Williams v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 21

OPINION AND ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 13 Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's 18 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Matthew F. Leitman. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DEANO D. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 13-13339
Hon. Matthew F. Leitman

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S [13] MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
[18] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On January 29, 2010, Plaintiff Deano Williams was employed as a security
guard at a high school in Detroit when a group of students attacked him in the
school parking lot. According to Plaintiff, the attack left him with nerve damage
and intense pain in his right (dominant) hand. Plaintiff also claims to suffer from
numerous other ailments, including bipolar disorder and back pain. Unable to
return to work, Plaintiff filed an application for disability benefits.
On November 21, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Donald G. D’Amato (the
“ALJ”) found that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits.

Plaintiff thereafter

appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Social Security Appeals Council (the “Appeals
Council”), which denied Plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision.

1

Plaintiff then filed this action. Plaintiff and Defendant the Commissioner of Social
Security (“the Commissioner”) have now filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (See ECF #13 and ECF #18.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court
GRANTS the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment (ECF #18) and
DENIES Plaintiff’s motion (ECF #13).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed an application for “supplemental security income” on May 27,
2010. (TR at 20.) In his application, Plaintiff alleged that he had been disabled
since January 29, 2010. (See id.) The Commissioner denied benefits on January
26, 2011. (See id.) Plaintiff retained counsel and requested a de novo hearing,
which was held on September 21, 2011, before Administrative Law Judge Donald
G. D’Amato (the “ALJ”). (See id.) 1
After hearing testimony from Plaintiff and vocational expert Michele Robb,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had “not been under a disability within the meaning of
the Social Security Act [(the “Act”)], since May 27, 2010, the date the application
was filed.” (Id.) As described in more detail below, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

1

This was the second time Plaintiff applied for these benefits. In 2006, Plaintiff
filed a claim for benefits alleging he became disabled on October 29, 2005. (TR at
25.) “A requested closed period of disability from March 2, 2007 until March 2,
2008, was granted after a hearing in a decision dated December 2, 2008…” (the
“2008 Decision”) (Id.) In the 2008 Decision, it was determined that Plaintiff
could perform “light work.” (Id.) For the reasons explained below, though, the
ALJ in this case found that “[t]here is new and material evidence that supports a
change in [Plaintiff’s] residual functional capacity…” (Id. at 25-26.)
2

was not entitled to benefits for two reasons: (1) even though Plaintiff suffered from
numerous “severe impairments” (id. at 22), Plaintiff did “not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one
of the listed impairments in [the applicable regulations]” (id.); and (2) “jobs …
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can
perform…” (Id. at 32.)
On December 21, 2011, Plaintiff requested that the Appeals Council review
the ALJ’s decision. (Id. at 14.) The Appeals Council, however, “found no reason
under [the] rules to review the [ALJ’s] decision.”

(Id. at 1.).

Plaintiff

subsequently filed this action and the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. (See ECF #13 and ECF #18.)
APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Framework for Social Security Determinations

“The Act entitles [] benefits payments [to] certain claimants who, by virtue
of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment of at least a year's
expected duration, cannot engage in ‘substantial gainful activity.’” Combs v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)). A claimant qualifies as disabled “if she cannot, in light of
her age, education, and work experience, ‘engage in any other kind of substantial

