Williams v. Detroit Medical Center et al

Filing 46

OPINION AND ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 36 Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ERIC WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-12657
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
VHS OF MICHIGAN,
INC., et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT (ECF #36)
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Eric Williams (“Williams”) brings this action against his former
employer, VHS of Michigan, Inc. and VHS Sinai-Grace Hospital, Inc.
(collectively, “Sinai-Grace”) for quid pro quo sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2 et seq. (“Title VII”).
Williams alleges that after Sinai-Grace terminated his employment for cause, his
former supervisor offered to re-hire him in a customer service position in exchange
for sexual favors.

Sinai-Grace now moves to dismiss and/or for summary

judgment. (See the “Motion,” ECF #36.) For the reasons explained below, the
Court grants in part and denies in part Sinai-Grace’s Motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Typical Hiring Process at Sinai-Grace
Sinai-Grace is a hospital system in Detroit, Michigan. When a manager at
Sinai-Grace decides to hire a new employee at Williams’ level, the hiring process
typically works as follows. First, the manager of the department that seeks to hire
a new employee submits a request to the human resources department (the “HR
Department”). (See Deposition of Employment Specialist Christen Lieb (“Lieb”),
ECF #36-4 at 12, Pg. ID 272.) The HR Department then posts the job on SinaiGrace’s computer system. (See id.) When an applicant applies for a position, the
application is sent to the HR Department.

(See id. at 21, Pg. ID 274.)

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representative of the HR Department then screens the applications to eliminate
unqualified candidates who lack the minimum qualifications for the position. (See
Deposition of Administrative Director of Patient Care Services Stacey Clark
(“Clark”), Vol. 2, ECF #40 at 37; Pg. ID 457.) The HR Department then forwards
the applications of qualified candidates to the manager in charge of the position.
(See id. at 26; Pg. ID 275.) From there, the manager reviews the applications
forwarded by the HR Department and decides which candidates to interview and,
ultimately, whom to hire. (See Deposition of Administrative Director of Patient
Care Services Stacey Clark (“Clark”), Vol. 2, ECF #40 at 37; Pg. ID 457.) Thus,

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under the typical hiring process, an applicant is not hired unless and until the HR
Department screens his application and sends it to the hiring manager.
B. Sinai-Grace Hires Williams in 2011 Through an Atypical Hiring
Process and Then Fires Him Shortly Thereafter
In late 2011, Williams applied to work for Sinai-Grace as an information
clerk. (See Williams Dep. Vol. 1, ECF #36-2 at 102, Pg. ID 204; Clark Dep. Vol.
2 at 25-26, Pg. ID 456.) After submitting his application, Williams learned that the
manager for the position was Stacey Clark (“Clark”), whom he had previously met.
(See Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 49-51, 102; Pg. ID 197-98, 204.) Williams contacted
Clark to inquire about the position. (See id. at 102, Pg. ID 204.) At that time,
Clark did not have Williams’ application, as Arlinda Dobbins (“Dobbins”), the HR
Department representative in charge of the position, was still “in the process of
selecting candidates for” Clark and had not sent Williams’ application to her.
(Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 25; Pg. ID 456.) Therefore, Clark called Dobbins and “asked
… if [Dobbins] could forward” Williams’ application.

(Id.)

As requested,

Dobbins sent Williams’ application to Clark, and Clark ultimately interviewed and
decided to hire Williams (the “Initial Hiring”). (See id. at 24-26, Pg. ID 456.) This
hiring of Williams was atypical in that Clark obtained Williams’ application and
hired him even though the HR Department had not independently forwarded his
resume for an interview and possible hiring.

