Barnes v. Green Tree Servicing LLC
Filing
6
ORDER Granting Defendant's 3 MOTION to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6) in Part and Order for Plaintiff to Show Cause, ( Show Cause Hearing set for 11/20/2013 04:00 PM before District Judge Denise Page Hood) Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NATAKI K. DAVIS (BARNES),
Plaintiff,
V.
Case No. 13-CV-12760
Honorable Denise Page Hood
GREEN TREE SERVICING, LLC,
Defendant.
/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER
FRCP 12(b)(6) IN PART AND ORDER
FOR PLAINTIFF TO SHOW CAUSE
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Nataki K. Davis (Barnes) , proceeding pro se, commenced this action
in Oakland County Circuit Court on June 7, 2013, challenging a residential property
foreclosure. Defendant Green Tree Servicing, LLC removed the action to this Court
on June 21, 2013, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. [Docket No. 1,
filed June 21, 2013] In her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Green Tree Servicing is
guilty of fraud in the inducement and breach of contract in connection with the
foreclosure and sheriff’s sale of real property located at 25241 Orchard Grove Street,
Southfield, MI, 48033-5345.1 Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Under FRCP 12(b)(6), filed July 1, 2013. [Docket No. 3, filed July 1, 2013] The
matter has been fully briefed and is now appropriate for review. Plaintiff did not
appear at the hearing set for Wednesday, September 4, 2013. Court Staff was unable
to reach Plaintiff by telephone. At the hearing, Defense Counsel notified the Court
that in a separate state proceeding regarding the property, Plaintiff had accepted “Cash
for Keys” and verbally agreed to dismiss this matter. However, Defense Counsel
indicated that Plaintiff has since refused to sign a stipulation for dismissal.
For the reasons discussed below, the court GRANTS IN PART Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6). The Court also orders Plaintiff Nataki
Davis (Barnes) to appear before the Court on November 20, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. to
show cause as to why Defendant Green Tree Servicing should qualify as a “debt
collector” pursuant to Section 1692g(a) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act or
to indicate her agreement with dismissal of this action.
1
Initially, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the Oakland County Circuit Court for the
State of Michigan. The case was removed by Green Tree Servicing to this Court on
June 21, 2013, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. [Docket No. 1, filed
June 21, 2013]
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II.
BACKGROUND
On June 15, 2007, Plaintiff Nataki Davis and non-party Paula Barnes-Rooks
executed a note and mortgage for $108,000.00 securing real property located at 25241
Orchard Grove Street, Southfield, MI 48033-5345. [Def. Ex. A at 1] The mortgage
was recorded in Liber 39290, Page 265 of the Oakland County Register of Deeds.
[Def. Ex. A] The mortgage listed Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. as
the “nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns” and Quicken Loans
Inc. as the Lender. [Def. Ex. A] On September 19, 2012, Quicken Loans assigned
the mortgage “with all interest secured thereby, all liens, and any rights due or to
become due thereon” to Green Tree Servicing, LLC. [Def. Ex. B] The assignment
listed both Paula Barnes-Rook and Nataki Davis (Barnes) as the makers of the
mortgage. [Def. Ex. B] This assignment was also recorded in Liber 44709, Page 560
of the Oakland County Register of Deeds. [Def. Ex. B]
After making regular and timely mortgage payments for more than five years,
Davis failed to make her July 2012 payment and Green Tree Servicing began
foreclosure proceedings. On December 11, 2012, a sheriff sale was held and Green
Tree Servicing purchased the property for $80,062.46. [Def. Ex. C at 1, 6] In a
sworn affidavit, Deputy Sheriff John M. Roehrig of Oakland County stated that
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pursuant to the printed notice of sale [Def. Ex. C at 3 - Evidence of Sale, dated
November 15, 2012], the sale of the Orchard Grove Street property was in
compliance with the auction sale requirements of the County.2 [Def. Ex. C at 2 Liber 45121, Page 638] The sheriff’s deed on the mortgage sale was duly recorded
in Liber 45121, page 637 of the Oakland County Register of Deeds and Plaintiff was
given until June 11, 2013 to redeem the property, exactly “six (6) months immediately
following the sale[.]” [Def. Ex. C at 1, 4, 6] Plaintiff failed to redeem the property
by June 11, 2013. Green Tree Servicing has since conveyed its interest in the sheriff’s
deed sale to Federal Mortgage Association via Quit Claim Deed.
