Dykes v. Winn et al

Filing 27

OPINION AND ORDER granting 19 Motion to Dismiss; adopting in part 23 Report and Recommendation. Signed by District Judge Patrick J. Duggan. (MOre)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT L. DYKES-BEY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 13-CV-13813
Honorable Patrick J. Duggan

O.T. WINN, WARDEN LLOYD W.
RAPELJE, SERGEANT ROLAND PRICE,
and CORRECTIONAL OFFICER JOSEPH
CRAWLEY,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________/
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING IN PART AND REJECTING IN PART
MAGISTRATE JUDGE KOMIVES’ MARCH 3, 2014 REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS
On September 6, 2013, Plaintiff, a Michigan Department of Corrections’
prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his
Complaint, Plaintiff, who is African-American, alleges that Defendants failed to
protect him from other inmates but provided protection to his cellmate, Prisoner
Eckstein, who is white. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ conduct constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights and a
violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection.
On January 28, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a response to the motion on
February 27, 2014. This case has been referred to Magistrate Judge Paul Komives
for all pretrial purposes. (ECF No. 20.)
On March 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Komives issued a Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) in which he recommends that this Court grant
Defendants’ motion and dismiss all claims asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint.1
(ECF No. 23.) Magistrate Judge Komives finds that Plaintiff fails to allege facts
suggesting that Defendant Warden Lloyd Rapelje was personally involved in the
alleged deprivations of his civil rights and that, therefore, Plaintiff’s claims against
him must be dismissed. (Id. at 6.) As to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim
based on Defendants’ alleged failure to protect Plaintiff from threats from other
inmates, Magistrate Judge Komives finds no allegations in the Complaint to
indicate that Defendants were aware of any threats to Plaintiff’s safety before he
was attacked by other inmates. (Id. at 9.) With respect to Plaintiff’s claim that
Defendants failed to protect him from a future assault that never happened,
Magistrate Judge Komives concludes that such a claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. (Id. at 9-10.)

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As indicated infra, Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s equal
protection claim in their motion to dismiss. Magistrate Judge Komives
nevertheless recommends dismissal of that claim in his R&R.
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In his Complaint, Plaintiff also asserts a due process claim based on false
misconduct tickets issued when he failed to obey orders to return from segregation
to his cell in the general population after he was physically attacked. Magistrate
Judge Komives concludes that this claim fails because Plaintiff does not assert the
violation of life, liberty, or property interests in his Complaint. (Id. at 10-11.) To
the extent Plaintiff argues in response to Defendants’ motion that the issuance of
the false misconduct tickets constituted retaliation in violation of his First
Amendment rights, Magistrate Judge Komives concludes that the claim fails for
two reasons. (Id. at 12.) First, the claim was not asserted in the Complaint.
Second, Magistrate Judge Komives finds that even in his response brief, Plaintiff
fails to assert that he engaged in any protected conduct. Lastly, Magistrate Judge
Komives concludes that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim fails because the
allegations in his Complaint are insufficient to state a viable claim in that they fail
to give rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. (Id. at 13.)
At the conclusion of the R&R, Magistrate Judge Komives advises the parties
that they may object to and seek review of the R&R within fourteen days of service
upon them. (Id. at 15.) He further specifically advises the parties that “[f]ailure to
file specific objections constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal.” (Id.)
Plaintiff filed objections, signed and dated March 20, 2014, that were received by
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the Court on March 24, 2014. (ECF No. 26.)
Standard of Review
When objections are filed to a report and recommendation by a magistrate
judge on a dispositive matter, the court “make[s] a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The court, however, “is not required to
articulate all of the reasons it rejects a party’s objections.” Thomas v. Halter, 131
F. Supp. 2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (citations omitted). A party’s failure to file
objections to certain conclusions of the Report and Recommendation waives any
further right to appeal on those issues. See Smith v. Detroit Fed’n of Teachers
Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir.1987). Likewise, the failure to object to
certain conclusions in the magistrate judge’s report releases the court from its duty
to independently review those issues. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149, 106
S. Ct. 466, 472 (1985).
Analysis
Plaintiff asserts four objections to Magistrate Judge Komives’ R&R.
Objection One
Plaintiff first objects to the magistrate judge’s finding that the Complaint
fails to allege facts to establish Defendant Rapelje’s direct involvement in the
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constitutional violations asserted. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Rapelje was
aware of the decision to release Plaintiff into the general population and could
have, but chose not to, correct that decision.
As Magistrate Judge Komives correctly recited in his R&R, liability under
§ 1983 must be based on more than the right to control employees. Polk Cnty. v.
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26, 102 S. Ct. 445, 453-54 (1981); Monell v. New York
City Dep’t of Soc. Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018 (1978). Thus, § 1983
liability cannot be premised upon mere allegations of respondeat superior. Monell,
436 U.S. at 691, 98 S. Ct. at 2036; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009). A party cannot be held liable under § 1983 absent a
showing that the party personally participated in, or otherwise authorized,
approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. See,
e.g., Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 932, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990); Hays v. Jefferson Cnty, Ky., 668
F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 (1982); see also Bellamy v.
Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 845, 105 S. Ct. 156
(1984).
Supervisory officials can be found liable for the acts of their subordinates
only if the plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge
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his supervisory duties, and that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of the
plaintiff’s federal rights. See, e.g., Leach, 891 F.2d at 1246; Hayes v. Vessey, 777
F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). The failure of a supervisor to supervise, control
or train the offending employee is not actionable, however, absent a showing that
the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced
in, or in some other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. Leach, 891
F.2d at 1246.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Rapelje knowingly acquiesced in the
misconduct by accepting the decision to deny Plaintiff’s request for protective
custody. Plaintiff refers the Court to Exhibit E-4 to his Complaint, the denial of his
Step II Grievance Appeal by Defendant Rapelje. (See ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 23.)
However, the denial of a grievance or the failure to act upon the filing of a
grievance is insufficient to establish liability under § 1983. See Shehee v. Luttrell,
199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). Further, Defendant Rapelje indicated on this
document that he was denying the grievance because an investigation conducted
after Plaintiff was assaulted concluded that he could be safely housed with the
general population. (ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 23.) Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to
suggest that this conclusion was wrong– or more importantly that Defendant
Rapelje had a reason to doubt its accuracy– and thus that Defendant Rapelje was
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knowingly acquiescing in the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The Court therefore rejects Plaintiff’s objection and adopts Magistrate Judge
Komives’ recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Rapelje.
Objection Two
Plaintiff next argues that Magistrate Judge Komives erred in rejecting his
Eighth Amendment claim based on the fact that any risk of harm never
materialized after Plaintiff was first attacked and Defendants became aware of any
threat to Plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that he suffered psychological pain (i.e., fear
and mental anguish) when Defendants refused to place him in protective custody
after he was threatened and physically attacked. He argues that this is sufficient to
support his Eighth Amendment claim. The Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection for
the following reasons.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that “prison officials
have an affirmative duty to protect inmates from violence perpetrated by other
prisoners.” Wilson v. Sanford, 148 F.3d 596, 600 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 525
U.S. 1139, 119 S. Ct. 1028 (1999)). The court went on to state, however, that “not
all injuries suffered by an inmate at the hands of another prisoner result in
constitutional liability for prison officials under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. The
court elaborated:
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the deprivation alleged “must result in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,’” . . . and, in prison condition
cases . . . the prison officials must exhibit deliberate indifference to
the health or safety of the inmate. . . . Implicit in this standard is the
recognition that the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or is
threatened with suffering actual harm as a result of the defendants’
acts or omissions before he can make any claim with an arguable basis
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
Id. at 600-01 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
1978 (1994) (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392,
2399 (1981)). As such, the Wilson court advised that “a non-physical injury such
as fear of assault” will not demonstrate the “extreme deprivations . . . required to
make out a conditions-of-confinement claim” and thus will not support a claim for
monetary damages under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 601 (quoting Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (emphasis added in Wilson)).
Wilson instructs that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is subject to
dismissal. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants had a reason to be aware of any
specific risk of harm to him before he was attacked by another inmate. Plaintiff
was never physically harmed after Defendants became aware of the threats to him.
While the Wilson court indicated that injunctive relief might be appropriate “to
remedy prison conditions fostering unconstitutional threats of harm to inmates[,]”
id. at 601, there is no indication that Plaintiff continues to be threatened.

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The Court therefore is adopting the recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim.
Objection Three
In his third objection, Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Komives erred
in finding no due process violation based on the issuance of false misconduct
tickets that resulted in Plaintiff being placed in segregation for twenty-eight days.
Plaintiff also argues that Magistrate Judge Komives erred in rejecting his
retaliation claim based on Plaintiff’s failure to allege that he engaged in protected
conduct.
A prisoner’s ability to challenge a prison misconduct ticket depends on
whether any liberty interest is implicated, as the Due Process Clause protects only
deprivations of “life, liberty, or property.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Supreme Court has held that a prisoner may be able to raise a due process
challenge to prison misconduct charges that result in “atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin
v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2300 (1995); Ingram v. Jewell, 94
F. App’x 271, 273 (6th Cir. 2004). However in Sandin, the Court further held that
a prisoner’s placement in segregation does not present the type of atypical or
significant deprivation sufficient to state a due process claim. Sandin, 515 U.S. at
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486, 115 S. Ct. at 2301; see also Mackey v. Dyke, 111 F.3d 460, 463 (6th Cir.
1997) (finding that the prisoner’s placement in segregation for more than ten
months did not constitute an atypical or significant deprivation sufficient to state a
due process claim); Rimmer-Bey v. Brown, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995).
Magistrate Judge Komives therefore correctly concluded that Plaintiff failed to
establish the deprivation of a liberty interest sufficient to state a viable due process
claim.
Plaintiff also argues that Magistrate Judge Komives erred in finding that he
failed to allege protected conduct to show that the misconduct tickets were issued
in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff contends that
his protected conduct was speaking “in opposition of the orders he was given to
put his life in danger”– that is, when he refused the order to return to the general
population. (Pl.’s Obj. at 6.)
To state a valid First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish
that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken
against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that
conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected
conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir.1999) (en banc).
However, “if a prisoner violates a legitimate prison regulation, he is not engaged in
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‘protected conduct,’ and cannot proceed beyond step one.” Id. at 395. The Sixth
Circuit has indicated with respect to the third factor that the plaintiff must be able
to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating
factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250
F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977)).
Here, Plaintiff was issued misconduct tickets for refusing Defendants Price’s
and Crawley’s orders to return to his cell in the general population. He was
charged with disobeying a direct order. (See ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 31, 37, 38.)
Plaintiff admits that he disobeyed the orders given by these prison officials.
Accordingly, because he violated a legitimate prison regulation, he cannot satisfy
the first prong of his First Amendment retaliation claim.
For these reasons, the Court rejects Plaintiff’s objection addressed to
Magistrate Judge Komives’ analysis of his due process claim and adopts
Magistrate Judge Komives’ recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss that claim.

