Jamaleddin v. Oakland Physicians Medical Center, L.L.C. et al

Filing 29

OPINION AND ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AMEEN JAMALEDDIN,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-cv-12735
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
OAKLAND PHYSICIANS MEDICAL
CENTER, L.L.C. et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF #18)
In February 2011, Defendant Oakland Physicians Medical Center, L.L.C.,
(“Oakland”) hired Plaintiff Dr. Ameen Jamaleddin (“Jamaleddin”) as a first-year
medical resident.

Jamaleddin’s direct supervisor was Defendant Dr. Nikhil

Hemady (“Hemady”). Jamaleddin claims that Oakland and Hemady discriminated
against him during his employment and ultimately forced him to resign from his
residency program. In this action, Jamaleddin asserts claims for (1) discrimination
based on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq. (“Title VII”), and Michigan’s Elliot-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.201 et. seq. (the “ELCRA”); (2) retaliation in violation of Title VII
and the ELCRA; and (3) breach of his residency employment contract.  (See
Complaint, ECF #1.) Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment. (See
1 

ECF #18.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES summary judgment on
Jamaleddin’s national origin discrimination and breach of contract claims but
GRANTS summary judgment with respect to Jamaleddin’s retaliatory harassment
claims.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 25, 2011, Jamaleddin, who is of Arabic descent, and Oakland
executed a “Residency Agreement” in which Oakland “offer[ed] and [Jamaleddin]
accept[ed] appointment as a first year resident in Family Medicine for the year
beginning July 1, 2011 and ending June 30, 2012.”

(See the “Residency

Agreement,” ECF #21-2 at § I, Pg. ID 792.) Among other things, the Residency
Agreement stated that the “Program Director” of the Family Medicine Department
– Defendant Hemady – “shall determine [Jamaleddin’s] duties and responsibilities
[], including [Jamaleddin’s] hours of duty….” (Id. at § III, Pg. ID 792.) Oakland
also “agree[d] to provide [Jamaleddin] a training program that meets the standards
established in the essentials of approved residencies as formulated by the
Accreditation Council on Graduate Medical Education of the American Medical
Association.” (Id. at § II, Pg. ID 792.) Finally, as relevant to this action, the
Residency Agreement included an anti-discrimination provision that stated that
Oakland “shall not discriminate against [Jamaleddin] based on race, color, religion,
sex, [or] national origin … and shall conduct itself in compliance with the various
2 

state and federal laws and Hospital policies which prohibit employment
discrimination.” (Id. at § VIII, ¶ B, Pg. ID 794.)
Jamaleddin began his residency program in July 2011, and conflicts arose
between Jamaleddin and Hemady almost immediately. For example, Jamaleddin
says that during his orientation, Hemady told Jamaleddin that he needed to “give
up” his “Arab mentality.” (Jamaleddin Deposition, Exhibit H to ECF #21-3 at 95,
Pg. ID 941.) On another occasion, Hemady allegedly asked Jamaleddin if he was
using “Arabic time.” (Id. at 96, Pg. ID 941.) Jamaleddin also says that while he
received favorable reviews from some of the physicians he worked with (see, e.g.,
Exhibit D to ECF #21-2, Pg. ID 851-882), Hemady “refused to meet with
[Jamaleddin] and evaluate [Jamaleddin].” (Jamaleddin Dep. at 97, Pg. ID 941.)
According to Jamaleddin:
Dr. Hemady never met with me to evaluate me, to train
me, to talk to me like the other residents he does. He
never really gave me the environment of teaching and
caring that he gives to the other residents.
[….]
The program director is like my father. If he chooses not
to train me, not to show me things, then I’m just cut out
of the whole program, basically. [Hemady] was not
meeting with me, he’s not evaluating me, he’s not
educating me.
(Id. at 139, Pg. ID 952.)

