Johnson v. Roseville, City of et al
Filing
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OPINION and ORDER Dismissing Plaintiff's State Law Claims Signed by District Judge Robert H. Cleland. (LWag)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
RONALD JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 13-13313
CITY OF ROSEVILLE, et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFF’S STATE LAW CLAIMS
Pending before the court is Plaintiff’s complaint, which alleges the following
counts:
•
Count I: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for an excessive use of force in
violation of the Fourth Amendment;
•
Count II: a gross negligence claim;
•
Count III: an assault and battery claim;
•
Count IV: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for municipal liability.
Counts I and IV assert claims under federal law; the other two counts assert claims under
state law.
The court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. Because Plaintiff’s state and federal law claims arise out of the same incident
and share a common nucleus of operative fact, the court could exercise its
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However,
because an exercise of supplemental jurisdiction will not promote judicial economy, the
convenience of the parties, fairness, or comity, the court will dismiss the state law
claims.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that three Roseville police officers stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle as
Plaintiff was leaving a Wal-Mart parking lot. Plaintiff alleges that the officers pulled him
out of his car, threw him to the ground, and put their feet on the back of his head,
pushing his face into the pavement. While Plaintiff was being handcuffed, one of the
officers allegedly used his knee to strike Plaintiff’s right arm. Plaintiff alleges that the
officers called him a “nigger” and told him not to cross Eight Mile Road.
II. DISCUSSION
To litigate in federal court, a party must invoke a basis for original jurisdiction,
such as federal-question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1332. A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over each claim in an
action that shares a common nucleus of operative fact with a claim that invokes the
court’s original jurisdiction. See United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715
(1966). However, supplemental jurisdiction “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s
right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present, a federal court should hesitate to exercise
jurisdiction over the state claims . . . .” 383 U.S. at 726. Supplemental jurisdiction may
be denied “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial,” if “it appears that the state
issues substantially predominate,” or “if the likelihood of jury confusion” would be strong
without separation of the claims. Id. at 726-27.
A federal court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
which recognizes a court’s discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if:
(1)
the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
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(2)
the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3)
the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4)
in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
§ 1367(c). Subsections two and four govern the present action.
“In deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction . . . a judge must take
into account concerns of comity, judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and the like.”
Senra v. Smithfield, 715 F.3d 34, 41 (1st Cir. 2013).
A. Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4)
A district court may decline supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(4) if, “in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.” “Congress’s use of the word ‘other’ to modify ‘compelling
reasons’ indicates that what ought to qualify as ‘compelling reasons’ for declining
jurisdiction under subsection (c)(4) should be of the same nature as the reasons that
gave rise to the categories listed in subsections (c)(1)-(3).” Exec. Software N. Am., Inc.
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1557 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by
Cal. Dep’t of Water Res v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008).
1. There are “Compelling Reasons” for Dismissing
Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
“Compelling reasons” for the purposes of [§ 1367] (c)(4) . . . should be those that
lead a court to conclude that declining jurisdiction best accommodates the values of
economy, convenience, fairness and comity.” 24 F.3d. at 1557 (internal citations
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omitted); see also Palmer v. Hosp. Auth. of Randolph Cnty, 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (11th
Cir. 1994). The circumstances of the particular case, the nature of the state-law claims,
the character of the governing state law, and the relationship between the state and
federal claims (including the possibility of jury confusion) inform a decision to exercise
or decline supplemental jurisdiction. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726-727.
Mixing federal-law claims with supplemental state-law claims can cause
procedural and substantive problems; in the interest of judicial economy and
convenience, these problems should be avoided. See Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569. Even
where, as in the present case, the federal and state claims arise out of the same factual
background, the simultaneous litigation of such claims may prolong pre-trial practice;
complicate the trial; lengthen and make more complex the jury instructions, potentially
confusing the jury; result in inconsistent verdicts, and cause post-trial problems with
respect to judgment interest and the availability of prevailing-party attorney fees.
Consequently, the apparent judicial economy and convenience to the parties of a court
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over a state claim may be substantially offset by
problems simultaneously created.
a. Applicable Legal Standards and Defenses
Different legal standards and defenses apply to the state and federal claims. If
used together, these legal standards and defenses could cause jury confusion. To
succeed in a § 1983 claim for excessive force, the plaintiff must “show that [the officer’s]
use of force was unjustified.” Miller v. Taylor, 877 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1989).