3

gainful work which exists in the national economy.’” Id (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(2)(A)).
Under the authority of the Act, the Social Security Administration (the
“SSA”) has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining
whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). The five steps
are as follows:
In step one, the SSA identifies claimants who “are doing
substantial gainful activity” and concludes that these
claimants are not disabled. [20 C.F.R.] §
404.1520(a)(4)(i). If claimants get past this step, the SSA
at step two considers the “medical severity” of claimants'
impairments, particularly whether such impairments have
lasted or will last for at least twelve months. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(ii). Claimants with impairments of
insufficient duration are not disabled. See id. Those with
impairments that have lasted or will last at least twelve
months proceed to step three.
At step three, the SSA examines the severity of
claimants' impairments but with a view not solely to their
duration but also to the degree of affliction imposed. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii). Claimants are conclusively presumed
to be disabled if they suffer from an infirmity that
appears on the SSA's special list of impairments, or that
is at least equal in severity to those listed. Id. §
404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d). The list identifies and defines
impairments that are of sufficient severity as to prevent
any gainful activity. See Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,
532, 110 S.Ct. 885, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). A person
with such an impairment or an equivalent, consequently,
necessarily satisfies the statutory definition of disability.
For such claimants, the process ends at step three.
Claimants with lesser impairments proceed to step four.
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In the fourth step, the SSA evaluates claimant's “residual
functional capacity,” defined as “the most [the claimant]
can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(1). Claimants whose residual functional
capacity permits them to perform their “past relevant
work” are not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f).
“Past relevant work” is defined as work claimants have
done within the past fifteen years that is “substantial
gainful activity” and that lasted long enough for the
claimant to learn to do it. Id. § 404.1560(b)(1). Claimants
who can still do their past relevant work are not disabled.
Those who cannot do their past relevant work proceed to
the fifth step, in which the SSA determines whether
claimants, in light of their residual functional capacity,
age, education, and work experience, can perform
“substantial gainful activity” other than their past
relevant work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g)(1).
Claimants who can perform such work are not disabled.
See id.; § 404.1560(c)(1).
Combs, 459 F.3d at 642–43. “Through step four, the claimant bears the burden of
proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by her impairments and
the fact that [ ]he is precluded from performing her past relevant work.” Jones v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2003). If the analysis reaches the
fifth step, the burden transfers to the Commissioner. See Combs, 459 F.3d at 643.
At that point, the Commissioner is required to show that “other jobs in significant
numbers exist in the national economy that [claimant] could perform given her
[residual functional capacity (“RFC”)] and considering relevant vocational
factors.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007); 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4)(v) and (g).
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B.

This Court’s Standard of Review

This Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final
administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review under this
statute is limited: the Court “must affirm the Commissioner's conclusions absent a
determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standard
or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Longworth v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234,
241 (6th Cir. 2007), quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d
284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994). If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's
decision, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter
differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.”
Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286 (internal citations omitted); see also Mullen v. Bowen, 800
F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the substantial evidence
standard “presupposes ... a zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go
either way, without interference by the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

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When reviewing the Commissioner's factual findings for substantial
evidence, the Court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider
that record as a whole. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512–13 (6th Cir. 2007);
Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992).
There is no requirement, however, that either the ALJ or this Court discuss every
piece of evidence in the administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
167 F. App'x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, this Court does “not try the case de
novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility.” Bass, 499
F.3d at 509; Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A.

Plaintiff’s and Vocational Expert’s Testimony

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony
At the administrative hearing before the ALJ, Plaintiff testified that in early
2010, he “was working for a company that generally did a lot of high-school
security.” (TR at 44.) Plaintiff told the ALJ that while working at a high school in
Detroit, he had a “very violent, verbal confrontation” with the operator of the
school, after which the operator told Plaintiff “to leave his building.” (Id. at 4445). Plaintiff testified that as he was walking to “the parking lot to get to [his]
vehicle … probably 10 or 15 students rushed out of there and ran at [him],
surrounding [him] in the parking lot…” (Id. at 45.) Plaintiff said that the students
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then “charged” him and that he “got hit in the head.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claimed
that he “lost nerve damage in [his] hand from [the attack].” (Id.) Plaintiff testified
that the injury to his right “hand is the real problem because [he’s] right handed
…And from what the [] – hand specialist and everybody telling [sic] [him] that in
order for them to repair it, they would have to insert a rod in the tip of [Plaintiff’s]
finger to the knuckle for probably six months to a year. And that may not cure it.”
(Id. at 50-51.) Plaintiff said that his “hand bothers [him] a lot” and that his pain is
“probably about a six [out of a scale of ten] …with the medication [he was
prescribed to control the pain]. Without it, probably a nine.” (Id.)
Plaintiff also identified myriad other medical conditions when testifying
before the ALJ. Among other ailments, Plaintiff told the ALJ that he has “deep
vein thrombosis” in his left leg and that in 2009 he had “clots in [his] leg” as a
result of the condition. (Id. at 46.) Plaintiff also testified that he has “aches and
pains here and there” due to carpel tunnel syndrome (id. at 47), that he suffers from
back and buttocks pain due to arthritis and “deteriorating” discs (id. at 47-48; 5354), that he has diagnosed high blood pressure, heartburn and acid reflux (id. at
51), that he has undiagnosed issues with his liver (id. at 55-56), and that he was
told he has bipolar disorder (id. at 46).

