Jenkins v. Livonia Police Department et al

Filing 17

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 7 and 9 Motions for Temporary Injunction. Signed by District Judge Victoria A. Roberts. (Monda, H)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

VAN JENKINS,
Plaintiff,

Case Number: 2:13-14489

v.

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

LIVONIA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET
AL.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
Michigan state prisoner Van Jenkins filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. He seeks monetary damages for alleged violations of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, assault and battery, and false arrest and imprisonment. Now before the
Court are Plaintiff’s two motions for temporary injunction.
Plaintiff’s motions for temporary injunction, which are essentially identical, appear
to request the Court’s intervention in the payment of Plaintiff’s creditors. Plaintiff’s
arguments are difficult to follow, but he seems to seek release of a bond posted as proof
of financial responsibility under Michigan’s Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act,
Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 257.517 & 257.523. Plaintiff argues that, absent release of this
bond, he is unable to pay several creditors, including his landlord and the University of
Michigan Hospital.
A preliminary injunction is an “extraordinary remedy” that should be granted only

when the circumstances “clearly demand it.” Welch v. Brown, __ F. App’x __, 2014 WL
25641, *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2014). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a Court
should balance four factors in deciding whether a temporary restraining order or a
preliminary injunction is appropriate: (1) the likelihood that the requesting party will
succeed on the merits of the action; (2) whether the party requesting the relief will suffer
irreparable harm without the grant of relief; (3) the likelihood or extent that granting the
injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the degree to which granting the
injunction will advance the public interest. Bonnell v. Lorenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 809 (6th
Cir. 2001). These four different factors are “factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that
must be met.” Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994).
“‘[A] party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a
relationship between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in
the complaint.’” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 300 (6th Cir. 2010), quoting Devose v.
Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). “This is because ‘[t]he purpose of interim
equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being
harmed or further harmed in the manner in which the movant contends [he] was or will be
harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint.’” Id. quoting Omega World
Travel, Inc. v. Trans World Airlines, 111 F.3d 14, 16 (4th Cir. 1997). See also
Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 565 (6th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he [party
seeking the injunction] must show the likely existence of a constitutional violation
causally related to the result sought to be enjoined.”). Plaintiff’s complaint relates to a
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traffic stop and his resulting arrest. He claims that defendants committed an assault and
battery when they arrested him, improperly arrested and imprisoned him, and violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Plaintiff seeks an injunction related to payment of his
creditors. The injunction Plaintiff seeks is not causally related to the alleged
constitutional violation. Accordingly, the extraordinary remedy of injunctive relief is not
warranted.
The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motions for Temporary Injunction [dkt. # 7 and #9].
SO ORDERED.

S/Victoria A. Roberts
Victoria A. Roberts
United States District Judge
Dated: January 13, 2014

The undersigned certifies that a copy of this
document was served on the attorneys of record
and Van Jenkins by electronic means or U.S. Mail
on January 13, 2014.
S/Holly A. Monda for Carol A. Pinegar
Deputy Clerk

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