Watkins v. Genesee, County of et al
Filing
67
ORDER Regarding Motions in Limine 39 & 40 . Signed by District Judge Denise Page Hood. (LSau)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
Anson Watkins,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 13-13678
Hon. Denise Page Hood
v.
County of Genesee, et al.
Defendants.
_________________________________/
ORDER REGARDING MOTIONS IN LIMINE
Before the Court are Defendants’ Motion in Limine [Docket No. 39] and
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine [Docket No. 40], both filed on December 7, 2015. Each
party filed a response to the other party’s Motion in Limine, and Defendants filed a
reply with respect to their Motion in Limine.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that the following events occurred on or about August 28,
2011, when he was an inmate at the Genesee County Jail (“GCJ”). Plaintiff was
approached in his cell by Defendants Broecker, Winston, Mangrum, and Illig.
Defendant Winston used knee strikes against Plaintiff, Defendant Winston put
Plaintiff in a headlock and brought him to the ground, and Defendant Broecker tased
Plaintiff in the buttocks. All of the above-named individual Defendants then kicked,
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punched, and hit Plaintiff until he lost consciousness. Defendants placed Plaintiff in
a safety cell for 24 hours. Plaintiff requested medical care, but when a nurse came to
see him, she did not render treatment.
On or about August 31, 2011, Plaintiff was released from the GCJ, and his
brother took him to McLaren Hosptial to treat his injuries. At McLaren Hospital,
Plaintiff reported that he had been kicked and punched in the head and face by the
above-named individual Defendants at the GCJ, and he complained of head and facial
pain, blurred vision, bilateral arm and back pain, and redness around the left eye.
Since the incident, Plaintiff claims he suffered or suffers from head trauma,
concussion, dizzy spells, blackouts, migraines, memory loss, stress, chronic body pain,
paranoia, constant nervousness, and numbness in his neck and down his arms.
On August 27, 2013, Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint alleging the
following claims: (i) Fourteenth Amendment Excessive Force; (ii) Eighth Amendment
Excessive Force; (iii) Eighth Amendment Inadequate Medical Care/Failure to Provide
Adequate Medical Care; (iv) Fourteenth Amendment Deliberate Indifference to
Serious Medical Need; (v) municipal liability against Defendant Genesee County
pursuant to Monell; (vi) Assault and Battery; and (vii) Gross Negligence. Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages for the personal injuries he allegedly
sustained on August 28, 2011, at the GCJ. Defendants filed a Partial Motion for
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Summary Judgment [Docket No. 32], and the Court dismissed Counts II, III and VII
as to all Defendants and Count VI as to Defendant Genesee County. [Docket No. 37]
II.
ANALYSIS
A.
Defendants’ Motion in Limine
Defendants seek to preclude Plaintiff from mentioning, suggesting, arguing,
introducing, or offering into evidence testimony or documents: (a) concerning
complaints against Defendant Winston for conduct that occurred prior to August 28,
2011, including lawsuits that stemmed from that conduct, and (b) discipline against
Defendant Winston with respect to events involving a “Mr. Holmes” that occurred in
March 2012, about six months after the incident at issue in this case.
Defendant Winston indicated at his deposition that: (1) he had been named as
a defendant in several (but less than five) lawsuits, and (2) several (but less than five)
inmate or citizen complaints regarding his use of force or his demeanor prior to
August 28, 2011 had been filed against him. In addition, Defendant Winston stated
he was disciplined for the beating of Mr. Holmes in March 2012. Defendant Winston
was initially discharged for his conduct as it related to Mr. Holmes, but the discharge
was later rescinded at step five of the grievance process. Defendant Winston’s
employment was reinstated, together with his seniority and personal and vacation
time, but he did not receive any backpay.
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Defendants argue that: (1) no claims against Defendant Winston involving his
conduct prior to August 28, 2011, were proven, (2) there is no evidence the subject
matter of those complaints was similar to the excessive force Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Winston used against Plaintiff, and (3) those complaints occurred several
years prior to the incident at issue in this case. Defendants also contend that the
incident involving Mr. Holmes in March 2012 should be excluded because there is no
connection between that discipline and the allegations in this case. For these reasons,
Defendants argue that the complaints involving conduct that occurred prior to August
28, 2011 and the March 2012 incident are not relevant pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 401. Defendants further argue that, even if they are relevant, the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury substantially
outweighs any probative value of such evidence and should be excluded pursuant to
Rule 403.
