McCants v. Rapelje

Filing 14

OPINION and ORDER denying petition for writ of habeas corpus; denying certificate of appealability and denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Signed by District Judge Nancy G. Edmunds. (CBet)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

ERIC MCCANTS, #726088,
Petitioner,
CASE NO. 2:13-CV-14590
HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS

v.
LLOYD RAPELJE,
Respondent.
/

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS, DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,
AND DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL
I.

Introduction
This is a habeas case brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Michigan prisoner Eric

McCants (“Petitioner”) was convicted of three counts of armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.529, and one count of resisting arrest, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.81d(1), following a
jury trial in the Macomb County Circuit Court. He was sentenced as a second habitual
offender, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.10, to concurrent terms of 15 years to 23 years 5 months
imprisonment on the armed robbery convictions and a concurrent term of 1 to 3 years
imprisonment on the resisting arrest conviction in 2011. In his petition, he raises claims
concerning the use of leg shackles during trial, the trial court’s denial of a jury request to
view the crime scene, the effectiveness of trial counsel, and the trial court’s ruling that he
could be impeached with a prior conviction if he testified at trial. For the reasons set forth
herein, the Court denies with prejudice the habeas petition. The Court also denies a
certificate of appealability and denies leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
II.

Facts and Procedural History

Petitioner’s convictions arise from the robbery of three girls in Detroit, Michigan on
September 10, 2010. The Michigan Court of Appeals described the relevant facts, which
are presumed correct on habeas review, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Wagner v. Smith, 581
F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir.2009), as follows:
On the evening of September 10, 2010, three men approached four
twelve-year-old girls who were walking down the street. One of the girls was
able to escape, but a man in a burgundy hooded sweatshirt pulled out a gun,
ordered the other girls to the ground, and took their book bags.
Minutes later, a deputy alerted nearby officers to look for a man in a
burgundy hooded sweatshirt accompanied by two other men. A plain-clothes
officer near the scene of the crime spotted the three men. He approached the
men and identified himself as a police officer, but they fled. Shortly thereafter,
the police officer apprehended defendant who, at that time, had no shirt on
even though the temperature outside was around 50 degrees. Officers found
a burgundy sweatshirt, a starter pistol, and several book bags near the area.
One of the girls identified defendant at the scene and told the officers that he
had worn0 the discarded sweatshirt during the armed robbery.
People v. McCants, No. 303454, 2012 WL 1890234, *1 (Mich. Ct. App. May 24, 2012)
(unpublished).
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal of right with the
Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claims presented on habeas review. The court
affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. Id. Petitioner then filed an application for
leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same issues, which was
denied in a standard order. People v. McCants, 493 Mich. 893, 822 N.W.2d 585 (2012).
Petitioner thereafter filed his federal habeas petition raising the following claims:
I.

He was deprived of his due process right to a fair trial and the court
abused its discretion when he was forced to wear leg shackles
throughout trial.

II.

The trial court erred in denying the jury’s and the defense’s requests
for the jury to view the crime scene.

III.

He was deprived of his right to due process and the effective
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assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to object in two
instances: (1) the court’s reasoning for shackling and (2) the in-court
identification of him.
IV.

The trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could
impeach him under Michigan Rule of Evidence 609.

Respondent has filed an answer to the petition contending that it should be denied because
the first claim is barred by procedural default and all of the claims lack merit.
III.

Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), codified 28

U.S.C. § 2241 et seq., provides the standard of review for federal habeas cases brought
by state prisoners. The AEDPA provides in relevant part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect
to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim-(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. §2254(d) (1996).
“A state court’s decision is ‘contrary to’ ... clearly established law if it ‘applies a rule
that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court cases]’ or if it ‘confronts a
set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court
and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent.’” Mitchell v. Esparza,
540 U.S. 12, 15-16 (2003) (per curiam) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06
(2000)); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). “[T]he ‘unreasonable application’ prong
of § 2254(d)(1) permits a federal habeas court to ‘grant the writ if the state court identifies
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the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of petitioner’s case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003)
(quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 413); Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. However, “[i]n order for a
federal court find a state court’s application of [Supreme Court] precedent ‘unreasonable,’
the state court’s decision must have been more than incorrect or erroneous. The state
court’s application must have been ‘objectively unreasonable.’” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 52021 (citations omitted). The “AEDPA thus imposes a ‘highly deferential standard for
evaluating state-court rulings,’ and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the
benefit of the doubt.’” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (quoting Lindh, 521 U.S.
at 333, n. 7); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)).
The Supreme Court has held that “a state court’s determination that a claim lacks
merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the
correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 770,
786 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme
Court has emphasized “that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s
contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75
(2003)). Pursuant to § 2254(d), “a habeas court must determine what arguments or
theories supported or ... could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must
ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or
theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision” of the Supreme Court. Id.
Thus, in order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner must show that the
state court’s rejection of his claim “was so lacking in justification that there was an error
well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
disagreement.” Id.
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Section 2254(d)(1) limits a federal habeas court’s review to a determination of
whether the state court’s decision comports with clearly established federal law as
determined by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.
Williams, 529 U.S. at 412; see also Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)
(noting that the Supreme Court “has held on numerous occasions that it is not ‘an
unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law’ for a state court to decline to
apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by this Court” and
quoting Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2008) (per curiam). Section 2254(d)
“does not require a state court to give reasons before its decision can be deemed to have
been ‘adjudicated on the merits.’” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785. Furthermore, it “does not
require citation of [Supreme Court] cases–indeed, it does not even require awareness of
[Supreme Court] cases, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state-court
decision contradicts them.” Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). While the requirements
of “clearly established law” are determined solely by Supreme Court precedent, the
decisions of lower federal courts may be useful in assessing the reasonableness of the
state court’s resolution of an issue. See Stewart v. Erwin, 503 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir.
2007) (citing Williams v. Bowersox, 340 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 2003)); Dickens v. Jones,
203 F. Supp. 354, 359 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
A state court’s factual determinations are presumed correct on federal habeas
review. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with
clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
Moreover, habeas review is “limited to the record that was before the state court.” Cullen
v. Pinholster, _ U.S. _, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
IV.

Analysis
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A.

Procedural Default

As an initial matter, Respondent contends that Petitioner’s first claim is barred by
procedural default. It is well-settled, however, that federal courts on habeas review “are
not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner
on the merits.” Hudson v. Jones, 351 F.3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lambrix v.
Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). The United States Supreme Court has explained
the rationale behind such a policy: “Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other]
question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner,
whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law.” Lambrix, 520
U.S. at 525. In this case, the procedural issue is intertwined with the merits of Petitioner’s
issues and the substantive issues are simpler to resolve. Accordingly, the Court shall
proceed to the merits of Petitioner’s claims.
B.

Merits
1.

Shackles

Petitioner first asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court
denied him due process and abused its discretion by requiring him to wear leg shackles
throughout his trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim finding that
Petitioner failed to object at trial, that the shackles were not visible to the jury and could
not have affected the verdict, and that an evidentiary hearing was not required because
any error in the use of shackles was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the
overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s guilt presented at trial. McCants, 2012 WL 1890234
at *1-2.
The state court’s denial of relief is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor
an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. The United States Supreme Court
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has recognized that due process precludes the use of visible physical restraints upon a
defendant “absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are
justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622,
629 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 343-44 (1970)). Shackles may be used upon a defendant at the trial court's
discretion to prevent escape, for security in the courtroom, and to maintain order during
trial. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 105 -07 (6th Cir. 1973). When a
court, “without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be
seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due
process violation. The State must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling]
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Deck, 544 U.S. at 634
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).
In this case, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Petitioner’s leg
shackles were visible to the jury. To the contrary, the trial court ensured that Petitioner
was seated in a certain position so that his “leg irons” would not be seen. See 1/4/11 Trial
Tr., p. 3. Because Petitioner’s leg shackles were not visible to the jury, he is not entitled
to habeas relief under Deck. See Mendoza v. Berghuis, 544 F.3d 650, 651, 654-55 (6th
Cir. 2008) (denying habeas relief under similar circumstances); Bachynski v. Warren, _
F. Supp. 3d _, 2015 WL 1469207, *12 (E.D. Mich. March 30, 2015). Moreover, even if the
shackling was improper, Petitioner is still not entitled to relief because the Court agrees
with the Michigan Court of Appeals that, beyond a reasonable doubt, any error in the use
of shackles did not contribute to the verdict. The evidence against Petitioner was
overwhelming. Habeas relief is not warranted on this claim.
2.

