Jenkins v. Livonia Police Department et al

Filing 114

ORDER granting 90 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (CPin)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

VAN JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER: 13-14489
HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

v.
LIVONIA POLICE DEPARTMENT,
CITY OF LIVONIA, et al.
Defendants.
/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT (Dkt. No. 90)
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Van Jenkins (“Jenkins”) filed a pro se complaint seeking to recover

damages and other relief for injuries arising out of an alleged assault that occurred
during a traffic stop on May 13, 2013. The Wayne County Sheriff’s Department, the
State of Michigan, and Wayne County have already been dismissed.
Before the Court is a multi-faceted Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings, and, in the alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. #90) filed by
the remaining defendants: the City of Livonia, the Livonia Police Department, and
Officers Kristin Crawford and Katy Perkins. The Motion is fully briefed.
Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED and judgment will enter in favor of Defendants.
Jenkins’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, all claims against the
“John Doe” Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

1

II.

BACKGROUND
Jenkins says that the events surrounding an alleged illegal traffic stop on May 13,

2013 constitute actionable claims, resulting in a variety of injuries. Jenkins alleges that
Officer Crawford handcuffed him too tightly causing a flare-up of his Spina Bifida and
hypertension disabilities. Jenkins also claims he was denied hospitalization. Further,
Jenkins asserts that during or shortly after the arrest several of his possessions were
confiscated, and that at some point during his detention officers took money from him.
Jenkins states that as a result of these events he suffered a variety of harms: (1)
personal injury; (2) eviction from his home; (3) repossession of his automobile; (4)
inability to pay a loan on time; and (5) deprivation of his right to travel with a Michigan
driver’s license.
Jenkins says his damages arise from violations of the United States Constitution
and several statutes. The Amended Complaint does not list allegations by count,
leaving the Court and Defendants to speculate about Jenkins’ particular legal claims.
The Court perceives claims as being made pursuant to five statutes: (1) 18 U.S.C. §
241; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 242; (3) 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (5) the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
III.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Defendants seek dismissal of the suit, judgment on the pleadings and summary

judgment, which the Court evaluates under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
12(c) and 56 respectively.
These rules will be qualified to the extent necessary in light of Jenkins’ status as
a pro se litigant; when reviewing pro se complaints, the Court must employ a less
2

stringent standard than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But “leniency granted to pro se petitioners . . . is not
boundless.” Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004). Further, courts are not
required to conjure unstated allegations or guess the plaintiff’s claims. Wells v. Brown et
al., 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted); even pro se litigants must meet
minimal standards. Id.
A.

Motion to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that, “after the pleadings are
closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment
on the pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c). In general, a motion for judgment on the
pleadings under Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6). Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d, 291, 295-96
(6th Cir. 2008).
The standards differ, however, in one key respect: a motion for judgment on the
pleadings may not be made until after the pleadings (complaint, answer, and reply if
ordered) are closed, while a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) must be made
before the answer is filed. No reply was filed and the Court did not order one, so the
pleadings were “closed” when Defendants filed their Answer on November 24, 2014.
Defendants filed this Motion on May 8, 2015. Since the Motion was filed after the
Answer, the Court evaluates this Motion under Rule 12(c) only and not Rule 12(b)(6).
See, e.g., McGlone v. Bell, 681 F.3d 718, 728 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Defendants filed an
untimely motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as it
was filed after Defendants' Answer. The district court, using its discretion to address
3

substance over form, treated Defendants' motion to dismiss as a 12(c) motion for
judgment on the pleadings.”)
Judgment may be granted under Rule 12(c) where the movants clearly establish
that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 312 U.S. 45, 61 S. Ct. 418,
85 L. Ed. 577 (1941); Drew v. Kemp-Brooks, 802 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (E.D. Mich.
2011); 5C C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1368, p. 518.
“For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material
allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion
may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”
Poplar Creek Dev. Co. v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 636 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
To withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, "a complaint
must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under
some viable legal theory." Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508
F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). The "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right
to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545,
548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 1970, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007).
"[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not be dismissed based on
a district court's assessment that the plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his
allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the factfinder." Twombly, 550 U.S. at
4

563 n.8. The function of the Court in ruling on such a motion is not to weigh the
evidence, nor to appraise the credibility of witnesses. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377
(6th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Court simply determines "whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009).
B.

Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper when
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A genuine issue
of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 2507, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). The essential inquiry is "whether the evidence
presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S. Ct. at
2512.
The movant has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91
L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant, who “must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256,
106 S. Ct. at 2514 (discussing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). “The court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in
that party's favor.” Sagan, 342 F.3d at 497 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)).
5

Both parties must support their assertions “that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions,
documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations
(including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(1)(A). Alternatively, either party may
carry its burden by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.” Id. 56(c)(1)(B).
It is not enough for the nonmovant to “simply show that there is some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. at
1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). Rather, the nonmovant must sufficiently allege a fact
that, if proven, “would have [the] effect of establishing or refuting one of essential
elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties.” Midwest Media Prop.,
L.L.C. v. Symmes Twp., Ohio, 503 F.3d 456, 469 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Kendall v. Hoover Co., 751 F.2d 171, 174 (6th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If the nonmoving party does not respond with specific facts showing a
genuine issue for trial, summary judgment is appropriate. Emmons v. McLaughlin, 874
F.2d 351, 353 (6th Cir. 1989).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Livonia Police Department

Police departments are not separate entities and cannot be sued in tort actions.
Thiel v. Sterling Heights, No. 09-12399, 2010 WL 3170510, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 10,
2010); McPherson v. Fitzpatrick, 63 Mich. App. 461, 463-464, 234 N.W.2d 566 (Mich.
6

Ct. App.1975). Nor may police departments be sued under § 1983. Boykin v. Van Buren
Twp., 479 F.3d 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2007) (Police Department was improperly included as
a separate defendant in § 1983 suit); Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir.
1991). Accordingly, Defendant Livonia Police Department is DISMISSED; it is not a
separate legal entity that can be sued. Any claims against the Livonia Police
Department will be construed as claims against the City of Livonia.
B.

18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242

18 U.S.C. Section 241 provides for criminal penalties for conspiracies against
civil rights. Section 242 provides for criminal penalties for deprivations of civil rights
under color of law. Both of these sections are part of the criminal code and civil relief is
not afforded by them. Willing v. Lake Orion Cmty. Sch. Bd. of Trustees, 924 F. Supp.
815, 818 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (“the law is clear that § 241 does not provide a basis for a
civil liability.”); Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638, 640 (E.D. Mich. 1958). Accordingly,
Jenkins’ claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are DISMISSED.

C.

42 U.S.C. § 1983
1.

City of Livonia

Jenkins’ remaining claims against the City of Livonia are brought pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 does not impose vicarious liability on a municipality for the
constitutional torts of its employees, Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658, 692, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978); instead, Jenkins

7

must show some wrongdoing on the part of the municipality itself in order to prevail.
Games Galore of Ohio, Inc. v. Masminster, 154 F. Supp. 2d 1292, 1300 (S.D. Ohio
2001). Under the Monell precedent, the City cannot be found liable unless Jenkins can
establish that an officially executed policy, or the toleration of a custom within the City
leads to, causes, or results in the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. Doe v.
Claiborne Cnty., Tenn. By & Through Claiborne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 507
(6th Cir. 1996) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91, 98 S. Ct. at 2035–36). This requires
Jenkins to “show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that
policy.” Doe, 103 F.3d at 508 (quoting Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 8 F.3d 358, 364
(6th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177, 114 S. Ct. 1219, 127 L.
Ed. 2d 565 (1994)); Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 362 (6th Cir. 2001).
Jenkins alleges that the City of Livonia has several customs and/or practices of
deliberate indifference which allowed for the conduct that resulted in the alleged
violation of his constitutional rights. These are: (1) inadequate and improper
investigation of a disabled citizen’s complaints of police misconduct; in short, toleration
of acts of misconduct; (2) inadequate supervision and training of Livonia police officers,
constituting a systematic failure to adequately discourage further constitutional
violations; and (3) failure to require appropriate in-service training or re-training of
officers who were known to have engaged in police misconduct. Response, Dkt. No.
104 at 4-5.
"The inadequacy of police training only serves as a basis for § 1983 liability
'where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with
whom the police come into contact.'" Miller v. Sanilac Cty., 606 F.3d 240, 255 (6th Cir.
8

2010) (quoting Slusher v. Carson, 540 F.3d 449, 457 (6th Cir. 2008) and City of Canton
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S. Ct. 1197, 103 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1989)). In order to
establish deliberate indifference, the plaintiff "must show prior instances of
unconstitutional conduct demonstrating that the [city] has ignored a history of abuse and
was clearly on notice that the training in this particular area was deficient and likely to
cause injury." Fisher v. Harden, 398 F.3d 837, 849 (6th Cir. 2005).
Neither Jenkins’ Amended Complaint nor his Response to Defendants’ Motion
shows prior instances of unconstitutional conduct. Indeed, neither document lists any
prior interactions between Jenkins and the City of Livonia. Neither document lists prior
complaints lodged or judgments entered against the City of Livonia. Thus, while the
allegations pass the plausibility standard of Rules 8 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, there is insufficient factual support for Jenkins’ to satisfy his burden at the
summary judgment stage to show prior instances of conduct. His Section 1983 claims
against the City of Livonia are DISMISSED.