3 

In September 2011, Hemady e-mailed Jamaleddin regarding concerns
Hemady had with Jamaleddin’s performance. (See Exhibit F to ECF #21-2, Pg. ID
910.) In that e-mail, Hemady chastised Jamaleddin for “not logg[ing] [his] duty
hours for the last two weeks,” for failing to “turn[] in his resident self-assessment
document,” and for wearing “scrubs [] when seeing patients in the Family
Medicine Center,” which Hemady noted “is against the residency program policy.”
(Id.) Hemedy further told Jamaleddin that:
You have been verbally warned over the past few months
by a number of individuals (including your faculty
advisor and chief residents) because of several concerns
regarding your professionalism, and interpersonal and
communication skills. Hence, if you do not perform the
duties and responsibilities of a resident as required by the
program and institution, there will be disciplinary action
taken against you, including the possibility of being
terminated from the residency program.
(Id.)

Jamaleddin disputes Hemady’s assertion regarding improperly logged duty

hours. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 28-30, Pg. ID 924-925.) Further, Jamaleddin says
that after receiving Hemady’s e-mail, he turned in his self-assessment form as
directed and never again wore scrubs in the Family Medicine Center. (See id.)
An incident that occurred on November 3, 2011, precipitated the end of
Jamaleddin’s employment at Oakland. Jamaleddin began working at 7:00 a.m. that
day. (See id. at 81, Pg. ID 937.) Jamaleddin was scheduled to work until 9:00
p.m., and he was scheduled to begin another shift at 7:00 a.m. the following day.
4 

(See id.; see also id. at 137-141, Pg. ID 951-952.) Jamaleddin says that early in his
shift, he spoke with Hemady and voiced his concern that Oakland was forcing him
to work too many hours without sufficient breaks between shifts. (See id. at 98-99,
Pg. ID 942.) According to Jamaleddin, he told Hemady that he believed he was
being “discriminated [against] because of [his] Arabic decent.” (Id. at 98, Pg. ID
942.)
Later that evening, near the end of Jamaleddin’s shift, Dr. Henry Fosah, the
floor chief resident, asked Jamaleddin to draft a patient history. (See id. at 78-79.)
Jamaleddin agreed to draft the history, but he then became concerned that he
would not have time to complete the assignment before the end of his shift. (Id.)
Jamaleddin says he did not want to stay late to complete the history because he
needed to sleep before returning to the hospital at 7:00 a.m. the next morning. (See
id. at 89.)
Around 9:00 p.m., Jamaleddin asked another physician, Dr. Basmal Yaldo
(“Yaldo”), to complete the history for him, and Yaldo agreed. (See id. at 88.)
Jamaleddin then left the hospital. (See id.) Jamaleddin insists he had “permission”
to leave from Yaldo, who assured Jamaleddin that he (Yaldo) would complete the
history that night. (See id.)
Shortly after returning home to rest in preparation for his shift the next day,
Jamaleddin received a page from Yaldo. (See id. at 135, Pg. ID 951.) Yaldo told
5 

Jamaleddin that Hemady (1) found out that Jamaleddin had asked Yaldo to draft
the patient history and (2) told Yaldo to stop working on the assignment. (See id.)
Jamaleddin concedes that he then asked Yaldo to complete the history “in a way
where Dr. Hemady doesn’t see you,” but Yaldo refused. (Id. at 89-90, Pg. ID 939940.)

Jamaleddin then returned to the hospital and completed the history as

originally assigned. (Id. at 136-137, Pg. ID 951.)
Jamaleddin says that Defendants fired him one week later, on November 10.
(See id. at 91-93, Pg. ID 940.) On that day, Hemady, accompanied by an Oakland
human resources employee and two chief residents, met with Jamaleddin. (See
Hemady Deposition, Exhibit B to ECF #21-2 at 136-137, Pg. ID 830.) Hemady
says that during that meeting, he gave Jamaleddin a letter he drafted that “formally
notif[ied]” Jamaleddin that his “employment as a Family Medicine resident … is
being terminated….” (The “Termination Letter,” ECF #18-4 at 5, Pg. ID 147.) A
copy of the letter was also placed in Jamaleddin’s personnel file. (See ECF #18-4.)
The Termination Letter stated that Oakland was terminating Jamaleddin’s
employment because he “refused to complete [his] assigned patient care
responsibilities (i.e. history and physical on an admitted patient) while on call….”
(See id. at 5, Pg. ID 147.) The Termination Letter described Jamaleddin’s actions
as a “gross dereliction of patient care responsibilities [that] mounted [sic] to
insubordination of [his] superiors, including the chief resident, senior resident and
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the Program Director.” (Id.)