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As a result of these conditions, Plaintiff told the ALJ that on a typical day he
“gets up, takes [his] medications, eat[s] a little bit, sit[s] around, watch[es] TV,
fall[s] asleep, take[s] [his] naps, get[s] back up, tr[ies] to eat a little something,
sit[s] around for a minute, take[s] [his] medication, and [goes] back to sleeping
again.” (Id. at 53.) Plaintiff said that due to his medication, his naps “generally”
last for “about an hour, two hours, three hours.” (Id. at 54.) As Plaintiff described
it to the ALJ, he “do[es] mostly what [his] dog do[es]. When he go[es] to sleep,
[Plaintiff] sleep[s], and [the dog] sleep[s] mostly all day.” (Id. at 55.) Plaintiff also
remarked that when he “sit[s] long period of time, [his] back starts getting stiff and
sore.” (Id. at 48.) Finally, Plaintiff explained to the ALJ that “a lot of times …
[he] yell[s] a lot and [] get[s] angry a lot. And [Plaintiff] know[s] it’s because a lot
of stuff that [he’s] been going through and [his] health conditions …. It’s hard for
[him] to really get along with people a lot.” (Id. at 52.)
2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony
At Plaintiff’s hearing, the ALJ heard testimony from vocational expert
Michelle Robb (“Robb”) in order to determine whether there would be jobs
available for a hypothetical person with functional limitations that the ALJ thought
were similar to Plaintiff’s. Robb first testified that Plaintiff did not have any past
relevant work for purposes of her analysis, and the ALJ, “based on [a] review of
the earnings record,” agreed. (See id. at 59.) She was then asked if there were
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“any jobs in the regional and national economy” that a hypothetical person could
perform if that person had Plaintiff’s “age, education, and past work experience”
and had limitations similar to Plaintiff (such as requiring “simple and unskilled”
work in a “low-stress environment,” and a work environment in which the person
would need to sit or stand “for only 15 minutes at a time” before changing
positions). (Id. at 59-60). Robb responded affirmatively, testifying that “there
would be some examples at the light, unskilled level” including “general office
clerk,” “some bench assembly positions,” and “file clerk” positions. (Id. at 60.)
The ALJ also asked Robb if there were any positions for “sedentary” individuals,
and Robb again testified that there were. (Id. at 61.)
During questioning from Plaintiff’s counsel, Robb testified that no jobs
would be available if the hypotheticals the ALJ posed to her included either (1) a
restriction that the person needed to be “off task at least one hour per eight-hour
day” or (2) an allowance for the person to “miss greater than two workdays per
month.” (Id. at 61-62.) Finally, Robb agreed with Plaintiff’s counsel that no jobs
would be available to the hypothetical person discussed in her testimony if the
person needed to “nap twice each day, ranging from an hour to two hours each
time, in addition to normal breaks.” (Id. at 62-63.)

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B.