On June 7, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant Green Tree
was guilty of: (1) fraud in the inducement and (2) breach of contract. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant committed fraud in the inducement because “[t]he
bank made (her) the alleged borrower a depositor by depositing a $108,000.00
negotiable instrument, which the bank sold or had available to sell for approximately
$108,000.00 in legal tender.” She argues that the bank committed fraud because it
“claimed that (she) the alleged borrower owed the bank $108,000.00, then placed a
2
The sale followed printed notice, was opened at 10:00 a.m. on December 11, 2012
on the first floor Main entrance to the Court House in Pontiac (Circuit Court in
Oakland County), was kept open for the space of one hour, the highest bid was
accepted, and the “sale was in all respects open and fair[.]” [Def. Ex. C at 2]
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lien on the [her] real property for $108,000.00 and demanded loan payments or the
bank would foreclose.”
Because she “did not receive a loan, . . . [but] lost
$108,000.00 in value to the bank, which the bank kept and recorded as a bank asset[,]”
Plaintiff contends that the bank owes her damages of $108,000.00 plus interest
payments. These damages, she claims, are owed because the bank “refuses to loan
their money[,]” attempts to “extort payment on a contract the bank never
fulfilled[,]”and has “denie[d] . . . [her] equal protection under the law and contract[]
by merely exchanging one currency for another and refusing repayment in the same
type of currency deposited.” In Count II of the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Green
Tree Servicing breached its contract because the bank never gave her the loan it
promised and “never invested any money to receive [her] mortgage note.”
In addition to these two claims for relief, though not specifically delineated in
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Plaintiff makes additional claims for relief. Plaintiff alleges that
Green Tree purposely failed to notify her of the status of the Orchard Grove Street
property and the foreclosure sale, though Defendant was aware that she shared title
to the property, and this lack of notice removed her opportunity to purchase the
property at the sheriff’s sale. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant failed to meet the
obligations under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, § 339.915(f)3 because Green
3
Michigan Fair Debt Collection Practices Act § 339.915(f) states:
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Tree failed to give her notice that the property was being foreclosed or sold due to
nonpayment of debt. Furthermore, because she was not notified of the sheriff’s sale,
Plaintiff argues that she was not given the required six-month period from the date of
the sale to redeem the property. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that Defendants are not bona
fide purchasers of the property because they did not take it free from any prior interest
of which they had no notice. See In re Wohlfeil, 322 B.R. 302, 304 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 2005) (“Under Michigan law a bona fide purchaser for value takes free of prior
unrecorded interests . . . , for value[,] and without notice or knowledge of an adverse
interest.”). Plaintiff requests that the court discharge the foreclosure sale and give her
an opportunity to redeem the property or, in the alternative, require the Defendant to
pay $108,000.00 in damages. Conversely, Defendant argues that this Court should
A licensee shall not commit 1 or more of the following acts:
(f) Misrepresenting in a communication with a debtor any of the
following:
(I) The legal status of a legal action being taken or threatened.
(ii) The legal rights of the creditor or debtor.
(iii) That the nonpayment of a debt will result in the debtor’s
arrest or imprisonment, or the seizure, garnishment, attachment,
or sale of the debtor’s property.
(iv) That accounts have been turned over to innocent purchasers
for value.
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 339.915 (West).
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grant its 12(b)(6) motion because: (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet the pleading
requirements of Rule 8, (2) Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity as required
by Rule 9, (3) The “Vapor Money” theory cannot serve as the basis for a cause of
action, (4) Plaintiff fails to set forth a cause of action under the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act, and (5) Plaintiff fails to set forth sufficient fraud or irregularity to set
aside the foreclosure. Plaintiff and Defendant have opposing views on whether
Plaintiff was contacted to request concurrence in the motion.