Plaintiff contends that the complaints and/or prior lawsuits of excessive force
involving Defendant Winston are highly relevant, particularly as they relate to the
Monell municipal liability claims against Defendant Genesee County because they
demonstrate Genesee County’s failure to train and supervise. Plaintiff argues this is
especially true since Defendant Winston was reinstated after beating Mr. Holmes.
Plaintiff also contends that the conduct resulting in the complaints could be
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admitted as bad acts evidence under Rule 404(b). In order to admit evidence pursuant
to Rule 404(b), (1) there must be sufficient proof from which the jury could find that
the defendant committed the prior act, (2) the prior act was committed not too
remotely in time, (3) if used to prove intent, the prior offense must be similar to the
charged offense, (4) the prior act must be introduced to prove a material issue, and (5)
the probative value must outweigh any prejudice. United States v. Sneezer, 983 F.2d
920, 924 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff states, conclusorily and without citation to any
authority, that:
Clearly, the evidence which Defendants seek to exclude meets the
standard above and must be permitted to be heard by the jury. The
evidentiary rule does not require a conviction or adjudication before any
‘act’ can be admitted as evidence. Also, the rule does not prohibit the
introduction of such evidence for impeachment purposes.
[Docket No. 46, PgID 498-99]
Defendants argue, and no evidence has been proffered to the contrary, that Rule
404(b) cannot be satisfied because, although there have been allegations of excessive
force against Defendant Winston for incidents that occurred prior to August 28, 2011,
(a) no court or other tribunal has made a finding that Defendant Winston used
excessive force, and (b) there is no evidence that the excessive force allegations
regarding Defendant Winston’s conduct prior to August 28, 2011, were committed
close in time to that date or that such incidents of misconduct involved conduct similar
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to the incident at issue in this case.
Defendants also assert that Sneezer is inapplicable to this case because, in
Sneezer, the prior bad acts were admissible only to show intent and a plan, neither of
which are elements of an excessive force claim. Instead, Defendants cite cases from
the Second, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits holding that bad acts committed prior
to and/or subsequent to the conduct at issue are not relevant or admissible with respect
to excessive force claims against an officer. Citing Berkovic v. Hicks, 922 F.2d 1018
(2d Cir. 1991) (prior complaints not admissible under Rule 404(b) to prove motive,
intent, or absence of mistake or accident based upon allegations that the act showed
a propensity); Clark v. Martinez, 295 F.3d 809 (8th Cir. 2002) (officer’s alleged prior
bad acts inadmissible due to the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
and misleading the jury with respect to Plaintiff’s claims of intentional torts by the
officer); Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (a shooting by the
officer three days after the incident at issue was inadmissible because its marginal
probative value was substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice and would
result in a “whole-blown trial within this trial” causing a danger of confusion of the
issues, misleading the jury, or undue delay and waste of time); Chavez v.
Albuquerque, 402 F.3d 1039 (10th Cir. 2005) (prior bad acts are not relevant or
admissible against an officer with respect to excessive force claims).
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The Court concludes that the complaints, including lawsuits, regarding
Defendant Wintson’s alleged misconduct prior to August 28, 2011, and the incident
involving Mr. Holmes are inadmissible against any of the individual Defendants,
including Defendant Winston. First, there is no evidence that a finding of misconduct
was made by a court or tribunal. The Court finds that asking the jury to make a
determination regarding such conduct would result in several mini-trials within this
trial, causing a danger of confusion of issues and undue delay at the trial. Second, it
is not clear that any such prior conduct, particularly if it has not been proven to have
occurred, would make any material fact at issue in this case any more or less likely to
have occurred. Third, even if such conduct is probative, the danger that the jury
would afford the prior incidents undue weight as to Defendant Winston’s actions
involving Plaintiff on August 28, 2011, is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. For these reasons, the Court grants
Defendants’ Motion in Limine (except to the extent the evidence at issue would be
appropriate for impeachment purposes, discussed immediately below) as it relates to
the individual Defendants.
Whether such evidence should be admissible for purposes of Plaintiff’s claim
against Defendant Genesee County is a much closer call. For all of the reasons set
forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, the Court finds that such evidence is not
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admissible against Defendant Genesee County, even though such evidence may be
probative with respect to whether Defendant Genesee County failed to train and
supervise its officers, especially Defendant Winston. The most important variable is
that there has not been any determination of wrongdoing by Defendant Winston, and
the jury would have to make that determination of wrongdoing based upon a “trial
within the trial” with respect to those complaints. The Court grants Defendants
Motion in Limine as it relates to Plaintiff’s failure to train and supervise claims
against Defendant Genesee County (again, subject to evidence that may be offered for
appropriate impeachment purposes).
Plaintiff also argues that the evidence can be used for impeachment purposes.
Citing United States v. Clingman, 521 F. App’x 386, 395 (6th Cir. 2013) (the Sixth
Circuit has “consistently recognized the broad scope of allowable impeachment
evidence and, more importantly perhaps, the significant discretion left to the trial court
in this area.”). If an appropriate opportunity arises to impeach a witness regarding
Defendant Winston’s past performance, the Court will allow Plaintiff to inquire about
past discipline or complaints against Defendant Winston, provided that Plaintiff
advises the Court, outside the hearing of the jury, of Plaintiff’s intent to impeach
beforehand so that the Court can make a determination of whether the proposed
impeachment would be proper.
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B.
Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine
Plaintiff moves the Court to exclude evidence regarding, among other things:
(1) Plaintiff’s use or sale of, involvement with, or incarceration for offenses involving,
marijuana or other drugs; (2) his criminal history, including arrests and other contacts
with law enforcement; (3) his failure to pay, arrearages for, or incarceration related to,
child support; (4) his failure to file income tax returns; (5) his receipt of public
assistance; (6) his employment status, educational background and that he lives with
his parents; (7) that he fell out of a moving pickup in July 2006, a fall that resulted in
medical treatment for his back, (8) the stress he experienced for various reasons in
2006; and (9) the criminal backgrounds of witnesses called by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that none of the above-described evidence is probative or
relevant because the central legal issues in this case are whether: (1) Plaintiff was the
victim of excessive force at the hands of Defendants, (2) Defendants refused to render
or afford him medical assistance on August 28, 2011, and (3) he suffered injuries as
a result of Defendants’ actions or inactions. Plaintiff asserts that, because he is not
making a wage loss or future earnings claim, evidence of child support arrearage and
income tax returns not being filed are not probative of the issues in this case. See, e.g.,
Clark v. W&M Kraft, Inc., 476 F. App’x 612, 617 (6th Cir. 2012) (in slip and fall case,
evidence of failure to pay child support relevant only to determine future earnings).
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Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s physical capacity and the types of activities
he engaged in following the incident are relevant to whether he supported his children
prior to and after the August 28, 2011, incident and his overall credibility. The only
authority Defendants cite in support of their contentions, however, is a Supreme Court
case that generally addresses issues of credibility or proof of bias and how they are
always relevant as it relates to the credibility of a witness. See United States v. Abel,
469 U.S. 45 (1984). Defendants further contend the fact that Plaintiff owes child
support is probative of his motive for seeking a monetary recovery and his motivation
not to work. Defendants also argue that matters affecting credibility of a witness are
proper on cross-examination. Citing Rule 611(b) (“Cross-examination should not go
beyond the subject matter of the direct examination and matters affecting the witness’s
credibility.”).
Defendant argues the jury should be allowed to hear about anything that affects
Plaintiff’s current physiological, mental and financial condition in making a
determination regarding damages. Citing DXS Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys, Inc., 100 F.3d
462, 475 (6th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citation omitted) (“Even if the
District Court believes the evidence is insufficient to prove the ultimate point for
which it is offered, it may not exclude the evidence if it has the slightest probative
worth.”). See also Figgins v. Advance America Cash Advance Centers of Michigan
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Inc., 482 F. Supp. 2d 861, 866 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (“the definition of relevant evidence
is quite liberal and creates a low threshold for admissibility under Rule 401.”); Berry
v. Deloney, 28 F.3d 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1994) (evidence is relevant if it tends to make
a witness’s testimony more or less credible).
The Court finds that evidence regarding failure to pay child support or file
income tax returns may be relevant with respect to Plaintiff’s credibility, motive for
filing this lawsuit, and his quality of life and ability to have worked both before and
after August 28, 2011. With respect to Plaintiff’s drug involvement and criminal
history, however, it is hard to discern why those matters would be relevant in this
case. The issues in this case stem from whether Defendants used excessive force
against Plaintiff while he was being held at the Genesee County jail, not while he was
being arrested for using or selling drugs or engaged in any criminal activity.
Moreover, the issues in this case involve Defendants’ conduct and injuries Plaintiff
suffered, not Plaintiff’s conduct. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s use or sale of–or other
involvement with–illegal drugs and Plaintiff’s criminal history have little, if any,
relevance to–nor do they have any connection with–the issues to be tried.
Plaintiff argues that the Court should find that, even if such evidence is
relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any probative value. See, e.g.,
Graddy v. City of Tampa, 2014 WL 1092285, at *3 (M.D. Fla. 2014) (in an excessive
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force case, “the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs any relevancy of Plaintiff’s
outstanding child support obligations”); Nibbs v. Goulart, 822 F. Supp. 2d 339, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (in a false arrest and malicious prosecution action, the court
precluded evidence of any “child support obligation . . . [because it] risks significant
prejudice”); Blazek v. Santiago, 2015 WL 2176819, at *2 (S.D. Iowa 2015) (in an
excessive force claim where no lost wages were being sought, even if evidence of
failure to file tax returns was relevant, the probative value would be substantially
outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice). In addition, as other courts have
recognized, the Court must ensure that, even if drug involvement or criminal history
may be relevant, “civil rights plaintiffs are not unfairly prejudiced by the use of their
criminal pasts against them.” Geitz v. Lindsey, 893 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1990);
Gregory v. Oliver, 2003 WL 1860270, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (“any evidence as to a
litigant’s use of drugs has an obvious potential for being extraordinarily prejudicial”).
Defendants largely avoid the impact of Rule 403 with respect to the
admissibility of evidence relating to Plaintiff’s life Plaintiff seeks to exclude.
Defendants’ sole statement regarding the prejudicial nature of such evidence is:
“[t]here is no support for the proposition that such relevant evidence is more
prejudicial than probative under the circumstances.” In other words, Defendants argue
only that the evidence is admissible because it is relevant.
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For the reasons set forth by Plaintiff, the Court concludes that the evidence
discussed above (i.e., any evidence related to Plaintiff’s involvement with drugs, his
criminal history, and his failure to pay child support and income taxes) is inadmissible
pursuant to Rule 403. The relevance of such evidence to the issues to be tried is, at
most, minimal and the unfair prejudicial value of such evidence would be substantial
in a case where the Defendants’ conduct, not Plaintiffs’ conduct, is at issue. The
Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine as it relates to any evidence related to
Plaintiff’s involvement with drugs, his criminal history, and his failure to pay child
support and income taxes.
Neither party discusses the following matters Plaintiff seeks to exclude in his
Motion in Limine: his receipt of public assistance, his educational background, his
residential status, his medical treatment or injuries in 2006 resulting from falling out
of a moving pickup, his stress condition in 2006, and the criminal background of
witnesses Plaintiff intends to call. As Plaintiff is seeking damages for injuries
suffered in the August 28, 2011, incident at GCJ (and not lost wages or future
earnings), the Court finds that his receipt of public assistance, educational
background, and residential status are inadmissible pursuant to Rule 401 because they
are not relevant to any material issues to be decided. The Court grants Plaintiff’s
Motion in Limine as it relates to his receipt of public assistance, educational
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background, and residential status.
Evidence regarding Plaintiff’s medical treatment or injuries related to falling
out of the pickup and his stress condition in 2006 may be relevant to his contentions
regarding the various physical and emotional injuries he suffered as a result of the
August 28, 2011, incident at GCJ. Plaintiff has not explained how the introduction
of such evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. The Court will deny Plaintiff’s
Motion in Limine with respect to the medical treatment or injuries related to falling
out of the pickup and stress endured by Plaintiff in 2006.
Finally, Plaintiff’s general request to preclude the criminal backgrounds of
witnesses he will call does not afford the Court a basis upon which to rule, i.e., the
Federal Rules of Evidence allow some past conduct to be admitted but bar other
conduct. As the Court does not know what criminal background is at issue for any
witness Plaintiff intends to call, the Court denies, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s request
regarding the criminal backgrounds of other witnesses.
III.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion in
Limine (except to the extent the evidence at issue would be appropriate for
impeachment purposes). In addition, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES
IN PART Plaintiff’s Motion in Limine . Specifically, the Court:
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A.
GRANTS the Motion in Limine with respect to evidence related to
Plaintiff’s involvement with drugs, his criminal history, his failure to pay
child support and file income tax returns, his receipt of public assistance,
his educational background, and his residential status;
B.
DENIES the Motion in Limine with respect to the 2006 medical
treatment/injuries and stress endured by Plaintiff; and
C.
DENIES, without prejudice, the Motion in Limine with respect to the
criminal backgrounds of other witnesses.
S/Denise Page Hood
Denise Page Hood
Chief Judge, United States District Court
Dated: February 24, 2016
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of
record on February 24, 2016, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/LaShawn R. Saulsberry
Case Manager
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