The ALJ’s Findings and Relevant Medical Evidence2

The ALJ issued a detailed opinion on November 21, 2011, in which the he
held that “[a]fter careful consideration of all the evidence … claimant has not been
under a disability within the meaning of the [SSA] since May 27, 2010, the date
the application was filed.” (Id. at 20.) The ALJ reached this conclusion after
progressing through each of the five-steps of the evaluation process.
First, the ALJ determined that “claimant has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since May 27, 2010, the application date.” (Id. at 22.) He then
determined that the claimant had a number of “severe impairments” that “have
more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to perform basic work-related
activities.” (Id.) These “severe impairments” included, but were not limited to, a
“history of assault to the right upper extremity,” “history of degenerative arthritis
of the lumbar spine,” “bipolar disorder,” and “adjustment disorder with mixed
emotional features.” (Id.)
Despite these “severe impairments,” in stage three of the evaluation process,
the ALJ held that none of the impairments, or their combination, “equals the
severity” of one of the SSA’s special list of impairments. (Id.) In other words, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff was not conclusively presumed disabled. The ALJ spent
considerable time in this section of his opinion detailing Plaintiff’s medical records

2

The Court has conducted an independent review of Plaintiff’s medical records
and will incorporate comments and citations as necessary throughout this opinion.
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and explaining why his impairments, while severe, did not satisfy the statutory
definition of disability that would entitle Plaintiff to benefits. (Id. at 22-24.) For
example, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “upper extremity impairments” did not
qualify under the relevant standards because Plaintiff “is able to perform fine and
gross movements effectively as defined in the regulations.” (Id. at 22.) Likewise,
the ALJ determined that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments” (such as Plaintiff’s
diagnosed bipolar disorder) did not qualify because, among other things, Plaintiff
“has reported that he is able to take care of his basic needs, do light housework,
and do light cleaning. Therefore, there are only mild limitations with respect to
activities of daily living.” (Id.) The ALJ did note, though, that Plaintiff had
“moderate difficulties” with “social functioning” and “concentration, persistence,
and pace,” but none of these impairments qualified Plaintiff for benefits under step
three. (Id.)
The ALJ then moved to step four of the evaluation and determined
Plaintiff’s RFC. (See id. at 25-32.) This review again included a detailed and
thorough consideration of “all [of Plaintiff’s] symptoms and the extent to which
these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
medical evidence and other evidence…”. (Id. at 26.) After “careful consideration
of the entire round,” the ALJ found that Plaintiff :

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[R]equires work that is simple and unskilled, with one-,
two-, or three step instructions, occasionally in close
proximity to coworkers and supervisors (meaning that the
claimant can occasionally function as a member of a
team) and occasionally in direct contact with the public,
in a “low stress” environment defined as having only
occasional changes in the work setting; can lift and/or
carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally;’
can stand and/or walk with normal breaks for a total of
four hours in an eight-hour workday, but can do so for
only 15 minutes at a time; can perform pushing and
pulling motions with the upper extremities, and right
lower extremities within the aforementioned weight
restrictions, but can do so only occasionally with the left
lower extremity; can perform activities requiring bilateral
manual dexterity for both gross and fine manipulation
with handling and reaching for 2/3 of an 8-hour workday;
need to avoid hazards in the workplace such as moving
machinery and unprotected heights; need to avoid
vibrations; needs to be restricted to a work environment
with stable temperatures, stable humidity, and good
ventilation; and can occasionally climb stairs with
handrails, balance, stoop, crouch, kneel, and crawl, but
needs to avoid climbing ladders, scaffolds, and ropes.
(Id. at 25.)
In the section of his opinion discussing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ
summarized, but did not credit, Plaintiff’s testimony regarding some of his claimed
symptoms.

The ALJ explained that while Plaintiff’s “medically determinable

impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms,” that
Plaintiff’s “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not credible to the extent they are inconsistent with the []
residual functional capacity assessment. The [Plaintiff’s] allegations are deemed
13