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Standard
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Accepting all factual allegations as true, the court will review the
Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff. See Eidson v. Tennessee Dep’t
of Children’s Servs, 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion to
dismiss, the Complaint must state sufficient “facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
The Complaint must demonstrate more than a sheer possibility that the Defendant’s
conduct was unlawful. See id. at 556. Claims comprised of “labels and conclusions,
and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at
555. Rather, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
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content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Although a court is normally precluded from considering matters outside of the
pleadings in addressing a motion under FRCP 12(b)(6), courts recognize an exception
for documents attached to or referenced in the Complaint. “When a court is
presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may consider the Complaint and any
exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and
exhibits attached to [the] defendant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred
to in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). Viewing the Complaint
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepting all allegations as true,
Defendant, Green Tree Servicing, LLC, is entitled to the requested relief on Counts
I and II but not on the claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.4
A. Failure to Comply With Rule 8 Requirements
Defendant’s first allegation is that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to meet the
pleading requirement of Rule 8. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a
4
Plaintiff does not specifically allege a Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim in her
initial Complaint but the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s Complaint can
be read to allege such a violation. See infra, p. 13.
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short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[,]”
to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Though a Complaint need
not detail factual allegations to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, a Plaintiff is still obligated
to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief.” Id. All allegations in the
Complaint must be enough to raise a right to relief above the “speculative level,”
though a well-pleaded Complaint may proceed even if it appears that recovery is very
remote and even unlikely. Id. at 555-56.
Plaintiff filed a 204 paragraph Complaint in which she made two specific
claims: (1) that Defendant committed fraud in the inducement and (2) that the
Defendant breached its contract with her. Though Plaintiff’s Complaint cites to many
cases, gives many definitions, and makes various claims, the Complaint provides
minimal factual support for her claims. Following Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
filing, Plaintiff filed a response in which she more articulately stated her claims.
However, Plaintiff again presented conclusory arguments and little factual support for
her claims that could, if “accepted as true, . . . state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Courie v. Alcoa Wheel & Forged Products, 577 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir.
2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677). It is well-settled that federal courts hold the
pro se Complaint to a “less stringent standard[]” than those drafted by attorneys,
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Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a pro se litigant “must conduct enough
investigation to draft pleadings that meet the requirements of the federal rules[.]”
Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 50 (1984). Applying this less stringent standard,
Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant’s actions resulted in fraud and a breach of contract
are arguably sufficient to give the Defendant “fair notice of the claim[s] asserted [and]
to enable [it] to answer and prepare for trial.” Smith v. MERS, No. 10-12508, 2011
WL 4469148, at * 3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2011), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 10-12508, 2011 WL 4479481 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2011). For this reason,
Plaintiff’s Complaint and subsequent response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) meet the
minimum pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and her claims will not be dismissed for this reason.
B. Rule 9 Particularity
Defendant next argues that Plaintiff failed to plead fraud with particularity as
required by Rule 9. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires that “[i]n alleging
fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting
fraud or mistake.” The Sixth Circuit has interpreted Rule 9(b) to require that a
Plaintiff allege “the time, place and content of the alleged misrepresentations on which
he or she relied; the fraudulent scheme; the fraudulent intent of the defendants; and
10
the injury resulting from the fraud.” Sanderson v. HCA-The Healthcare Co., 447 F.3d
873, 877 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 341 F.3d 559, 563
(6th Cir. 2003)).
When deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 9(b) for failure to plead fraud
with particularity, a court must also consider the policy favoring simplicity in
pleading, codified in the “short and plain statement of the claim” requirement of
FRCP 8. “Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement does not mute the general principles
set out in Rule 8; rather, the two rules must be read in harmony.” Sanderson, 447 F.3d
at 876 (quoting Michaels Bldg. Co. v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 848 F.2d 674, 679 (6th
Cir. 1988)). “On the other hand, a district court need not accept claims that consist
of no more than mere assertions and unsupported or unsupportable conclusions.’” Id.
(quoting Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has
failed to allege fraud with the particularity that the law requires. In Plaintiff’s
Complaint, she alleges that Green Tree Servicing committed fraud in the inducement
because “no loan ever took place” and what “took place was merely a change of
currency (without authorization), a negotiable instrument for a check.” Plaintiff also
asserts that though the seller of the home received a check, the money that was
deposited to issue the check came from (her) the borrower and not the bank, therefore,
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the bank has no right to the mortgage note until the bank loans her the money.
Plaintiff contends that the bank tricked her because they got her mortgage “without
investing once cent, by making [her] a depositor and not a borrower.” Because the
“bank had no intent to loan,” she argues, the bank committed fraud.
To sufficiently state a fraud claim, Plaintiff had to show “ (1) that defendant
made a material representation; (2) that it was false; (3) that when [it] made it [it]
knew that it was false, or made it recklessly, without any knowledge of its truth, and
as a positive assertion; (4) that [it] made it with the intention that it should be acted
upon by plaintiff; (5) that plaintiff acted in reliance upon it; and (6) that [she] thereby
suffered injury.” Disner v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 726 F.2d 1106, 1111, n.11 (6th
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not satisfy all of the required
elements for fraud because it fails to address fraud in any particularity. Plaintiff
alleges in a conclusory fashion that Defendant misrepresented facts, purposely failed
to disclose material facts, and failed to give her notice of the foreclosure and sheriff’s
sale, but fails to allege who made fraudulent statements or omissions, what those
statements were, when they were made, or how she relied on them to her detriment.
Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of fraud are insufficient to state a claim. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claim for fraud is dismissed.
C. Breach of Contract Pursuant to Vapor Money Theory
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Additionally, Defendant contends that Plaintiff’s reliance on the “Vapor
Money” theory should fail as a matter of law because it cannot serve as the basis for
a cause of action. In the Complaint, Plaintiff argues that the bank “deposited a nonlegal tender negotiable instrument and exchanged it for another non-legal tender
check, which traded like money, using the deposited negotiable instrument as the
money deposited.” In essence, Plaintiff argues that she never received “real money”
for her mortgage and the bank only exchanged currency, not providing her with the
loan that she was promised. Similar arguments have been made and rejected by this
Court. See Carrington v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. 05-CV-73429-DT, 2005 WL
3216226, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2005) (finding “fundamentally absurd and
obviously frivolous” plaintiff’s claim that the lender unlawfully “created money”
through its ledger entries). Additionally, while a negotiable instrument itself is not
‘money,’ it is an “acknowledgment of a debt and a promise to repay the debt at some
date in the future.” Roper v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., No. 07-CV-10002, 2007
WL 3244754, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2007). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s claim
that the bank failed to credit her account with the $108,000.00 that she borrowed is
dismissed.
D. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
While Plaintiff does not explicitly indicate violation of the Fair Debt Collection
13
Practices Act (“FDCPA” or the “Act”) in her Complaint, the Court agrees with
Defendant that Plaintiff’s Complaint can be read to allege a violation of the FDCPA.5
Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to set forth a cause of action under the
FDCPA and the Court agrees.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff challenges the Defendant’s allegation that they are
note and mortgager holders in due course pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1629g. She also
argues that the Defendant failed to “validate alleged debt to this date.” Additionally,
in her response to Defendant’s motion, Plaintiff elaborates on this claim by alleging
misrepresentation in communication because she was “not given notice that [the]
property was being foreclosed or sold because of nonpayment of debt” which, she
argues, was in violation of the FDCPA.
The FDCPA was enacted “to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors[.]” Miller v. Javitch, Block & Rathbone, 561 F.3d 588, 591 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692e). Section 1692g(a) “requires debt collectors to issue a
‘validation notice,’ either in the initial communication with a consumer or within five
days of that initial communication, that informs the consumer of certain rights
including the right to make a written request for verification of the debt and to dispute
5
Though Plaintiff did not address this issue in her initial Complaint, she did address
it in her response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) motion.
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the validity of the debt.” Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Lamar, 503 F.3d 504, 508
(6th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F)(iii), the term
“debt collector” does not include “any person collecting or attempting to collect any
debt owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity . .
. concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained by such
person[.]” Green Tree Servicing argues that though it initiated the foreclosure
proceedings on the Orchard Grove Street property, it falls within the exception of the
“debt collector” definition in the Act because it was servicing Plaintiff’s mortgage
prior to her July 2012 default. However, based on the record before the Court, the
Court is unable to determine that Defendant was not a “debt collector” within the
meaning provided in the Act because the Court is unable to ascertain Plaintiff’s date
of default.6 See Glazer v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 704 F.3d 453, 461 (6th Cir.