Jury View of Crime Scene
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Petitioner next asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the trial court
erred in denying a juror’s and the defense’s request to allow the jury to view the crime
scene. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim finding that the trial court
acted within its discretion in denying the requests because maps introduced at trial were
sufficient to give the jury an understanding of the events and nothing would be gained from
an in-person viewing of the scene. McCants, 2012 WL 1890234 at *2.
The state court’s denial of relief is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor
an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. State court judges in Michigan
have discretionary authority to permit juries to view crime scenes. See Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 768.28; Mich. Ct. R. 6.141(F); People v. Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97, 20 N.W.2d 824 (Mich.
1945). Petitioner’s claim amounts to a challenge to a state law evidentiary ruling. It is
well-established, however, that alleged trial court errors in the application of state
procedure or evidentiary law, particularly regarding the admissibility of evidence, are
generally not cognizable as grounds for federal habeas relief. Estelle v. McGuire, 502
U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Serra v. Michigan Dept. of Corrections, 4 F.3d 1348, 1354 (6th Cir.
1993). “Trial court errors in state procedure or evidentiary law do not rise to the level of
federal constitutional claims warranting relief in a habeas action, unless the error renders
the proceeding so fundamentally unfair as to deprive the petitioner of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment.” McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 494 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting
McGuire, 502 U.S. at 69-70); see also Wynne v. Renico, 606 F.3d 867, 871 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citing Bey v. Bagley, 500 F.3d 514, 519-20 (6th Cir. 2007)); Bugh v. Mitchell, 329 F.3d
496, 512 (6th Cir. 2003).
No such error occurred in this case. The trial court acted within its discretion under
state law. Moreover, Petitioner fails to allege facts which show that an in-person view of
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the crime scene was essential to his defense or the jury’s understanding of the evidence.
Conclusory allegations, without evidentiary support, do not provide a basis for habeas
relief. See Cross v. Stovall, 238 F. App’x 32, 39-40 (6th Cir. 2007); Workman v. Bell, 178
F.3d 759, 771 (6th Cir. 1998) (conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
do not justify habeas relief); see also Washington v. Renico, 455 F.3d 722, 733 (6th Cir.
2006) (bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient basis for an
evidentiary hearing on habeas review). The trial court’s denial of the requests to view the
crime scene did not violate state law nor deny Petitioner a fundamentally fair trial. Habeas
relief is not warranted on this claim.
3.