not fully credible because … the objective evidence does not support the severity
of the symptoms and limitations claimed.” (Id. at 27.) Specifically, the ALJ cited
Plaintiff’s “lack of treatment for his allegedly disabling impairments” as
“suggest[ing] that [Plaintiff’s] symptoms and limitations are not as severe as he
claims.” (Id.)
The ALJ cited other inconsistences as well. For example, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff, while working as a security guard, had to “stand/walk for nine of the
10 hours” he worked. (Id. at 28.) “There [was] no suggestion that the [Plaintiff’s]
ability to perform the standing and walking requirements of his job were in any
way hampered by his history of hypertension or left lower extremity DVT.” (Id.)
The ALJ found this “remarkable given that the [Plaintiff] was not being treated for
[those] conditions at [that] time.” (Id.) The ALJ also found that despite Plaintiff’s
claim that the injuries to his right hand caused him to be disabled, that Plaintiff
“reported that a hand doctor advised him to do hand exercises with a rubber ball,
but admitted that he did not receive any physical therapy and did not take any
medications for his complaints of some residual soreness, numbness, tingling, and
clumsiness in the right hand.” (Id. at 29.) Finally, the ALJ found that while

14

Plaintiff “claims that he is unable to work due to depression[,]” that Plaintiff “has
never sought or received treatment for mental health issues.” (Id. at 29.)3
Finally, in step five of the evaluation process, the ALJ determined that
“[c]onsidering the [Plaintiff’s] age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that the [Plaintiff] can perform…” (Id. at 32.) In this stage, the ALJ
credited the vocational expert’s testimony that a hypothetical person with
Plaintiff’s limitations “would be able to perform the requirements of representative
occupations such as: General office clerk

… Bench assembler … and File

clerk…” (Id.) The ALJ therefore concluded that “[a] finding of ‘not disabled’ is
therefore appropriate under the framework…” (Id.)
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff claims that the ALJ committed three errors in concluding that
Plaintiff was not disabled. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s “finding that the
Plaintiff can perform a limited range of light work is not supported by substantial
evidence.” (See Pla.’s Br., ECF #13, at 9-12.) Second, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he

3

In this section of his opinion, the ALJ also considered evidence from Plaintiff’s
“primary care physician” and reports from “examining psychiatrists.” (Id. at 3132.) The ALJ gave Plaintiff’s primary care doctor’s opinions “minimal weight”
because, among other things, these opinions were not supported by “objective
evidence” and the doctor had only “treated [Plaintiff] on two occasions with
progress notes totaling four pages.” (Id. at 31.) The two psychiatrist opinions
were given “modest weight” and “minimal weight” respectively. (Id. at 31-32.)
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ALJ committed reversible error in relying on an unsigned report of a consulting
physician, despite agency requirements.” (Id. at 13-14.) Finally, Plaintiff says that
“[t]he ALJ erred when he failed to properly assess the [P]laintiff’s mental RFC as
required by agency regulations.” (Id. at 14-17.) Having reviewed the record,
including the ALJ’s detailed opinion and the related medical evidence, the Court
finds none of these arguments persuasive. It will therefore deny Plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s.
A.

Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Finding That Plaintiff
Can Perform a Limited Range of Light Work

Plaintiff first argues that “the ALJ’s opinion concerning [Plaintiff’s RFC] in
relationship to his right hand is inconsistent with his medical condition and directly
contradicts the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing.” (Id. at 11.)
Plaintiff therefore contends that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff “was
capable of a limited range of light work … [was] not supported by the requisite
substantial evidence…” (Id. at 9.)
Based on its review of the record, the Court believes that the ALJ properly
examined the medical evidence with respect to Plaintiff’s hand injury and that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff is able to
perform a limited range of light work.

As the ALJ aptly pointed out, when

Plaintiff was seen in an emergency room shortly after the attack he claims led to
his disability, “[x]-rays of [Plaintiff’s] right hand, wrist, forearm, elbow, shoulder,
16