The Termination Letter also reiterated that

Jamaleddin had “been warned verbally and in writing of several concerns
regarding [his] professionalism, and interpersonal and communication skills.” (Id.)
The Termination Letter next said that “[t]he Program Oversight Committee, along
with resident representatives, reviewed the [November 3] incident and was
unanimous in its decision to terminate your employment as a resident in the
residency program.”

(Id.)

The Termination Letter concluded by informing

Jamaleddin that he had the “right to appeal this decision of termination.” (Id.) At
the bottom of the Termination Letter, there was a space for Jamaleddin to sign and
confirm that he had “received a copy of the Graduate Medical Education’s policy
on Resident Grievance Procedure and Due Process Policy” and that he
“underst[ood] that [he had] the right to appeal this decision, but must submit a
written request for a hearing to Dr. Hemady by 9 am on November 17, 2011.”
(Id.)
Jamaleddin never appealed his termination.

Jamaleddin says Hemady

frustrated his right to appeal and forced Jamaleddin to sign a different document in
which Jamaleddin formally resigned from the residency program.
“Resignation Form,” ECF #18-4 at 4, Pg. ID 146.)

(See the

Jamaleddin asserts that

Hemady told him that if he appealed his termination rather than signing the
Resignation Form, he would “not win [his] appeal.” (Jamaleddin Dep. at 107, Pg.
7 

ID 944.) According to Jamaleddin, Hemady told him: “I will make sure you lose
because I’m the one who’s in charge of the appeal.” (Id.) Jamaleddin insists that
he did not want to resign, but that Hemady further threatened that if Jamaleddin
refused to sign the Resignation Form, Hemady would not write Jamaleddin a letter
of recommendation and would “make sure [Jamaleddin] end[s] up nowhere.” (Id.)
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 20, 2013, Jamaleddin filed this action against Defendants. (See
Compl.)

In his Complaint, Jamaleddin alleged that Defendants discriminated

against him due to his national origin in violation of both Title VII and the
ELCRA. (See id. at ¶¶58-73, 87-99.) Jamaleddin also alleged that he “engaged in
an activity protected under Title VII [and the ELCRA] when he reported and
complained about the discriminatory conduct and comments to which he was
subjected” (id. at ¶¶81, 102), and that as a result of these complaints, he was
“subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment.” (Id. at ¶¶85, 105.)
Finally, Jamaleddin claimed that Oakland breached the Residency Agreement by,
among other things, “[f]ailing to provide [Jamaleddin] with a training program…”
and “[d]iscriminating against [Jamaleddin] based on his national origin….” (Id. at
¶111.)
Defendants filed their summary judgment motion on May 15, 2014. (See
ECF #18.) The Court heard oral argument on the Motion on October 15, 2014, and
8 

ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs. (See ECF #25.) The Court now
grants in part and denies in part Defendants’ motion.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
A movant is entitled to summary judgment when it “shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact....” U.S. SEC v. Sierra Brokerage Services,
Inc., 712 F.3d 321, 326–27 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)) (quotations omitted). “The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for
[that party].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. However, summary judgment is not
appropriate when “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury.” Id. at 251–252. When reviewing the record, “the court must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all
reasonable inferences in its favor.” Id. Indeed, “[c]redibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drafting of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge ...” Id. at 255.
ANALYSIS
A.