Effectiveness of Trial Counsel

Petitioner also asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to request that the trial court state its reasons for shackling him during
trial and for failing to object to one victim’s in-court identification of him as one of the
perpetrators of the crime.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to the effective assistance of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set forth a two-prong test for
determining whether a habeas petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel.
First, a petitioner must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient. This requires a
showing that counsel made errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as counsel
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, the
petitioner must establish that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
Counsel’s errors must have been so serious that they deprived the petitioner of a fair trial
or appeal. Id.
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To satisfy the performance prong, a petitioner must identify acts that were “outside
the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690. The reviewing court’s
scrutiny of counsel’s performance is highly deferential. Id. at 689. There is a strong
presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The petitioner
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged actions were sound
trial strategy.
As to the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. “On balance, the benchmark
for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the [proceeding] cannot be relied on
as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
The Supreme Court has confirmed that a federal court’s consideration of ineffective
assistance of counsel claims arising from state criminal proceedings is quite limited on
habeas review due to the deference accorded trial attorneys and state appellate courts
reviewing their performance. “The standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both
‘highly deferential,’ and when the two apply in tandem, review is ‘doubly’ so.” Harrington,
131 S. Ct. at 788 (internal and end citations omitted). “When § 2254(d) applies, the
question is not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there
is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Id.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim essentially finding that
Petitioner could not establish that he was prejudiced by counsel’s conduct. As to the
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shackling portion of the claim, the court found that there was no evidence that Petitioner’s
shackles were visible during trial and that the evidence against him was overwhelming.
McCants, 2012 WL 1890234 at *2. As to the identification portion of this claim, the court
determined that there was an independent basis for the victim’s identification - her
recollection of the crime, that Petitioner fit the victim’s original description, and that the
victim was certain in her identification. Additionally, the court noted that the other evidence
against Petitioner was overwhelming. Id. at *3.
The state court’s decision is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor an
unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. Petitioner fails to demonstrate that
he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s conduct. As explained by the Michigan Court of
Appeals, the leg shackles were not visible to the jury, the witness’s in-court identification
was reliable and supported by an independent basis, and the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt
was overwhelming. Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice, he fails to establish
that trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard. Habeas relief is not
warranted on this claim.
4.

Impeachment

Petitioner also asserts that he is entitled to habeas relief because the state trial
court abused its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could impeach him under
Michigan Rule of Evidence 609. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied relief on this claim
finding that the trial court’s decision that Petitioner could be impeached with his prior
conviction for home invasion with intent to commit a theft “fully conformed with the
requirements of MRE 609" and was not an abuse of discretion. McCants, 2012 WL
1890234 at *4.
The state court’s denial of relief is neither contrary to Supreme Court precedent nor
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an unreasonable application of federal law or the facts. Petitioner is not entitled to relief
on his claim that the trial court violated the Michigan Rules of Evidence. As discussed,
supra, it is well-established that federal habeas review is not available to correct perceived
errors of state law. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68. Moreover, Petitioner fails to establish that
the trial court’s ruling was fundamentally unfair. To be sure, the Supreme Court has not
held that the admission of a defendant’s prior convictions for impeachment purposes is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dothard v. MacLaren, No. 13-15217, 2015 WL 470585, *19
(E.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 2015) (adopting magistrate judge’s report and discussing cases).
Moreover, because Petitioner did not actually take the stand, the question of the
admissibility of his prior conviction for impeachment purposes is not preserved for
appellate review because any possible harm is speculative. Luce v. United States, 469
U.S. 38, 41-43 (1984). Federal courts have applied Luce to bar federal habeas corpus
review of allegedly erroneous rulings regarding the admissibility of prior convictions for
impeachment purposes in cases where the petitioner chose not to testify. See, e.g.,
Zueski v. Grayson, 81 F. App’x. 849, 850 (6th Cir. 2003); Turner v. Curtin, No. 2:07-Cv12739, 2011 WL 740753, *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 24, 2011) (citing cases). Habeas relief is
not warranted on this claim.
V.

Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal

habeas relief on the claims contained in his petition. Accordingly, the Court DENIES and
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Before Petitioner may appeal the Court’s decision, a certificate of appealability must
issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(a); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b). A certificate of appealability
may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
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constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). When a court relief on the merits, the
substantial showing threshold is met if the petitioner demonstrates that reasonable jurists
would find the court’s assessment of the claim debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel,
529 U.S. 473, 484-85 (2000). “A petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that
... jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). Having conducted the
requisite review, the Court concludes that Petitioner fails to make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right as to his habeas claims. Accordingly, the Court
DENIES a certificate of appealability. The Court also DENIES leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on appeal because an appeal cannot be taken in good faith. See FED. R. APP.
P. 24(a). This case is closed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Nancy G. Edmunds
NANCY G. EDMUNDS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: May 28, 2015

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