and occipital orbits were ordered. They were all negative, showing no fractures,
dislocations, or soft tissue abnormalities.” (TR at 29.) Furthermore, during a 2011
examination by Dr. Leonidas Rojas, Plaintiff “admitted that he did not receive any
physical therapy and did not take any medications for his complaints of some
residual soreness … in the right hand” and “[o]n examination of the right hand,
there were no gross deformities, swelling, tenderness, or restriction.” (Id.; see also
TR at 409-410) At this examination, Plaintiff was “able to perform fine and gross
manipulation, and his grip strength in his right hand was actually greater than his
left hand.” (Id.) The medical evidence therefore supports the ALJ’s finding that
Plaintiff’s “lack of treatment coupled with minimal objective abnormalities on
examination bear negatively on the [Plaintiff’s] allegation of disability.” (Id. at 29.)
The Court also rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in failing to
credit his testimony that the medication he takes to control the pain related to his
hand injury causes him to “nap” for multiple hours each day. (Id. at 53-54.) As
the ALJ found, the medical record is inconsistent with this testimony. Specifically,
these records show that when Dr. Rojas examined him in 2011, Plaintiff said he
“does not take medication.”

(Id. at 409.)

Furthermore, in both Dr. Rojas’

examination and an examination performed in 2011 by psychologist Ibrahim
Youssef, Plaintiff apparently did not indicate that he needed to nap multiple hours
per day. (Id. at 409-410; 416-418.)
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This Court is hesitant to disturb the ALJ’s rejection of Plaintiff’s testimony
because “there seem[s] to be demonstrable discrepancies between what the
[Plaintiff] said on the stand and what the written record shows.” Gooch v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Svcs., 833 F.2d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1987). In addition, an ALJ’s
credibility determination is due “great weight and deference particularly since the
ALJ has the opportunity, which [a court does] not, of observing a witness’s
demeanor while testifying.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th
Cir. 2003); see also Daniels v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 153 F. App’x 485, 488 (6th
Cir. 2005) (“Claimants challenging the ALJ’s credibility findings face an uphill
battle”).

In this action, the ALJ observed Plaintiff’s testimony, including

testimony about his level of pain and need to nap on a daily basis, weighed that
testimony against the record medical evidence, and credited the medical record
over Plaintiff’s testimony. The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s claim that the
ALJ’s conclusion was not supported by substantial evidence.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the vocational expert’s testimony “directly
contradicted” the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could perform a limited range of light
work. (Pla’s. Br. at 12.) Plaintiff reaches this conclusion based on the vocational
expert’s testimony that, if a hypothetical person needed to have “1 hour off per 8
hour day” or “needed to miss 2 or more days of work per month” (two restrictions
Plaintiff alleges he has), then “there were no jobs available that could
18

accommodate those restrictions.” (Id.) As described above, however, the ALJ did
not find Plaintiff’s testimony that he needed to nap during the day credible.
Therefore, the vocational expert’s testimony regarding a hypothetical need to have
“1 hour off per 8 hour day” was not relevant, and the ALJ’s determination was not
contrary to the vocational expert’s testimony.
B.

The ALJ Did Not Improperly Rely on an Unsigned Report of a
Consulting Physician

Plaintiff’s second claimed error is that, contrary to the applicable
regulations, the ALJ wrongly “reli[ed] [on] an unsigned report of a consulting
physician” when determining Plaintiff’s RFC. (Pla.’s Br. at 13.)

Plaintiff’s

argument, though, has myriad fatal flaws. Among other faults, as Plaintiff was
forced to admit in his brief (see id.), the subject report actually is signed in three
different places. (See TR. at 208, 210, and 212.) Plaintiff’s inability to read the
signatures (all of which appear to be from the same person) does not render them
in violation of any applicable rule or regulation. In addition, as Defendant rightly
points out (see Def.’s Br., ECF #18, at 10-11), the referenced report is from 2006,
four years before Plaintiff’s claimed disability. While the ALJ did cite to the
report in his opinion, his decision did not rest on that report. Indeed, as the ALJ
detailed in his opinion, there was ample medical evidence, besides the report, that
supported the ALJ’s decision, nearly all of it more recent than the 2006 report
which forms the basis of Plaintiff’s alleged error. The Court therefore finds no
19

basis to reverse the ALJ’s ruling on the basis he improperly relied upon the 2006
report.
C.

