Moran v. Social Security, Commissioner of

Filing 17

ORDER Accepting 16 Report and Recommendation and Remanding Action Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (JOwe)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
KIMBERLY LYNN MORAN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-13452
Honorable Denise Page Hood

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
ORDER ACCEPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION [#16]
and
REMANDING ACTION
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Patricia T. Morris’s
Report and Recommendation. [Docket No. 16, filed July 30, 2014] In this Report
and Recommendation, Magistrate Morris recommended that this Court GRANT
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 10, filed January 15,
2014], DENY the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No.
13, March 12, 2014], REVERSE the Commissioner’s Decision, and REMAND
this matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Neither party has filed
an objection within the time provided under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and E.D. Mich.
LR 72.1(d).
Judicial review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited in scope to
determining whether the Commissioner employed the proper legal criteria in

reaching his conclusion. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). The
credibility findings of an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) must not be discarded
lightly and should be accorded great deference. Hardaway v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987). A district court’s review
of an ALJ’s decision is not a de novo review. The district court may not resolve
conflicts in the evidence nor decide questions of credibility. Garner, 745 F.2d at
397. The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence, even if the record might support a contrary decision or if the district
court arrives at a different conclusion. Smith v. Secretary of HHS, 893 F.2d 106,
108 (6th Cir. 1984); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Court has had an opportunity to review this matter and finds that the
Magistrate Judge reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons.

The

Magistrate Judge reviewed the ALJ’s findings and the record thoroughly in
reaching her conclusion that the matter should be remanded because the ALJ’s
determination was “not supported by substantial evidence and should therefore be
remanded to gather expert guidance concerning whether Plaintiff’s impairments
equaled a Listing impairment.” [Docket No. 16, Pg ID 500]
As recommended by the Magistrate Judge, this matter is remanded to the
Commissioner for the ALJ to develop the record, as necessary, and gather expert
guidance concerning whether the Plaintiff’s impairments equaled a Listing

impairment, as needed. The Supreme Court recognizes only two kinds of remands
involving social security cases-those pursuant to sentence four and those pursuant
to sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99
(1991); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 626 (1990). The Supreme Court
concluded that Congress’s explicit delineation in § 405(g) regarding circumstances
under which remands are authorized clearly showed that Congress intended to limit
the district court’s authority to enter remand orders in these two types of cases.
Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 100. Sentence four allows a district court to remand in
conjunction

with

a

judgment

affirming,

modifying

or

reversing

the

Commissioner’s decision. Id. at 99-100. Sentence four remands are appropriate in
situations where the decision maker incorrectly applied the regulations in denying
disability benefits. See Faucher v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d
171, 174 (6th Cir. 1994). In such situations the district court must reverse the
Commissioner’s decision and remand the matter for further proceedings in order to
correct the error. Id. A judgment must be entered immediately with a sentence
four remand and the district court does not retain jurisdiction during the
administrative proceedings on remand. Melkonyan, 501 U.S. at 101-02. Failure to
remand under sentence four and retention of jurisdiction is error. Shalala v.
Schaeffer, 509 U.S. 292, 299 (1993). A sentence four remand is a judgment for the
plaintiff. Id. at 302 (citations omitted)

Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate
Judge Patricia Morris [Docket No. 16, filed July 30, 2014] is ACCEPTED and
ADOPTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 10, filed January 15, 2014] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment [Docket No. 13, March 12, 2014] is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is
REVERSED and this action is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: August 22, 2014

s/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on August 22, 2014, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/Julie Owens acting in the absence of LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager