Chaffee v. Social Security, Commissioner of
Filing
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Order Denying Plaintiff's 8 Motion for Summary Judgment and Granting Defendant's 10 Motion for Summary Judgment and Dismissing Case. Signed by District Judge Avern Cohn. (SCha)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
DICK CLAYTON CHAFFEE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 13-13428
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
HON. AVERN COHN
Defendant.
______________________________________/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 8)
AND GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. 10)
AND DISMISSING CASE
I. INTRODUCTION
This is an action appealing the denial of an application for Supplemental Security
Income (SSI) benefits under the Social Security Act (SSA).
Dick Clayton Chaffee
(Plaintiff) appeals the Commissioner of Social Security’s (Defendant) denial of his
application for SSI benefits.
Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. (Doc. 8, 10). For the reasons below, there is substantial evidence
supporting the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 8) is therefore DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 10) is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
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Plaintiff filed an application for SSI benefits on October 8, 2010, alleging disability
from all gainful employment since September 15, 1996. Until that time, Plaintiff worked
for the United States Postal Service as a mail carrier. Plaintiff claimed that he was
unable to work, due to several debilitating conditions that, when taken as a whole,
render him unable to perform any substantial gainful activity.
Specifically, Plaintiff
claimed that he was unable to work due to paranoid schizophrenia, irritable bowel
syndrome, anxiety, and depression. (Tr. at 142).
However, based on Plaintiff’s earnings, he had acquired only enough Social
Security credits to remain insured through December 31, 2001—the date that Plaintiff’s
insured status under the SSA expired. Therefore, Plaintiff was required to demonstrate
that he became disabled while he was insured under the SSA—on or before December
31, 2001—in order to receive disability benefits. Further, any disability acquired after
this date cannot provide the basis for relief under the SSA. For reasons that are unclear
in the record, Plaintiff did not file his application for SSI benefits until October 2010—
more than 14 years after the alleged onset date, and nearly 9 years after his insured
status expired.1
Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied. At Plaintiff’s request, a hearing was held
before an administrative law judge (ALJ).
(Tr. at 35)
The ALJ found that Plaintiff
retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels, provided he was limited to simple, routine tasks and to low-stress work
involving no interaction with the public and only occasional interaction with coworkers.
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Although the length of time between Plaintiff ceasing work and the filing of the
disability application may seem unusually long, the disability application was filed within
the time allowed. For a graphical timeline of relevant events see Exhibit 1, attached.
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This became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. at 22-24) This action followed.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ first considered Plaintiff’s claim that he suffered from irritable bowel
disease, insomnia, chronic fatigue, back/sciatica pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and
headaches. In support, Plaintiff submitted a letter from Dr. Kenneth Chun, dated June
5, 1997 (Tr. at 231-32). In the letter, Dr. Chun stated that Plaintiff suffered from peptic
ulcer disease, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic insomnia, and fatigue, as well as
multiple symptoms of psychologically induced stress (Tr. at 231). In addition, Dr. Chun
noted that Plaintiff suffered from mild recurrent depression (Tr. at 231). With respect to
Plaintiff’s claimed back/sciatica pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and headaches, Dr.
Chun’s letter mentioned no such symptoms.
Dr. Chun concluded that despite the
“stressful situation created in [Plaintiff’s] work environment,” Plaintiff was highly
intelligent, well-motivated, had no signs of psychosis, and was capable of performing his
duties as a postal service worker. (Tr. at 232).
Based on this letter, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff suffered from recurrent
major depression.
However, the ALJ noted that Dr. Chun’s letter revealed no
permanent limitations that would interfere with Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic work
duties, and concluded that Plaintiff’s other claimed conditions did not constitute severe
impairments (Tr. at 38). In addition, because Dr. Chun’s letter mentioned no symptoms
relating to back/sciatica pain, carpal tunnel syndrome, and headaches, the ALJ noted
that there was “no evidence of record to indicate” that Plaintiff received such diagnoses,
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and concluded that these conditions were “not medically determinable.” (Tr. at 38)
Turning to the RFC assessment, in addition to describing Plaintiff’s claimed
disabilities; the ALJ noted that Plaintiff said that he was unable to work due to his
difficulty concentrating, his tendency to become distracted, and his need for frequent
access to a bathroom. The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s claims that he experienced panic
attacks in large groups, as well as chronic insomnia, sciatica pain, carpal tunnel
syndrome, and migraine headaches. However, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff’s statements
concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were not
credible, to the extent they were inconsistent with the ALJ’s other findings.