2.

Individual Defendants

Jenkins claims that Crawford and Perkins are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.; illegal arrest, illegal search, and excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. These claims present no plausible basis for relief and are
DISMISSED.

9

a.

Illegal Seizure and Illegal Search

Jenkins broadly alleges that he was improperly arrested during a traffic stop in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 13-16, 20, 24, 27, 28, 29.
He alleges that there was an illegal search in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights
because no warrant was issued and because this was not a proper search incident to a
lawful seizure. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20, 27, 28, 29.
Defendants dispute that there was an illegal search and seizure. Additionally,
they argue that this claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the United States Supreme Court addressed the relationship between a
state court judgment and a federal § 1983 action. The Court found that when the basis
of a petitioner’s claim for monetary damages under § 1983 would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of the conviction, the claimant can be said to be attacking the
fact or length of confinement. To maintain that kind of action, the Court held that “a §
1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” Id. at 486-87. The district court must decide if a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff will necessarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or
sentence. Id. at 487.
Jenkins pled guilty in the Michigan Third Judicial Circuit Court to possession of
burglary tools and possession of a financial transaction device without the consent of
the deviceholder. He appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals and the Michigan
Supreme Court, which declined to hear his appeal. Accordingly, Jenkins has a final
10

judgment against him and he is precluded from collaterally attacking that judgment via a
§ 1983 claim, unless the attack would not necessarily invalidate the sentence.
This Court finds that a judgment in favor of Jenkins on his Fourth Amendment
claims would necessarily imply the invalidity of his Michigan state law convictions.
Jenkins alleges that Defendants committed an illegal arrest because they lacked the
requisite basis to stop his vehicle. He also claims they had no reason to detain him; his
identification and driver’s permits were valid and Jenkins says no violation of Michigan
law occurred. But, the officers’ reports assert that the initial stop and subsequent arrest
were predicated on their observations of Jenkins’ driving and insufficient documentation
during the stop. They say the search was incident to a lawful detention and arrest. If the
arrest is found to be improper, it would call into question any evidence seized incident to
that arrest without a warrant. Without the evidence from the search, Jenkins could not
have been charged and probably would not have pled guilty. Thus, success on Jenkins’
unlawful search claim would undermine the validity of his criminal conviction.
Accordingly, Jenkins’ claim is barred under Heck unless and until he obtains a favorable
termination on his previous conviction. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87.
b.

Excessive Force

Jenkins alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant
officers exerted excessive force by handcuffing him too tightly during his arrest.
Amended Complaint ¶ 17. An excessive force inquiry turns on “whether the officers'
actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting
them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443
(1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). To survive summary judgment on an
11

excessive force claim based on handcuffing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a genuine
issue of material fact that: “(1) he or she complained that the handcuffs were too tight;
(2) the officer ignored those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced 'some physical
injury' resulting from the handcuffing." Stricker v. Twp. of Cambridge, 710 F.3d 350, 364
(6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 252 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Defendants note Jenkins’ testimony that he complained that the handcuffs were
too tight when he was placed in the police car, although Defendants dispute that this
complaint was made. The Court does not weigh credibility at the Rule 56 stage; Jenkins
demonstrates that a genuine issue exists for the first element.
However, Jenkins’ Amended Complaint and Response do not provide factual
support for the second and third elements of the claim. While the Court is sensitive to
the limitations of pro se litigants, it will not conjure new arguments not made by the party
nor search the record for factual support to bolster underdeveloped claims. Jenkins has
not provided evidence that officers ignored his complaints and that he suffered physical
injury. Since there are insufficient issues of material fact on this excessive force claim;
Jenkins cannot survive summary judgment and that claim is DISMISSED.
c.

Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

Jenkins alleges that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his serious
medical need by failing to provide hospitalization for a pre-existing diagnosed medical
disability. Amended Complaint Cover Page. In particular, Jenkins alleges that he was
refused medical help or hospitalization for his injuries, which consist of pain and the
flare up of his Spina Bifida disability and hypertension. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17, 18.

12

Defendants construe Jenkins’ claims as a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
To sufficiently plead such a claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate "acts or
omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs." Bowman v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 350 F.3d 537, 544 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). This standard contains both an objective
component – whether the deprivation was sufficiently serious – and a subjective
component – whether the defendant official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind. Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838-39 (1994)).
The Sixth Circuit has variations on when the objective component is satisfied, but
several decisions apply forms of the obviousness test which, is satisfied when the
plaintiff establishes that the medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” See, e.g., Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 897 (6th Cir. 2004).
The subjective component is satisfied when the plaintiff demonstrates that "the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety," which
requires the official to know of the facts upon which an inference about the existence of
a substantial risk of serious harm could be made and to actually make that inference.
Clark-Murphy v. Foreback, 439 F.3d 280, 286 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Farmer, 511, U.S.
at 837).
Defendants say that Jenkins fails to allege that the medical need is a serious
13

medical need and that Defendants acted with the requisite subjective mental state. They
seek summary judgment in the event the Court determines Jenkins adequately pleaded
those elements. The Court agrees that these claims may not proceed.
Jenkins’ pleadings are arguably sufficient to allege a medical need because they
use the words “diagnosed by a doctor.” But, Jenkins fails to assert anything about the
officers’ subjective knowledge of his injuries, the seriousness of the injuries, and a
conscious decision by Defendants to disregard treatment for a known serious medical
need. As a result, Jenkins failed to meet his burden to state a claim under Rule 12(c).
Jenkins’ claims of deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the
Eighth Amendment are DISMISSED.

d.

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et
seq.

Jenkins lists the ADA on paragraph 9 of his Amended Complaint and on the Civil
Cover Sheet which accompanies his complaint. He also attaches a copy of his
completed “Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act Complaint Form.” That form
does not provide the factual basis for his complaint. Jenkins makes no other references
to the statute in the Amended Complaint or in his Response. While ADA claims may be
brought outside of § 1983, Jenkins lists the ADA violation in conjunction with a
reference to § 1983. Regardless, the Court cannot ascertain the contours of - let alone
evaluate the viability of - any claims Jenkins brings under the ADA and those claims are

14

DISMISSED.
e.

Other Claims

Jenkins asserts that he was deprived of his right to travel when Livonia Police
Officer Crawford confiscated his international driver’s permit and Michigan driver’s
license and stated that the two documents were invalid. Amended Complaint ¶ 20. The
complaint fails to provide the legal basis of this right, its source, or its elements.
Jenkins also alleges money was wrongfully confiscated or recorded. Amended
Complaint ¶ 25. It is unclear what civil cause of action is implicated, when during his
transfer this allegedly occurred, and which officers or agency were responsible.
These claims are fatally flawed and are DISMISSED.
D.

42 U.S.C. § 1988

Jenkins claims entitlement to relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. That statute does not
create a cause of action, but instead enables a district court to award a “reasonable
attorney's fee” to a “prevailing party” in a federal civil rights action. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. A
prevailing party is “one who has been awarded some relief by the court”—say, by entry
of a consent decree or judgment in the party's favor. United States v. Tennessee, 780
F.3d 332, 336 (6th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). Jenkins has not prevailed and is not
entitled to recover attorney’s fees under § 1988. This claim is DISMISSED.
E.

“John Doe” Defendants

Jenkins sues unnamed police officers as Defendants in his Second Amended
Complaint; and he still fails to specifically identify them. Nor have they been served
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), although more than 120 days have elapsed since the

15

filing of the Amended Complaint. An action cannot be maintained solely against Doe
defendants; therefore, these "John Doe" Defendants must be dismissed. See Petty v.
County of Franklin, Ohio, 478 F.3d 341, 345 (6th Cir. 2007); Sanders v. Michigan Dep't
of Corr., No. 11-12563, 2014 WL 2993751, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2014); Hindes v.
F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1998). Moreover, Jenkins fails to connect these
Doe Defendants to particular alleged violations.
The Court has broad inherent authority to manage its docket and craft
appropriate orders, responses, and order sanctions for impermissible litigation
practices. First Bank v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 515 (6th Cir.
2002). Pursuant to that authority and Rule 4(m), all claims against the Doe Defendants
are DISMISSED.

V.

CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), 12(c), or in the

Alternative, Rule 56 is GRANTED. All claims against the City of Livonia, the Livonia
Police Department, Kristin Crawford and Katy Perkins are DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE, including those concerning: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 241; (2) 18 U.S.C. § 242; (3)
42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) 42 U.S.C. § 1988; and (5) the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. Any claims against the “John Doe” Defendants are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Judgment will enter in favor of Defendants.
IT IS ORDERED.

Dated: February 26, 2016

S/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
16

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of
record and Van Jenkins by electronic means
or U.S. Mail on February 26, 2016.
S/Carol A. Pinegar
Deputy Clerk

17