Objection Four
Plaintiff’s final objection relates to Magistrate Judge Komives’ analysis of
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his equal protection claim. Specifically Plaintiff argues that the magistrate judge
erred in finding that Plaintiff and Eckstein (Plaintiff’s cellmate) were not similarly
situated and thus that Plaintiff’s allegations failed to give rise to a plausible
discrimination claim. Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and the
documents attached thereto, Magistrate Judge Komives concluded that Plaintiff
and Eckstein were not similarly situated because Eckstein, rather than Plaintiff,
was the focus of the assault by other inmates. (ECF No. 23 at 13.) In his R&R,
Magistrate Judge Komives also found that “Eckstein was placed in protective
custody immediately after the assault to [P]laintiff, when it was too late to protect
[P]laintiff but not too late to protect Eckstein[.]” (Id.)
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Defendants did not seek dismissal
of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim in their motion to dismiss. This alone does not
require the Court to reject Magistrate Judge Komives’ recommendation to dismiss
the claim, however, as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires district
courts to screen civil actions brought by prisoners against a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity and to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
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A plaintiff claiming a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment must show that a state actor intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987); Henry v.
Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990). “The purpose of the Equal
Protection Clause is to ‘protect[ ] against invidious discrimination among
similarly-situated individuals . . ..’ thereby ensuring that all similarly-situated
people are treated alike.” Dog Pound, LLC v. City of Monroe, Mich., – F. App’x –,
2014 WL 929154, at *2 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Plaintiff asserts an equal protection claim in his Complaint, stating:
Defendant O.T. Winn discriminated against the Plaintiff when he
approved that prisoner Eckstein (who was not assaulted) be given
protection, but denied the Plaintiff (who was assaulted) protection.
The only conceivable reason is that prisoner Eckstein is white and the
Plaintiff is black.
(ECF No. 1 at Pg ID 10.) Referring generally to the documents attached to
Plaintiff’s Complaint, Magistrate Judge Komives found evidence that he concluded
refuted Plaintiff’s assumption that race was the cause of the disparate treatment of
Plaintiff and Eckstein. Magistrate Judge Komives therefore recommended
dismissal of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim. This Court believes that the
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magistrate judge went too far in evaluating the merits of Plaintiff’s claim at this
stage of the proceedings.
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that a note was slid under his prison cell
door on September 15, 2011, threatening Eckstein and Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at Pg
ID 6.) The following day, while exiting the unit for breakfast, Plaintiff allegedly
was stabbed twice in the head by an unknown assailant. (Id.) According to the
documents attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, prison guards subsequently located
the weapon used during the attack. (Id. at Pg Id 13, 23.)
After receiving treatment for his injuries, Plaintiff was placed in segregation.
(Id. at Pg Id. 6.) Eckstein, however, asked to be placed in protected custody and
was transferred to a protective unit. (Id.) Despite Plaintiff’s requests to also be
placed in protective custody, he was ordered back to the general population.
Plaintiff alleges that he subsequently was approached and threatened by other
inmates in the yard on October 20, 2011. Prison officials refused to provide
protection for Plaintiff, however, because they concluded that his claims could not
be adequately substantiated and that he did not have any reason to be in fear. (Id.
at Pg ID 13.) The decision rejecting Plaintiff’s request for protection reflects that
prison officials denied Plaintiff’s request based on Plaintiff’s indication that he did
not owe anyone money. (Id.)
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At this stage of the proceedings, the Court believes that Petitioner’s factual
allegations are sufficient to survive summary review under § 1915A. Assuming
that Plaintiff’s allegations are true, this Court cannot conclude – as the magistrate
judge did– that “it was too late to protect Plaintiff but not too late to protect
Eckstein” or that “Eckstein, not [P]laintiff was the focus of the inmate who
assaulted [P]laintiff.” (See ECF No. 23 at 13.) Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations
indicate that: (1) he and Eckstein were similarly situated as the written threat was
directed to both inmates regardless of who owed the debt; and (2) prison officials
treated Plaintiff and Eckstein differently in that Plaintiff was ordered to return to
the general population and Eckstein was placed in protective custody.
Whether considering Defendants’ motion to dismiss or reviewing Plaintiff’s
Complaint under § 1915A, this Court must construe the Complaint in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff and accept all of his allegations as true. See Keys v. Humana,
Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571,
575 (6th Cir. 2005)); Broyles v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., 478 F. App’x 971, 974
(6th Cir. 2012) (applying the standard for evaluating a motion to dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to the district court’s determination of
whether to dismiss a prisoner’s claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). With respect to
the claims in a plaintiff’s complaint, Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
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requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has held that
“[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007) (additional quotation marks
and citation omitted)). The facts alleged by the plaintiff, however, “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965.
The plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. at 1965).
Additionally, to assert a viable discrimination claim, the plaintiff need not
plead facts in the complaint establishing a prima facie case under the burdenshifting framework outlined in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.
Ct. 1817 (1973). Keys, 684 F.3d at 609 (citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S.
506, 510, 122 S. Ct. 992 (2002)). “[T]he ordinary rules of notice pleading apply”
and thus the complaint need only give “ ‘fair notice’ of the basis of the plaintiff’s
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claims.” Id. (quoting Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S. Ct. at 999). Thus,
whether Defendants had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for treating
Plaintiff and Eckstein differently (as Magistrate Judge Komives concluded) is not
relevant to evaluating whether Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to state a
plausible equal protection claim.
Ultimately, Plaintiff might not prevail on his equal protection claim if he
fails to show that Defendants’ proffered reasons for treating him differently were a
pretext for discrimination. He need not make that showing now, however. See
Keys, supra. Notably, in the case Magistrate Judge Komives cites in his R&R to
reflect the proof a plaintiff must present to support a discrimination claim, the court
was ruling on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment rather than evaluating
the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8. (See ECF No. 23 at 14.)
For these reasons, the Court rejects Magistrate Judge Komives’
recommendation to dismiss Plaintiff’s equal protection claim.
Conclusion
In summary, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Komives that Plaintiff
fails to plead viable claims against Defendant Lloyd Rapelje and claims alleging
violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment, First Amendment, and the
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As such, the Court adopts the
magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. In
that motion, however, Defendants do not seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim
alleging discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s factual allegations
with respect to that claim satisfy Rule 8’s pleading requirements. Therefore
Plaintiff’s equal protection claim is not subject to sua sponte dismissal under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that the Court adopts in part and rejects in part
Magistrate Judge Komives’ March 3, 2014 Report and Recommendation;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is
GRANTED in that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Lloyd W. Rapelje are
dismissed and Defendant Rapelje is dismissed as a party to this lawsuit and
Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of the First and Eighth Amendments and Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s Equal Protection claim against the remaining Defendants, however, is
not dismissed.
Dated: April 14, 2014

s/PATRICK J. DUGGAN
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies to:
Robert L. Dykes-Bey
#201541
Michigan Reformatory
1342 West Main
Ionia, MI 48846
AAG Allan J. Soros
Magistrate Judge Paul J. Komives

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