Next, the ALJ considered an extensive range of medical records, as well as the
medical evaluations by several examining and treating physicians. The most relevant
evaluations, and the ALJ’s treatment of them, are summarized as follows:
April 10, 1996 psychiatric evaluation by Jacob Zvirbulis, M.D.: Dr. Zvirbulis
assessed Plaintiff with a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) rating of 75,
which indicates indicatives no more than slight impairment in social or
occupational functioning. Dr. Zvirbulis found no restrictions from a psychiatric
viewpoint and recommended that Plaintiff return to full-duty work (Tr. at 214).
The ALJ noted that although Dr. Zvirbulis’s assessment was made prior to
Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, she accorded it great weight as to Plaintiff’s
functional ability for the relevant time period.
May 14, 1996, evaluation letter from Ismail B. Sendi, M.D.: Dr. Sendi had
been treating Plaintiff for three months, and recommended that Plaintiff return to
work (Tr. at 183). The ALJ noted that although Dr. Sendi’s evaluation was made
prior to Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, she accorded it great weight because Dr.
Sendi was Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist.
June 14, 1996 evaluation by Dr. Sendi: Dr. Sendi, a treating physician,
provided a diagnosis of panic disorder with agoraphobia, and noted that Plaintiff
was anxious, depressed, and had difficulty trusting others. Dr. Sendi assessed
Plaintiff as having a GAF score of 40, indicating “some impairment in reality
testing or communication OR major impairment in several areas, such as work or
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.” (Tr. at 41) As with Dr.
Sendi’s previous assessment, although the evaluation was made prior to
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Plaintiff’s alleged onset date, she accorded it great weight as to Plaintiff’s
functional ability. However, the ALJ accorded the GAF score little weight
because it was inconsistent with Dr. Sendi’s previous assessment that Plaintiff
was capable of returning to work.
June 5, 1997 evaluation letter by Kenneth Chun, M.D.: Dr. Chun had been
treating Plaintiff since July 13, 1995. As noted above, Dr. Chun stated that
Plaintiff suffered from a number of physical and psychological conditions,
nonetheless concluding that Plaintiff was highly intelligent, well-motivated, and
capable of performing his duties, and had never manifested any signs of
psychosis. The ALJ accorded Dr. Chun’s opinion great weight as Plaintiff’s
treating internist over a significant period.
June 4, 1997 intake records by Dr. John Sczomak, M.D.: Dr. Sczomak, a
treating physician, noted that Plaintiff reported feeling depressed and anxious for
more than six months, and that Plaintiff stated that he had difficulty
concentrating, suffered poor sleep and appetite, and continuously felt stress and
pressure. Dr. Szomak diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression, recurrent, and
recommended psychotherapy on a weekly basis.
June 6, 1997 evaluation letter by Dr. Daniel F. Swerdlow-Freed: Dr.
Swerdlow-Freed, a treating physician, reported seeing Plaintiff between
December 1995 and March 1996, and diagnosed Plaintiff with major depression,
recurrent and mild. Dr. Swerdlow-Freed noted that Plaintiff terminated treatment
after 11 sessions, against his advice.
In addition, the ALJ noted several other medical evaluations and records from various
community health centers conducted after December 31, 2001, the date before which
Plaintiff must prove that he became disabled. The ALJ concluded:
Although the evidence from the relevant period is minimal at best, a
review of the record in its entirety provides that the claimant has a severe
impairment that caused limitations. While the record provides that the
claimant sought treatment and was hospitalized subsequent to the date
last insured, it is insufficient to establish limitations during the relevant
period. Indeed, the claimant’s limitations during the relevant period were
not so excessive as to label them as work preclusive. With regard to this,
the claimant’s subjective complaints cannot be found completely credible.
....
Further, there is nothing from either Dr. Sczomak or Dr. Chun from
this period to indicate that the claimant had limitations greater than those
found in the [RFC]. For example . . . Dr. Chun opined that the claimant
was capable of performing his duties, well-motivated, and that he never
had any signs of psychosis. I have given the claimant the benefit of the
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doubt and incorporated limitations into the provided [RFC] that reflect his
testimony, and are greater than those identified by his treating medical
personnel.
