Watkins v. Genesee, County of et al
Filing
37
ORDER granting in part and denying in part Defendant's 32 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (TMcg)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Anson Watkins,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-13678
Hon. Denise Page Hood
v.
County of Genesee, et al.
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN DEFENDANTS’
PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Docket No. 32)
Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
[Docket No. 32, filed October 6, 2014]. Plaintiff filed a Response to the Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment [Docket No. 35, filed November 10, 2014].
Defendants filed a Reply to the Response [Docket No. 36, filed November 24,
2014].
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that on August 28, 2011, he was an inmate at the Genesee
County Jail (“GJC”) and was approached in his cell by Defendants Broecker,
Winston, Mangrum, and Illig. Defendant Winston used knee strikes against
Plaintiff, Defendant Winston put Plaintiff in a headlock and brought him to the
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ground, and Defendant Broecker tased Plaintiff in the buttocks. Defendants
kicked, punched, and hit Plaintiff until he lost consciousness.
Defendants placed Plaintiff in a safety cell for 24 hours. Plaintiff requested
medical care, but when a nurse came to see him, she did not render treatment. On
or about August 31, 2011, Plaintiff was released and his brother took him to
McLaren Hosptial to treat his injuries. At McLaren, Plaintiff reported being
kicked and punched in the head and face by the Defendants at the jail, and
complained of head and facial pain, blurred vision, bilateral arm and back pain,
and redness around the left eye. Since the incident, Plaintiff says he suffers from
dizzy spells, blackouts, migraines, chronic body pain, paranoia, constant
nervousness, and numbness in his neck and down his arms.
On August 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint. The Complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges the following causes of action: (i) Fourteenth
Amendment Excessive Force; (ii) Eighth Amendment Excessive Force; (iii)
Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care/Failure to Provide Adequate
Medical Care; (iv) Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to Serious
Medical Need; (v) Monell claims against Defendant Genesee County; (vi) Assault
and Battery; and (vii) Gross Negligence.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) says a "court shall grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A party asserting
that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to
particular parts of materials in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
The burden is on the moving party to show that no genuine issue of
material facts exist, and a court should evaluate the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc., 468
F.3d 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2006).
To create a genuine issue of material fact, the non-moving party must
present more than a mere scintilla of evidence in support of her position to raise
some doubt as to the existence of a fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986). “Conclusory allegations do not create a genuine issue of material
fact which precludes summary judgment.” Johari v. Big Easy Restaurants, Inc., 78
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F. App'x 546, 548 (6th Cir. 2003). The non-moving party must “go beyond the
pleadings and … designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial,” bringing forth sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury
to return a verdict for that party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249-50.
The Court may grant a motion for summary judgment if the non-moving
party fails to make a sufficient showing establishing the existence of an element
that is essential to that party's case. See Muncie Power Prods., Inc. v. United
Tech. Auto., Inc., 328 F.3d 870, 873 (6th Cir. 2003).
III.
ANALYSIS
A.
Watkins’ Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to
Serious Medical Need Claim
Plaintiff says he sustained injuries that were ignored. For the failure to
provide medical treatment to constitute a constitutional violation, a plaintiff must
show that the defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs.” Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 550 (6th Cir. 2009). The
deliberate indifference standard applies to substantive due process claims raised
by persons in state custody, including pretrial detainees. Stemler v. City of
Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 870 (6th Cir. 1997); Heflin v. Stewart County, 958 F.2d
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709, 713–14 (6th Cir.1992).
A claim for deliberate indifference contains both an objective and a
subjective component. The objective component requires a plaintiff to show the
existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical need. The subjective component, in
contrast, requires a plaintiff to “allege facts which, if true, would show that the
official being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer substantial risk
to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference, and that he then disregarded
that risk.” Dominguez, 555 F.3d at 550.
Watkins claims he was “injured, had lost consciousness, had been tased, and
had a swollen face and his medical records[ and despite knowing this,
Defendants] did nothing to make sure [he] obtained the necessary medical
treatment [he] needed.” [Docket No. 35 pg. 20, filed November 10, 2014].
Defendants assert Plaintiff did not show any signs of obvious injury and did not
request medical care. Plaintiff’s medical records do not reflect any injuries.
Whether Watkins was obviously injured and needed medical attention is a
question of fact best resolved by a jury. The Court denies summary judgment on
this claim.
B.