Defendants Are Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Jamaleddin’s
Title VII and ELCRA Discrimination Claims (Counts I and III of the
Complaint)
Jamaleddin’s national origin discrimination claims under Title VII and the
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ELCRA (counts I and III of his Complaint) are “analyzed under the same
evidentiary framework.” Humenny v. Genex Corp., 390 F.3d 901, 906 (6th Cir.
2004). To establish a Title VII or ELCRA employment discrimination claim,
Jamaleddin must “present direct evidence of discrimination or introduce
circumstantial evidence that would allow an inference of discrimination.” Johnson
v. Kroger Co., 319 F.3d 858, 864-865 (6th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, Jamaleddin
attempts to present circumstantial evidence of discrimination, the claim is
evaluated under the familiar analysis described in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-805 (1973). Under this test, Jamaleddin has the initial
burden to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. Jamaleddin may
establish a prima facie case by showing that: “(1) he is a member of a protected
class; (2) he was terminated; (3) he was qualified for the position; and (4) he was
replaced by a person outside a protected class or was treated differently than a
similarly situated, non-protected employee.” Abdulnour v. Campbell Soup Supply
Co., 502 F.3d 496, 501 (6th Cir. 2007). If Jamaleddin establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to Defendants to produce a “legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason” for their actions. Id. at 502. Finally, if Defendants meet this burden of
production, the onus shifts back to Jamaleddin to demonstrate that Defendants’
proffered reason is pretextual. See id.

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Defendants argue that Jamaleddin has failed to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination because he has failed to show that he was (a) terminated, (b)
qualified for his position, and (c) replaced by a person outside a protected class or
was treated differently than a similarly situated, non-protected employee. (See
Def.s’ Brief, ECF #18 at 13-15, Pg. ID 125-127.) This Court disagrees. Drawing
all inferences in Jamaleddin’s favor, the Court finds that Jamaleddin has stated a
prima facie case of discrimination.
Defendants first argue that Jamaleddin cannot show that he was terminated
from his employment because he, in fact, resigned from the residency program.
But, while it is true that Jamaleddin signed the Resignation Form (see ECF #18-4
at 4, Pg. ID 146), it is undisputed that Oakland issued the Termination Letter to
Jamaleddin before he signed that form.

The Termination Letter stated, in

unambiguous terms, that Jamaleddin’s “employment as a Family Medicine resident
… is being terminated….” (Id. at 5, Pg. ID 147). Moreover, Jamaleddin testified
that he did not want to sign the Resignation Form, and that the only reason he did
was due to Hemady’s threats. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 91-93, Pg. ID 940.) The
evidence on the termination issue, when viewed in the light most favorable to
Jamaleddin, is sufficient to satisfy the termination element of Jamaleddin’s prima
facie case.

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Second, Defendants appear to argue that Jamaleddin cannot show that he
was qualified for his position because of his “behavior and professionalism.”
(Def.s’ Br. at 13, Pg. ID 125.) However, Jamaleddin has presented evidence of
positive reviews from doctors he worked with. (See, e.g., Exhibit D to ECF #21-2,
Pg. ID 851-882.) Jamaleddin has also shown that once he learned of certain issues
Hemady had raised with respect to his “behavior and professionalism,” he
immediately corrected and remedied those alleged deficiencies.
Dep. at 28-30, Pg. ID 924-925.)

(See Jamaleddin

The evidence concerning Jamaleddin’s

qualifications, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, is sufficient to
establish the qualification element of Jamaleddin’s prima facie case.
Finally, Defendants argue that Jamaleddin has failed to satisfy the fourth
element of his prima facie case by (1) establishing that he was replaced by a person
outside of his protected class or (2) identifying a similarly-situated individual
outside his protected class who engaged in similar alleged misconduct but who did
not face discipline and/or termination of his employment. The Court agrees that
Jamaleddin has failed to make either of these showings. However, the Court
disagrees with Defendants’ contention that the absence of these showings is fatal to
Jamaleddin’s prima facie case.
“There are many ‘context-dependent ways by which plaintiffs may establish
a prima facie case’ of discrimination.” Rachells v. Cingular Wireless Employee
12 

