Dillard v. Wayne County District and Circuit Court of the State of Michigan et al

Filing 6

OPINION and ORDER Summarily Dismissing 1 Complaint. Signed by District Judge Arthur J. Tarnow. (CPic)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

EDDIE L. DILLARD, #254178,
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 2:14-CV-10198
HONORABLE ARTHUR J. TARNOW

v.
WAYNE CO. DIST. & CIR. CT, et al.,
Defendants.
/

OPINION AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING COMPLAINT
I.

INTRODUCTION
This is a pro se civil rights case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In his

complaint, Michigan prisoner Eddie Dillard (“Plaintiff”) challenges his state criminal
proceedings. He names Wayne County District Court, Wayne County Circuit Court, and
Judges Irma J. Chenevert, Nancy Blount, and Terrance K. Boyle as the defendants in this
action. He sues the defendants in their individual and official capacities. He seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The Court
has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee for this action.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to

sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint before service on a defendant if it

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determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court is similarly required to
dismiss a complaint seeking redress against government entities, officers, and employees
which it finds to be frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in law or in fact.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A pro se civil rights complaint is to be construed liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972). Nonetheless, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a
complaint set forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” as well as “a demand for the relief sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (3).
The purpose of this rule is to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted). While this notice pleading standard does not require “detailed” factual
allegations, it does require more than the bare assertion of legal principles or conclusions.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the

defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
“A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of
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a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To state a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1)
he or she was deprived of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the federal Constitution
or laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation was caused by a person acting under
color of state law. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1978); Harris v. Circleville,
583 F.3d 356, 364 (6th Cir. 2009).
III.

DISCUSSION
A.

Criminal Proceedings

Plaintiff’s complaint concerns his state criminal proceedings. It is subject to summary
dismissal because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. A claim under § 1983 is an appropriate remedy for a state prisoner challenging a
condition of his imprisonment, Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973), not the
validity of continued confinement. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994)
(holding that a state prisoner does not state a cognizable civil rights claim challenging his
imprisonment if a ruling on his claim would necessarily render his continuing confinement
invalid, until and unless the reason for his continued confinement has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or has been called
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into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §
2254). This holds true regardless of the relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. at 487-89.
Heck and other Supreme Court cases, when “taken together, indicate that a state
prisoner's § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation) – no matter the relief sought
(damages or equitable relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading
to conviction or internal prison proceedings) – if success in that action would necessarily
demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S.
74, 81-82 (2005). The underlying basis for the holding in Heck is that “civil tort actions are
not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.”
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. If Plaintiff were to prevail on his claims concerning the validity of
his criminal proceedings, his conviction(s) and continued confinement would be called into
question. Consequently, such claims are barred by Heck and must be dismissed.
B.

Claims against the Courts

Plaintiff’s claims against the Wayne County District Court and the Wayne County
Circuit Court must also be dismissed because those state courts are not “persons” under the
provisions of § 1983. Neither the state, nor a governmental entity that is an arm of the state
for Eleventh Amendment purposes, nor a state official who acts in his or her official capacity,
is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 70-71 (1989). Accordingly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has
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held that a state court is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Mumford v. Zieba,
4 F.3d 429, 435 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 418 (6th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff’s complaint against the state courts must thus be dismissed.
C.

Eleventh Amendment and Judicial Immunity

Plaintiff names three state court judges as defendants in this action and sues them in
their official and individual capacities. The state court judges are entitled to sovereign
immunity on Plaintiff’s claims for damages against them in their official capacities. The
Eleventh Amendment bars civil rights actions against a state and its agencies and
departments unless the state has waived its immunity and consented to suit or Congress has
abrogated that immunity. Will, 491 U.S. at 66. The State of Michigan has not consented to
be sued for civil rights actions in federal court, Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th
Cir. 1986), and Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity when it enacted
§ 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979). The Michigan Supreme Court and its
lower courts operate as arms of the state, and are thus entitled to the same sovereign
immunity as the State of Michigan. Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 762-64 (6th
Cir. 2010); Chambers v. Michigan, No. 10-12509, 2011 WL 940830, *3-4 (E.D. Mich.
March 16, 2011); Young v. District & Supreme Cts. of Mich., No. 2:10-CV-15144, 2011 WL
166331, *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 18, 2011) (citing cases); Brown v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., et
al., No. 2:10-CV-12649, 2010 WL 5056195, *2 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 6, 2010). Eleventh
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Amendment immunity applies to state employees, i.e., the judges, who are sued in their
official capacities. See Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Cady v.
Arenac Co., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)). The state court judges are thus entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity and Plaintiff’s claims for damages against them in their
official capacities must be dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiff’s claims against the state court judges in their individual
capacities are subject to dismissal based upon absolute judicial immunity. Judges are entitled
to absolute judicial immunity on claims for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Mireles v Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) (judge performing judicial functions
is absolutely immune from suit seeking monetary damages even if acting erroneously,
corruptly, or in excess of jurisdiction); Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994).1
Plaintiff’s claims against the judges concern the performance of their judicial duties. The
judges are therefore entitled to absolute judicial immunity for their actions and Plaintiff’s
claims against them in their individual capacities must be dismissed.

1

The Court notes that the 1996 amendments to § 1983 extended absolute immunity for
state judges to requests for injunctive or equitable relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity,
injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory
relief is unavailable”); see also Kipen v. Lawson, 57 F. App’x 691 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing
federal judges’ immunity); Kircher v. City of Ypsilanti, 458 F. Supp. 2d 439, 446-47 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
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IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted in his complaint regarding his criminal proceedings as to
all of the defendants, that the state courts are not entities subject to suit in this action, and that
the state court judges are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and absolute judicial
immunity. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the civil rights complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). The Court further concludes that an appeal from this
decision cannot be taken in good faith. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

S/Arthur J. Tarnow
Arthur J. Tarnow
Senior United States District Judge
Dated: January 31, 2014
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon parties/counsel of record on January 31, 2014,
by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
S/Catherine A. Pickles
Judicial Assistant

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