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Williams’ employment at Sinai-Grace did not last long. Soon after starting
the information clerk job, Williams had an altercation with a patient’s family
member. (See Clark Dep. Vol. 1, ECF #36-3 at 26-27, Pg. ID 232-33; Resp. Br.,
ECF #37 at 3, Pg. ID 389.) Clark learned of the incident, consulted with her
supervisor and the HR Department, and decided to terminate Williams’
employment on or about April 30, 2012. (See Clark Dep. Vol. 1 at 26-27, 31-32,
63, Pg. ID 232-33, 236-37, 256; Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 119-21, Pg. ID 208.)
C. The First Alleged Quid Pro Quo Harassment and Non-Hiring of
Williams
Clark called Williams on May 7, 2012 – approximately a week after firing
him (the “May 7th Conversation”). (See Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 122, Pg. ID 208;
Clark Dep. Vol. 1 at 64, 68, Pg. ID 257, 261; Call Log, ECF #36-11 at 3, Pg. ID
313.) According to Williams, Clark apologized for firing him and told him to
“n[o]t worry about it” because she “ha[d] something” for him: a new “position
coming up” in her department. (Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 122, 127; Pg. ID 208,
210.)1 Clark then asked Williams what he was wearing, and she complemented the
way he dressed. (See id.) According to Williams:

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Clark disputes the content of the May 7th Conversation and a subsequent
telephone conversation she had with Williams on October 3, 2012. (See Clark
Dep. Vol. 2 at 68, 70; Pg. ID 461.) However, on summary judgment, the Court
must view Williams’ allegations in the light most favorable to him. The Court
takes the facts described herein as true for the purposes of this Motion only.

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Then [Clark] said, “Well, this opportunity is here for you. Do you
want it?” [Williams] said yes, and [Clark] said, “Well, what do you
want to do?” [Williams] said, “What do you mean by that?” [Clark]
said … “Are you going to give me some dick?”
(Id. at 125-26, Pg. ID 209.) Williams refused Clark’s sexual advances, told Clark
not to “call [him] with that type of B.S.,” and hung up the phone. (Id.)
At some point shortly after the May 7th Conversation, the Sinai-Grace HR
Department formally posted the new position to which Clark had referred during
the call (the “May Job Posting”). On May 15, 2012, Williams applied for the
position. (See Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 128, Pg. ID 210; Application Tracker at 6,
Pg. ID 330.) Importantly, Clark was not aware that Williams had applied and did
not become aware of his application at any point during the hiring process. (See
Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 42; Pg. ID 458.)
Consistent with Sinai-Grace’s standard hiring practices for a position at this
level, Williams’ application was not sent directly to Clark, the manager for the
position. Instead, Williams’ application first went to the HR Department for a
determination as to whether Williams was qualified for the position and whether
his application should be forwarded to Clark for consideration. (See Lieb Dep. at
26, 33; Pg. ID 275, 276.) Employment Specialist Lieb from the HR Department
screened the applications for the May Job Posting. (See id.) In light of Williams’
prior termination from Sinai-Grace, Lieb did not forward Williams’ application to
Clark. (See id. at 32-33; Pg. ID 276-77; Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 42; Pg. ID 458.)

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Clark ultimately hired another candidate – one whose application had been
forwarded by Lieb. (See id. at 45; Pg. ID 459.)
D. The Second Alleged Quid Pro Quo Harassment and Non-Hiring of
Williams
Several months later, in September 2012, Clark requested that the HR
Department post a vacancy for a customer service position within her department
(the “September Job Posting”). (See Job Requisition, ECF #36-17, Pg. ID 346.)
Williams applied for the position on October 2, 2012. (See Application Tracker at
5, Pg. ID 329.)2 The following day, October 3, 2012, Clark called Williams (the
“October 3rd Conversation”). (See Call Log, ECF #36-11 at 4, Pg. ID 314.) Clark
told Williams that she saw that he had applied for the September Job Posting.3
(See Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 149; Pg. ID 215.) Clark then asked Williams, “What
are you willing to do for this job?” (Id. at 145, Pg. ID 214.) Williams asked Clark
what she meant. (See id. at 148; Pg. ID 215.) Clark responded, “Are you going to

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In fact, it appears that Williams applied – and was rejected – for approximately
13 jobs at Sinai-Grace between the time he was terminated and the September Job
Posting. (See Application Tracker at 5-6, Pg. ID 329-330.) However, the May and
September Job Postings are the only vacancies at issue in this action.
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Clark admits that she called Williams on October 3 but denies the content of the
conversation as reported by Williams. (See Clark Dep. Vol. 1 at 70; Pg. ID 263.)
Clark contends that her phone inadvertently dialed Williams while the phone was
in her pocket and that she said nothing during the call. (See id.)

