowing Plaintiff a sitting accommodation; and (3) such
evidence could lead to juror confusion because it does not relate to Plaintiff’s medical condition
in November 2011.
Plaintiff argues in his response that medical evidence that postdates his November 2011
request for an accommodation is relevant and admissible but fails to set forth any reasoning or
analysis to support his argument. Plaintiff contended during oral argument that the medical
records dated after November 2011 through June 2012 are relevant because such evidence shows
that Plaintiff’s skin condition was exacerbated by the denial of his request to sit as needed in
November 2011. Plaintiff further argued that the medical records that postdate his resignation
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are relevant because such evidence supports his claims for damages relating to both his physical
and mental condition.
As discussed supra, the Court concludes that Plaintiff seeks to admit his medical records
postdating his request for an accommodation for the sole purpose of establishing his damages.
The Court also observes that Plaintiff has wholly failed to indicate with any specificity what
medical evidence he will be relying upon to show his damages. Accordingly, the Court finds
that such evidence will not be admissible at his trial on liability, and will be admitted, it at all,
during a damages trial, if one occurs.
D.
Erick Smith’s Position Change
Finally, Defendant requests that this Court preclude any evidence regarding Erick
Smith’s change in position with Defendant from Store Manager to Retail Store Consultant.
Defendant argues that Smith voluntarily stepped down from his manager position four months
after Plaintiff resigned and the change “had nothing to do with Smith’s response to Gleed’s
accommodation request to sit at times.” (Def.’s Br. at 4-5). Defendant further contends that any
possible relevance of this information is outweighed by possible prejudice (Fed. R. Evid. 403),
because a juror could make an improper inference from its mere admission that Smith’s position
change was connected to the alleged denial of Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Moreover,
Defendant argues that Fed. R. Evid. 602 bars Plaintiff from testifying about Smith’s position
change because he has no firsthand knowledge regarding the position change. Rule 602 requires
that “[a] witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”
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Plaintiff argues that “Defendants [sic] argument is ipsedixit [sic] and reckless. Plaintiff
will attempt to show at trial that Smith’s refusal of Plaintiff’s accommodation request violated
the ADA and that Defendant removed him from his management position for that reason.” (Pl.’s
Resp. at 5). Yet, Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that he has no evidence that Erick
Smith’s change in position is related to Plaintiff’s accommodation request in November 2011.
Plaintiff also did not dispute he lacked firsthand knowledge regarding Smith’s position change.
Plaintiff appears to argue merely that he should be allowed to question Smith whether he was
demoted based on his incompetence relating to the denial of Plaintiff’s request for an
accommodation.
The Court finds that because Plaintiff has no firsthand knowledge regarding why Smith
changed positions, he cannot testify regarding his speculations. See FED. R. EVID. 602. Further,
the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to otherwise show that Smith’s change in position, four
months after Plaintiff’s resignation, is relevant to the issue of whether Smith denied Plaintiff’s
sitting accommodation in November 2011. Finally, the Court concludes that any possible
relevance of Smith’s position change is greatly outweighed by the likelihood of prejudice (Fed.
R. Evid. 403) to Defendant due to the possibility of an improper inference that Smith’s position
change was related to Plaintiff’s accommodation request. Also see FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
Therefore, the Court will grant Defendant’s request to exclude any evidence regarding Smith’s
position change.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For all these reasons, the Court:
(1)
ORDERS bifurcation of the liability and damages phases of the trial; and
(2)
GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s motion in limine such that the
June 29, 2012 resignation email will be allowed but also allowing Plaintiff to testify
regarding his motivation for authoring the email, and allowing a limiting instruction
regarding the relevance of the resignation email;
(3)
DENIES AT THIS TIME Defendant’s request to preclude Plaintiff’s submission of
medical evidence post-dating his November 2011 request for accommodation, but only
allowing, if at all, such medical evidence and testimony during any subsequent damages
phase of the trial.
(4)
GRANTING Defendant’s request to exclude evidence regarding Smith’s change in
position.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Paul D. Borman
PAUL D. BORMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: November 12, 2015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing order was served upon each attorney or
party of record herein by electronic means or first class U.S. mail on November 12, 2015.
s/Deborah Tofil
Case Manager
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