Watkins’ Monell and Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force
Claim Against Defendant Genesee County
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Defendants argue Defendant Genesee County is entitled to summary
judgment because all of Plaintiff’s claims against it are barred by governmental
immunity or otherwise fail as a matter of law. A municipality is liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation only when the entity itself is a moving
force behind the deprivation. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Generally, proof of a single incident is
insufficient to impose §1983 liability against Genesee County. See, City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). In Canton v. Harris, however, the
Supreme Court held that where a municipality’s inadequate training program for
employees leads to an employee violating a plaintiff's rights, the Plaintiff must
“demonstrate that the municipal action was not simply negligent, but was taken
with ‘deliberate indifference’ as to its known or obvious consequences.” Bd. of
Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 398 (1997) (citing
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Genesee County fails to supervise its
officers and does not adequately train its employees regarding use of force, and
therefore is not concerned with how force is applied to those inmates whose care is
entrusted to them. Plaintiff has provided testimony of the Defendant correction
officers that indicates a lack of adequate training, including Defendant Broecker’s
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deposition testimony that states it has been more than 5 years since she had a use
of force training. Defendant Mangrum stated that the only use of force training he
had was at the corrections academy, which was approximately 7-8 years ago. GCJ
officers testified that Genesee County does not conduct performance evaluations
on its correction officers.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the
Plaintiff, the Court denies the request for summary judgment on the issue of
Defendant Genesee County’s liability for constitutional violations. There is a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the training and supervision was
adequate.
Defendants argue that the claims against the individual Defendants in their
official capacities are not sustainable because there is no evidence that they were
acting pursuant to an unconstitutional policy or custom. Plaintiff argues that since
the Monell claims against Defendant Genesee County must move forward, such
claims against the individually-named Defendants in their official capacities must
also move forward. The Court agrees and, therefore, summary judgment is denied
in this regard.
C.
Counts II and III - Eighth Amendment Excessive Force and
Inadequate Medical Care/Failure to Provide Adequate Medical
Care
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Plaintiff asserts two claims under the Eighth Amendment - Excessive Force
and Inadequate Medical Care/Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care.
Defendants argue that summary judgment is warranted with respect to Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim because Plaintiff had not been convicted at the time of
the alleged incident at issue Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393 n.6 (1989).
Plaintiff concedes this point and applies the Fourteenth Amendment standard to
his federal claims. The Eighth Amendment claims are dismissed.
D.
Assault and Battery
Plaintiff alleges one count of assault and battery. Defendants argue that
Plaintiff’s allegations of assault and battery only identify Deputy Winston,
therefore, all other individual Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Plaintiff concedes that the assault and battery claim is not applicable to Defendant
Genesee County. Plaintiff, offered additional evidence to support an assault and
battery claim for the remaining Defendants, including tasing by Defendant
Broecker, a knee strike by Defendant Mangrum, and stomping by Defendant Illig.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s assault and battery claim is only dismissed against
Genesee County.
E.
Gross Negligence
Plaintifff pled one claim of gross negligence against all Defendants.
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Defendants say Plaintiff failed to plead a claim of gross negligence against any of
the individual Defendants because: (1) Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim is based
on an intentional tort, and (2) Plaintiff cannot identify a duty the individual
Defendants owed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff says his gross negligence claim does not
rely on an intentional or offensive touching. Rather, Plaintiff's gross negligence
claim is based on Defendants' breach of their duty to perform their employment
activities so as not to endanger or cause harm to Plaintiff.
Michigan law forbids plaintiffs from attempting to transform claims
involving elements of intentional torts into claims of gross negligence. VanVorous
v. Burmeister, 687 N.W.2d 132, 143 (Mich.Ct.App.2004). Summary judgment is
appropriate for a gross negligence claim premised on an alleged assault. Norris v.
Police Officers, 808 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Mich.Ct.App.2011). When faced with
claims of gross negligence, courts are to determine the “gravamen” of the action
by “examining the entire claim.” Id.
Plaintiff concedes that he cannot bring such a claim against Genesee
County. See, Mich. Comp. Laws 691.140791). The Court finds Plaintiff cannot
sustain his gross negligence claim against the remaining defendants. The
“gravamen” of Watkins’ gross negligence count is battery. Watkins says
Defendants breached their duty “to perform their employment activities so as not
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to endanger or cause harm to Plaintiff.” [Docket No. 1, ¶ 71 filled August 27,
2013]. He says Defendants breached “theses duties with deliberate indifference
and gross negligence and without regard to Plaintiff’s rights and welfare, which
caused serious injuries and damages to Plaintiff.” And, “Defendants knew or
should have known that by breaching these duties, harm would come to Plaintiff.”
[Docket No. 1, ¶ 73 filled August 27, 2013]. Watkins fails to explain how this
claim is based on anything other than the same intentional conduct that gave rise
to his assault and battery claim. Accordingly, this claim is dismissed. See, White v.
City of Southfield, No. 14-CV-10557, 2015 WL 5545472, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Sept.
18, 2015).
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IV.
CONCLUSION
IT IS ORDERED that Summary Judgment is: (1) GRANTED on Count II
(Eighth Amendment Excessive Force), Count III (Eighth Amendment Inadequate
Medical Care/ Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care) and Count VII (Gross
Negligence) as to all Defendants; (2) GRANTED on Count VI (Assault and
Battery) as to Defendant Genesee County; and (3) DENIED as to the remainder of
Plaintiff’s claims.
s/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
United States District Judge
Dated: October 9, 2015
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on October 9, 2015, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
s/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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