2013) (determining that “mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the FDCPA”
because there is “no reason to make an exception to the Act when a debt collector uses
foreclosure instead of other methods”) (quoting Wilson v. Draper & Goldberg,
6
The date of default is unclear to the Court because, though Defendant noted that
“Plaintiff defaulted under the terms of the note and mortgage by failing to make
payment beginning in July 2012[,]” Defendant argues that it was not a “debt collector”
within the meaning of the Act though Green Tree was assigned the mortgage on the
Orchard Grove Street property on September 19, 2012, months after Plaintiff’s
purported default. [Def. Ex. B at 1]
15
P.L.L.C., 443 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2006)).
Determining that Plaintiff’s actual date of default is a material fact necessary
to address this issue, the Court orders Plaintiff Nataki Davis (Barnes) to appear before
the Court on November 20, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. and show cause as to (1) the date that
she was determined to be in default and (2) why this date makes Defendant’s “debt
collectors” within the meaning of the Act.
E. Fraud or Irregularity in the Foreclosure Proceedings
Lastly, Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to present sufficient fraud or
irregularity to set aside the foreclosure on the property.
Under Michigan law, a property owner in default has six months following a
foreclosure sale in which to redeem the property by paying the amount that is owed,
see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3240(8), and once the period expires, “all of plaintiff’s
rights in and title to the property [are] extinguished.” Overton v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., No. 284950, 2009 WL 1507342, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 28,
2009). Michigan law also provides that a party may foreclose a mortgage by
advertisement if all of the following circumstances exist:
(a) A default in a condition of the mortgage has occurred, by which the
power to sell became operative.
(b) An action or proceeding has not been instituted, at law, to recover the
debt secured by the mortgage or any part of the mortgage; or, if an action
or proceeding has been instituted, the action or proceeding has been
discontinued; or an execution on a judgment rendered in an action or
16
proceeding has been returned unsatisfied, in whole or in part.
(c) The mortgage containing the power of sale has been properly
recorded.
(d) The party foreclosing the mortgage is either the owner of the
indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the
mortgage or the servicing agent of the mortgage.
Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.3204(1).
Though Plaintiff does not challenge nonpayment and, therefore default, she
contends that she was never notified of the foreclosure sale which should make the
sale invalid. Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.328 requires that “notice of foreclosure by sale
shall be given by publishing, in a newspaper, a notice in the county where the
mortgaged premises is situated. It must be published for four consecutive weeks, at
least once in each week, and within 15 days of the first publication a true copy of the
notice shall be posted on the premises to be sold.” In this case, the Defendant satisfied
the requirements of M.C.L. § 600.328 by publishing a notice in the Oakland County
Legal News on November 12, 2012, November 19, 2012, November 26, 2012, and
December 3, 2012. [Def. Ex. C at 4] Defendant also posted a notice on the property
on November 13, 2012. [Def. Ex. C at 3] Plaintiff’s claim for fraud due to the
violation of notice of foreclosure sale is dismissed as she has failed to sufficiently
allege any fraud or irregularity in the foreclosure sale proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
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The Court has reviewed the evidence in the record and finds that though
Plaintiff’s Complaint arguably meets the FRCP Rule 8 pleading requirement, Plaintiff
fails to allege fraud with the particularity that FRCP Rule 9 requires and, furthermore,
both Counts I and II of Plaintiff’s Complaint fail to “state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 552. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Counts
I and II of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Under FRCP 12(b)(6)
[Docket No. 3, filed July 1, 2013] is GRANTED IN PART.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Nataki Davis (Barnes) appear before
this Court on November 20, 2013 at 4:00 p.m., to show cause as to (1) her actual date
of default and (2) why Defendant Green Tree Servicing should be held as “debt
collectors” based on this default date or to indicate her agreement with dismissal of
this action. Failure to appear for this Show Cause hearing will result in dismissal of
Plaintiff’s FDCPA claim and, being the sole surviving claim, dismissal of the case in
its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 8, 2013
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on October 8, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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