....
I have also considered the claimant’s testimony with regard to his
activities of daily living. The claimant reported that he took care of his
parents, both of whom were ill with cancer, and took care of his home,
including cooking and cleaning. . . . Accordingly, the claimant has
described daily activities which are not limited to the extent one would
expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.
(Tr. at 43-44).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Once the Appeals Council concludes there is no reason to alter the ALJ’s
decision and denies a claimant’s request for review, the decision of the ALJ becomes
the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1484(b)(2). This
Court reviews the Commissioner’s final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Judicial review under the statute is limited: the Court “must affirm the Commissioner’s
conclusions absent a determination that the Commissioner has failed to apply the
correct legal standard or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence
in the record.” Longworth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241
(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence, “it must be affirmed even if the reviewing court
would decide the matter differently and even if substantial evidence also supports the
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opposite conclusion.” Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th
Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted); see also Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (noting that the substantial evidence standard “presupposes . . . a
zone of choice within which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference
by the courts” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
When reviewing the Commissioner’s factual findings for substantial evidence, the
Court is limited to an examination of the record and must consider that record as a
whole. Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 512-13 (6th Cir. 2007); Wyatt v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court “may look to any
evidence in the record, regardless of whether it has been cited by the Appeals Council.”
Heston v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 535 (6th Cir. 2001).
There is no
requirement, however, that the Court discuss every piece of evidence in the
administrative record. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir.
2006). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, “it must be
affirmed even if the reviewing court would decide the matter differently and even if
substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286
(internal citations omitted). Further, this Court does “resolve conflicts in evidence, or
decide questions of credibility.” Bass, 499 F.3d at 509; Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247.
IV. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has advanced two primary objections to the ALJ’s decision. First, he
says that the ALJ erred by according inappropriate weight to his treating physicians,
Drs. Sendi, Sczomak, and Swerdlow-Freed. Second, he says that the ALJ’s decision is
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not supported by substantial evidence. Each is addressed in turn.
A. The ALJ Accorded Appropriate Weight to Plaintiff’s Treating Physicians
1.
Under the “Treating-Source Rule,” the opinions of a claimant’s treating physician
are generally given more weight than those of non-treating and non-examining
physicians. This is because treating sources “are likely to be the medical professionals
most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [the claimant’s] medical
impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot
be obtained from the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual
examinations, such as consultative examinations or brief hospitalizations.” 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1527(c)(2).
Further, if the opinion of a treating physician is “well-supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not
inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in your case record,” then an ALJ “will
give it controlling weight.” Id.; see also Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
544 (6th Cir. 2004).
When an ALJ does not give the treating source’s opinion controlling weight, the
ALJ must consider a number of factors in considering how much weight is appropriate.
Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242. These factors include the length of the treatment relationship
with the physician, the nature and extent of that relationship, the frequency of
examination, the supportability of the physician’s opinion, the consistency of that opinion
with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the physician. Wilson, 378 F.3d at
544. In addition,
[t]here is additional procedural requirement associated with the treating
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physician rule. Specifically, the ALJ must provide “good reasons” for
discounting treating physicians’ opinions, reasons that are “sufficiently
specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons
for that weight.”
Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (quoting Soc. Sec. Rul. 96–2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *4). The
purpose of this rule is two-fold: “‘to let claimants understand the disposition of their
cases,’” and to “ensure[] that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits
meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544 (quoting
Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 1999)).
2.
Here, Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by according little weight to Dr.
Sendi’s GAF score, while according great weight as to Dr. Sendi’s assessment of
Plaintiff’s functional ability. This argument is without merit.
The record shows that the ALJ, in assigning Dr. Sendi’s GAF score little weight,
considered all of the relevant factors and provided good reasons for this decision. The
ALJ noted that Dr. Sendi had treated Plaintiff for three years, and described the nature,
extent, and frequency of their treatment relationship. However, the ALJ concluded that
Dr. Sendi’s June 14, 1996 GAF score was inconsistent with the prior determination—
only one month earlier—concluding that Plaintiff was capable of returning to work.