Services, LLC, 732 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Clay v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 501 F.3d 695, 704 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also Macy v. Hopkins County
Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 365 (6th Cir.2007), abrogated on other grounds
by Lewis Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012)
(“elements of prima facie case are not rigid requirements that all plaintiffs with
similar claims must meet regardless of context”). As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held, “while a discriminatory inference is usually,
and perhaps most readily, generated through evidence of unfavorable treatment of
the minority plaintiff vis-à-vis similarly-situated individuals, McDonnell Douglas
and its progeny do not require this always be the case.” Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F.3d
407, 417 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original). Thus, “so long as additional
evidence exists—beyond showing the first three elements of the McDonnell
Douglas test—that indicates discriminatory intent in light of common experience,
the required ‘inference of discrimination’ can be made in satisfaction of the prima
facie case. This holds true even if the plaintiff is not necessarily able to identify
similarly-situated individuals outside of the relevant protected group who were
treated more favorably.” Id. at 418 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks
omitted)1.

Simply put, in assessing the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s prima facie

1

While Yates involved allegations of housing, not employment, discrimination, the
portions of the Yates decision quoted herein discuss the prima facie burden
generally, and are not limited to the housing context. And the approach described
13 

case, “[t]he pivotal question is always ‘whether, under the particular facts and
context of the case at hand the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that he
suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances which give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.’” Rachells, 732 F.3d at 661 (quoting Clay,
501 F.3d at 703).
In this case, Jamaleddin’s evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable
to him, is sufficient to support an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Jamaleddin has presented evidence that (1) on several occasions and in material
respects Defendants treated him less favorably than his non-Arabic counterparts
and (2) Hemady made anti-Arabic comments that could be deemed to reflect a
discriminatory animus. For example, as discussed above, Jamaleddin says that
although Hemady frequently taught and evaluated other non-Arabic residents,
Hemady refused to meet with him, evaluate him, and provide him necessary
training. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 139, Pg. ID 952; see also id. at 97, Pg. ID 941.)
Jamaleddin has also presented evidence that he was required to work more hours

in Yates is consistent with how other courts of appeals have evaluated a plaintiff’s
duty to establish a prima facie case in the employment discrimination context. See,
e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011)
(“[E]stablishing the elements of the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and
never was intended to be, the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive a summary
judgment motion in an employment discrimination case. Accordingly, the
plaintiff's failure to produce a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff's
case. Rather, the plaintiff will always survive summary judgment if he presents
circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer's
discriminatory intent”).
14 

than residents of non-Arabic descent (see ECF #21-3 at 46-104, Pg. ID 957-1015),
that he was reprimanded for failing to attend conferences that non-Arabic residents
missed without reprimand (see, e.g., Hemady Dep. at 88-90, Pg. ID 818-819), and
that he was denied the ability to use vacation days at the beginning of his obstetrics
rotation, even though a non-Arabic resident was allowed to take vacation during
that same time period. (See Jamaleddin Affidavit, Exhibit P to ECF #21-3, Pg. ID
1017-1018).

Moreover, Jamaleddin asserts that Hemady made anti-Arabic

comments to him on more than one occasion. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 95-96, Pg.
ID 941.) Taken as a whole and viewed in Jamaleddin’s favor, all of this evidence
is sufficient to support an inference that the Defendants harbored a discriminatory
animus towards Jamaleddin due to his national origin, acted upon that animus in
the past, and acted upon that animus again when they terminated his employment.
In response to Jamaleddin’s evidence, Defendants argue that Jamaleddin
“lacks credibility” and that the Court should not credit his testimony or evidence.
(See Def.’s Reply Br., ECF #23 at 1, Pg. ID 1131.) However, on summary
judgment, the Court cannot make credibility judgments and must view all of the
evidence, including Jamaleddin’s testimony, in his favor. “This Court takes no
position on the credibility of either side – as that is the province of the finder of
fact. [The Court’s] holding is limited to the recognition of a genuine issue of
material fact concerning the prima facie case, as well as the issue of pretext as
15 