Federal law examines excessive force through the objective reasonableness standard
set by the Fourth Amendment. Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir.
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2005). The mere use of force—even if unnecessary—does not satisfy this burden.
Lyons, 417 F.3d at 575. A jury must evaluate “the objective reasonableness of the
officer’s conduct in view of the facts and circumstances facing the officer.” 417 F.3d at
575. And the jury must ignore the officers’ underlying motivation. Good intentions do
not justify an objectively unreasonable use of force. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
397 (1989).
Under Michigan law, assault and battery are considered intentional torts.
Consequently, a jury must consider the intent or willfulness behind the officer’s actions to
determine whether an assault or battery has occurred. Young v. Morall, 101 N.W.2d 358,
362 (Mich. 1960). Since “the mere fact that a person has inflicted bodily injury on
another does not render him or her guilty of an assault and battery unless the result was
intended or should have been anticipated as the natural result of the wrongful act,” Gillespie
Mich. Crim. L. & Proc. § 40:8 (2d ed.), a jury must evaluate the subjective intent of an
officer’s actions when evaluating a state claim of assault and battery. Young, 101 N.W.2d
at 362.
Using different legal standards and defenses on the same conduct could lead to
jury confusion because the jury would have to constantly switch from one standard to
another for claims that arise from a single act. The jury would have to objectively
evaluate the officers’ actions without regard to the officers’ intent for the federal
excessive force claim, yet take the officers’ intent into consideration when evaluating the
state assault and battery claim. This constant switching between standards would
increase the danger of a jury applying the wrong standard to a claim.
Moreover, jury confusion may arise as a result of the jury having to evaluate the
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claims through an objective or subjective standard, yet apply defenses that may or may
not use an objective standard. For instance, if an assault and battery occurs as the
result of an intentional or wrongful act, a defendant may plead self-defense. If a
defendant pleads self-defense, he has the burden of showing that he had a “reasonable
belief of great danger” before he responded “with the appropriate amount of force to
foreclose the threat.” Alexander v. Riccinto, 481 N.W.2d 6, 8 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
Thus, the jury would be tasked, using a subjective analysis, to determine if there is a
valid assault and battery claim, yet be tasked, using an objective analysis, to determine
the sufficiency of a possible defense.
b. Immunity
Another issue that may cause jury confusion is the fact that state and federal law
apply different standards of immunity. Federal qualified immunity does not apply if an
officer violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a
reasonable person would have known. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
Michigan law, meanwhile, applies different standards of qualified immunity, sometimes
denying immunity if an officer failed to act in good faith; sometimes denying immunity if
an officer was grossly negligent. Odom v. Wayne Cnty., 760 N.W.2d 217, 228 (Mich.
2008).
Applying these various standards of qualified immunity could lead to jury confusion,
inconvenience to the parties, and other trial complications. A jury would, while considering
a single event, have to switch from one type of analysis to another to decide whether a
defendant enjoys federal or state qualified immunity. Switching between standards could
increase the danger that a jury will apply the wrong legal standard to a claim.
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c. Municipal Liability
Federal law and state law have different standards of municipal immunity, which
if used together could lead to jury confusion or an unfair outcome. Municipal liability
under § 1983 is governed by Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978), and its progeny. “The doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for
rendering municipalities liable under § 1983 for the constitutional torts of their
employees.” 436 U.S. at 662 n.7. Instead, municipal liability depends upon whether a
“supervisory official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending subordinate.” Bellamy v. Bradley, 729
F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984).
In Michigan, the law of municipal liability is governed by an immunity statute,
Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1407, which states that “a governmental agency is immune
from tort liability if the agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge or a governmental
function.” § 691.1407(1). Under the statute, a municipality can only be held liable “with
respect to providing medical care or treatment to a patient.” § 691.1407(4).
Michigan municipal immunity is broader than federal municipal liability. Further,
under state law, there is no issue of authorization or acquiescence. This dichotomy
could lead to a verdict that exonerates the municipality from § 1983 liability simply
because it cannot be liable for the state tort.
d. Recoverable Damages
A plaintiff may recover punitive damages from an individual (in his individual
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capacity) under § 1983. Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 267, 271 (1981).
A plaintiff may recover exemplary damages, but not punitive damages, for a tort under
state law. Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Mich. 1980).