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give me some?” (Id.) Williams again refused Clark’s advances, said “a few
choice words” in response, and “just hung up the phone.” (Id.)
Sinai-Grace made little progress toward filling the customer service position
listed in the September Job Posting. At the time the position was posted, SinaiGrace had an acute need for additional nurses, and, accordingly, Clark’s
supervisor, Elmira Nixon (“Nixon”), “directed … Clark to specifically focus all of
her interviewing and hiring between September and December 2012 on nurses.”
(Nixon Aff., ECF #36-9 at ¶5.) After receiving Nixon’s direction, Clark “put [the
vacant customer service position] on the back burner” to focus on “fill[ing] …
nursing positions….” (Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 47-48, Pg. ID 460.) Nonetheless,
Clark acknowledges that she “may have interviewed one or two” candidates for the
September Job Posting, but those candidates “weren’t a good fit for the position.”
(Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 49; Pg. 460.) The HR Department ultimately closed the
September Job Posting on January 28, 2013, without having filled the position.
(See Job Requisition at 2, Pg. ID 347.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Williams filed the instant action in this Court on June 17, 2013. (See
Compl., ECF #1.) In his First Amended Complaint, Williams alleges that “Clark’s
offer to give [Williams] employment with [Sinai-Grace] in exchange for sexual

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favors” violated Title VII. (First Am. Compl., ECF #2 at ¶24.)4 Sinai-Grace has
now moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. (See the Motion.) The
Court heard oral argument on the Motion on August 11, 2014. The parties have
presented, and the Court has considered, voluminous deposition testimony and
other matters outside of the pleadings.

Accordingly, the Court will treat the

Motion as one for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact....” U.S. SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services,
Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. However, summary judgment is not
appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Id. at 251-252. When reviewing the record, “the court must

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Williams’ First Amended Complaint also contained an apparent Title VII
retaliation claim. (See id. at ¶25.) However, Williams has since clarified that he is
not pursuing a cause of action for retaliation. (See Resp. Br. at 1, n. 1; Pg. ID 387.)
To the extent that Williams’ First Amended Complaint contained a retaliation
claim, the Court considers this claim abandoned.

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view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge…” Id. at 255.
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard Governing Williams’ Claim and The Parties’ Positions
Williams acknowledges that in order to prevail under a “quid pro quo”
theory of sexual harassment, he must show:
(1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to
unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4)
his refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual demands resulted in a
tangible job detriment; and (5) respondeat superior liability.
(Resp. Br. at 6, Pg. ID 392) (citing Highlander v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 805 F.2d
644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986)). Sinai-Grace does not contest the first three elements of
this test for the purposes of the Motion. (See Motion at 15, Pg. ID 177.) However,
Sinai-Grace argues that Williams has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material
fact with respect to the fourth and fifth elements. (See Motion at 15, Pg. ID 177.)
“To satisfy the fourth element [Williams] must establish: (1) a tangible
employment action or detriment; and (2) a causal relationship between the tangible
employment action and [Clark’s] alleged actions.” Sanford v. Main Street Baptist
Church Manor, Inc., 327 Fed. App’x 587, 598 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Howington v.

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Quality Rest. Concepts, LLC, 298 Fed. App’x 436, 442-43 (6th Cir. 2008)). The
test for the fifth element (i.e., respondeat superior liability) is similar. See, e.g.,
Howington, 298 Fed. App’x at 443, n.7 (respondeat superior liability under Title
VII exists when supervisor’s harassment “culminates in” a tangible employment
action).
In this case, Sinai-Grace’s decision not to hire Williams for either the May
or September Job Postings was a tangible employment action. See Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (“A tangible employment action
constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring….”)
(emphasis added).