discussed infra, that renders judgment as a matter of law unsustainable.” Yates,
578 F.3d at 420. Jamaleddin has satisfied his prima facie case.
Accordingly, the burden shifts to the Defendants to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Jamaleddin’s termination. The Termination Letter says
that Defendants fired Jamaleddin because on November 3, 2011, he “refused to
complete [his] assigned patient care responsibilities” despite “repeatedly being told
to do so by [his] floor chief resident and senior resident.” (ECF #18-4 at 5, Pg. ID
147.) The Termination Letter further notes that this incident followed several
warnings that Defendants had provided Jamaleddin that his behavior and conduct
needed to improve. (See id.) The reason for Jamaleddin’s termination listed in the
Termination Letter is a valid, non-discriminatory reason.

Defendants have

satisfied their burden of production under McDonnell Douglas.
Thus, the burden shifts back to Jamaleddin to identify evidence that shows
that Defendants’ justification is pretextual. Jamaleddin can satisfy this requirement
in one of three ways. He can show “(1) that the proffered reason[] had no basis in
fact, (2) that the proffered reason[] did not actually motivate [his termination], or
(3) that [the proffered reason was] insufficient to motivate [his termination].”
Rachells, 732 F.3d at 668. Jamaleddin has presented sufficient evidence to raise a
material factual dispute as to whether Defendants’ stated reasons for his discharge
had a basis in fact and/or were sufficient to motivate his termination.
16 

As noted above, the Termination Letter says that Defendants fired
Jamaleddin because he “refused to complete” an assigned patient history on
November 3. (ECF #18-4 at 5, Pg. ID 148.) However, Jamaleddin has presented
evidence that he had permission to leave the hospital before he completed the
patient history, that he arranged for another doctor to complete the patient history
and, moreover, that he ultimately returned to the hospital and completed the
assigned patient history that very evening. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 90-91, Pg. ID
940; see also 136-137, Pg. ID 951.) Accordingly, there is a material factual
dispute as to whether Defendants’ primary stated reason for terminating
Jamaleddin (i.e., his alleged refusal to complete the patient history) had a basis in
fact.
Moreover, to the extent Defendants relied on his prior alleged lack of
professionalism and deficient interpersonal skills as a secondary reason for his
termination, Jamaleddin has presented evidence that those prior failings were
insufficient to motivate his termination. (See Jamaleddin Dep. at 34-36, Pg. ID
926; see also 48-52, Pg. ID 929-930.) As noted above, Jamaleddin has presented
evidence that he had immediately corrected many, if not all, of the flaws that he
was made aware of (see id. at 28-30, Pg. ID 924-925), and he submitted positive
performance reviews from the Oakland physicians who supervised him – reviews
that, when viewed in Jamaleddin’s favor, undercut the Defendants’ claims that
17 

Jamaleddin was a problem employee. (See, e.g. Exhibit D to ECF #21-2, Pg. ID
851-882.) This evidence raises a factual dispute as to whether the Defendants had
a legitimate basis to rely on his alleged prior misconduct to justify his dismissal.
There is, in short, a material factual dispute as to whether the reasons stated in the
Termination Letter were pretextual.
Accordingly, for all of the reasons stated above, summary judgment on
Jamaleddin’s national origin discrimination claim would be improper.
B.