“Punitive” and “exemplary” damages differ:
Exemplary damages are compensation for injury to feelings and are
awardable where the defendant commits a voluntary act which inspires
feelings of humiliation, outrage, and indignity. . . .[A] plaintiff must establish
that the act giving rise to the damages was voluntary, that the voluntary act
inspired feelings of humiliation outrage and indignity, and that the conduct
was malicious or so willful and wanton as to demonstrate a reckless
disregard of plaintiffs’ rights
Punitive damages, unlike exemplary damages, are not intended to
compensate the injured party but, rather, to punish the wrongdoer and to
deter him or her, and others, from similar extreme conduct.
7 Mich. Civ. Jur. Damages § 161 (2013) (footnotes omitted); see also Newport, 453
U.S. at 266-67; Ass’n Research & Dev. Corp., 333 N.W.2d 206, 211 (Mich. Ct. App.
1983).
Allowing punitive damages for some claims but not others may result in jury
confusion and an unfair verdict. The jury would be instructed that they may “punish” for
an egregious § 1983 violation, but that they may not “punish” for even the most obvious
violation of state law. This difference could lead a jury to award more for a proven
§ 1983 claim merely to “compensate” for the jury’s inability to award punitive damages
for the state law claims. It could also lead a jury to reduce an award if it concluded,
incorrectly, that because Michigan law does not permit punitive damages, a plaintiff
does not deserve punitive damages for his federal claims, either. The availability of
punitive damages for the federal claims, but not for the state claims, may cause an
unfair outcome.
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e. Conclusion: Compelling Reasons Exist to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s State Claims
Given the disparity between the state and federal claims as a result of their
different legal standards and defenses, potential immunity, vicarious liability and
recoverable damages, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over these claims would
result in confusion, inconvenience, and potentially unfair results.
2. There are “Exceptional Circumstances” for Dismissing
Plaintiff’s State Law Claims
The phrase “exceptional circumstances” in 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4) limits the
broad discretion that district courts once had under Gibbs to deny supplemental
jurisdiction in any case. See, e.g., Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier,
Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir. 1998); Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1558. However,
Congress did not restrict a district court’s ability to dismiss claims to cases that were
“ridiculous” or “impractical.” Exec. Software, 24 F.3d at 1558, 1560 (citing Hays Cnty.
Guardian v. Supple, 969 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that exceptional
circumstances were present when parallel state proceedings were underway and
therefore the adjudication of state claims would be a “waste of judicial resources”)).
Exceptional circumstances are present in this case because of the likelihood of
jury confusion, judicial inefficiency, substantial inconvenience to the parties, and
potential unfairness in outcome that could result if Plaintiff’s state law claims and federal
law claims are tried together. Though there will be some duplication of effort required
by Plaintiff and Defendants if Plaintiff decides to pursue the state claims in state court,
any advantages to be gained by trying all claims together are outweighed by the
potential for confusion about the issues, legal theories, defenses, and possible relief.
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Thus, the court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction and will dismiss without
prejudice the state-law claims.
B. Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2)
Separately, a district court may decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction
pursuant to § 1367(c)(2) if “the [state] claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2).
The state claims presented here raise problems, including the need to introduce
evidence inapplicable to—indeed, inconsistent with—the evidence relevant to the
federal claims, the need to introduce additional witnesses, the presence of disparate
legal theories on both claims and defenses, and the need to create expanded and
contradictory jury instructions. The state claims presented in this case would, for these
reasons, predominate over the § 1983 federal claims over which the court has original
jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), the court will not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction and will dismiss without prejudice all state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
The inclusion of Plaintiff’s state claims for gross negligence and assault and
battery with Plaintiff’s federal law claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 could lead to jury
confusion, judicial inefficiency, inconvenience to the parties, and an unfair outcome.
Additionally, these claims would predominate over Plaintiff’s § 1983 federal claims.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1367(c)(2) and (4), the court exercises its discretion to decline
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff’s state law claims for gross negligence (Count II), and
for assault and battery (Count III) are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
s/Robert H. Cleland
ROBERT H. CLELAND
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 3, 2013
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to counsel of record on
this date, October 3, 2013, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Lisa Wagner
Case Manager and Deputy Clerk
(313) 234-5522
10/3/13:S:\Cleland\JUDGE'S DESK\C1 ORDERS\13-13313.JOHNSON.dismissal.stateclaims.wpd
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