Therefore, the critical issue for purposes of Sinai-Grace’s

Motion is whether there was a causal relationship between Clark’s unwelcome
advances and Sinai-Grace’s decision not to hire Williams for the May or
September Job Postings (the “non-hires”).

“[A] causal relationship between

refusal of sexual advances and an adverse employment action [is] not established
when the alleged … harasser had no formal role in” taking the tangible
employment action. Sanford, 327 Fed. App’x at 598 (citing Idusuyi v. State of
Tennessee Dept. of Children’s Svcs., 30 Fed. App’x 398, 401 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Sinai-Grace argues that Williams cannot establish the requisite causal
connection because Clark played no formal role in the non-hires. (See Motion at
16-17, Pg. ID 178-79.) Specifically, Sinai-Grace maintains that Williams was not

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hired for the May Job Posting because Lieb chose not to forward Williams’
application as part of the organization’s standard screening process. (See id. at 16;
Pg. ID 178.) Sinai-Grace argues that Lieb’s decision not to forward Williams’
application to Clark precluded Clark from hiring Williams for the May Job
Posting. (See Reply Br., ECF #42 at 9, Pg. ID 486.)
Sinai-Grace contends that Williams was not hired for the September Job
Posting because Nixon’s instruction to Clark to focus her hiring efforts solely on
nurses precluded Clark from hiring Williams (or anyone else, for that matter) for
the vacant customer service position. (See Motion at 16-17, Pg. ID 178-79.) Thus,
Sinai-Grace contends that Lieb’s and Nixon’s independent actions negate any
causal connection between Williams’ rejection of Clark’s alleged unwelcome
advances and Williams’ non-hire.
Williams responds that he has presented evidence from which a reasonable
jury could infer a causal connection between his refusal of Clark’s advances and
both of his non-hires. Williams argues that the evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to him, establishes that Clark could have hired Williams for either the
May or September Postings and that she declined to exercise her authority to do so
because he rebuffed her sexual advances. (See Resp. Br. at 9-11; Pg. ID 440-42.)
As support for his argument that Clark had the independent ability to hire
him, Williams points to his Initial Hiring into the information clerk position in

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2011. Williams highlights that Clark reached out to the HR Department, obtained
his application and hired him – all without the HR Department having made the
affirmative decision to forward his application for consideration. Simply put,
Williams argues that his Initial Hiring shows that Clark could intervene in the HR
Department’s screening process at her discretion, could bypass the HR
Department’s screening process, and that she could have hired Williams for the
May or September Job Postings. Williams thus argues that there is a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Williams’ refusal of Clark’s advances resulted in his
non-hire. (See id.)
B. Williams Has Not Created a Material Factual Dispute as to Whether
His Rejection of Clark’s Advances Resulted in His Non-Hire for the
May Job Posting
Williams has not demonstrated a causal connection between his rejection of
Clark’s advances and his non-hire for the May Job Posting because the evidence,
even taken in the light most favorable to Williams, indicates that his non-hire was
attributable to Lieb’s screening decision and not to any action by Clark. Lieb did
not include Williams’ application among those she forwarded to Clark because of
Williams’ previous termination from Sinai-Grace. (See Lieb Dep. at 32-33, Pg. ID
276-77; Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 42; Pg. ID 458.) Critically, Clark could not have
bypassed Lieb’s screening process and requested that Williams’ application be sent
directly to her because Clark did not even know that Williams had applied for the

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position.5 Thus, the May Job Posting did not present a situation – like that created
in connection with the Initial Hiring – in which Clark arguably had the ability to
proactively request that the HR Department forward Williams’ application to her.
Clark’s lack of knowledge that Williams applied for the May Job Posting
sharply distinguishes that posting from the Initial Hiring. With respect to the
Initial Hiring, Clark knew that Williams had applied for the information clerk
position because he “reach[ed] out to” her after he applied. (Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at
25, Pg. ID 456.) With respect to the May Job Posting, Williams told Clark he was
interested in the position before it was posted, but he did not tell Clark that he was
going to apply; he did not contact Clark after applying to inform her that he had
applied; and he did not ask Clark to obtain his application from the HR
Department. Simply put, Williams has failed to demonstrate how Clark could have
possibly caused Williams’ non-hire for the May Job Posting in light of the
undisputed facts that (1) she did not know that he had applied and (2) Lieb did not
send his application to Clark for consideration.