Oakland Is Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Jamaleddin’s
Breach of Contract Claim (Count V of the Complaint)
Defendants argue that Jamaleddin has “failed to establish a claim for breach

of contract.” (Def.s’ Resp. Br. at 19, Pg. ID 131.) The Court disagrees. As noted
above, the Residency Agreement specifically states that Oakland “shall not
discriminate against [Jamaleddin] based on race, color, religion…[or]…national
origin….” (Residency Agreement at § VIII, ¶ B, Pg. ID 794.) As described in the
previous section, the Court has determined that a material question of fact exists as
to whether Defendants did in fact discriminate against Jamaleddin on the basis of
his national origin. If Oakland is found to have discriminated against Jamaleddin,
it would necessarily be in breach of the anti-discrimination provision of the

18 

Residency Agreement.2

Moreover, Jamaleddin has presented evidence that,

despite Oakland’s promise in the Residency Agreement to “provide [him] a
training program” (id. at § II), Hemady, his Program Director, refused to train or
even meet with him. This too, if proven, would suggest a breach of the Residency
Agreement. Thus, for all of the reasons explained above, summary judgment is not
appropriate on Jamaleddin’s breach of contract claim.
C.

Defendants Are Entitled to Summary Judgment on Jamaleddin’s
Retaliation Claims (Counts II and IV of the Complaint)
To establish a prima facie claim for retaliation under Title VII, Jamaleddin

must demonstrate that “(1) [he] has engaged in Title VII-protected activity; (2)
[his] employer had knowledge of this fact; (3) [he] suffered an adverse
employment action; and (4) there is a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.”

Clay, 501 F.3d at 713. “But for”

causation between the protected activity and the adverse employment action must
also exist. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
“But for” causation exists where “the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred
in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Id. The
requirements for a retaliation claim brought under the ELCRA are similar. See In
Re Rodriguez, 487 F.3d 1001, 1011 (6th Cir. 2007)) (“A plaintiff alleging

2

Jamaleddin, however, would not be entitled to a double recovery should a jury
find that Oakland discriminated against him in violation of both the Residency
Agreement and Title VII/the ELCRA.
19 

retaliation in violation of the ELCRA must establish the following elements of a
prima facie case: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in a protected activity, (2) that this
was known by the defendant, (3) that the defendant took an employment action
adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action”) (quoting Barrett v.
Kirtland Comm. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Mich. App. 2001)). Moreover, “[t]o
establish causation [under the ELCRA], the plaintiff must show that his
participation in activity protected by the ELCRA was a significant factor in the
employer's adverse employment action, not just that there was a causal link
between the two.” Id.
Jamaleddin asserts that he complained to Hemady on November 3 that he
was being overworked due to his national origin, and Defendants retaliated against
him for that complaint by requiring him to work additional hours and terminating
his employment a week after his complaint.

However, Jamaleddin has failed to

establish the required causal connection between his complaint and these adverse
employment actions. First, he has not shown that his complaint led to his allegedly
burdensome workload. Indeed, Jamaleddin repeatedly insists in this litigation that
he was overworked because he was Arabic – not because he complained – and the
alleged overworking began long before Jamaleddin allegedly lodged his complaint
with Hemady on November 3. There is no basis on which to conclude that the
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alleged complaint led to an unduly burdensome work schedule for Jamaleddin
during the 7 days between the complaint and his discharge.
Second, Jamaleddin has not shown that his alleged complaint led to his
termination. The only link between Jamaleddin’s complaint and his firing is that
they happened during a seven-day window of time. But, as Jamaleddin himself
concedes, “temporal proximity alone is not enough” to state a cognizable
retaliation claim. (See Pla.’s Br., ECF #21 at 23, Pg. ID 784.) Jamaleddin has
presented no evidence, apart from timing, that his alleged “protected activity” was
a “significant” or “but for” cause of the termination of his employment.
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Jamaleddin’s Title VII
and ELCRA retaliation claims.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons stated in this Opinion and Order, Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF #18) is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART. Defendants are GRANTED summary judgment with respect
to Jamaleddin’s claims for retaliation under Title VII and ELCRA (counts II and
IV of the Complaint). Defendants’ request for summary judgment is DENIED in
all other respects.

s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: January 12, 2015
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the
parties and/or counsel of record on January 12, 2015, by electronic means and/or
ordinary mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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