The ALJ Did Not Fail to Properly Assess Plaintiff’s Mental
Residual Functional Capacity

Plaintiff’s final claim of error is that the ALJ did not follow certain
applicable regulations when he assessed Plaintiff’s mental RFC. (See Pla.’s Br. at
14-17.)

First, Plaintiff alleges that “the ALJ failed to express the Plaintiff’s

abilities in terms of work related functions.” (Id. at 15.) Specifically, Plaintiff
claims that the ALJ “did not properly evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairment
pursuant to SSR 96-8p and SSR 85-15.”4 (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ
violated these regulations when the ALJ failed to, among other things, “address[
Plaintiff’s] ability to understand, carry-out, and remember instructions … respond
to supervision … [and] deal with changes in a routine work setting.” (Id.)
The Court rejects Plaintiff’s claims. For example, it is clear from the ALJ’s
determination of Plaintiff’s RFC that the ALJ in fact considered and took into
account each of the above-cited factors. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff needed
work that was “simple and unskilled, with one-, two-, or three-step instructions
…in close proximity to coworkers and supervisors … in a ‘low stress’ environment

4

These regulations state that “work-related mental activities generally required by
competitive, remunerative work include the abilities to: understand, carry-out, and
remember instructions … respond appropriately to supervision, co-workers’ and
work situations; and deal with changes in a routine work setting.” (Pla.’s Br. at 14,
quoting SSR 96-8p and SSR 85-15.)
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defined as having only occasional changes in the work setting.” (Id. at 30). The
ALJ could not have made these determinations without considering the factors
Plaintiff claims the ALJ ignored. Indeed, the ALJ specifically outlined that “[t]he
restriction to unskilled work in a low stress environment with limited social
demands are based on the claimant’s mental impairments and his testimony
regarding anger and difficulty getting along with others.” (TR at 31.)5 The ALJ
also acknowledged that Plaintiff had “moderate difficulties” with “social
functioning” and “concentration, persistence, and pace,” (id. at 22) and those
factors were taken into account in the ALJ’s decision of Plaintiff’s mental RFC.   

Indeed, in the ALJ’s comprehensive opinion, it is readily apparent that the

ALJ took into account Plaintiff’s mental impairments when determining Plaintiff’s
RFC. The ALJ specifically found that Plaintiff’s capacity contained “restrictions
[that were] greater than those determined in [the 2008 Decision] and are based on
[Plaintiff’s] new … mental impairments.” (TR at 30.) Thus, not only did the ALJ
fully examine and take into consideration Plaintiff’s mental impairments when
determining Plaintiff’s RFC, these impairments led to a more favorable (i.e. more
restrictive) RFC than Plaintiff was determined to have in 2008.

5

Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ improperly determined Plaintiff’s mental
impairment was not severe (see Pla.’s Br. at 15-16), but the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff in fact had multiple “severe impairments” including “severe impairments”
related to his “bipolar disorder,” “adjustment disorder with mixed emotional
features,” and “personality disorder.” (TR at 22.)
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Finally, Plaintiff claims that his “ability to work has been severely overestimated, resulting in an erroneous finding that he retains the ability to perform
light work. The ALJ ignored Plaintiff’s numerous additional significant
symptoms when determining that he could work as a general office clerk, bench
assembler or file clerk.” (Pla.’s Br. at 16.) Plaintiff posits that “[t]he ALJ seems to
have ignored the additional hypotheticals posed to the [vocational expert], which
asked if plaintiff would be able to work if it was necessary for him to nap.” (Id.)
As detailed above, though, where there is substantial evidence to support
the ALJ’s decision, as there is here, this Court cannot reverse that judgment “even
if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if substantial
evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286. For all of
the reasons explained in this Opinion, the ALJ’s findings were supported by
substantial evidence and the Court will not disrupt his findings.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF #18) and DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (ECF #13).
s/Matthew F. Leitman
MATTHEW F. LEITMAN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: June 2, 2014
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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the parties
and/or counsel of record on June 2, 2014, by electronic means and/or ordinary
mail.
s/Holly A. Monda
Case Manager
[phone]

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