Because Williams has not

demonstrated a causal connection, Sinai-Grace is entitled to summary judgment on
that portion of William’s quid pro quo claim that is based upon the May Job
Posting.

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During oral argument before the Court, Williams acknowledged that he has no
evidence that Clark knew he had applied for the May Job Posting.

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C. Williams Has Created a Material Factual Dispute as to Whether His
Rejection of Clark’s Advances Resulted in Williams’ Non-Hire for the
September Job Posting
Williams has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there
was a causal connection between his rejection of Clark’s advances and his non-hire
for the September Job Posting. In contrast to the May Job Posting, Clark was
aware that Williams applied for the September Job Posting. Indeed, she started the
October 3rd Conversation by saying, “I see[] that you applied for the job.” (See
Williams Dep. Vol. 1 at 149; Pg. ID 215.) Furthermore, there is no evidence in the
record that the HR Department determined that Williams was unqualified for the
September Job Posting. (See Dobbins Dep. at 25, Pg. ID 297.)6 Thus, based on the
current record, it appears that the September Job Posting was analogous to the
Initial Hiring. In each case, Clark knew that Williams had applied for the position,
and there is no evidence that the HR Department had disqualified Williams from
consideration. Thus, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Williams, it

6

Clark testified that the HR Department performed its screening and sent a pool of
candidates to Clark. (See Clark Dep. Vol. 1 at 49, Pg. ID 247.) However, Clark
was not asked at her deposition whether Williams’ application was among the
applications she was sent. (See id.) Furthermore, HR Department representative
Dobbins testified that she did not “recall that [Clark] was sent applicants” for the
September Job Posting (Dobbins Dep. at 25, Pg. ID 297), and Sinai-Grace’s
application tracking system contains no record of the HR Department having
screened Williams’ application (see Application Tracker at 5; Pg. ID 329). Taken
in the light most favorable to Williams, the Court must view these statements as
evidence that the HR Department did not disqualify Williams’ application for the
September Job Posting.

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appears that Clark could have intervened in the screening process, requested that
Williams’ application be forwarded to her, and ultimately hired Williams for the
September Job Posting – just as she did in the Initial Hiring.
Sinai-Grace resists this conclusion by pointing to the direction that Clark
received from her supervisor, Nixon, in late 2012, to focus on hiring solely nurses.
Sinai-Grace argues that given this direct order from her supervisor, Clark could not
have hired Williams for the September Job Posting. However, Nixon directed
Clark to focus on interviewing and hiring nurses “between September and
December 2012,” (Nixon Aff., ECF #36-9 at ¶5) (emphasis added), and the HR
Department did not cancel the September Job Posting until January 28, 2013. (See
Job Requisition at 2, Pg. ID 347.) Thus, for the full month of January 2013, the
September Job Posting was open, and there is no evidence that Clark was subject
to any directive not to interview or hire for that position. Moreover, Clark testified
that despite Nixon’s directive she “may have interviewed one or two” candidates
for the position. (Clark Dep. Vol. 2 at 49; Pg. ID 460.) Taken in the light most
favorable to Williams, the Court must interpret this testimony to mean that Clark
did take steps toward hiring for the September Job Posting and, therefore, could
have hired Williams – at the very least during January of 2013 when she was not
subject to a direction not to hire and while the position remained posted.

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In sum, Williams has presented evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find a causal connection between Clark’s alleged unwelcome advances
and Williams’ non-hire for the September Job Posting. Accordingly, Sinai-Grace
is not entitled to summary judgment as to the September Job Posting.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons in stated in this Opinion and Order, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED THAT Sinai-Grace’s Motion to Dismiss and/or For Summary
Judgment (ECF #36) is GRANTED as to the May Job Posting and DENIED as to
the September Job Posting.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: September 29, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on September 29, 2014, by electronic means
and/or ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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