The ALJ provided good reason for discounting Dr. Sendi’s GAF score, and the
Court can engage in a meaningful review of that decision. In the ALJ’s analysis, she
described Plaintiff’s extensive medical and psychological history, evidenced by
Plaintiff’s own testimony, diagnoses by Plaintiff’s treating physicians, and records from
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community health centers. The ALJ also noted Plaintiff’s daily activities—particularly his
ability to care for himself, his ailing parents, and his home. The ALJ had sufficient basis
to conclude that Dr. Sendi’s GAF score is inconsistent with the determination that
Plaintiff was capable of returning to work, as well as with Plaintiff’s longitudinal history.
Further, Plaintiff presents no case law indicating that such a bifurcated assignment of
weight is improper, and instead argues that it is simply “odd.” (Doc. 8 at 13). The Court
finds no reason why the ALJ cannot give controlling weight to one portion of a treating
physician’s opinion while discounting another, so long as the ALJ articulates “good
reasons” for its decision to do so.
Next, Plaintiff says that the ALJ erred by failing to address the issue of weight
with regard to the opinion of two of his treating physicians, Drs. Sczormak and
Swerdlow-Freed.
This argument, too, is without merit.
Both physicians diagnosed
Plaintiff with major depression, recurrent, and recommended that Plaintiff continue
psychological treatment. However, the ALJ had already determined that Plaintiff
suffered from recurrent major depression. Neither physician opined as to Plaintiff’s
ability to return to work, or made a determination regarding Plaintiff’s GAF score. Even
assuming, as Plaintiff argues, that the ALJ improperly failed to give controlling weight to
these physicians’ medical opinions, the opinions were largely irrelevant to the ALJ’s
RFC assessment.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by considering the April 10, 1996
evaluation of Dr. Zvirbulis, who recommended Plaintiff return to full-duty employment,
because this was prior to Plaintiff’s alleged onset date of September 15, 1996.
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However, Plaintiff’s most favorable evaluation indicating a GAF score of 40 also
predated the alleged onset date. In addition, as noted by the ALJ, there is minimal
evidence dating between the onset date and the expiration of his insured status on
December 31, 2001.
Plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that he became
disabled before this expiration date, and evidence dating from a few months prior to the
alleged onset date is certainly relevant a relevant consideration. Finally, Dr. Zvirbulis’s
evaluation is consistent with Dr. Chun’s June 16, 1997 post-onset date evaluation,
which concluded that Plaintiff was “highly intelligent and capable of performing his
duties.”
Therefore, the ALJ properly evaluated the medical evidence and assigned
appropriate weight to the medical opinions before her.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Determination
1.
Next, Plaintiff says that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that his irritable
bowel syndrome, chronic insomnia, and chronic fatigue did not constitute “severe
impairments.” In support, Plaintiff notes several instances where he was diagnosed
with peptic ulcer disease, irritable bowel syndrome, chronic insomnia, and fatigue, as
well as multiple symptoms of psychologically induced stress. There is no question,
however, that Plaintiff suffered from these disorders; rather, the issue is the severity of
those impairments, as determined by the ALJ. Here, the ALJ noted no “permanent
limitation that would interfere with [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform basic work activities.”
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(Tr. at 37-38)
In addition, the ALJ discussed all of Plaintiff’s claimed impairments,
concluding that his claimed limitations “were not so excessive as to label them as work
preclusive,” and that his “subjective complaints cannot be found completely credible.”
(Tr. at 43).
2.
Although such a credibility assessment must be supported by substantial
evidence in the record, the ALJ’s findings regarding a claimant’s credibility “are to be
accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty
of observing a witness’s demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, the several physicians that treated Plaintiff
determined that he should return to work, and was fully capable of doing so. In addition,
the ALJ noted Plaintiff activities of daily living, concluding that he was “not limited to the
extent one would expect, given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.”
(Tr. at 44). The ALJ therefore provided specific reasons for her credibility determination
and there was substantial evidence in the record supporting her determination that
Plaintiff retains the functional capacity to perform a limited range of work activities.
V. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment has been
denied, and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment has been granted. This case is
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
S/Avern Cohn
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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13-13428 Dick Clayton Chaffee v.
Commissioner of Social Security
Dated: December 10, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was mailed to the attorneys of
record on this date, December 10, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Sakne Chami
Case Manager, (313) 234-5160
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